

THE BHUTTO BLOOD

An independent probe into Benazir Bhutto's killing

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Suhail Warraich

Sagar Publishers
Alhamd Market, 40 Urdu Bazaar, Lahore
Phone: 042-37230423
Email: sagarpublishers@hotmail.com

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Dedicated to Ammi Ji

In her blessings I still find solace!

Ammi Ji, Sarfraz Begum (1938-2005), was a simple family woman. She had a great penchant for books. She loved cooking. I will always miss the taste of food she cooked and relish the sweetness of her prayers. Though she had motherly feelings for the whole family, her love and affection centered on me, the only child of hers. She would lovingly file my columns and news items and would sit before television set much before time to watch my shows. These gestures have always egged me on. May God raise her in status!

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PUBLISHER'S NOTE

A lot has been said and written in the national and international media about the assassination of former Pakistani prime minister Benazir Bhutto on 27 December 2007. She was killed while leaving a campaign rally for the Pakistan Peoples' Party (PPP) in the run-up to the January 2008 parliamentary elections at Rawalpindi's Liaqat National Bagh. The park is named after then prime minister Liaqat Ali Khan who was assassinated there in 1951. The United Nations and Scotland Yard have made thorough probes into Benazir Bhutto's murder. But many questions about the killing remain unanswered.

Veteran journalist, political commentator and television anchor Suhail Warraich has eruditely connected the dots to clue the readers in on who engineered the great leader's murder. His book dilates on the probe after probe into the killing and the genuineness of Benazir Bhutto's will. The book is a conclusive gathering of evidence about what has so far taken place. After reading it, it is up to the reader to decide who should be held responsible.

Focused on facts, it is an impartial and unbiased take on the killing. Detailed, well-researched and written responsibly, this book promises to come up as an important historic document. Hope you like this endeavour of ours. May God be with us all!

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FOREWORD

A pall of gloom enveloped Pakistan for several days after Benazir Bhutto was assassinated on 27 December 2007. I lounged out these days of desolateness, dejection and despondency indolently watching television until comforted by an idea. I had a good association with her built up on several meetings over years. This bond prodded me into preserving details of the encounters for history. But as I set out to do that, several other subjects like details of the incident and fact-finding cropped up for inclusion in the book.

A few days after Benazir Bhutto's killing, I had just set out to write this book when I met Vinod Sharma, India's English-language daily Hindustan Times' political editor, at a common friend and journalist Sattar Khan's place. Sharma has known Pakistan as a journalist and a peace activist for almost two decades. He reported out of Islamabad in the tense, often troublesome, early 1990s.

Sharma, who was on a visit to Pakistan, condoled the Pakistani leader's death but faulted her the most for the denouement she had met. To him she should have ensured her safety so she could come to power and implement her agenda. [General Musharraf too, echoed this opinion when he told me in an interview that BB was herself to blame for her death; she was shot as she waved to supporters through the sunroof of her car.] "Leaders do not weep and they are not to die on the road; it doesn't befit them," Sharma said.

I couldn't help cutting him off short. "I cannot say anything about India but in Pakistan people have a passionate relationship with their leaders. Here a popular leader does not act like Italian political theorist Niccolò Machiavelli's The Prince who can craftily indulge in politics and then without losing a drop of blood or facing any hardships come to power," I said sharply. "Pakistani leaders - Zulfikar Ali Bhutto [the 9th Prime Minister of Pakistan from 1973 to 1977, and prior to that, the fourth President of Pakistan from 1971 to 1973, hanged for murder in 1979 after a farcical trial, on the orders of General

Zia, who had ousted him two years before in a military coup] or his daughter Benazir Bhutto – were all human beings and so, would laugh, cry and get angry. They would make mistakes but people always forgave them and loved them even more than before. In the developing countries, people love only those politicians who can risk their life. Bhutto always remained popular and became the country's prime minister twice because she too remained undeterred in the face of perils." Sharma kept silent at my avid argument but all Pakistani friends sided with me.

Political polarization was very deep and based on biases during ZA Bhutto's times and so, the society gave him the recognition he deserved quite late. But Bhutto had it during her lifetime and no doubt the Himalayas wept at her death. Right-wing Jamaat-e-Islami to the left-wing parties – all mourned her death. Ms Bhutto had always remained at odds with the military but floral wreaths were laid on her grave on behalf of the chiefs of its all three services. She is here no more but has made the world acknowledge her greatness.

Benazir Bhutto was a unique character in Pakistani history. She was eastern at heart but fed on western wisdom, she had become a model for both the East and the West. She did face accusations of political and financial corruption but nobody could point finger at her character. Her chaste life, legendary bravery and commitment had made her an icon. While she empathized with the poor, she would also remain in constant touch with the US foreign secretary Condoleezza Rice.

My association with her spans several years. After her return from exile in April 1986 to lead the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) against Zia-ul-Haq, I covered her political campaign and so, heard her speak at rallies. We had several meetings. She would be glad to see me and would appreciate my work a lot. Once she got angry with me. She had tears in her eyes then.

The Bhutto Blood is an effort to present all sides of the Benazir Bhutto's killing. The chapters on Bhutto's assassination – Tragedy 27/12, Investigation after Investigation and The Real Killer -- required tough grind; scores of meetings with the people from across the broad spectrum, on- and off-the-record interviews with dozens of people, insider interviews bringing

in interesting anecdotes and delving in several books but, in my endeavor to stay impartial and unbiased, plucking only whatever sounded credible.

The book also features a summary of the investigations so far .

Murderer and the Murdered: Stories Their Hands Tell is an analysis of the hand print of Bhutto's and that of the suicide bomber's by palmist Sadiq Mahmood Malik.

There has been a lot of debate about the veracity of Benazir Bhutto's will. The book contains the opinion of the US, UK and Pakistani handwriting experts' on the controversial hand-written document.

I have tried to focus on facts, sidestepping emotive accusations and bias, to come up with real and investigative reports instead of superficial ones. In no way conclusive, this book is meant to be considered just a preliminary work. Should my book serve any research, it would be what I had aimed to achieve in writing it. May this book go well with the readers!

Suhail Warraich

December 2013

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THE TRAGEDY 27/12

The murder timeline

Six years since former prime minister Benazir Bhutto's murder, Pakistan is still rife with speculation and theories about who did it. And so is the world outside. Sifting facts from fiction is a difficult task. Yet, this study has scientifically and logically sorted through the statements of the accused and the investigators, the reports by Scotland Yard, the United Nations Commission and the Pakistani teams in an effort to record every bit of the real story for history books. It is always tough to join the dots in unexplained incidents like this one. Yet through this chapter readers would be able to know the details – the possible planning for the murder, the security arrangements, and the killing and the reactions of Benazir Bhutto's spouse Asif Ali Zardari and their children and of then president, Pervez Musharraf.

TIGHT SCHEDULE

Benazir Bhutto led a very busy life and followed tight schedules. Meeting party workers and foreign guests and social interaction was part of her daily routine. The 27th of December, 2007 was no exception. She was listed to meet Afghanistan's President Hamid Karzai in the morning, address a party meeting at Liaquat Bagh, Rawalpindi, in the afternoon and dine with some foreign diplomats at Zardari House (her residence in Islamabad) in the evening. Her spouse Asif Ali Zardari was returning to Pakistan the next day (28th December) to take part in the election campaign. They were to be together for the first time in Pakistan in 11 years as free individuals; when Bhutto was in Pakistan, Zardari was in jail and when he was released she was abroad. [Zardari was arrested on charges of corruption in late 1996, following the collapse of the Bhutto government. Although incarcerated, he nominally served in Parliament after being elected to the National Assembly in 1990 and Senate in 1997. He was released from jail in 2004. He subsequently went into self-exile in Dubai, but returned in December 2007 after Bhutto's assassination.]

Bhutto had arrived in Islamabad on the evening of 26th December after spending a busy day on campaign trail in Peshawar¹. Just before going to bed at 1:15am, she was informed that the Inter Services Intelligence, ISI, chief General Nadeem Taj had arrived to see her. Rehman Malik, later the country's interior minister (2008-2013), was also present during the meeting which lasted for two hours. It is believed that the ISI chief advised Bhutto against addressing Liaquat Bagh meeting². However, Malik says no specific threat was mentioned and only general risks were referred to³.

¹ UN Commission Report paragraph 85

² Interview with Mohsin Naqvi

³ Interview with Rehman Malik

MEETING WITH HAMID KARZI

On the morning of 27th December, Benazir Bhutto went to the Serena Hotel in Islamabad to meet Afghan President Hamid Karzai. She returned to Zardari House by noon and remained there till she left for Liaquat Bagh⁴. Karzai was on good terms with Bhutto and had offered her to land in Kabul instead of Karachi on her return to Pakistan⁵. Before leaving for Liaquat Bagh on Dec 27th, Bhutto told her political secretary Naheed Khan they also discussed provision of jammers for her security⁶. Bhutto and Karzai agreed to jointly fight terrorism and extremism and to improve Pak-Afghan relations.

After the meeting Bhutto told reporters she would like to see improvement in Pak-Afghan relations and normalization in Indo-Pak ties. To a question she chided Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid-e-Azam, led by Chaudhary Shujaat Hussain, for their claim to win 110 seats from Punjab saying “Q-League will not even win 10 seats from whole of Pakistan let alone Punjab.” She said the Q-League wanted to rig the elections and said her party was making its strategy to stop rigging.

DEPARTURE FOR LIAQAT BAGH

Benazir Bhutto was having lunch alone when Naheed Khan reached Zardari House to escort her to Liaquat Bagh⁷. Bhutto sent a Blackberry message to journalist Amir Mir asking for details of the ‘rigging cell’ headed by Brigadier Riaz Chibb ‘set up by the Musharraf regime’⁸. She left Zardari House for Liaquat Bagh around 2pm in a convoy of vehicles. She was riding a white bullet-proof Toyota Land Cruiser. Ahead of her car was party leader Tauqeer Kaira’s black Toyota Land Cruiser. Bhutto’s car was flanked by two other security vehicles. Of these two, one was a black Mercedes Benz Van on her right and a four-door double cabin van on her left. These security vehicles were closely followed by two Toyota Vigo pick-up

⁴ UN Commission Report paragraph 85


⁵ Interview with Rehman Malik

⁶ Interview with Naheed Khan

⁷ Interview with Naheed Khan

⁸ Amir Mir’s article “If I am killed”

Benazir Bhutto's convoy



1. Lead vehicle: Tauqeer Kaira's black Toyota Land Cruiser
2. Benazir Bhutto's car
3. A black Mercedes Benz Van on her right
4. A four-door double cabin van on her left
- 5 and 6. Two Toyota Vigo pick-up trucks followed the security vehicles
7. Black Mercedes Benz car used as a back-up car for Benazir Bhutto

trucks. Behind these trucks was another black Mercedes Benz car which was used as a back-up car for Bhutto. This car and the two Vigo trucks were the property of Zardari House⁹.

THE RALLY ROUTE

Benazir Bhutto's convoy reached the Faizabad junction at about 1415 hours, according to the Rawalpindi District Police, who were to assume responsibility for security of the convoy. According to the police and the Security Plan, an escort was to be provided composed of a traffic police "pilot" jeep, a regular police jeep leading the convoy and three Elite Force Toyota pick-up trucks protecting Bhutto's Land Cruiser on three sides. People in her vehicle, however, claim that there was no such escort except for one traffic police vehicle¹⁰. While travelling within the limits of Islamabad she kept chatting with her comrades - Makhdoom Amin Faheem, Naheed Khan, Dr Safdar Abbasi and Khalid Shahanshah. Soon after crossing over into Rawalpindi she went into a telephone conversation with Mohsin Naqvi, then CNN's Correspondent in Pakistan¹¹. This telephone call continued till she left Murree Road to enter Liaquat Bagh. During this telephone call, a variety of topics came under discussion including her meeting with Hamid Karzai, the rigging allegedly planned by PML-Q under Musharraf's leadership and the ways to counter it, the expected number of audience at Liaquat Bagh and the estimated number of seats each party was expected to win¹².

At about 1456 hours, Bhutto's convoy turned right at the Murree Road-Liaquat Road junction and headed towards Liaquat Bagh VIP gate. She stood through the roof escape hatch of her Land Cruiser and waved at the large crowd around the vehicle while it moved slowly on Liaquat Road.

Contrary to the police assertion, there was no police box formation around Bhutto as she arrived at the rally, and the Elite Force unit did not execute their duties as specified in the

⁹ UN Commission Report paragraph 86

¹⁰ UN Commission Report paragraph 88

¹¹ Interview with Naheed Khan

¹² Interview with Mohsin Naqvi

security deployment. In its report, the UN Commission said it did not believe that the full escort as described by the police was ever present.¹³

THE MISSING KEY?

At about 1516 hours, Benazir Bhutto's convoy stopped for a few minutes at the inner gate of the parking area waiting for it to be opened, during which she remained standing through the escape hatch. The police and some PPP members differ on the reason for the delay in opening the gate. While the PPP asserts that the police did not have the key to open the gate, the police said that they did not want the large crowd following Bhutto to get into the VIP parking area.

Once the convoy passed through the inner gate, at about 1531 hours, it drove through the VIP parking area to the rear of the stage. At least the following three vehicles were in the VIP parking area: Bhutto's Land Cruiser, Kaira's lead vehicle and the black bullet-proof Mercedes-Benz car. Temporary wooden stairs had been built for the rally to access the rear of the stage directly from the parking area. Bhutto climbed the stairs, went to the stage to wave to the crowd and took her seat before addressing the crowd¹⁴.

Near the rear of the stage, a scuffle broke out between some workers of the PPP and police who tried to prevent them from climbing to the stage. This created tension between the PPP workers and the police officers posted in that area. Accounts given by the PPP representatives and the police with regard to the degree and nature of this event differ significantly. The police state that the dispute was minor and was settled immediately, whereas some on the local PPP side claim it was serious and led to bitter reactions from the police during the rest of the rally. They say that the police felt insulted and became more passive in their security role. The UN

¹³ UN Commission Report paragraph 89, 90, 91

¹⁴ UN Commission Report paragraph 92

Commission has criticized the police for this lax attitude on their part as a result of wounded pride¹⁵.

DEATH STALKING

Benazir Bhutto had earlier disregarded all threats by extremists and warnings by security agencies. Previously she had come out of the security cordon and challenged the terrorists in Peshawar, Mardan and Rawalpindi.¹⁶

The investigation into Benazir Bhutto's death is almost complete now. Interviews with investigators and the statements of the accused show that extremists had started honing their strategy as soon as she announced her plan to address a rally at Liaquat Bagh. Only five kilometers from Liaquat Bagh lived two religious-fanatic cousins Rafaqat and Hasnain Gul at Dhok Sayyadan (Quaid-e-Azam Colony). Hasnain was a trained militant. Rafaqat being a taxi driver was familiar with all the streets and places in Rawalpindi.

During their frequent meetings at Darul Uloom Jamia Haqqania, a seminary in Akora Khattak, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, these two young men were indoctrinated by Qari Nadir alias Ismaeel and Nasrullah alias Ahmad to believe that extreme actions were the only solution to the problems. (*See Chapters: The Real Killer and Investigation after Investigation*). Rafaqat and Hasnain had aided different terrorist acts in Rawalpindi, with Qari Nadir alias Ismaeel and Nasrullah alias Ahmad of Jamia Haqqania being their handlers. They became more aggressive in their religious views after the killing of one of their friends in [the military's assault in 2007 on a radical mosque,] the Lal Masjid [Red Mosque] in Islamabad. The Pakistani investigation agencies later found the names of Qari Nadir and Nasrullah on the rolls of Jamia Haqqania¹⁷.

RAWALPINDI CELL

Rafaqat and Hasnain Gul were to lodge the suicide bombers in Rawalpindi and transport and guide them to the strike site.

¹⁵ UN Commission Report paragraph 93

¹⁶ Interview with Naheed Khan

¹⁷ Off- and on-the-record interviews with investigators

They had done that before for a Caucasian boy Akrama, who according to investigators, was sent from Waziristan for a suicide attack on Sheikh Rasheed Ahmad, information minister in the Musharraf government. Razaqat and Hasnain Gul went inside the Lal Haveli, Sheikh Rasheed's residence and political office located in the central part of old Rawalpindi, in disguise on a reconnaissance mission. They handed an application to the minister requesting him for financial aid. He referred them to the Nazim (administrator) of the Union Council.

Later, they took a 15-year-old Eurasian boy, Akrama, to Lal Haveli on 30th October 2007 for the final action. Incidentally, the minister left the Haveli from the backdoor to condole someone's death while Akrama, with suicide belt tied to his waist, waited for him on the front. On failure to complete their mission, Razaqat and Hasnain took Akrama along in their taxi and drove into city. They spotted the vehicle of an Army Brigadier on a traffic light. Taking an instant decision, they sent Akrama towards that vehicle. But in the meantime the light turned green and the vehicle moved on before Akrama could explode himself near it. Then they decided to destroy another army vehicle. But that vehicle carried only two people, not worth wasting one suicide bomber and so, they spared it. Meanwhile, a protest demonstration by lawyers was in progress in that area. Eight police cars and a good number of policemen were accompanying the protesters. This seemed to be a good target. But by the time they came back to the protesters after taking a long U-turn, the police cars had moved away. This was too much for them. Razaqat and Husnain wanted to do something right there and then. Apparently, Akrama too wanted to finish his task without wait. They all sat in the taxi and moved towards the official residence of Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. Akrama got out of the taxi, approached the residence and when a police inspector intercepted him, he exploded himself. The inspector and six other policemen were killed and 31 people wounded¹⁸.

¹⁸ Off- and on-the-record interviews with investigators

PREPARED TO STRIKE

Nasrullah alias Ahmad, the handler, had reached Rawalpindi from Waziristan along with potential suicide bombers Saeed alias Bilal and Ikramullah on 26th December 2012. (Some investigators are of the view that Seed alias Bilal had been dispatched three days ahead of the planned rally on Dec 27th.¹⁹) Nasrullah left these bombers with Rafaqat and Hasnain. He came back to the Liaqat Bagh meeting and disappeared from there. Saeed and Ikramullah were made to stay indoors lest someone spotted them or they were arrested by security agencies. However, one secret agent differs with this view. He believes that Saeed and his accomplices kept coming to the venue for three days. On the morning of 27th Dec, Rafaqat and Husnain went to the Faisal Mosque in Islamabad, took a round around it and then came back to their house in Dhok Sayyadan. They made a map of Liaqat Bagh with a lead pencil and briefed Saeed and Ikramullah on the venue. With the help of this map, they showed the potential suicide bombers the vantage location for attack. (The investigators could not find this map as probably it was destroyed after its use.) On the morning of Dec 27th, Saeed and Ikram were waiting anxiously at home for the meeting at Liaqat Bagh to begin so that they could complete their “holy” mission and go to heaven as soon as possible²⁰. They had taken shower in the morning and applied henna on their hands. According to the tales heard from Waziristan, a suicide bomber gets ready like a groom by wearing henna because he is told that “hoors” (very beautiful women) are waiting for him in heaven.

UNIQUENESS OF THE MEETING

Liaqat Bagh meeting was unique in many ways. Several thousand people attended the event. Benazir Bhutto was joined on the stage by a number of national-level PPP leaders and all of the parliamentary candidates from Rawalpindi district. The crowds were enthusiastic, and PPP leaders and activists considered the event a great success. They say Bhutto gave a

¹⁹ Off- and on-the-record interviews with investigators

²⁰ Off- and on-the-record interviews with investigators

strong and rousing speech, one of the best of her campaign, and describe her as having been radiant that day²¹. Speeches aside, she made them pledge they would serve the nation after coming to power, would not indulge in nepotism and would rather take good care of the party workers. She had never taken such an oath ever before²².

She asked Makhdoom Amin Faheem and Naheed Khan, who were present on the stage, whether they could see “a black moving thing” in the trees along the boundary of Liaquat Bagh. When both replied in negative, she said it could just be a figment of her imagination or probably she needed to have her eyesight tested²³. She told Farzana Raja, a party leader, to take care of the coverage of the meeting. Gesturing towards Khan and her husband, she said “this couple would not have done anything as usual”²⁴.

MYSTERIOUS SIGNALS

Another controversy that came to light after the meeting was that Bhutto’s personal guard Khalid Shahanshah was seen making some mysterious signals. (Still pictures grabbed from the video footage have been included in the picture pages of this book.) The PPP group disgruntled with Zardari claims that Shahanshah was trying to convey it to the killers that Bhutto was wearing a bullet-proof jacket, so they should take aim of her head. This allegation clearly meant that Khalid was in connivance and that perhaps Zardari was behind this assassination plot. It was also said that Khalid hailed from Khattak family and he went to Wana [the largest town of South Waziristan Agency in Pakistan's FATA (Federally Administrated Tribal Areas)] in 2007 where this conspiracy was hatched. A policeman also raised such doubts but could not come up with any proof²⁵. When Khalid was interviewed for

²¹ UN Commission report paragraph 94

²² Interview with Naheed Khan

²³ Interview with Naheed Khan

²⁴ Interview with Farzana Raja

²⁵ Interview with investigators

this book in Naudero, he said he was explaining something to a photographer. He said this would become quite clear if you watched the whole footage²⁶. Shahanshah is accused of being Zardari's trusted man who was later sent to Karachi and given the charge of Bhutto's security. Shahanshah was murdered a few months later and his killing was hyped to have links with Bhutto's assassination. However, Interior Minister Rehman Malik said he was murdered after an altercation at a gambling den and it had nothing to do with Bhutto's killing²⁷. Scotland Yard did not touch upon the so-called signals by Shahanshah. The Commission did not uncover any new facts that support the conspiracy theory surrounding Shahanshah's behaviour²⁸.

THE DEADLY RETURN

The public gathering concluded and, at about 1710 hours, Bhutto descended the wooden stairs and entered her Land Cruiser²⁹. The occupants of the white Land Cruiser and their seating positions were the same as for the trip in to Liaquat Bagh. The composition of passengers in the black Mercedes-Benz car also remained the same. Driver Javedur Rehman was on the steering wheel of this left-hand drive bullet-proof white Land Cruiser. Bhutto's security in charge and Senior Superintendent of Police retired major Imtiaz Husain was seated next to the driver on the right side of the car. Right behind Imtiaz on the rear right seat was Naheed Khan and behind the driver on the left was PPP leader Makhdoom Amin Faheem while Bhutto was sitting between the Makhdoom and Khan. There were three more seats in the back of the vehicle. The two seats, next to each other, on the right side were taken by Senator Dr Safdar Abbasi and Bhutto's personal attendant Abdul Razzaq Mirani while Khalid Shahanshah was on the single seat on the left side in the back of the car. (*The seating arrangement can be seen in the illustration*).

²⁶ Interview with Khalid Shahanshah

²⁷ Interview with Rehman Malik

²⁸ UN Commission report paragraph 73

²⁹ UN Commission report paragraph 95

THE BACKUP CAR DISAPPEARS

The black bullet-proof Mercedes-Benz backup car was the first to leave the parking area. It is not clear how much distance there was between this vehicle and the rest of Bhutto's convoy at the moment of the blast. Credible reports range from 100 meters to 250 meters. Some of those in the car said that they were close enough to Bhutto's vehicle to feel the impact of the blast. Others at the site of the blast have said that the Mercedes-Benz left Liaqat Bagh so quickly that it was nowhere to be seen when the blast occurred. Indeed, the Commission has not seen this vehicle in the many video images of the exit area it reviewed. Despite the acknowledgement of some occupants of the vehicle that they felt the impact of the blast, the Commission finds it incredible that they drove all the way to Zardari House, a drive of about 20 minutes, before they became aware that Bhutto had been injured in the blast³⁰. Rehman Malik appeared on TV and said that Bhutto was safe. On the other hand, Asif Zardari said she was not in a good condition and needed prayers³¹. The UN Commission said they should have stopped at a safe distance when they felt the blast so as to check on Bhutto's condition, the condition of her vehicle and whether the back-up vehicle was required. Indeed, as the back-up vehicle, the Mercedes-Benz car would have been an essential element of Bhutto's convoy on the return trip even if the occupants of that car had confirmed that Bhutto had been unscathed in the attack³². In this backup car seated next to the driver was party spokesman Farhatullah Babar while in the rear Dr Babar Awan was sitting on the left side, retired general Tauqueer Zia on the right and Rehman Malik in the middle.

CHANGE OF ROUTE?

Bhutto was very happy at the success of the meeting. Her face was basking in happiness while leaving the venue and she was all smiles when she got into her car. She was constantly

³⁰ UN Commission report paragraph 96

³¹ Comment by the author

³² UN Commission report paragraph 96

waving to the highly charged crowd who were raising slogans in her favour. The first thing that she did after sitting in the car was to ask Naheed Khan to put her through to Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz party leader Nawaz Sharif on phone to convey condolences for the deaths of some of his supporters who had been shot during the PML-N rally on Islamabad Highway earlier that day. It had been reported that the shooting incident occurred between supporters of the PML-N and those of the PML-Q parties. Khan had just dialed the last digit of Nawaz Sharif's phone number when Bhutto put her hand on the phone and told her that she would talk to him in a while³³.

The Rawalpindi administration, police and PPP workers are at variance on the route the convoy was to take after leaving the venue. Rawalpindi District Police and District Coordination Officer Irfan Elahi claim that following the route plan the convoy was to turn right on the Liaquat Road after coming out of Liaquat Bagh and then turn left onto the Murree Road. This was the same route the convoy took to get to the venue. They claim that the convoy was to turn left only in case of an emergency and a decision to that effect was only to be taken by the police officer in charge of the security. On the other hand the PPP workers refer to a December 25 meeting between Rawalpindi leaders and the administration in claiming that the convoy was to turn left after coming out of the gate of Liaquat Bagh³⁴. Though the police, the administration and the PPP workers had had a lot of discussion, they did not discuss the route and security plan comprehensively. According to the UN Commission report, it was not possible to turn left as police vehicles were parked on that road. They learnt that these cars belonged to senior police officers. The Commission declared the parking of police cars in the middle of an exit route as highly irresponsible an act on the part of police³⁵.

³³ Interview with Naheed Khan

³⁴ See documents: The rally code

³⁵ UN Commission report paragraph 102

WHO ASKED BHUTTO TO STAND UP?

From the exit, Bhutto's Land Cruiser started to make a right turn onto Liaquat Road. As it slowly approached the central divider on Liaquat Road, the crowd began chanting slogans [on recognising Bhutto's car]. There is some dispute over whether Bhutto made the decision to stand up on her own [through the escape hatch of her car to answer the slogans] or was urged to do so³⁶.

Khalid Shahanshah³⁷, Rehman Malik³⁸ and Razzaq³⁹ said in their separate statements that Naheed Khan asked Bhutto to stand up. According to Malik, Khan told Bhutto she should stand up to acknowledge the presence of old party workers in the crowd. Malik says that everyone present in the car heard Khan say that⁴⁰. Khan vehemently denies this. She says that instead it was Bhutto herself who asked Safdar Abbasi, "How about raising a few slogans [to the crowd using the vehicle's loudspeaker]?"⁴¹

It takes a lot of effort to open the escape hatch of the car. After Bhutto's death it was repeatedly said on many occasions that Khan opened the hatch⁴². Khan in her statements first said she did not remember whether Bhutto opened the hatch herself or someone else opened it for her. But in her later statements, she said Khalid Shahanshah opened the hatch⁴³. Could I refuse if BB asked me to open it, she asked. Without naming anybody, the UN Commission and Scotland Yard ascertained that someone from the back seats opened the hatch. This would mean it was one of Shahanshah, Razzaq and Abbasi. The report did not discuss this controversy and so, it died down. It is,

³⁶ UN Commission report paragraph 104

³⁷ Interview with Khalid Shahanshah

³⁸ Interview with Rehman Malik

³⁹ Razzaq's statement to the investigators

⁴⁰ Interview with Rehman Malik

⁴¹ Interview with Naheed Khan

⁴² Interview with Khalid Shahanshah

⁴³ Interview with Naheed Khan

however, clear that Bhutto stood up as soon as the hatch was opened.

THE TRAP IS LAID

On the other side, everything was in place at Dhok Sayyadan. Saeed and Ikram were waiting in the house when Razaqat and Hasnain came back after taking a round around Faisal mosque. Saeed alias Bilal was wearing joggers when he came from Waziristan. But he took off his joggers and put on Servis sandals before leaving for Liaqat Bagh. (The suicide bomber involved in the attack on Benazir Bhutto's convoy in Karachi also wore similar Servis sandals. It is also a coincidence that Servis Shoes belongs to the family of Ahmad Mukhtar, a PPP leader and a former minister.) Saeed alias Bilal also put on Hasnain's sunglasses while leaving the house.

As soon as the rally started, Nasrullah alias Ahmad phoned his accomplices who left the house at once on knowing this. [The mobile record confirms this] Razaqat had already decided that instead of Murree Road, he would take the Raja Bazaar route to reach Liaqat Bagh. He once again explained the route to Saeed alias Bilal and Ikramullah while offloading them at Raja Bazaar and drove away. Saeed alias Bilal was wearing a suicide jacket around his chest and waist. He also had a hand grenade, a pistol and several bullets on him. Passing through different streets like a professional killer, Saeed reached Liaqat Road while Ikramullah went to the other gate of the venue. The Rawalpindi Cell extremists had decided that the attack would only be carried out if Bhutto came out of her car because they knew that her car was bullet-proof and just hitting the car would not achieve the objective. But Bhutto gave them exactly what they had been looking for -- she came out to wave to the crowd.

THE RED-CAP MAN

A bearded young man wearing a red cap appeared from the right side as Bhutto got up and started waving. He came in front of the car, patted its bonnet with both his hands and the car stopped momentarily. He disappeared within seconds to the right side while three shots were fired from the left followed by a bomb blast. (This is visible in video footages. Still frames grabbed from video footage are included in this book.)

There is every chance that this man would have survived. No one can say for sure who he was, but it is assumed that he was either Nasrullah alias Ahmad who had brought the suicide bomber from Waziristan or he was the backup suicide bomber Ikramullah who went back to Waziristan. There is no mention of this man in the reports of the UN Commission, Scotland Yard or Pakistani investigators. No investigating agency has identified him or discussed his role in stopping the car so far. Interestingly, his red cap was similar to the one worn by the Lal Masjid fame Ghazi Abdur Rasheed and with this association the cap is also called "Ghazi cap". The hair and beard of this suspicious young man resembled that of the Taliban.

SECONDS BEFORE THE BLAST

Given below is the transcript of a rare video featuring the slogans, cheers and sentences that could be heard seconds before the blast along with the exact movement of the bearded young man wearing a red cap and Benazir Bhutto.

Crowd is raising slogans "Wazir-e-Azam Benazir" (Benazir, the Prime Minister).

Bhutto appears from the safety hatch and is acknowledging the slogans and waving to the crowd.

A bearded young man wearing a red cap appears from the right side of the car and makes it stop for a moment.

Safdar Abbasi's voice comes out of the microphone: "Hello friends. Let's have some good slogans."

The bearded man disappears to the right side.

Slogans are heard: "Na'ara, Na'ara, Na'ara Bhutto"; "Jiye, Jiye, Jiye Bhutto" (Long live Bhutto)

(The crowd comes closer to the car from all sides and more slogans are raised)

Safdar Abbasi raises slogan in the microphone: "Na'ara, Na'ara, Na'ara Bhutto".

The crowd responds with "Jiye, Jiye, Jiye Bhutto".

Abbasi raises this slogan six times. Then he raises another slogan: “Aj te ho gai” and the crowd responds: “Bhutto Bhutto” (Roughly it means “it’s Bhutto all over today”). This slogan is repeated 15 times. Meanwhile, the crowd is getting dense around Bhutto’s car. Abbasi makes requests on microphone: “Please keep moving; leave the way and keep moving”. Bhutto gets a tissue paper from someone in the car and wipes her face. Shots are heard. Bhutto tries to duck and an explosion takes place.

THE DENOUMENT

Around 1714 hours⁴⁴ [and according to Pakistani investigators at 1711 hours] a man wearing dark glasses (Saeed alias Bilal) appeared in the crowd on the left side of the white Land Cruiser, pulled out a pistol, and from a distance of approximately two to three meters, fired three shots at Bhutto. According to video analysis conducted by Scotland Yard, the three shots were fired in less than one second. After the third shot, Bhutto started to move down into the vehicle⁴⁵. After the third shot, the gunman lowered the gun, looked down and then detonated the explosives. At the time of the blast, the gunman was near the left rear corner of the vehicle. Video footage shows that at the time of the explosion, the Land Cruiser was still making the right turn. Scotland Yard team’s analysis shows that it took 1.6 seconds from the time of the first shot to the detonation of the bomb. The UN Commission, Scotland Yard and three Pakistani investigators rejected the claim of the occupants of the car that Bhutto had fallen inside the car before the bomb went off. The scientific analysis of the video footage proved that Bhutto was still coming down through the escape hatch when the bomb exploded⁴⁶.

FROM THE PRESIDENCY

Though President Pervez Musharraf had handed over Army’s command to General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani in November 2007, he still wielded the real power. He had full

⁴⁴ UN Commission report paragraph 106

⁴⁵ UN Commission report paragraph 107

⁴⁶ UN Commission report paragraph 108

grip on political as well as foreign affairs and had met Afghan President Hamid Karzai on Dec 26th. Preparations for general elections were in full swing. The United States and some Western countries were pressing Pakistan for free and fair elections. The unwritten agreement between President Musharraf and Bhutto appeared to be falling apart. Bhutto thought Musharraf wanted to spin a victory for PML-Q and to achieve this objective a plan was put in place to rig the elections. After the October 18 Karsaz [in Karachi] incident, Bhutto complained time and again, in writing also, that she was not being provided adequate security and cell phone jammers. Many analysts believe that by December the political relationship between Musharraf and Bhutto had reached its abyss. It can be said without exaggeration that Bhutto had become the biggest critic of Musharraf on Pakistan's political landscape.

In those days, Muhsarraf used to answer questions from press at a PTV programme every week. The programme "Aiwan-e-Sadar Se" (From the President's House) was hosted by Kamran Shahid⁴⁷. On 27th December just as Bhutto was entering Liaquat Bagh, the recording of this programme began and continued for about two hours, almost for the whole duration when Bhutto was at Liaquat Bagh. Musharraf answered questions about governance, politics and performance of the government. He was also questioned about allegations of planned rigging in the elections. Shahid says⁴⁸ that he used to accompany the President to his room after the recording where they would discuss the points that were raised in the programme and plan the next week's episode. He says he stayed with the president till about 5:15pm and then left to see Senator Nisar Memon who had invited him over tea. He says he heard about firing on Bhutto in his car. He recalls that when he was with the president, his military secretary had

⁴⁷ Son of Pakistani film star Shahid, Kamran Shahid has been associated with PTV, Geo TV, Express News and is now hosting a programme 'On the Front' on Dunya TV.

⁴⁸ Telephone interview and one-on-one conversation 2010

whispered something to him a couple of times. He says he was not sure if the military secretary had broken this news to the President or it was something else. Shahid says he, however, did not notice any change in Musharraf's expressions. He also did not see any unusual movement in the President's House that would hint something untoward had happened in the country.

It is a standard procedure that such news is conveyed to the president by his military secretary. A source in the President's House revealed, on the condition of anonymity, that President's Military Secretary Syed Shafaat Ahmad informed him about the firing on Bhutto only a few minutes after the incident. On hearing the news Musharraf became worried but only momentarily and turned normal again. He asked for details and TV was also switched on for latest updates on the incident.

DUBAI TRAVEL

After her self-exile from Pakistan, Bhutto lived in Dubai for a long time and it became like a second home for her. In the beginning she lived in a house in Jumaira area but later shifted to a bigger house 'Umm-e-Saqeem'. When Asif Zardari joined his wife and children in 2004 after his release from prison in Pakistan, the family shifted to an even bigger house P24, Emirates Hill. Zardari turned the house in Umm-e-Saqeem into his office. Zardari had a prodigal disposition. Before his arrival in Dubai, there were two old model Mercedes Benz and two Toyota Prado cars in the house. But he bought a new Lexus, Rolls Royce Bentley, Chevrolet, a sports car and a limousine. He also purchased a four-wheel drive car separately for Bakhtawar⁴⁹. Later after suffering a heart attack, Zardari had to move to the US where he stayed for a long time for treatment and convalescence.

Zardari came back to live with his children in Dubai in 2007 because Bhutto had to go to Pakistan. Zardari and children bade Bhutto an emotional farewell as she left for Karachi on

⁴⁹ Party sources and aides in Dubai

October 18th 2007. Bhutto travelled back to Dubai on the first of November to reassure her family who were very upset after the Karsaz bombing which she had survived. Her daughters believe she knew then she would not see them again. "She kept on telling us life is in God's hands," said her youngest, Asifa, interviewed for Bhutto, a film about her mother's life. "It was going to be my 18th birthday in January, and she said she wanted to wish me happy birthday in advance," said her older daughter, Bakhtawar. "I said, 'Don't wish me in advance, wish me then.' " The next morning, after her mother left, she found a beribboned box containing a silver jaguar head on a pendant. A note wished her "Happy birthday, all my love, Mummy"⁵⁰.

Back in Pakistan, on December 26, the day before the Rawalpindi rally, she addressed a public meeting in Peshawar and a suspected suicide bomber was caught trying to get in. That night her husband, Asif Ali Zardari, called her, begging her to let him campaign in her place. "I pleaded with her, 'You stay home and I'll go do the rallies. You're the mother.' But she said, 'What can I do? I have to go and meet my people.' "

Probably her sixth sense was also telling her that she might not see her children again. British journalist Christina Lamb visited the family after Bhutto's death. Bhutto's younger daughter Asifa narrated to Lamb how her mother had told them that her life was in God's hands. Bakhtawar said that her mother extended advance birthday wishes for her 18th birthday which was to fall in January 2008. Bakhtawar told Lamb that she asked her mother to wish her on the actual date. "But I found a birthday gift wrapped in a ribbon that she had left there for me before leaving for Pakistan," Bakhtawar said and recalled the sentence on the gift which read "Happy Birthday, all my love, Mummy".

Rehman Malik, too, was in Dubai then and he met Asif Zardari and Bhutto to discuss the political future of Pakistan. Malik recalls that while holding Zardari's hand Bhutto asked

⁵⁰ Christina Lamb, The Sunday Telegraph, May 2, 2010

him, "Will you look after my darling exactly the same way you looked after me?"⁵¹

Bhutto rushed back to Pakistan when Musharraf removed the judges of superior judiciary after declaring a state of emergency on November 3rd 2007. She vehemently opposed the declaration of emergency. She was put under house arrest in Lahore but she continued her political activities. She travelled to Dubai once again on Dec 7th and flew directly to Islamabad on December 11th. This was her last trip to Dubai.

THE DUBAI STORY

Benazir Bhutto's husband Asif Zardari and children Bakhtawar, Bilawal and Asifa were in Dubai on Dec 27th. The children were a little concerned as their father was also scheduled to leave for Pakistan on Dec 28th⁵². But they were also happy as this was going to be the first time in 11 years when their parents would be struggling together in Pakistan as free individuals. The family watched the Liaqat Bagh meeting together live on TV⁵³.

Anti-Zardari lobby alleges that Zardari, through a Blackberry message, asked Bhutto to stand up as they were watching her live in Dubai. This lobby believes that it was because of this SMS that Bhutto stood up in her car through the safety hatch. However, only one investigating agency checked the Blackberry record and the reports of the UN Commission and Scotland Yard do not mention this. It remains to be ascertained whether they found any proof for this. And so does whether Bhutto's departure from the Liaqat Bagh meeting was covered live or not. Because it is also alleged that Asifa wanted her mother to stand up so she could see her during the live coverage. (A separate story carries interviews with directors of different TV channels in this context.) The news of firing and bomb blast was there on TV channels as soon as the meeting finished. Zardari also came to know this through TV

⁵¹ Interview with Rehman Malik

⁵² Interview with Naheed Khan

⁵³ Christina Lamb, The Sunday Telegraph, May 2, 2010

channels⁵⁴. However, he learnt about her death before the general public. Rehman Malik was saying on TV that Bhutto was safe while almost simultaneously Zardari said Bhutto was not in good health and needed the nation's prayers. First of all, it was only the occupants of the car who came to know that Bhutto was not breathing. The outside world learnt about this after she was taken to hospital. It is believed that Khalid Shahanshah broke this news to Zardari by calling him from within the car on way to hospital.

INSIDE THE LAND CRUISER?

According to Scotland Yard's video analysis, the flash of the blast appeared just over two-thirds of a second after Bhutto disappeared from view.⁵⁵ Naheed Khan, Safdar Abbasi and Khalid Shahanshah⁵⁶ say that three shots were fired first and then the explosion took place. Khan recalled that immediately after she had heard the three gunshots, Bhutto fell down into the vehicle onto her lap. Khan said that she felt the impact of the explosion immediately thereafter. The right side of Bhutto's head came to rest on Khan's lap. Khan saw that Bhutto was bleeding profusely from the right side of her head. She noticed that Bhutto was not moving and saw that blood was also trickling from her ear. Makhdoom Amin Fahim recalled that Bhutto fell heavily and showed no sign of life after falling⁵⁷. No one else in her vehicle was seriously injured⁵⁸.

WAS MAJOR IMTIAZ ASLEEP?

A senior police officer scolded the inaction and bewilderment on the part of Major Imtiaz after Bhutto's killing in these words: "Was Major Imtiaz sleeping at that time?"⁵⁹

The UN Commission report says that just before Bhutto returned to Pakistan, the government offered her two

⁵⁴ Christina Lamb, The Sunday Telegraph, May 2, 2010

⁵⁵ Scotland Yard report paragraph 115

⁵⁶ Interviews with Naheed Khan, Safdar Abbasi and Khalid Shahanshah

⁵⁷ UN Commission report paragraph 109

⁵⁸ UN Commission report paragraph 110

⁵⁹ Interview with the person in charge of Rawalpindi Police

candidates to serve as her personal protection officer and more importantly as liaison with the Pakistani authorities. She chose retired major Imtiaz Hussain, a Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP) whom she trusted as he had served with her during her tenure as prime minister in 1993-96. The ISI offered three other candidates, according to ISI Deputy Director General, Major General Nusrat Naeem, but Bhutto turned them down.⁶⁰ Major Imtiaz was the only permanent government-provided security officer for Bhutto. His main role was to be with Bhutto at all times and to liaise with the local administration and police. There is ample documentary proof that he made requests to federal and provincial authorities for specific security support such as jammers, bullet-proof vehicles and vests and trained police personnel to escort Bhutto's entourage. Major Imtiaz did not receive adequate support from the government to carry out his duties effectively.⁶¹

No support staff was assigned to him by the government; nor did it accede to many of his specific requests. Despite the Commission's efforts, it could not establish whom Major Imtiaz reported to other than Bhutto while carrying out his duties, but he did coordinate with the other PPP security people surrounding Bhutto.

Major Imtiaz also advised Bhutto on her own security responsibilities. He noted that he had advised her many times not to expose herself by standing through the escape hatch of her armoured car to wave to the crowds, but she would usually ignore his advice and sometimes express anger at being told what to do. On the day of her assassination, Major Imtiaz did not advise Bhutto not to stand up through the escape hatch.⁶²

Major Imtiaz, who was sitting in the front seat of the Land Cruiser, said that he was worried that the convoy was being slowed down by the crowd. He wanted to call CPO Saud Aziz by cell phone, but he did not have the CPO's direct number. Instead he called CPO Saud Aziz's operator and the operator at

⁶⁰ UN Commission report paragraph 59

⁶¹ UN Commission report paragraph 60

⁶² UN Commission report paragraph 60

the police station in Multan, another town in Punjab Province (where Major Imtiaz had recently served). The Commission finds that this lack of preparation was a major flaw in the security arrangements and reflects badly on the professionalism of Major Imtiaz who should have had full and rapid access to the Rawalpindi police command.⁶³ Probably that is why Zardari was also not happy with him and Imtiaz was sent to Balochistan instead of being given some lucrative posting when PPP came to power.

TOWARDS THE HOSPITAL

After the explosion, Senator Abbasi told the driver to drive to the hospital (initially having in mind a hospital in Islamabad). Although all four of its tires were punctured by the blast, the Land Cruiser managed to drive along Liaquat Road for approximately 300 meters towards the junction with Murree Road where it turned left. As the Land Cruiser moved along Murree Road, it became increasingly difficult for the driver to manoeuvre on the metal rims of the wheels. The Land Cruiser made a U-turn at the Rehmanabad junction, located approximately four kilometres from the Liaquat Road-Murree Road junction, in order to get to the other side of the road where Rawalpindi General Hospital (RGH) was located. The occupants of the Land Cruiser recalled that at this point there was only one traffic police vehicle ahead of the Land Cruiser. No other vehicles were visible – neither the bullet proof black Mercedes-Benz car nor any Elite Force unit vehicle. Following the U-turn, its tyres now torn into shreds the Land Cruiser stalled. The party had to wait for some time on Murree Road until a private vehicle that belonged to a party leader Sherry Rehman (Rehman was not riding it) arrived⁶⁴ merely by chance and took Bhutto to the hospital. Bhutto was shifted to that car. Khalid Shahanshah says that he had lost all hope even before getting to the hospital because he had himself transferred Bhutto from one car to the other and knew at that time that she

⁶³ UN Commission report paragraph 99

⁶⁴ UN Commission report paragraph 110

was no more. He says he made conscious effort to stay calm after the blast to take the injured Bhutto to a hospital as soon as possible.⁶⁵

BEWILDERMENT OR INSENSITIVITY

Former caretaker interior minister retired general Hamid Nawaz says that all other occupants of Bhutto's car had lost senses after the blast. Nobody knew what to do. Instead of shifting her to any ambulance that travelled with the convoy, an attempt was made to take the injured Bhutto to hospital in a car that had no tyres. This car could not keep going and stopped after a few kilometres. One ambulance present at the blast site had reached hospital well before Bhutto was taken there. The minister believes that Bhutto died due to excessive bleeding and if her companions had tried to stop the bleeding and taken her to a hospital quickly, her life could have been saved. All the confusion and bewilderment resulted in the delay of 30 minutes and by the time she reached hospital she had expired. One source revealed that while Bhutto lay covered in blood, Makhdoom Amin Faheem stopped the car to buy a bottle of water. It is unclear if it was for Bhutto or for himself⁶⁶. Khan says that while Bhutto was being shifted from one car to the other, the Makhdoom was left behind and got to the hospital a little later⁶⁷.

HELPLESSNESS IN HOSPITAL

Bhutto was received by the Accident and Emergency Department of the Rawalpindi General Hospital at around 1735 hours⁶⁸. In the resuscitation room, she was treated by Dr Saeeda Yasmin. Dr Saeeda told the Commission that Bhutto was pale, unconscious and not breathing. There was a wound to the right side of her head from which blood was trickling and whitish matter was visible. Bhutto's clothes were soaked in blood. Dr Saeeda immediately began efforts to resuscitate her. Dr Aurangzeb Khan, the senior registrar, subsequently joined

⁶⁵ Interview with Khalid Shahanshah

⁶⁶ Interview with retired general Hamid Nawaz

⁶⁷ Interview with Naheed Khan

⁶⁸ UN Commission report paragraph 112

Dr Saeeda to assist. Both doctors said that they did not observe any other injury. As there was no improvement in Bhutto's condition, she was moved to the Emergency Operating Theatre located on the level above the ground floor to continue resuscitation efforts.

At around 1750 hours, Professor Mohammed Mussadiq Khan, the hospital's senior physician, arrived and took over. The doctors still had not detected a pulse. At 1757 hours, Professor Mussadiq opened Bhutto's chest and carried out open heart massage. These efforts were unsuccessful.

At 1816 hours, Professor Mussadiq stopped resuscitation efforts and declared Bhutto dead.⁶⁹

WHITE HEADSCARF GOES MISSING

Dr Qudsiya Anjum Qureshi cleaned Bhutto's head, neck and upper body and checked Bhutto's body for further injury. She saw no wounds other than the one to the right side of her head and the thoracotomy wound. Bhutto was next dressed in hospital clothing and her clothes given to her maid [who had arrived there from Zardari House by then]. The doctors said they had not seen her dupatta [headscarf]. The white dupatta remains missing.⁷⁰ Lt Gen Hamid Nawaz (retired), then the caretaker interior minister, says that doctors at the hospital and occupants of Bhutto's car were asked about the headscarf but nobody knew how it disappeared and this is still a mystery⁷¹.

FROM DUBAI TO ISLAMABAD

Bhutto's family in Dubai knew that she was in a serious condition even before she reached the hospital. They were informed again after the doctors confirmed her death. Nothing could be more tragic for Bilawal, Bakhtawar and Asifa. They were torn apart with grief, more so Asifa. Zardari, however, kept his calm. He stayed in contact with people in Pakistan and immediately started preparing to leave for Islamabad. The PPP

⁶⁹ UN Commission report paragraph 115

⁷⁰ UN Commission report paragraph 116

⁷¹ Interview with Hamid Nawaz

workers in Rawalpindi General Hospital were fuming with anger and were not ready to listen to the hospital staff. Dr Babar Awan spoke to Zardari on phone and sought permission for announcing the death⁷² and did so on behalf of the party. On learning about the tragedy, the PPP workers in Dubai rushed to the Emirates Hill to console the family. But on reaching there they learnt that Zardari and children had already left for the airport⁷³. The mourning family landed at Chaklala airbase through a chartered plane.

'BLOODY HELL': MUSHARRAF'S REACTION

The President's House depended on TV channels for news about the entire episode from the suicide attack on Bhutto to her reaching the hospital. No intelligence official contacted any of the co-riders of the car. Once Bhutto was in hospital, Musharraf started getting latest information through intelligence channels. He also got the news of her death immediately. The President's House appeared to be in a state of emergency. ISI's Deputy Director General (Internal) Nusrat Naeem stayed in touch with Rawalpindi Detachment Commander Colonel Jehangir Akhtar who was present at the hospital. At one point, the ISI Deputy Director General, Major General Nusrat Naeem, contacted Professor Mussadiq through Colonel Jehangir's cell phone. When asked about this by the Commission, Major General Nusrat Naeem initially denied making any calls to the hospital, but then acknowledged that he had indeed called the hospital, when pressed further. He asserted that he had made the call, before reporting to his superiors, to hear, directly from Professor Mussadiq that Bhutto had died⁷⁴. It is highly likely that it was either the ISI chief Nadeem Taj or his deputy Nusrat Naeem who confirmed this to Musharraf's military secretary before anyone else. President Musharraf says that when his military secretary gave him the news, his first reaction was: "Bloody hell. It is a very bad thing to happen. Things are already not in a good shape

⁷² Interview with Babar Awan

⁷³ Interviews with PPP workers in Dubai

⁷⁴ UN Commission report paragraph 120

and this will further complicate the situation.”⁷⁵ The first order to be passed in the President’s House was cancellation of a Christmas dinner that was to be hosted that night. A meeting of the President’s senior staff was called to discuss whether the elections should be postponed.

ZARDARI- MUSHARRAF CONTACT?

A close aide of Musharraf’s says that the general and Asif Zardari were in direct contact and kept on talking on phone after Bhutto’s death. They also discussed whether a postmortem should be done on her body or not. General Musharraf kept on giving instructions in the light of his conversations with Zardari. The intelligence agencies and administration were in dark about this. It is believed that Musharraf himself arranged a C-130 of Pakistan Air Force to take the body of Benazir Bhutto to Larkana⁷⁶. However, this could not be confirmed from any independent source.⁷⁷

Bhutto’s former political rival and former associate in the Alliance for Restoration of Democracy, Nawaz Sharif, was in Rawalpindi that day. On getting the news of Bhutto’s death he went to the hospital. Addressing the distressed PPP workers there he said he would fight for their cause now⁷⁸.

Bhutto’s body remained in the operating room until it was placed in a wooden coffin and removed from the hospital at about 2235 hours that evening and transported to the nearby Chaklala Airbase. Naheed Khan signed for Bhutto’s body at the hospital. At around 0100 hours on 28 December, at the Chaklala Airbase, the remains were transferred to her husband, Asif Ali Zardari, who had flown from Dubai and who signed an acknowledgement note to that effect. ⁷⁹(The time of handing over of the body and Zardari’s signatures are part of police

⁷⁵ One-on-one conversation with General Musharraf, October 9, 2010, Manchester

⁷⁶ Interview with former Intelligence Bureau chief

⁷⁷ The author’s comment

⁷⁸ Dawn wire service

⁷⁹ UN Commission report paragraph 121

record.) Bhutto's body was flown to her home town Larkana, in Sindh Province, for burial. She was buried next to her father (Zulfikar Ali Bhutto) in their ancestral graveyard at Garhi Khuda Bakhsh. Bhutto's death caused huge distress and anger among her supporters. There was widespread violence throughout Pakistan, especially in her home province Sindh, over several days following her death.⁸⁰

BURIED SILENTLY

In a meeting, a friend of Bhutto's⁸¹ griped about her body being flown silently at night to Larkana by a C-130 of Pakistan Air Force. To her, since Bhutto was a popular leader, her body should have been taken from Rawalpindi to her home town by road so that people would arrange funerals and condemnatory rallies in each town on the way. This friend dubbed the silent burial of Bhutto as criminal and apolitical, which she thought might have followed some deal between Asif Zardari and the ISI.

Bhutto leaves behind a big question for the nation: Who killed this most popular democratic leader⁸² of the Muslim world? In the following chapters we will go after the clues to her killers.

⁸⁰ UN Commission report paragraph 124

⁸¹ Off the record conversation

⁸² Interview with Fareed Zakaria. From 2000 to 2010, he was a columnist for Newsweek and editor of Newsweek International. The interview was published in Jang Sunday Magazine (March 22, 2009)

THE TIMELINE

DATE	HAPPENING	TIME
27 Dec, 2007	Departure for Liaqat Bagh from Zardari House, Islamabad	14.00 hours
27 Dec, 2007	Arrival at Liaqat Bagh Gate	15.16 hours
27 Dec, 2007	On the stage	15.31 hours
27 Dec, 2007	The public meeting ends	17.10 hours
27 Dec, 2007	Firing and blast	17.14 hours*
27 Dec, 2007	Received at Rawalpindi General Hospital	17.35 hours
27 Dec, 2007	Announcement of death	18.16 hours
27 Dec, 2007	The place of incident is washed	18.30 hours
27 Dec 2007	Body taken from hospital to Chaklala	22.35 hours
28 Dec 2007	Asif Zardari receives the body	1.10 hours

*According to the UN Commission report the firing and the blast occurred around 1714 hours. However, Pakistani investigators put the time of incident at 1711 hours.

IN SEARCH OF TRUTH

Complicated questions about the murder and their possible answers

Benazir Bhutto's murder has left behind a trail of unsolved questions. Usually naïve solutions – based on imaginary tales -- are suggested to such mysterious murders. But there is a need for seeking possible answers to the puzzling questions and digging out the truth. Oft-talked-about important and controvertible issues are discussed in this chapter through various inquests and characters to have a clear answer. Answers to all questions may not necessarily be true, but these could serve a step forward in search of truth.

**Rawalpindi:
where Pakistan lost its premiers**

- 1: The place Benazir Bhutto was murdered
- 2: The location of Liaqat Ali Khan's killing
- 3: The point where Z. A. Bhutto was hanged
- 4: The military's General Headquarters (GHQ)



CONUNDRUMS AND RESEARCH

So shrouded in mystery is Benazir Bhutto's murder it is difficult to puzzle out. What is so confounding about it? Does the research suggest any ways out?

WHY RAWALPINDI?

Rawalpindi is not merely a name of a city. It houses Pakistan army's General Head Quarters, the GHQ. It just happened or was a worst example of machination that the city saw Pakistan's first prime minister Liaqat Ali Khan shot dead in October, 1951; former prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto sent to gallows on April 4, 1979 and Benazir Bhutto killed on December 27, 2007, and all of them belonged to the southern Sindh province.

BENAZIR BHUTTO AND LIAQAT ALI KHAN

Both Khan and Bhutto held the office of prime minister and were murdered just a few meters from each other. Khan was shot while addressing a public rally at Municipal Park. The park, renamed "Liaqat National Bagh (Park)" after Liaqat Ali Khan's assassination, saw Bhutto assassinated 56 years later after an election rally there. Khan died at 4:10 pm while Bhutto breathed her last at 5:11 pm (or according to the UN Commission report at 5:14). Syed Akbar, who shot Khan, was a religious fanatic and so are the alleged killers of Bhutto's. Khan's slayer was mown down on the spot and Bhutto's alleged killer died in the bomb blast only seconds after he had shot her¹.

ISI WARNING?

Whether General Nadeem Taj, then the ISI chief, had informed Bhutto during a call-on about the danger in general or intended to stop her from going to Liaqat Bagh to address the rally is a bit controversial. Mohsin Naqvi, then CNN representative in Pakistan, who thinks he owes such a piece of information to history², quotes General Taj as having told him

¹ Police's First Information Reports

² Interview with Mohsin Naqvi, April 13, 2009, Lahore

in the presence of ISI-Internal head General Nusrat Naeem 'on whose insistence' he had 'grudgingly' met Bhutto at her residence on December 26-27 night, he apprised Bhutto of threats to her life. Bhutto was woken from sleep at 1:15 am to see General Taj. Rahman Malik, who handled Bhutto's security affairs, was present in the meeting.

Taj said he informed Bhutto how bad the country's security situation was, and about the threats to her life. He also shared with her 'intelligence reports about the presence of extremists in the city to target the next day's political gathering in Rawalpindi'. He told Bhutto: "May you live long! You have a whole life to pursue politics. Please cancel tomorrow's rally; we have reports of presence of terrorists, their telephones are being tapped and we will trace them out in a couple of days".

General Taj then asked Bhutto: "Stay away from tomorrow's public meeting. We can stage-manage a reasonable justification for not holding the rally like putting you under house arrest".

Malik said: "How can we believe your talk of dangers? It might be a drama to keep us from the public gathering and make people misconstrue that BB is scared".

General Taj said: "The ISI chief's being here in person pleads strong that it goes beyond politics. No politics, believe me. It's rather a plea for saving the life of a popular leader".

Bhutto acknowledged the concern and said: "Let me do politics, thank you. You need no drama to keep me from the rally. Confining oneself to the house out of fear means no politics".

General Taj said: "You can hold the rally after the terrorists are arrested. It's a matter of just a couple of days".

Bhutto said: "I have made commitment to the people. The public rally has been announced. People want me to speak to them. It cannot be cancelled".

General Taj left the place at 3:15 am and told General Naeem about Bhutto's refusal.

Newspapers quoted Asif Zardari and Rahman Malik as saying that the meeting discussed other issues and not the

Rawalpindi rally. Naqvi insists on the veracity of the meeting's details. He says that once he presented Malik with the details. He accepted them as true but hastened to add that it was too late to cancel the rally or gauge how real the threats were.

BHUTTO'S LAST PHONE CALL

Bhutto made her last phone call to Mohsin Naqvi on her way to Liaquat Bagh. Naheed Khan confirmed the telephonic talk that lasted 17.5 minutes.

The talk started with the expected attendance at the Rawalpindi public gathering. Naqvi says he along with Naheed Khan and Safdar Abbasi had visited Liaquat Bagh the night before. He told Bhutto, who was in a pleasant mood, that the rally would be a great success. Then they talked about Bhutto's Peshawar tour. He told her the gathering had neutralized the fears [of terrorism] creeping among the voters of the North Western Frontier Province (now named Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa), and would impact the election results positively. Bhutto asked Naqvi about the number of seats he thought the PPP could grab. He said the PPP would be able to form government quite easily. Talking about the Punjab province, he said the PPP might win three more seats if Bhutto toured its capital, Lahore.

According to Naqvi, some guests from America were to arrive in Pakistan for talks with the government on elections. Bhutto asked Naqvi if it was a scheduled visit. He said all the arrangements for their visit were in place.

Naqvi asked Bhutto to take care of her security. Bhutto retorted: "I won't do politics timidly".

Naqvi had to meet Bhutto sometime after the rally. They tied up their meeting. By then Bhutto had arrived at Liaquat Bagh, which she told Naqvi about and ended the call.

HOW SAFE BHUTTO'S VEHICLE WAS

The white Toyota Land Cruiser used by Benazir Bhutto remained parked at the Police Lines, Rawalpindi for quite a long time after her murder. Now it has been shifted somewhere else. According to Hamid Nawaz, a retired general and home minister in the Musharraf regime, Pakistani investigative

agencies had minutely examined the car and concluded that it was totally safe. To quote a former top most government official, the Land Cruiser was more protected than Bhutto's residence, the Bilawal House; it was like a fortress. He was of the view that since the vehicle needed no security around while on the move, no foot police were deployed.

A senior official of an agency investigating the case for Musharraf government said a specialist armour conversion company based in the United Arab Emirates, International Armoured Group of Ra'as al-Khaima, had made the car bulletproof on July 10, 2007 according to international standards. The one-and-half inch glass used in the Land Cruiser, girded with 5 mm steel plate, had survived the bomb blast.

Sources say Rahman Malik had overseen armour conversion of two Mercedes and two Land Cruiser cars in July 2007, several months before Bhutto's arrival in Pakistan indicating she had made up her mind then to return to the country. Bhutto's car was moving at a speed of two to three kilometers an hour when targeted. An analysis of the ball bearings used in the blast proved that not even a single one could pierce through the car. Some ball bearings did penetrate the upper surface of the vehicle though. This shows that the vehicle was safe.

Investigators say the escape hatch was manually operated and was not automatic. Had the escape hatch [being a feared cause of Bhutto's death] been automatic, it would not have killed her. They argue that had Bhutto not stood through the escape hatch, she would have remained safe and if at all she had to do that lowering herself down just by one-and-half inch would only have injured her mouth. They say the escape hatch had a 24-inch opening and Bhutto's head was 7.25 inches in width allowing her head a space of 17 inches. Bhutto's head was at the extreme left of the hatch. Had she been at the right side or in the middle, she would not have sustained a severe injury.

HOW DID THE GUNMAN LOOK LIKE?

The man who shot Bhutto looked different from other people around him in appearance. His hair was thick and black. Clean-shaven, he had fair complexion and wore black glasses. Based on the chemical tests of the alleged killer's clothes, the investigators conclude that he was not wearing *shalwar kamiz* but was dressed in a grey suit with brown and cream color stripes to conceal his identity. He wore a white shirt, but without a necktie. His Servis brown sandals are in the custody of investigation agencies. The Karachi suicide bomber also wore the same type of foot ware. It may just be a coincidence or it can be argued that the two hailed from one region, and the shoes were bought from one place. However, the alleged killer's photograph shows him as wearing a jacket and not a suit. A Scotland Yard radiographer, who examined the bomber's limbs, concluded that he was about 15 years old.

NO POSTMORTEM?

The UN Commission and Scotland Yard have repeatedly pointed out in their reports that important evidence was destroyed by not carrying out the postmortem. Benazir Bhutto was shifted to the hospital at 5:35 pm, and her body transported to the nearby Chaklala Airbase in Rawalpindi at 10:35 pm. No postmortem, not even a proper scan, was conducted at the hospital where she lay dead for five hours. According to UN Commission report, on three different occasions, Professor Mussadiq asked CPO Saud Aziz for permission to conduct an autopsy on Bhutto, and the CPO refused each request. On the second request, CPO Saud Aziz is reported to have sarcastically asked the Professor whether an FIR had been filed, a matter that the CPO should know, not the Professor. DCO Irfan Elahi, who was also present outside the operating room, supported CPO Saud Aziz's position. The authorities, however, deny that the CPO deliberately refused to allow an autopsy. They insist that they wanted to get permission from Bhutto's family. The police's legal duty to request an autopsy does not require permission from a family member³. The report says an ISI officer, Rawalpindi

³ UN Commission report paragraph 117

Detachment Commander Colonel Jehangir Akhtar, was present at the hospital through much of the evening⁴. Scotland Yard report, on the other hand, says that given the chaotic and increasingly volatile atmosphere inside the hospital, there was no chance of transferring Bhutto from the operating theatre to another part of the complex. So serious was the overcrowding inside the A&E Department, that blood and emergency equipment had to be carried up a makeshift bamboo ladder from the outside of the building to a small balcony adjacent to the emergency operating theatre⁵.

Discussing the decision not to carry out a post-mortem examination, the UN Commission report says that Pakistani law provides that in the case of an unnatural death, the police must have a postmortem examination report as part of their investigations. This requirement places the responsibility for initiating the examination on the police and not the hospital authorities. Indeed, hospital authorities must get a request from the police before proceeding. Even CPO Saud Aziz himself acknowledged that this is the law in Pakistan⁶. Some people suggested to the Commission that the practice is different from the legal requirement. Due primarily to religious considerations, permission from the family might be sought. There are sensitivities around conducting a postmortem examination of a woman in Pakistani culture⁷. While denying that the doctors requested his authority for a postmortem three times, CPO Saud Aziz told the Commission that because of the importance of the person of Bhutto, he could not just have a postmortem examination without first seeking her family's consent. He first sought the approval of the President of the PPP, Makhdoom Amin Fahim for a post-mortem examination. Fahim told him that he was not in a position to give such approval and asked him to wait for Zardari who was on his way to Pakistan from Dubai. When Zardari arrived at Chaklala

⁴ UN Commission report paragraph 120

⁵ Scotland Yard report paragraph 94

⁶ UN Commission report paragraph 143

⁷ UN Commission report paragraph 144

Airbase, the request for permission was made to him and he declined⁸.

Discarding all the excuses for not carrying out the postmortem, the UN Commission said it did not find any credible reasons for failing to carry out an autopsy on Bhutto. The body had already undergone invasive medical procedures when the open heart massage was undertaken. Moreover, a postmortem examination limited to a complete external examination and not involving any invasive surgery could have been carried out⁹.

It is odd that Bhutto's remains were moved to the Chaklala Airbase before Zardari's arrival from Dubai. According to sources, the body was taken from the hospital around 2300 hours [according to Scotland Yard around 22.35] on 27 December. The note signed by Zardari accepting his wife's remains is timed 0110 hours on 28 December. If the police were genuinely waiting for Zardari's permission before requesting a postmortem examination, they should have left Bhutto's remains at the hospital. Instead they moved her remains to Chaklala Airbase, thereby rendering such an examination more difficult. When questioned about this, senior Punjab officials stated that the plan was to carry out the examination at the base which also had medical facilities. However, the fact that Ms Bhutto's coffin was not taken to the medical facilities, but placed in a room at the base makes this assertion doubtful¹⁰.

The UN Commission deemed it fit to laugh down the police claim that since Zardari did not give his consent the autopsy could not be done.

The Commission finds the letter written by CPO Saud Aziz to the IGP of Punjab, dated 27 December, but actually written on Dec. 28, in which reported that an autopsy could not be conducted because her husband had refused to authorise one, be fundamentally misleading. Nothing in the letter explains why the autopsy had not been carried out earlier, during the preceding five hours while Bhutto's remains were at

⁸ UN Commission report paragraph 145

⁹ UN Commission report paragraph 146

¹⁰ UN Commission report paragraph 147

Rawalpindi General Hospital. Rather, the letter focuses solely on Zardari's refusal to approve an autopsy – and portrays even that refusal in misleading terms. The letter is clearly intended to hide CPO Saud Aziz's fundamental failure to carry out his legal obligation regarding the autopsy and, instead, to redirect blame for this failure to Zardari¹¹. No autopsy had been carried out even though five hours had passed since Bhutto had been declared dead. The body had been placed in a coffin and brought to the PAF airbase. CPO Saud Aziz placed Zardari in an impossible situation – one which almost compelled Zardari to refuse the request for an autopsy¹².

CPO Saud Aziz, an experienced senior police officer, refused to allow a postmortem examination. He certainly knew the requirements of the law and the practice of law enforcement in such cases. He need not have waited for Zardari. He was, furthermore, aware of the importance and status of the person involved. All these factors together support the view held by many Pakistanis that CPO Saud Aziz did not act independently in this matter. CPO Saud Aziz's insistence on justifying his actions has made it difficult for the Commission to inquire any further and attempt to unearth who might have been behind the decision¹³.

POSTMORTEM: A LEGAL REQUIREMENT?

Dr Khalid Ranjha, a federal law minister in Musharraf regime and a reputed criminal lawyer, opined that the situation did not warrant conducting an autopsy for it would have led to a law and order breakdown. The assassination had baffled the administration. It was with great difficulty that the crowd which was bent upon breaking the hospital gates open and taking the body out, was put under control.

Asked about who is legally required to get the postmortem carried out, he said that under the law the police were supposed to get it done. Three documents are needed for the autopsy: 1. Death report (Death certificate); 2. FIR; 3. Injuries report (Police statement on apparent wounds).

¹¹ UN Commission report paragraph 144

¹² UN Commission report paragraph 149

¹³ UN Commission report paragraph 152

In the context of Bhutto's postmortem, Ranjha said the option for having an autopsy rested with the deceased's family.

On whether an autopsy could be conducted during the intervening period of declaring Bhutto dead at 6:16 pm and handing over her body to Asif Zardari at 1:10 am the next morning, Dr Ranjha said the police should have had it done themselves. He did not doubt the police intentions. There might be a lapse on the part of police though, the lawyer said, adding that "Taking decision in such a situation is always difficult".

"The absence of an autopsy report sometimes affects evidence and the proceedings of a case. However, Bhutto had sustained only one injury which was X-rayed. A visual postmortem was also done. And so, the absence of an autopsy has not affected the case much," Ranjha said.¹⁴

THE FLAWED X-RAY!

Evidences, which would have been vital in tracing the crime, were done away with either by mistake, in panic or at will. The lack of evidence made it very difficult to establish how Bhutto died. To cite an example of mistake, a portable unit, and not a proper machine, was used to take X-ray of Bhutto's skull with some 250 people crowding the room hampering a meticulous scan. Several days after Bhutto's murder, colored configuration of the X-ray was developed by a computer. Scotland Yard team was provided a copy of the X-ray and not the original one.

An inquiry officer said hurdles were created to slow down the investigation process intentionally, or through slackness and inefficiency. It took two days even to have the X-ray released; only the policeman who had deposited the X-ray was authorized to get it released and he had gone on leave on such an important occasion. He had to be called back to get the report¹⁵.

¹⁴ Interview with Dr Khalid Ranjha

¹⁵ Interview with investigating officer

LIVE COVERAGE OF THE MURDER?

Asif Zardari is also fingered as having been involved in the Bhutto murder conspiracy. The story goes like this: On Asif Zardari's insistence, Asifa, the youngest daughter, phoned Bhutto to ask her to stand through the hatch so she could see her for the event was being covered live. I asked Dawn News, Aaj News and Geo News directors whether their channels had covered the shooting and the bombing live.

Azhar Abbas, Director, Dawn News

The first footage we received after the incident had been made using mobile phone. A second footage was of Bhutto lowering in the car and the bullet fire. It was provided by a Peoples Party worker. Dawn News was not giving live coverage. The footage we got was a recorded one.¹⁶

Talat Hussain, MD, Aaj News

The rally was shown live but not the incident. We did deploy cameras for the stage but not outside the venue. Our OB [outside broadcast] van was positioned at quite a distance from the stage to ward off any mishap¹⁷.

Jawad Nazir, Director, Geo News

The arrangements for live coverage of the speeches were in place but not for the exit. This is what I can recall. I was not on the operational side. Better talk to Nasir Baig Chughtai for the exact situation¹⁸.

Nasir Baig Chughtai, Geo News

"We could not cover the tragedy live because the cameras were installed at the second gate on the assumption that Bhutto would leave through it."

He recalled how Geo newscaster Salman Hassan, taking a beeper, informed Nawaz Sharif about the tragic incident. Sharif said he was going to the hospital to inquire after Bhutto. Studio producer told Hassan to convey the news of Bhutto death to

¹⁶ Telephone talk, January 22, 2010

¹⁷ Telephone interview, January 23, 2010

¹⁸ Telephone talk, January 23, 2010

Sharif cautiously. When told that Bhutto was no more, Sharif did not believe it. Overwhelmed with grief, his voice choked and perhaps in shock he disconnected the phone¹⁹.

THE CAUSE OF DEATH

It remains unsolved whether Bhutto died from a gunshot wound or an escape hatch injury. All the persons sitting in the vehicle with Bhutto held consensus view that Bhutto had collapsed after being hit by a bullet before the blast.

The Musharraf government, in an unseemly rush to announce the cause of death and to name an assassin as on December 28, said the hospital report showed Bhutto had been killed by striking the lever of the sunroof as she ducked to avoid the bomb. "There was no bullet or metal shrapnel found in the injury," Brigadier Javed Cheema, the interior ministry spokesman, told a press conference. Perhaps the government was suggesting, in an effort to demean Bhutto, that she had caused her own death by emerging from her vehicle. The press conference not only failed to provide credible answers to essential questions arising from the assassination, it triggered widespread suspicion that government authorities would not be conducting a genuine search for the truth.

HIT BY BULLET?

After Benazir Bhutto's murder, the Pakistani investigative agencies initially differed among themselves on whether she had been hit by gunshot. A doctor who was a part of the team that tried to resuscitate Bhutto claimed she received a bullet in her neck. An intelligence agency report said the bullet hit her when she was turning her head from left to right. However, Saud Aziz was of opinion that a third bullet brushed past Bhutto's hair puff²⁰.

The UN and Scotland Yard reports have dwelt on bullet hitting Bhutto. Although a number of PPP members asserted publicly and in private shortly after the assassination that Bhutto had been shot, none of them, both senior and low-

¹⁹ Telephone talk, January 23, 2010

²⁰ Interview with Saud Aziz

ranking, interviewed by the Commission could confirm that assertion²¹.

The Commission also interviewed some PPP supporters who had been injured in the blast. None had received any bullet wounds, as previously reported in some media reports. According to the police, over 25 people were also interviewed in the immediate aftermath of the incident, and none received bullet wounds. They were injured by ball bearings, but not bullets²². An investigator said bullet travels at a speed of 3500 kilometer a second. The officer said bullets did hit Bhutto's chief security guard Tauqir Kaira. Asked about any proof supporting his claim, he said it was his observation²³. The UN Commission and Scotland Yard do not agree to this notion and rather view that all the bullets hit some higher points around.

IS ESCAPE HATCH TO BLAME?

Both international inquires into Benazir Bhutto murder said the forensic reports from London and Netherlands observed that the appearance of the fracture strongly suggested a blow to the right side of Bhutto's head. There are no features to suggest a bullet entry or exit point.²⁴ Pakistani investigators said the injury to Bhutto's head was not caused by any firearm. The world's biggest small arm is of 9mm range (mortar shell: 60mm; teargas shell: 50mm; anti aircraft gun: 30mm). According to Scotland Yard the radiographer noticed there was a depressed fracture in the right temporoparietal region of the skull with main fragment measuring 40 milimetres with depression by approximately 13 mms²⁵. In Dr Cary's [Scotland Yard's] opinion Bhutto died as a result of a severe head injury sustained as a consequence of the bomb and due to head impact somewhere in the escape hatch²⁶. According to Scotland Yard's video analysis, the flash of the blast appeared just over two-thirds of a second after Ms Bhutto disappeared from view.

²¹ UN Commission report paragraph 153

²² UN Commission report paragraph 154

²³ Interview with investigating officer

²⁴ Scotland Yard report paragraph 165

²⁵ Scotland Yard report paragraph 162

²⁶ Scotland Yard report paragraph 201

Bhutto wounds 5 times

Assisted by Defence Science and Technology Laboratory, UK, Scotland Yard said that high explosives of the type used in this device typically detonate at a velocity between 6000 and 9000 metres per second²⁷. According to the Pakistani investigators, 50 newton force²⁸ is required to break a human head with hair. The blast at one meter from Bhutto's vehicle might have produced a force more than 50 newton. Due to the blast's impact the Land Cruiser went four feet up in the air from left side pushing Bhutto's head into the escape hatch. Had the explosive not burst its tyres, the vehicle would have turned belly up.

Scotland Yard observes that the escape hatch has a depth of 9 cms; this is in the form of a lip constructed of armoured plate and covered in upholstery. The injury is entirely consistent with Bhutto's head impacting upon this lip²⁹. Pakistani investigator Aftab Ahmad Khan (SP, Forensic) prepared a plaster of Paris copy of the escape hatch and found it consistent with the size and shape of the wound. This finding was later acknowledged as correct.

FIRING BY LASER GUN?

So mesmerizing was Bhutto people don't believe she is no more. Even if some people do, they rivet themselves more to the mysterious angles of her murder. The reports of Pakistan police, Scotland Yard and UN Commission probes conclude that Bhutto was not killed by a pistol fire. Several people think she was killed using laser gun from a nearby rooftop and not by pistol.

Dr Muddasir-al-Gilani, an Italian expert on missile technology and weaponry, said: "No laser gun in the world is as light as could be carried by one person. Even the smallest laser gun needs a truck to transport it".

Let's suppose Bhutto was killed using a laser gun. In that case, the laser gun would have been lifted onto a rooftop.

²⁷ Scotland Yard report paragraph 203

²⁸ The newton is a unit of force; it is equal to the amount of net force required to accelerate a mass of one kilogram at a rate of one meter per second squared.

²⁹ Scotland Yard report paragraphs 204, 205

Police were not deployed on the nearby rooftops; a negligence on the part of the authorities. But no evidence of a laser gun having been installed there was found when the rooftops and the water tank were searched. Another assumption may be the mounting of a laser gun on a vehicle nearby. No evidence of that too is traced. Dr Muddasir rules out any possibility of the use of a laser gun in Bhutto murder. Laser gun is too heavy a weapon to be employed in such a way.

WHY NO BLOOD TRACES ON THE ESCAPE HATCH?

Scotland Yard, UN Commission and Pakistani intelligence agencies have all concluded that the escape hatch caused Bhutto's death. Initial pictures showed that the escape hatch, which pierced Bhutto's head, did have a few drops of blood on it.

Microscopic and other scientific applications were employed to examine the escape hatch. But, not a single hair or a trace of human flesh was found on the hatch. When I contacted some investigators to know their version on this aspect, they found it intriguing but said Bhutto's head was covered by a dupatta [scarf or head covering] and she had hair also. And since the incident was of three-fourth of a second, the blood would have oozed out a few seconds after the escape hatch struck Bhutto's head. She started bleeding after she had collapsed in Naheed Khan's lap.

SCARF MYSTERY

Hamid Nawaz, a former general and caretaker interior minister at the time of Bhutto's murder, said Bhutto was seen sporting the scarf tightly in the last video before her death and the investigators were quite troubled at the scarf going missing probably at the hospital. Bhutto's shoes and other belongings were there in the car, but not her scarf. Even persons in the vehicle and people at the hospital, including the doctors, could not tell where the scarf had gone. The general said the scarf would have provided an answer to the puzzle. 'The scarf would have a hole if she had been hit by a bullet. And if the escape hatch had struck her, the blood-stained scarf would have a mark as big as the size of the hatch. And so, the scarf would have easily solved the murder mystery but nobody knows where it had gone.'

WASHING THE BLAST SITE DOWN

The biggest mystery which surfaced after Benazir Bhutto's killing was the hosing down of the crime scene within one hour and thirty minutes [at 6:30 pm] of the blast [at 5:14 pm] destroying a lot of evidences in an inexplicable haste.

The question is: Who decided to wash down the blast place? Many a people hold the view that rounding up of persons responsible for hosing down the crime scene can lead to the arrest of Bhutto's killers. The UN Commission has rejected Pakistani agencies' stance that hosing down the crime scene was a necessary crowd control measure because, to them, some PPP supporters at the scene were dipping their hands into the blood on the ground, believing it to be Bhutto's, and rubbing it on themselves.

SP Khurram Shahzad, the most senior Rawalpindi police official remaining at the crime scene after CPO Saud Aziz and SSP Yaseen Farooq had left for Rawalpindi General Hospital, continued to take instructions from Aziz by telephone.

SP Khurram ordered the fire and rescue officials present to wash the crime scene down with fire hoses. He told the Commission that the police had collected all the available evidence by then. Police records show that only 23 pieces of evidence were collected, in a case where one would normally have expected thousands. The evidence included mostly human body parts, two pistols, spent cartridges and Bhutto's damaged vehicle.

No one apart from SP Khurram told the Commission that they saw anyone smearing blood on themselves. Even SP Khurram, himself, ultimately told the Commission that he saw only one person doing that.

One eye-witness said that there were about 100 to 200 people present at the crime scene after the blast and about 20 to 30 police officers. One police official stated that there were about 40 police officers at the scene. The Commission found that SP Khurram had a number of options for controlling the crowd at the crime scene short of the drastic measure of hosing it down. He could have ordered the police officers present to form a cordon around the immediate vicinity of the crime

scene; he could have redeployed any of the 1,371 police officers on duty; he could have called for reinforcements.

SP Khurram asserted that he made the decision to hose down the scene. Before issuing the order to the rescue and fire services, SP Khurram called his superior, CPO Saud Aziz, to seek permission, which was granted. Sources, including police officials familiar with the case, have questioned the veracity of SP Khurram's claim that the decision was his initiative.

CPO Saud Aziz's role in this decision is controversial. Many senior Pakistani police officials have emphasized that hosing down a crime scene is fundamentally inconsistent with Pakistani police practice. With the exception of some Rawalpindi police officials, nearly all senior Pakistani police officials have criticized the manner in which this crime scene was managed. One senior police official has argued that hosing down the crime scene amounted to "criminal negligence".

Sources informed the Commission that CPO Saud Aziz did not act independently in deciding to hose down the crime scene. One source, speaking on the basis of anonymity, stated that CPO Saud Aziz had confided in him that he had received a call from Army Headquarters instructing him to order the hosing down of the crime scene. Another source, also speaking on anonymity, said that the CPO was ordered to hose down the scene by Major General Nadeem Ijaz Ahmad, then Director General of MI. Even CPO Saud Aziz, when asserting to the Commission that there were precedents for hosing down a crime scene, acknowledged that all the incidents which he cited as precedents actually involved a military target. The police officials who point out this pattern saw it as further indication that the military was involved in having the crime scene hosed down³⁰.

SAUD AZIZ'S VERSION

CPO Saud Aziz has long kept silent despite allegations, both open and discreet, against him. He spoke to the UN Commission but it declared him the main accused. Aziz does not talk to anyone on the record. He narrated the whole account to me off the record and I was to publish it without

³⁰ UN Commission report paragraphs 126 to 134

attribution. But now that he is under trial and nothing has remained off the record, I am publishing it in good faith so readers could know his side of the story. One may not necessarily approve of everything he says, but his version may help us in our search for truth.

IN HIS DEFENCE

Saud Aziz told me: “Benazir Bhutto’s killing was an extraordinary incident. No one was in a position for half-an-hour to tell whether BB was alive, injured or dead. Rahman Malik said she was alright. Her car had left the scene. It was only after it arrived at the hospital that we knew what had happened. She had died. Police high officials rushed to the hospital. In the meantime, PPP workers started gathering at the crime scene. Thirty to thirty-five people had been killed or injured. Some people at the crime place started rubbing the blood on their faces taking it as that of Bhutto’s. A considerable number of people lay down there. People started pelting stones, burning flags and tearing down posters. PPP’s senior leadership was at the hospital and so, nobody was there to help us control the crowd, which was swelling. Realizing the gravity of the situation, Rawalpindi City SP Khurram Shahzad made a call to me. We both decided to seek the help of senior PPP leaders and wash down the crime scene”. He said: it was us who made the decision. Accepting the responsibility for hosing down the place, he said no one had asked him to do that.

Aziz elaborated: “The people who say that the crime scene was washed down to remove the evidences are mistaken. In fact, only blood was washed away and not the crime scene. Police and investigators had gathered 48 important objects including the suicide bomber’s pin, pieces of jacket and two pistols from the crime scene. Empties of bullets were also collected. One of the pistols belonged to Tauqir Ashraf Kaira, and the other was used by the bomber. Different limbs of the dead were matched after DNA testing. Even shoes and clothes were collected. A part of the skull of suicide attacker was recovered from the roof of a building on the third day of the attack. Police took 250 photographs and made a video. Although the crime scene had been washed down, samples of blood and the ground provided several proofs. The Scotland

Yard observation that though the blood at the crime scene was hosed down, quite a few evidences were found in blood and soil samples, is enough to support my claim, the police officer said.

EVIDENCES WERE IN THE VEHICLE

According to Saud Aziz, the proofs relating to Bhutto's murder were in the vehicle. Her shoes, glasses, blood and a part of her brain were found from the car. There was nothing to be seized from the crime scene concerning the murder since Bhutto had not left the vehicle.

BULLET TOUCHED BHUTTO'S HAIR

Aziz revealed a bullet had brushed past Bhutto's hair puff, but did not hit her. Bhutto's only apparent injury was a major trauma to the right side of the head, while the bullet was fired from her left. The X-ray excluded this injury being an entry or exit wound as a result of gunshot. The UK experts all exclude this injury being an entry or exit wound as a result of gunshot.

The police officer said three not two bullets were fired, two in the air and the third passing by Bhutto's hair puff. According to him, it appears from the Dawn TV video as if the bullet had hit her skull. However, the suicide bomber went for the explosion when he realized that the third bullet also failed to target Bhutto.

WHAT CAUSED THE DEATH?

Aziz said in a confident tone: "The bomber exploded the bomb after the bullet failed to hit Bhutto. She was lowering down after waving to the crowd in reply to their slogans at the time of the blast. The blast had produced an enormous amount of kinetic energy. The great impact of energy would have lifted the vehicle up. Later, Scotland Yard did a drill to measure how much kinetic energy and the resulting quake-like vibrations the blast might have produced.

According to the police official, armoured plating of the armoured vehicle struck Bhutto between her ear and temple, which doctors say is the softest area of head, when she was lowering down, and pierced her skull.

WAS IT MAJOR IMTIAZ TO BLAME?

Aziz said: "The security provided to Bhutto was fool-proof and it showed up in the attackers not being able to enter the rally venue. This is what the arrested accused told the police. They said that having failed in their plan they were leaving the place when they saw Bhutto waving to the crowd from her vehicle. They started firing. Had Bhutto not come into view, they would have failed. What was Major Imtiaz, who was in charge of Bhutto's security, doing? Was he sleeping? He should have stopped Bhutto from emerging from her vehicle."

WHAT DID THE INQUIRY CONCLUDE?

The extraordinary nature of the hosing down of the crime scene generated such controversy that Punjab provincial officials recognized that some response was necessary. A committee of inquiry was set up to look into the washing down of the crime scene. While acknowledging that a crime scene should in principle be preserved "at least till a detailed search and thorough forensic examination" has been carried out, it accepted the Rawalpindi police explanation that the decision to hose down the crime scene was formed on grounds of public order and not with any male fide intention.

The UN Commission did not agree to the finding.

THE HOSING ORDER

Analysts say it was either General Musharraf or some other official [Major General Nadeem Ijaz Ahmad, then Director General of Military Intelligence] who instructed Aziz to order the hosing down of the crime scene to wash away the evidence. However, Aziz said he did so independently for public order³¹

DIE-HARD WORKERS DIFFER

Not many diehard PPP workers buy the police explanation. They say the localities in Lahore where the ISI and FIA offices were attacked by suicide bombers remained sealed for more than a month. Every inch of the area was scanned. Then why was the Bhutto murder place cleared in no time?

³¹ Saud Aziz's interview 2009

A confidant of Bhutto's said that Musharraf wrote in his book "In the Line of Fire" that the clue to an attack on him was found through a mobile sim retrieved from the place of incident. He insists that the haste shown in hosing down the crime scene was quite mysterious. The mystery needs to be unfolded to reach the real planners of the conspiracy and Benazir Bhutto's killers.

RAHMAN MALIK: COWARD OR KILLER?

Early departure of Bhutto's back-up bulletproof black Mercedes from Liaquat Bagh is quite intriguing. There goes an allegation: Since Rahman Malik, Dr Babar Awan, Tauqir Zia and Farhatullah Babar, all in the back-up car, knew about the murder conspiracy beforehand, they fled the scene leaving Bhutto behind. Malik is specifically accused of being a part of the 'plot'. He drove away and did not return even after the blast. Scotland Yard has nothing to report on the theory.

The UN Commission report said Malik's departure from the scene at Rawalpindi after the attack allowed Bhutto's damaged vehicle to become isolated. The rapid departure of the only back up vehicle, in which Malik and other senior PPP leaders rode, was a serious security lapse. After moving a safe distance away from the scene of the attack, the occupants of the vehicle should have waited to see for themselves if Bhutto's vehicle was able to depart safely and if there was a need for a back up vehicle. As the back-up, their vehicle would have been a necessary part of the convoy whether Bhutto's vehicle was damaged or not³².

Malik described his role to the Commission as Bhutto's "national security advisor", not her physical security advisor. He also liaised with the federal authorities on behalf of Bhutto and participated as her representative in negotiations with General Musharraf and his aides. However, most PPP leaders understood Malik's role as encompassing all aspects of Ms Bhutto's security. Many also said that he coordinated with Bhutto's protection detail, including with Major Imtiaz and Tauqir Kaira. The Commission finds that, in addition to what

³² The UN Commission report paragraph 236

Malik himself described, he performed a significant role in the overall management of Bhutto's security. His letters to the authorities regarding threat warnings and requesting specific security support reflect this involvement³³.

The UN Commission has not fingered Malik for the killing, but for the disappearance of the back-up car and for faulty security arrangement. Only time will tell whether driving the car away from the scene and not returning indicated his involvement in the conspiracy to kill Bhutto or it was a sign of his cowardice. The charge of being directly involved in the murder plot might be politically motivated, but he owes a defence for the charge of cowardice to his party and the people at large.

CAR MATES RESPONSIBLE?

Immediately after Bhutto's murder, all the persons sitting with her in the Land Cruiser were censured for not stopping her from standing through the escape hatch. Makhdoom Amin Faheem said Bhutto should have been stopped from standing up after returning from the rally. "The responsibility for doing so first rested with the Security SP, and then with Naheed Khan, Safdar Abbasi and me respectively". Asked whether she would have accepted such a plea, Faheem said she would surely have. "We all are responsible"³⁴.

WHY GUNSHOTS?

Former caretaker interior minister Hamid Nawaz told me in an informal talk that the suicide attacker was well-trained. It was either the crowd or a push from behind or some fear that shook his hand holding the gun. Some said he was confused and could not maintain the right angle to open fire. The gunshots were not meant to hit anybody, but to gather the people around by diverting their attention towards him. More people around him entailed more damage. Acting as was planned, the second suicide bomber had to target Bhutto on standing through the escape hatch. It did not happen that way.

³³ The UN Commission report paragraph 65

³⁴ Amin Faheem's interview August 15, 2010, Hala, his hometown in Sindh province

The second bomber disappeared knowing that Bhutto had been killed. According to investigators, the skin of the face of suicide bomber was found on the rooftop of a building a few feet from the place of incident. The skin helped the investigators visualize clearly the features of the bomber's face. The face resembled that of the people belonging to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas region. A severed arm of the attacker with four fingers and a finger were also found separately. Experts said the same finger was on the trigger.

THE PLOT IS SPELLED OUT:

General Nawaz told me in an interview that he was quite distressed at Bhutto's murder. "Apparently, the mystery of Bhutto murder has been solved. Assuming that it was a big conspiracy, the chain of events should go like this:

- 1- A person or some force hired Baitullah Mahsood and his associates for Bhutto's murder. Mahsood was seemingly definitely involved in the killing at some level or the other.
- 2- If it was a conspiracy, then the place of murder was marked and the attackers had to stay there to wait for Bhutto's vehicle.
- 3- If it was a conspiracy, Bhutto's vehicle had to be stopped at some specific place. To do that some people might have been deployed there. [Apparently, the people gathered there belonged to PPP, and the killed and injured were party workers] Or a couple of people might have gathered the workers around and moved aside.
- 4- To make Bhutto emerge from her fortress like car, someone inside was needed to persuade her. We need to know whoever impelled Bhutto to stand through the escape hatch.
- 5- If that was a conspiracy, the conspirators must have studied Bhutto's psychology. They knew that a crowd would gather and raise slogans, and someone from inside would ask Bhutto to respond by coming out. And then Bhutto would be easy to target."

INVESTIGATION AFTER INVESTIGATION

A look at the confessional statements of the accused and the death plan

Several national – Inter Services Intelligence, Punjab Police, Special Branch, Central Intelligence Department, Federal Investigation Agency and Joint Investigation Cell -- and international agencies – Scotland Yard and the United Nations -- have looked into Benazir Bhutto's murder and come up with their reports. A glance at the reports – their summaries make up the chapter that follows – brings out similarities and dissimilarities in the findings. Seen in continuity, the reports winnow the chaff from grain.

A MINOR LEADS TO THE FIRST CLUE

A month after Bhutto's death, the civilian investigators say they were groping in the dark when they stumbled upon the first breakthrough with police in the northwestern city of Dera Ismail Khan in Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa [then North Western Frontier Province] arresting a 15-year-old boy, Aitezaz Shah, suspected of planning an attack on a Shia procession there. Usually such brainwashed persons do not break under torture, persuasion or greed, and, perhaps, out of fear that their handlers might harm their family if they did. But homesick, Shah did crack. His confession led to other arrests during raids in Lahore and Karachi. The police lost two of their officers in one such operation.

THE CHALLAN

Details of the challan the police submitted in the court:

THE ARRESTED SUSPECTS

1. Aitezaz Shah alias Saifullah, son of Syed Zaheer Ahmad Shah, caste Syed, resident of Mauza Sangal Kot, Mansehra, presently Metrowheel, Karachi
2. Sher Zaman, son of Akbar Khan, resident of Sega, South Waziristan
3. Hasnain Gul alias Ali, son of Muhammad Riaz, resident of Shah Jeewan Colony, Rawalpindi
4. Muhammad Rafaqat, son of Sabir Husain, caste Awan, resident of Ahmad Abad, Quaid-e-Azam Colony, Rawalpindi
5. Rasheed Ahmad alias Abdul Raheem Turabi, son of Qudrat Shah, resident of Sareekh Morozai Shabqadar, Charsadda

In addition, the Joint Investigation Team (JIT) charged Nasrullah, Abdullah, Baitullah Mehsud and Maulvi Sahib as “proclaimed offenders”. Baitullah Mehsud was killed in a drone attack in August 2009, and Nasrullah is reported to have been killed in an encounter in FATA.

Snippets from the confessional statements the arrested suspects made before a magistrate:

AITEZAZ SHAH:

- i. Was inspired by holy war fables
- ii. Signed up at a Taliban centre in Makeen (Waziristan) in May 2007 without his parent's permission.
- iii. Was trained by Sanaullah, the Ameer [head] of the Taliban center.
- iv. Enthused by the speeches of Maulvi Ishaq, a prayer leader at the centre.
- v. Was taken to a Taliban centre at Ladha and then to another centre at Tungai where Roza Din taught him how to drive and brainwashed him into launching a suicide attack.
- vi. Was told to launch a suicide strike on Benazir Bhutto by Roza Din in October 2007 to which he agreed.
- vii. Visited the house of Sher Zaman, a co-accused, in Seega, where he met Amjad of Swabi and Sabir of Kot Kai, who, too, were trained to attack Bhutto but could not as some of their companions had been arrested in Peshawar.
- viii. On the third day of Eid-ul-Azha, he visited Sher Zaman again and asked him as to why he was not being sent out for the suicide attack. Zaman told him his dispatch was delayed because the person whom Mehsud had given Rs 50,000 for bringing a suicide kit, had not turned up. Now that he was back and had provided the articles, he would be sent out for the suicide attack on Bhutto.
- ix. On 27.12.2007 night he learnt through BBC about a suicide attack on Bhutto. He came to know it was carried out by Saeed alias Bilal and Ikram of Barwand centre. Ikram walked away from the crime scene unscathed and returned alive. Dhelay centre head Wali Muhammad told him if Bhutto had survived the attack, he would have been sent next for a strike on her.
- x. Met Baitullah Mehsud four times.

- xi. On 16.01.2008, Wali Muhammad told him it was his turn for a suicide attack.
- xii. Was told to contact Sher Zaman on phone on reaching D.I. Khan.
- xiii. Was arrested there, followed by Zaman's arrest and recovery of explosives.
- xiv. During interrogation, identified Mehsud's voice in a recorded conversation provided by the Ministry of Interior.
- xv. Confessed his crime in a statement under section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

SHER ZAMAN

- i. Endorsed Aitezaz Shah's statement.
- ii. Learnt through Ameer Nawaz Mehsud etc. that they were planning to kill Bhutto.
- iii. Also heard them talking to Baitullah Mehsud on phone.
- iv. Was told by them that they had made preparation for killing her in every city of the country.
- v. Was paid Rs 7,000 and asked to mark some spot in Larkana for an attack on Bhutto.
- vi. Visited Karachi in January 2008 on Faiz Muhammad's call for some robbery to collect funds for Mehsud.

(A Rs150-million burglary did take place in the area of Police Station Preedi, Karachi, FIR No. 8/2008 u/s 395/PPC)

- vii. Was taking Aitezaz Shah to Faiz Muhammad in Karachi for a suicide attack on the direction of Zain-ud-Din of Ladha.

HASNAIN GUL

- i. Was arrested from near Special Communication Organization Office, Misarial Road, Rawalpindi on 07.02.2008 at 8.20 am.
- ii. Articles recovered: (1) One hand grenade (2) One Motorola mobile phone (3) One Nokia-1112 mobile phone.
(Case FIR No. 76 dated 07.02.2008 u/s 3/4 ESA & 13/20/65 AO, PS, Westridge, Rawalpindi)

- iii. Got recovered a pair of joggers, a shawl and a headgear (belonging to suicide attacker Saeed alias Bilal) and a CPU from his house.
- iv. Enrolled at a seminary in Wesa Hazro village.
- v. Got training in arms in 2005 at a Taliban centre of Qari Abbas in Miran Shah.
- vi. During training, he came into contact with Nadir Khan alias Qari Ismail, head of Madrasa Haqqania, Akora Khatak Group, who had close links with Baitullah Mehsud.
- vii. Expelled from the madrasa on the charge of being involved in jihadi activities, he got admission in Madrasa Muhammadia, China Chowk, Islamabad. He described how a friend of his had been killed when Musharraf ordered an assault on the Red Mosque in Islamabad in July 2007. Gul decided to avenge his friend's death and persuaded his cousin, Muhammad Rafaqat, to join him.
- viii. Met Nadir alias Qari Ismail, NasrUllah alias Ahmad, Ibad-ur-Rehman aliases Nauman and Usman and Abdullah alias Saddam in Akora Khatak who shared his anger against the government over the Lal Masjid and Waziristan operations. Decided to launch suicide attacks.
- ix. Was selected to identify targets in Rawalpindi.
- x. The suicide jacket and suicide attackers were provided by Nadir alias Qari Ismail through his accomplices including Faiz Muhammad alias Kiskat.
- xi. Managed suicide attacks on a colonel's vehicle at R.A. Bazaar Chowk [Square] on 04.09.2007 and a police picket on Golf Road in Rawalpindi on 30.10.2007.
- xii. Planned several suicide attempts on [minister] Sheikh Rasheed Ahmad's life but could not accomplish them.
- xiii. Visited Akora Khatak in November 2007, where Qari Ismail told him that they had been directed to kill Benazir Bhutto "whom the US had sent to eliminate Taliban and mujahideen".

- xiv. Nadir alias Qari Ismail, Nasrullah alias Ahmad and Hasnain Gul planned to kill Bhutto through suicide attack in election rallies.
- xv. Rehearsed a suicide attack on Bhutto in Pubbi, Naushera on 12.12.2007.
- xvi. Suicide attack could not be carried out in Peshawar on 26.12.2007 due to tight security.
- xvii. About five or six days before Eid-ul-Azha in 2007, he and his cousin Rafaqat received Nasrullah alias Ahmad from Akora Khatak and took him home in Rawalpindi on their taxi No BK-1427.
- xviii. Reconnoitered Liaqat Bagh and then went to Islamabad to see the Parliament House and the Lal Masjid.
- xix. Nasrullah alias Ahmad went back. Hasnain remained in contact with Qari Ismail and Nasrullah on phone.
- xx. He and his cousin Rafaqat received the two designated suicide bombers, Bilal and Ikramullah at the bus station who had travelled with Nasrullah alias Ahmed and took them home on their taxi. The morning Bhutto was due to give her speech, Rafaqat and Nasrullah took another look at Liaqat Bagh while Gul gave Bilal and Ikramullah suicide jackets, pistols, ammunition and hand grenades. The plan was simple. Bilal would stand by the exit gate and try to kill Bhutto. If he failed, Ikramullah would try to kill her instead. Bilal also put on Hasnain's black sunglasses.
- xxi. A suicide attack inside the park could not be carried out due to rush.
- xxii. Heard firing followed by an explosion.
- xxiii. Nasrullah left for Daewoo bus station whereas Ikramullah could not be located.
- xxiv. Left for home with Rafaqat and on the way heard about Benazir Bhutto's death.

MUHAMMAD RAFAQAT

- i. Was arrested from Misarial Road, Rawalpindi, near SCO Office on 07.02.2008.

- ii. Articles recovered: (1) Detonator (2) 24 30-bore live cartridges (3) One 30-bore cartridge missed (4) Taxi No. BK-1427 FX Model 1986 black & yellow colour (5) Registration Book of the taxi (6) Rout Permit of the taxi
- iii. Both Hasnain Gul and Rafaqat confessed their crime in their statements.

RASHEED AHMAD ALIAS ABDUL RAHIM TURABI

- i. Was arrested on 14.02.2008 by the Joint Investigation Team (JIT).
- ii. Studied at Madrasa Haqqania, Akora Khatak for two years where he came into contact with Nadir alias Qari Ismail, Nasrullah alias Ahmad, Abdullah alias Saddam and Abad-ur-Rehman aliases Nauman and Usman -- all linked to Baitullah Mehsud.
- iii. Enrolled at Madrasa Munba-ul-Aloom, Miran Shah and received jihadi [militant] training.
- iv. On 20.12.2007 Nadir alias Qari Ismail, Nasrullah alias Ahmad and Abdullah alias Saddam met him in Room No 11 of the seminary [Madrasa Haqqania] and told him Baitullah Mehsud had summoned them for an important task.
- v. They came back after two days along with a young boy of 20 and introduced him as Saeed alias Bilal who would launch a suicide attack on Bhutto. They told him Mehsud had paid Rs 400,000 to Qari Ismail to cover the costs.
- vi. After about 15 days, when he visited Akora Khatak, he met Qari Ismail, Nasrullah alias Ahmad and Abdullah and Saddam in Room No 83 of the madrasa. Abdullah alias Saddam told him that Qari Ismail, Ahmad and Hasnain Gul had had it done through suicide attacker Saeed alias Bilal.
- vii. Also owned up to planting missiles (rockets) along with some other persons in the fields for firing them on the Kamra Complex.
- viii. He confessed his crime in his statement.

CONGRATULATION

Shortly after Bhutto's death, the government put online what it claimed was a secretly recorded phone conversation in Pushto language between an unidentified person called Maulvi Sahib [phone number 0965-238387] and Ameer Sahib [Baitullah Mehsud] [phone number 0928-230493] on 28.12.2007 at 9:14 am in which Mehsud was heard congratulating the Maulvi on a job well-done.

Telephone number 0928-230493 is in the name of Mazharud-Din s/o Rehmat Ullah r/o Dara POL, Makeen-Razmak. Telephone number 0965-238387 is in the name of Haji Shah Wali Khan s/o Muhammad Shah r/o Kinni Guram, South Waziristan.

This is the transcript of the tape.

Maulvi Sahib: Asalaam Aleikum.

Ameer Sahib [Baitullah Mehsud]: Waaleikum Asalaam.

MS: Chief, how are you?

BM: I am fine.

MS: Congratulations, I just got back during the night.

BM: Congratulations to you, were they our men?

MS: Yes they were ours.

BM: Who were they?

MS: There was Saeed; there was Bilal from Badar [Barond] and Ikramullah.

BM: The three of them did it?

MS: Ikramullah and Bilal did it.

BM: Then congratulations.

MS: Where are you? I want to meet you.

BM: I am at Makeen [a town in the south Waziristan tribal area], come over, I am at Anwar Shah's house.

MS: OK, I'll come.

BM: Don't inform their house for the time being.

MS: OK.

BM: It was a tremendous effort. They were really brave boys who killed her.

MS: Mashallah. When I come I will give you all the details.

BM: I will wait for you. Congratulations, once again congratulations.

MS: Congratulations to you.

BM: Anything I can do for you?

MS: Thank you very much.

BM: Assalaam Aleikum.

MS: Waaleikum Assalaam.

Aitezaz Shah who had met and spoken with Baitullah Mehsud confirmed that the voice on the tape was his.

In their statements, the suspects also disclosed the telephone numbers through which they remained in contact with their terrorist network. Accordingly, the telephone data – reportedly provided to the police by the ISI -- indicating their contacts before and on the day of occurrence was collected and placed on record. If we join the dots, the whole plan shows up.

CONTACTS WITH BAITULLAH MEHSUD

Senator Dr Safdar Abbasi says that following Baitullah Mehsud's edict for Benazir Bhutto's murder he contacted Senator Saleh Shah, a friend of the Taliban chief, who having talked to him quoted him as saying he was not in favour of laying hands on women. Some people say Bhutto's security advisor Rehman Malik too got in touch with Mehsud on the edict.

Benazir Bhutto's murder and South Waziristan

Wana: Suspect Aetizaz Shah came to a Taliban centre here and received training from its head Sanallah. Maulvi Ishaq who persuaded Shah to go for a suicide attack on Bhutto led prayers here. Nadir alias Qari Ismail, Nasrullah alias Ahmad and Abdullah alias Saddam met Baitullah Mehsud here, received Rs 400,000 from him and returned along with Saeed alias Bilal.

Ladha: Suspect Aetizaz Shah received training here. Zainuddin Haqqani is deputy head of the centre here. Saman Khail Ladha's Shamim picked Shah from the Taliban centre here and handed him over to the head of suicide bombing centre in Tangai

Patola Sherkai: Amir Nawaz Mehsud from here was involved in the conspiracy to kill Bhutto. He would also mastermind bank heists to arrange funds for Baitullah Mehsud.

Kanigoram: The 'maulvi sahib' in the intercept used a landline number installed in the name of Shah Wali Khan s/o Muhammad Khan who came from here.

Shaktai: Tangnai suicide bombing centre head Roza Din lived here. He trained Aetizaz Shah in driving a car and gave him the target of a suicide attack on Bhutto



Benazir Bhutto's murder and North Waziristan

Makeen: A Taliban stronghold. Baitullah Mehsud received the news about Benazir Bhutto's murder here.
 Suspect Aetizaz Shah was persuaded here by Maulvi Ishaq for an attack on her.

Brund: A camp here is headed by Azizullah alias Izzullah Maulvi. Suspected suicide bombers Saeed alias Bilal and Ikramullah were trained here. Wali Muhammad alias Umri told Aetizaz Shah that the camp trained the suicide bombers

Razmak: A place frequented by Taliban. Baitullah Mehsud would use a mobile sim issued in the name of Mazharuddin from Razmak.

Miranshah: Arrested suspect Abdur Rahim Turabi received armed training at a seminary named Madrasa Manbaul Uloom here



PARADISE PROMISED

Those who motivated the Bhutto killers
Intelligence agencies' reports

Noted Urdu-language writer Abdul Halim Sharar, in his novel Firdous-e-Bareen, gives a biographical account of a youth lured and captured by Sheikh-al-Jibaaal Hasan bin Sabah's men (1034-1124) and then forced into his assassination machinery. The assassins who would kill Sabah's political rivals, princes, rulers and emirs were promised entry to paradise. To convince his followers, Sabah had actually constructed a 'paradise' complete with beautiful damsels acting as hoors. The followers were drugged and then taken to this 'paradise' where they lazed in luxury of beautiful surroundings in the stupor of hashish. After a day or two, they were drugged again and brought back to 'earthly life'. Once convinced about the promise of paradise, these youths were ready to die at command of the master of paradise. The group continued the reign of terror for several generations. Today Taliban and their suicide bombers are said to follow in Sabah's footsteps. Agencies investigating Bhutto's assassination have put together details of Sabah, his abettors and assassins of today.

THE GANG OF KILLERS

A March 7, 2008 letter by the additional inspector-general of CID, Punjab refers to a Joint Investigation Team (JIT) report that carries details of the handlers and trainers of Benazir Bhutto's suspected killers:

Maulana Ishaq of Makeen, South Waziristan	A prayer leader in Makeen who motivated Aitezaz Shah into volunteering for a suicide attack
Shamim of Saman Khel Ladha, South Waziristan	On the recommendation of Sanaullah, the head of Taliban centre in Makeen, he took Aitezaz Shah to the head of suicide centre in Tangai.
Roza Din of Shaktai, South Waziristan	Head of suicide centre in Tangai. Teaches suicide attackers how to drive. Gave Aitezaz Shah the target of suicide attack on Benazir Bhutto.
Zainuddin Haqqani alias Chittu of Maidan, Madrasa Haqqania, Akora Khatak	On the insinuation of Ladha suicide centre's deputy head Wali Muhammad, tasked Sher Zaman to take Aitezaz Shah to Karachi, telling him that Baitullah Mehsud had given Shamim Rs 50,000 for suicide jacket and ammunition to kill Benazir Bhutto. Delivered four grenades, half kg explosive material and a detonator at Sher Zaman's house. The ammunition was recovered on Sher Zaman's tip.
Azizullah alias Izzullah Maulvi, Brond, South Waziristan	Bhutto's attackers Saeed alias Bilal and Ikramullah are from his centre
Wali Muhammad alias Umri Wazir Gai Dhela, South	Head of suicide centre in Dhela. Took Aitezaz Shah, Amjad and Sabir from Tangai centre to Sher Zaman's house. He would talk the would-be suicide attackers

Waziristan	into believing that the US had tasked Benazir Bhutto to crush Taliban and that Islam prohibited women's rule. Introduced Aitezaz Shah to Baitullah Mehsud. Would take funds from Mehsud for his centre. Told Shah that those who attacked Bhutto were from Barond. Greeted his students on the success of the attack telling them that Saeed alias Bilal made the suicide strike while Ikramullah returned unscathed. Sent Aitezaz Shah to Dera Ismail Khan on January 16, 2008 for an attack and told him Sher Zaman would take him to Karachi.
Shahmal alias Umar Fidai of Khan Karma	A confidant of Qari Husain's. Went 13 times for a suicide attack but didn't get his turn. Told Aitezaz Shah that 85 boys had carried out successful suicide attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Amjad Fidai of Swabi	Trained for a strike on Bhutto at Dhela centre
Sabir Mahmood Fidai	Trained for a strike on Bhutto at Dhela centre
Faiz Muhammad of S Waziristan, now lives at Sohrab Goth, Karachi	Baitullah Mehsud's representative in Karachi. Would plan robberies to collect funds for him. Called Sher Zaman for a heist and asked him to bring Aitezaz Shah along.
Ameer Nawaz Mehsud of Patodla Sher Kai Ladha, S Waziristan	While planning for an attack on Benazir Bhutto, told Sher Zaman that arrangements were in place in all cities. Gave him Rs 7,000 to scout for a place in Larkana. Would keep in touch with Baitullah Mehsud and commit bank robberies for him.
Siraj Mehsud	Ameer Nawaz Mehsud's associate

Abideen Mehsud	Ameer Nawaz Mehsud's associate
Nek Daraz	Ameer Nawaz Mehsud's associate
Gul Hasan Afridi of a place near Jamrod Gate in the tribal areas	Would remain in contact with Baitullah Mehsud. Gives shelter to Taliban at Jamrod Gate. It was at his outhouse that Ameer Nawaz had told Sher Zaman about the plan to kill Bhutto. Conceals ammunition in cars for transportation to different areas. Also smuggles drugs.
Nazir Khan of Pando, Tank, originally of Makeen	A confidant of Baitullah Mehsud's. He and Ali Afghani would raid Nato containers and banks for Mehsud.
Ali Afghani	A confidant of Baitullah Mehsud's. Along with Nazir Khan, he would raid Nato containers and banks for Mehsud.
Qari Husain Mehsud of Sainkai Ghazni, South Waziristan	Baitullah Mehsud's deputy. Remained associated with the now defunct Anjuman-e-Sipah-e-Sahaba. Trains youth for suicide attacks.
Baitullah Mehsud	Chief of the Tehreek-e-Taliban

HENNAED HANDS

The pieces collected from the crime scene by the Punjab Police included hands (of the suspected suicide bomber) on which he had applied henna perhaps as a celebrative decoration before the journey to paradise. National Database and Registration Authority, charged with the establishment of a new registration system for the entire population of Pakistan, had no record of the fingerprints of either the suspected suicide bomber or of the arrested suspects.

SPECIAL INVESTIGATION GROUP

A special probe report by the FIA



In this report, senior officials of Special Investigation Group of the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) feared that a third bullet by the shooter hit Benazir Bhutto after which her head banged into the lever of sunroof [escape hatch] and she collapsed in the vehicle. This report came on January 6, 2008, only days after the incident, and so, its findings were closer to eyewitness accounts. Then thought to be based on facts, the report was rubbished by Scotland Yard and the UN Commission after scientific analysis. This report is still relevant for history and is usually cited in conspiracy theories.

PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION

SIG Explosive Expert Report [Edited and abridged version]

GENERAL:

A suicide bomber blew himself up near former prime minister Benazir Bhutto's vehicle on December 27, 2007 at about 5:11 pm. According to eyewitnesses and evidences, bullet shots by the suicide bomber or his accomplices preceded the blast. Bhutto and 21 others - including a police official Naeem Asghar - died and about 70 people - including six police officials - were injured. PPP leader Makhdoom Amin Fahim and Bhutto's political secretary Naheed Khan who accompanied her in her bulletproof jeep remained safe. At the time of fire, Bhutto was standing through the sunroof [escape hatch]. The crime scene was washed down at about 6 pm on December 27, 2007. There is a likelihood of vital evidence having been lost in hosing the place down.

VISUAL OBSERVATIONS:

Eyewitnesses reported hearing three to four gunshots before the blast which took place near Benazir Bhutto's vehicle. The shell casing recovered by the SIG team from the blast site also substantiates this claim. Inspection of the casing indicates they were all new bullets as it had no corrosion or damage.

Police said visible ejection marks were also found on the casing and gun propellant traces were also visible inside the casing. Police say that the murder weapon, a Chinese made 30-mm Norico handgun with ID No. 311-90 was found at the crime scene.

Two pistols, recovered by the police from the crime scene, could not be examined as they had been handed over to another agency.

The head and fingers of suicide bomber were also recovered from the crime scene by the police.

A few steel pellets were also recovered from the crime scene by the SIG team. Pellets holes made on the VIP vehicles and adjacent walls were all identical. The size of these pellets is approximately 0.5 to 3.5 inches.

The trajectory and angles indicate that the pellets could not spread outwards. The metallurgy and size of the pellets is identical to the pellets recovered after the suicide bombing in Karachi on 19 October 2007. The intended target of that attack was said to be Benazir Bhutto.

Bhutto's vehicle was examined in the Police Lines, Rawalpindi. The vehicle was identified as Toyota Land Cruiser with a bulletproof body and windows with two armor plates on left and right side of sunroof for flank protection. The right side of the armor plate was fitted with two opening handles with their nuts protruding outward approximately 3-4 cms.

The sunroof was open from front and rear with no protection. There was no threat analysis and the VIP was not restrained from getting out of the vehicle through the sunroof by the other occupants of the vehicle. Had she stayed in the vehicle, this tragic incident could have been averted.

The vehicle was severely damaged in the rear left with a lot of pellets.

The trajectory pattern of the pellets was regular and narrow hinting that the blast occurred just adjacent to the left side of vehicle. Some exit holes were noticed on the vehicle due to the ricochet of pellets from its bulletproof body. A large amount of blood was found on the seat just below the sunroof. Some brain material was also noticed hinting at the skull fracture.

No blast crater, but some pellet holes were observed on the epicenter. It indicates the position of suicide bomber at the time of explosion. Apparently, he was very close to the vehicle when he detonated the explosives. No piece of any type of shell or mortar bomb or electric wire was recovered from the crime scene.

As per eyewitness reports two to three gunshots were fired towards Bhutto's vehicle with the intention of killing her.

The attacker's line of fire was established with laser beam technology and effort was made to locate trajectory of fire along with bullet marks. Two separate bullet entry points were located.

The first mark was observed on a metal billboard towards east-west of the vehicle at a distance of 147 feet with entry and

exit points. The second was observed in the same direction but with a high angled trajectory at a distance of 147 feet. The second bullet broke the glass of a window. Any other bullet which was fired is likely to have hit Bhutto.

However, the medical report provided by the hospital authorities does not substantiate this evidence. As per medical report there was a wound in the right temporoparietal (the temporal and parietal bones or lobes) region measuring about 5x3 cm just above the pinna (the visible part of the ear that resides outside of the head) of right ear.

This wound caused depressed skull fracture on right temporoparietal bone measuring approximately 35 mm. A team of doctors were asked about the probable cause of wound. The team unanimously agreed that only high kinetic energy generated by some foreign body could cause such an injury. The size of wound is small if compared with the damage. Variables of momentum (Momentum = mass x velocity) reveal that mass of the object which struck the head of the victim is small but it caused severe damage to the skull.

About 50 Newton Force is required to break a hairy skull. The other variable is only velocity; therefore, the probable answer is that some very high velocity object had struck the head of victim on right side. However, the suicide bomber is said to have struck the vehicle on rear left side where, as per medical report, no injury was reported. Most probably, the victim had moved her head towards further right and exposed it to the line of fire. In the light of medical report no surrounding wounds or burns were seen which indicates that the face or body of the victim was not exposed to the blast.

No blood stain/human tissue or fiber was observed on the handles of the sunroof even with the use of magnifying glass and no striker sleeve was found from the crime scene.

MODUS OPERANDI

Reportedly, Bhutto was leaving Liaqat Bagh, Rawalpindi after addressing a political rally on the evening of 27 December 2007.

Ignoring all security threats to her life she came out of the sunroof of the vehicle and started waving to the crowd. Taking

advantage of this security lapse the suicide bomber stepped into the crowd and tried to reach her vehicle.

When the vehicle reached Liaquat Road and was just 69 feet from the VIP gate of Liaquat Bagh, the attacker started shooting at her with his handgun. According to eyewitnesses two to three shots were fired at her with apparent motive to assassinate her. Witnesses say she fell inside the vehicle due to either bullet injuries or ducking down into the vehicle and being struck one of two levers on sunroof towards right side of the vehicle.

However, no blood stains were found on the levers during inspection of the vehicle. The height of the vehicle is about 7 feet and the length 15.4 feet. The sunroof from the seat is about 3 feet. It means that the victim was exposed in the open for almost two to three feet with no protection in the rear and front.

The shooter was standing just eight to ten feet from the victim and, according to witnesses fired two to three bullets.

Within a fraction of a second after shooting a blast occurred, just eight to ten feet from the victim. The brunt of the blast was faced by the bulletproof vehicle in the rear left. After examining the intensity of the blast it is calculated that about three to five kgs of high explosives were used that generated a hammer-like impact which could have broken Bhutto's neck and smashed her head into pieces. However, none of this was mentioned in the medical report. It is, therefore, assumed that at the time of blast the victim was forcefully pulled down into the vehicle. The triggering mechanism of the suicide bomber seems to be manual. However, no evidence recovered from the crime scene substantiates this assumption.

BLAST EFFECT

The detonation waves struck the VIP vehicle in the rear left, being closest to the epicenter of the blast. Though it could not penetrate the armour, it resulted in a powerful jerk to the vehicle. The detonation waves deflected under mach effect from the armor plate of the vehicle and struck the people in the surrounding killing 21 others. The vehicle and the suicide bomber faced the brunt of the blast. The facial scalp and fingers

of the suspected bomber were collected 120 feet from the epicenter. Steel pellets which were embedded in the layers of explosives made holes in the vehicle and adjacent walls. The blast waves traveled 150 feet.

TYPE OF EXPLOSIVE

Going by the intensity and the waves of the blast, the 3-5 kg explosive seems to be of good quality but its nomenclature would be ascertained from the laboratory.

LINKAGES/OPINION

A man fired shots with 30-bore (7.63 mm) pistol killing two police officials at Police Training School, Sargodha on 02 August 2007 but, having been short-circuited, his jacket did not explode.

The use of primary and secondary devices on 19 October 2007 in Karachi was aimed at ensuring Bhutto was dead but tight security and use of bulletproof truck foiled the attempt at her life. However, this time, the security was flawed and the party people mismanaged the whole affair. Knowing well, the sunroof is not fully protected, she was allowed to stand through it which resulted in her death. This tragic incident could have been averted by enforcing a foolproof security plan and implementing the code of conduct signed between both the parties.

The blast occurred at 5.11 pm. Bhutto was shifted to a hospital just 3-4 km away around 5:35 pm causing a huge loss of blood in the same vehicle as had come under attack instead of an ambulance with a doctor.


It was 43rd suicide attack in the country in the year 2007. Suicide bombings increased manifold in the aftermath of the Lal Masjid incident.

LEADS

Modus operandi and the triggering mechanism used in 15 suicide bombings is manual and mechanical using the Striker Sleeve MUS2 with same lot number and factory code except little variation of the year of manufacturing. It is a clear indicator that one terrorist group is involved in almost all these incidents.

NETWORK OF SEVEN

1.	Nasrullah@Ahmed	(0304-9684538)
2.	Muhammad@Rafiqat	(0331-5013836)
3.	Nadir@Qari Ismael	(0344-6654236)
4.	Ibad-ur-Rehman@Nauman@Usman	(0344-9666465), (0346-9442498)
5.	Husnain Gul@Ali	(0332-5609682)
6.	Maulvi sahib	(0965-238387- Kaniigram, South- Waziristan)
7.	Ameer Sahib(Bait Ullah Mehsud)	(0928-230493- Maken, Razmak)



SCOTLAND YARD REPORT



Following Benazir Bhutto's assassination, the Pakistani government initially said there was no need for outside help with the investigation into the murder. But then in the face of people's discontentment and to fend off allegations against it before February 18 elections, the Pervez Musharraf government asked the United Kingdom for sending investigators from Scotland Yard to help in the inquiry. It was not the first time Scotland Yard came to the help of Pakistan after an assassination. Back in 1951 Pakistan asked the UK for help after the country's first prime minister, Liaqat Ali Khan, was shot dead in what was then called the Company Bagh (park) in Rawalpindi. The park was renamed Liaqat Bagh in his honour. Fifty-six years later it was in this same park that Benazir Bhutto's attacker, or attackers, struck. The parallels between 1951 and December 2007 go beyond location. After Khan's death, many opposition leaders said outside investigators were needed because they believed that some government officials were themselves involved in the murder conspiracy. As in the case of Bhutto, the government back in 1951 initially rejected outside help before agreeing that an expert from Scotland Yard come to Pakistan. But for reasons never disclosed, the British investigator was asked to leave Pakistan only few weeks into his investigations. The Pakistani authorities never revealed anything about the investigation. Move on four and a half decades to September, 1996 when another politician and the Benazir Bhutto's brother, Murtaza Bhutto, was killed outside his home in Karachi and the demand for help from Scotland Yard was again heard in the country. Bhutto, then prime minister, enlisted the help of British Home Office forensic experts and former experts of Scotland Yard. But not long after the President, Farooq Leghari, sacked Bhutto's government, which stood charged with corruption, and sent the British experts back home. To help clear up the confusion surrounding Benazir Bhutto's assassination, the 11 Scotland Yard experts came up with a technically, forensically, scientifically and medically sound report but they overlooked political and administrative aspects.

ASSASSINATION

The findings of a Scotland Yard inquiry into how Benazir Bhutto died after being attacked during a political rally in Rawalpindi were presented to the Government of Pakistan on February 08, 2008.

The conclusions of the inquiry were outlined in a detailed report handed over to interim Interior Minister Hamid Nawaz by Detective Superintendent John MacBrayne, accompanied by a senior official from the British High Commission, during a meeting in Islamabad.

The text of the executive summary of the report is as follows:

On the 27th December 2007, Mohtarma Benazir BHUTTO, the leader of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), died as a result of being attacked in Rawalpindi, Pakistan.

Following discussions between the Prime Minister and President Musharraf, it was agreed that officers from the Metropolitan Police Counter Terrorism Command (SO15) should support the investigation into Ms Bhutto's death. The primary focus of the Scotland Yard team was to assist the Pakistani authorities in establishing the cause and circumstances of Ms Bhutto's death. The wider investigation to establish culpability has remained entirely a matter for the Pakistani authorities.

The SO15 team was led by a Detective Superintendent Senior Investigating Officer, and comprised two forensic experts, an expert in analysing and assessing video media and an experienced investigating officer. The team arrived in Pakistan on 4th January 2008 and spent two and a half weeks conducting extensive enquiries. During the course of their work, the team were joined by other specialists from the United Kingdom.

The UK team were given extensive support and co-operation by the Pakistani authorities, Ms Bhutto's family, and senior officials from Ms Bhutto's party.

The task of establishing exactly what happened was complicated by the lack of an extended and detailed search of the crime scene, the absence of an autopsy, and the absence of recognised body recovery and victim identification processes. Nevertheless, the evidence that is available is sufficient for reliable conclusions to be drawn.

Within the overall objective, a particular focus has been placed on establishing the actual cause of death, and whether there were one or more attackers in the immediate vicinity of Ms Bhutto.

THE CAUSE OF DEATH

Considerable reliance has been placed upon the X-rays taken at Rawalpindi General Hospital following Ms Bhutto's death. Given their importance, the x-rays have been independently verified as being of Ms Bhutto by comparison with her dental x-rays. Additionally, a valuable insight was gained from the accounts given by the medical staff involved in her treatment, and from those members of Ms Bhutto's family who washed her body before burial.

Ms Bhutto's only apparent injury was a major trauma to the right side of the head. The UK experts all exclude this injury being an entry or exit wound as a result of gunshot. The only X-ray records, taken after her death, were of Ms Bhutto's head. However, the possibility of a bullet wound to her mid or lower trunk can reasonably be excluded. This is based upon the protection afforded by the armoured vehicle in which she was travelling at the time of the attack, and the accounts of her family and hospital staff who examined her.

The limited X-ray material, the absence of a full post mortem examination and CT scan, have meant that the UK Home Office pathologist, Dr Nathaniel Cary, who has been consulted in this case, is unable categorically to exclude the possibility of there being a gunshot wound to the upper trunk or neck. However, when his findings are put alongside the accounts of those who had close contact with Ms Bhutto's body, the available evidence suggests that there was no gunshot injury. Importantly, Dr Cary excludes the possibility of a bullet to the neck or upper trunk as being a relevant factor in the

actual cause of death, when set against the nature and extent of her head injury.

In his report Dr Cary states:

- "the only tenable cause for the rapidly fatal head injury in this case is that it occurred as the result of impact due to the effects of the bomb-blast."
- "in my opinion Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto died as a result of a severe head injury sustained as a consequence of the bomb-blast and due to head impact somewhere in the escape hatch of the vehicle."

Given the severity of the injury to Ms Bhutto's head, the prospect that she inadvertently hit her head whilst ducking down into the vehicle can be excluded as a reasonable possibility.

High explosives of the type typically used in this sort of device, detonate at a velocity between 6000 and 9000 metres per second. This means that when considering the explosive quantities and distances involved, such an explosion would generate significantly more force than would be necessary to provoke the consequences as occurred in this case.

It is also important to comment upon the construction of the vehicle. It was fitted with B6 grade armour and designed to withstand gunfire and bomb-blast. It is an unfortunate and misleading aspect of this case that the roof escape hatch has frequently been referred to as a sunroof. It is not. It is designed and intended to be used solely as a means of escape. It has a solid lip with a depth of 9cm.

Ms Bhutto's injury is entirely consistent with her head impacting upon the lip of the escape hatch. Detailed analysis of the media footage provides supporting evidence. Ms Bhutto's head did not completely disappear from view until 0.6 seconds before the blast. She can be seen moving forward and to the right as she ducked down into the vehicle. Whilst her exact head position at the time of the detonation can never be ascertained, the overwhelming conclusion must be that she did not succeed in getting her head entirely below the lip of the escape hatch when the explosion occurred.

HOW MANY PEOPLE WERE INVOLVED IN THE IMMEDIATE ATTACK?

There has been speculation that two individuals were directly involved in the attack. The suggestion has been that one suspect fired shots, and a second detonated the bomb. All the available evidence points toward the person who fired shots and the person who detonated the explosives being one and the same person.

- Body parts from only one individual remain unidentified. Expert opinion provides strong evidence that they originate from the suicide bomber.
- Analysis of the media footage places the gunman at the rear of the vehicle and looking down immediately before the explosion. The footage does not show the presence of any other potential bomber.
- This footage when considered alongside the findings of the forensic explosive expert, that the bombing suspect was within 1 to 2 metres of the vehicle towards its rear and with no person or other obstruction between him and the vehicle, strongly suggests that the bomber and gunman were at the same position. It is virtually inconceivable that anyone who was where the gunman can clearly be seen on the media footage, could have survived the blast and escaped.

The inevitable conclusion is that there was one attacker in the immediate vicinity of the vehicle in which Bhutto was travelling.

In essence, all the evidence indicates that one suspect has fired the shots before detonating an improvised explosive device. At the time of the attack this person was standing close to the rear of Ms Bhutto's vehicle. The blast caused a violent collision between her head and the escape hatch area of the vehicle, causing a severe and fatal head injury.

THE UN COMMISSION REPORT



Benazir Bhutto wanted the UN to investigate the Karsaz attack in Karachi. And so, when Bhutto was killed, the PPP demanded that the UN probe the assassination. Both the Musharraf government and the UN spurned the request. February 18, 2008 elections brought the PPP into power, which, in consensus with all the parties in the parliament, went for an inquiry by the UN. The Secretary-General appointed Ambassador Heraldo Muñoz, the Permanent Representative of Chile to the United Nations as head of the Commission as well as Mr Marzuki Darusman, a former Attorney-General of Indonesia, and Mr Peter FitzGerald, a former Deputy Commissioner of the Irish Police, the Garda Síochána. The inquest cost \$2.4 million, shared almost equally by Pakistan and some friendly countries. The Commission commenced its activities on 1 July 2009 and provided its report to the Secretary-General on 30 March 2010. The Commission conducted more than 250 interviews, meeting with Pakistani officials including General Pervez Musharraf and Gen Ashfaq Parvaiz Kayani, and private citizens, foreign citizens with knowledge of the events in Pakistan and members of Scotland Yard team that investigated aspects of the assassination. The Commission also reviewed hundreds of documents, videos, photographs and other documentary material provided by Pakistan's federal and provincial authorities and others. The report addresses the political and security context of Bhutto's return to Pakistan; the security arrangements made for her by the Pakistani authorities, who bore the primary responsibility to protect her, as well as her political party, the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP); events immediately before and after the assassination; and the criminal investigations and actions of the Pakistani government and police in the aftermath of the crime. A profile of the UN Commission head, main findings of the panel's report and the details about the officials charge-sheeted in the report follow.

HERALDO MUÑOZ VALENZUELA, HEAD OF THE UN COMMISSION

Heraldo Muñoz Valenzuela (born July 22, 1948) is a Chilean politician and diplomat, the former Chilean Ambassador to the United Nations, and currently Assistant Secretary General, Assistant Administrator, and Regional Director for Latin America and the Caribbean of the United Nations Development Programme.

Muñoz was born in Santiago. In 1973, under the Salvador Allende government, he served as National Supervisor of the People's Stores (Almacenes del Pueblo) until the coup d'état of September 11, 1973. He holds a Ph.D. from Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver, Colorado (1978), a Diploma in International Relations from the Catholic University of Chile (1975, graduated with honors), and also took courses at Harvard University. He received a B.A. with a major in Political Science at the State University of New York, Oswego. Recipient of the "Distinguished Alumnus Award" from the Graduate School of International Studies at the University of Denver (1991), he was bestowed with the title of Doctor Honoris Causa from the State University of New York (1996). He has received fellowships from: Resources for the Future, the Ford Foundation, the Tinker Foundation, the Twentieth Century Fund, and the MacArthur Foundation. He was a Ph.D. fellow at the Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C. (1977). He later taught at the University of Chile's Institute of International Studies.

He co-founded the Party for Democracy (PPD) and participated in the executive committee of the campaign to vote "no" on a second term for Augusto Pinochet during the 1988 plebiscite. During the administration of Patricio Aylwin, Muñoz was made permanent representative for Chile to the Organization of American States, (1990-1994) and ambassador to Brazil (1994-1998) during the government of Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle. At the start of the administration of Ricardo Lagos, Muñoz was appointed Deputy Minister of Foreign Relations until January 2002, when he was designated Minister Secretary

General of Government, a position from which he exercised considerable influence over policy, advising Lagos. He left the ministry in 2003, after being appointed Chile's ambassador to the United Nations, Permanent Representative. In May 2010, Muñoz was designated by UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon as Assistant Secretary General, Assistant Administrator, and Regional Director for Latin America and the Caribbean of the United Nations Development Programme.

Chile was elected a temporary member of the United Nations Security Council for 2003 and 2004, while Muñoz served as ambassador. Muñoz was chairman of a special UN committee on al Qaeda sanctions, during which he noted reluctance by many countries to cooperate in reporting names and information to the committee and in acting on information received by the committee. He was troubled by al Qaeda's continued ability to circumvent sanctions, which he said "need more teeth". In January 2004, Muñoz served as the President of the Security Council. He also headed up a panel to investigate the death of Benazir Bhutto at the request of Secretary General Ban in response to a petition for the inquiry by Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari. The report was delivered in April 2010.

**REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION OF INQUIRY
INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE
ASSASSINATION OF FORMER PAKISTANI PRIME MINISTER
BENAZIR BHUTTO**

MAIN FINDINGS

1: After nine years in exile, former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto returned to Pakistan on 18 October 2007, during an exceptionally violent year, marked by sharp increases in violence carried out both by Islamist extremists and by the state. She returned in the context of a tenuous and inconclusive political agreement with General Pervez Musharraf, as part of a process encouraged and facilitated by the governments of the United Kingdom and the United States. While their discussions included the issue of an eventual power sharing arrangement, the final terms were never agreed. Indeed, the Commission received no compelling evidence that, by the time of her assassination, either Ms Bhutto or General Musharraf believed that she or he still needed the support of the other to achieve their ultimate political goals.

2: Ms Bhutto was murdered on 27 December 2007 when a 15 and a half year-old suicide bomber detonated his explosives near her vehicle as she was leaving the PPP event at Liaquat Bagh. No one believes that this boy acted alone. A range of government officials failed profoundly in their efforts first to protect Ms Bhutto and second to investigate with vigour all those responsible for her murder, not only in the execution of the attack, but also in its conception, planning and financing.

3: Responsibility for Ms Bhutto's security on the day of her assassination rested with the federal government, the government of Punjab and the Rawalpindi District Police. None of these entities took necessary measures to respond to the extraordinary, fresh and urgent security risks that they knew she faced.

4: The federal government under General Musharraf, although fully aware of, and tracking, the serious threats to Ms Bhutto's security, did little more than pass on those threats to her and provincial authorities and were not proactive in neutralizing

them or ensuring that the security provided was commensurate to the threats. The federal government failed in its primary responsibility to provide effective protection to Ms Bhutto on her return to Pakistan.

5: The federal government lacked a comprehensive security plan for Ms Bhutto, relying instead on provincial authorities, but then failed to issue to them the necessary instructions. Particularly inexcusable was the government's failure to direct [Punjab] provincial authorities to provide Ms Bhutto the same stringent and specific security measures it ordered on 22 October 2007 for two other former prime ministers who belonged to the main political party supporting General Musharraf. This discriminatory treatment is profoundly troubling given the devastating attempt on her life only three days earlier and the specific threats against her which were being tracked by the ISI.

6: Ms Bhutto's assassination on 27 December 2007 could have been prevented if the Rawalpindi District Police had taken adequate security measures. The security arrangements for Ms Bhutto by the Rawalpindi District Police were ineffective and insufficient. The police's security plan, as written, was flawed, containing insufficient focus on Ms Bhutto's protection and focusing instead on the deployment of police for crowd control purposes. In many respects, the security plan was not implemented. Although the plan called for deploying 1,371 police officers, the actual deployment did not approach that number. Among other failings: the police coordinated poorly with the PPP's own security; police escort units did not protect Ms Bhutto's vehicle as tasked; parked police vehicles blocked the emergency route; and, the police took grossly inadequate steps to clear the crowd so that Ms Bhutto's vehicle would have safe passage on leaving Liaquat Bagh. The performance of individual police officers and police leadership was poor in areas of forward planning, accountability and command and control.

7: The additional security arrangements of the PPP lacked leadership and were inadequate and poorly executed. The Commission recognizes the heroism of individual PPP supporters, many of whom sacrificed themselves to protect Ms

Bhutto. However, Ms Bhutto was left vulnerable in a severely damaged vehicle that was unable to transport her to the hospital by the irresponsible and hasty departure of the bullet-proof Mercedes-Benz which, as the back-up vehicle, was an essential part of her convoy.

8: The Rawalpindi District Police's actions and omissions in the immediate aftermath of the assassination of Ms Bhutto, including the hosing down of the crime scene and failure to collect and preserve evidence, inflicted irreparable damage to the investigation. The collection of 23 pieces of evidence was manifestly inadequate in a case that should have resulted in thousands. The one instance in which the authorities reviewed these actions, the Punjab committee of inquiry into the hosing down of the crime scene was a whitewash. Hosing down the crime scene so soon after the blast goes beyond mere incompetence; it is up to the relevant authorities to determine whether this amounts to criminal responsibility. Furthermore, CPO Saud Aziz impeded some Joint Investigation Team investigators from conducting on-site investigations until two full days after the assassination. The failure of provincial authorities to otherwise review effectively the gross failures of the senior Rawalpindi police officials and deal with them appropriately constitutes a broader whitewash by Punjab officials.

9: The deliberate prevention by CPO Saud Aziz of a post mortem examination of Ms Bhutto hindered a definitive determination of the cause of her death. It was patently unrealistic for the CPO to expect that Mr Zardari would allow an autopsy on his arrival in Pakistan at Chaklala Airbase nearly seven hours after his wife's death and after her remains had been placed in a coffin and brought to the airport. The autopsy should have been carried out at Rawalpindi General Hospital long before Mr Zardari arrived.

10: The Commission is persuaded that the Rawalpindi police chief, CPO Saud Aziz, did not act independently of higher authorities, either in the decision to hose down the crime scene or to impede the post-mortem examination.

11: The government press conference conducted by Brigadier Javed Iqbal Cheema on 28 December 2007, the day after the assassination, was ordered by General Musharraf. The government's assertion that Ms Bhutto's death was caused when she hit her head on the lever of her vehicle's escape hatch and that Baitullah Mehsud and Al-Qaida were responsible for the suicide bomber were made well before any proper investigation had been initiated. This action preempted, prejudiced and hindered the subsequent investigation.

12: An unequivocal determination as to the cause and means of Ms Bhutto's death would have required an autopsy. The Commission has uncovered no new evidence to suggest a gunshot injury to Ms Bhutto. Instead, a senior PPP official [Naheed Khan] who publicly purported soon after the assassination to have seen indications of a bullet injury admitted to the Commission that she did not have direct knowledge of such an injury.

13: Ms Bhutto faced serious threats in Pakistan from a number of sources; these included Al-Qaida, the Taliban and local jihadi groups, and potentially from elements in the Pakistani Establishment. Notwithstanding these threats, the investigation into her assassination focused on pursuing lower level operatives allegedly linked to Baitullah Mehsud. The Commission finds it disturbing that little was done to investigate Baitullah Mehsud himself, Al-Qaida and any individuals or organizations that might have worked on, supported or otherwise been involved directly or indirectly in the planning or execution of the assassination. Investigators also dismissed the possibility of involvement by elements of the Establishment, including the three persons identified by Ms Bhutto as threats to her in her 16 October 2007 letter to General Musharraf.

14: The Commission has identified other significant flaws in the Joint Investigation Team investigation led by the Punjab Additional Inspector General Abdul Majeed. It lacked direction, was ineffective and suffered from a lack of commitment to identify and bring all of the perpetrators to justice.

15: The investigation was severely hampered by intelligence agencies and other government officials, which impeded an unfettered search for the truth. Despite their explanation to the Commission that they do not have a mandate to conduct criminal investigations, intelligence agencies including the Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) were present during key points in the police investigation, including the gathering of evidence at the crime scene and the forensic examination of Ms Bhutto's vehicle, playing a role that the police were reluctant to reveal to the Commission.

16: More significantly, the ISI conducted parallel investigations, gathering evidence and detaining suspects. Evidence gathered from such parallel investigations was selectively shared with the police. What little direction police investigators had was provided to them by the intelligence agencies. However, the bulk of the information was not shared with police investigators. In fact, investigators on both the Karachi and Rawalpindi cases were unaware of information the ISI possessed about terrorist cells targeting Ms Bhutto and were unaware that the ISI had detained four persons in late October 2007 for the Karachi attack.

17: On virtually every issue the Commission addressed, intelligence agencies played a pervasive role, including a central involvement in the political negotiations regarding Ms Bhutto's return to Pakistan and the conduct of the elections.

18: The Commission believes that the failures of the police and other officials to react effectively to Ms Bhutto's assassination were, in most cases, deliberate. In other cases, the failures were driven by uncertainty in the minds of many officials as to the extent of the involvement of intelligence agencies. These officials, in part fearing involvement by the intelligence agencies, were unsure of how vigorously they ought to pursue actions that they knew, as professionals, they should have taken.

IMPEDIMENTS

The Commission said it was mystified by the efforts of certain high-ranking Pakistani government authorities to obstruct access to military and intelligence sources, as revealed in their public declarations. The extension of the mandate until 31 March enabled the Commission to pursue further this matter and eventually meet with some past and present members of the Pakistani military and intelligence services.

- When the UN team visited Pakistan for the first time, Intelligence Bureau chief Brig Ijaz kept putting off his meeting with it. On a second visit, he did meet the panel but not without a lawyer sitting by his side. He plainly denied any role in Bhutto's killing.
- General Ashfaq Parvaiz Kayani met the panel only grudgingly "over tea" to fend off any impression of having been quizzed.
- Military Intelligence chief Gen Nadeem Ijaz has been fingered in the UN Commission report as a person behind hosing down. Following the report, he did not oblige when the JIT II called him and instead sent in a two-page statement denying any role in Bhutto's assassination. Later, he met the army chief and explained to him why he had not faced the JIT II.
- General Musharraf hung back facing the UN panel until he met it in the US. His version, however, failed to satisfy the UN team.
- The UN Commission has accused CPO Saud Aziz of lax security, hampering post mortem and hosing the crime scene down. Insiders say Aziz quarreled with the panel members and questioned their qualification for the probe.
- Former Punjab chief minister Pervez Elahi too refused to face the JIT II.

GEN MUSHARRAF RUBBISHES THE REPORT

In its report, the UN panel castigates the press conference conducted by Brigadier Javed Iqbal Cheema on 28 December 2007, the day after the assassination, ordered by General Musharraf. "The government's assertion that Bhutto's death was caused when she hit her head on the lever of her vehicle's escape hatch was made well before any proper investigation had been initiated. This action preempted, prejudiced and hindered the subsequent investigation." In a one-on-one interview with me, the former president calls the report gibberish. "Even the Zardari government has rejected it," he says. I am a firearms expert. Having seen the pictures and that the explosion occurred on Bhutto's left side while her only apparent injury was a major trauma to the right side of the head, we excluded this injury being an entry or exit wound as a result of gunshot or bomb attack. Bhutto's injury is not consistent with the size of bullet. In my opinion she died as a result of a severe head injury sustained due to head impact of the escape hatch lever," he said¹.

¹ Conversation with General Pervez Musharraf, October 9, 2010

THE UN COMMISSION'S CHARGES AGAINST PAKISTANI INSTITUTIONS AND PERSONNEL

The UN panel has fingered Pakistan army, police and intelligence agencies and named several politicians and other people making them all controversial. If the panel does not review its findings, they will be viewed as suspects by international institutions. Let us see who was charged for what?

MILITARY

The UN Commission said investigation was severely hampered by intelligence agencies and other military officials, which impeded an unfettered search for the truth.

MAJOR GENERAL NADEEM IJAZ

Sources informed the Commission that CPO Saud Aziz did not act independently in deciding to hose down the crime scene. One source, speaking on the basis of anonymity, stated that CPO Saud Aziz had confided in him that he had received a call from Army Headquarters instructing him to order the hosing down of the crime scene. Another source, also speaking on the basis of anonymity, said that the CPO was ordered to hose down the scene by Major General Nadeem Ijaz Ahmad, then Director General of MI. Others, including three police officials, told the Commission that CPO Saud Aziz did not act independently and that “everyone knows” who ordered the hosing down².

MAJOR GENERAL NADEEM TAJ

The Director General of the ISI, Major General Nadeem Taj, met with Ms Bhutto in the early morning hours of 27 December at Zardari House in Islamabad. Directly knowledgeable sources told the Commission that they spoke both about the elections and about threats to Ms Bhutto’s life; versions differ as to how much detail was conveyed about the threats. The Commission is satisfied, that at the least, Major General Taj told Ms Bhutto that the ISI was concerned about a possible terrorist attack against her and urged her to limit her public exposure and to keep a low profile at the campaign event at Liaquat Bagh later that day³.

MAJOR GENERAL NUSRAT NAEEM

An ISI officer, Rawalpindi Detachment Commander Colonel Jehangir Akhtar, was present at the hospital through much of the evening. At one point, the ISI Deputy Director General, Major General Nusrat Naeem, contacted Professor

² UN Commission report paragraph 133

³ UN Commission report paragraph 49

Mussadiq through Colonel Jehangir's cell phone. When asked about this by the Commission, Major General Nusrat Naeem initially denied making any calls to the hospital, but then acknowledged that he had indeed called the hospital, when pressed further. He asserted that he had made the call, before reporting to his superiors, to hear, directly from Professor Mussadiq that Ms Bhutto had died⁴.

COLONEL JEHANGIR AKHTAR

An ISI officer, Rawalpindi Detachment Commander Colonel Jehangir Akhtar, was present at the hospital through much of the evening. At one point, the ISI Deputy Director General, Major General Nusrat Naeem, contacted Professor Mussadiq through Colonel Jehangir's cell phone⁵.

POLITICIANS

The UN Commission faulted Rehman Malik for the rapid departure of the only back up vehicle, in which he and other senior PPP leaders rode. To the panel it was a serious security lapse. "As the back-up, their vehicle would have been a necessary part of the convoy whether Bhutto's vehicle was damaged or not." The Commission found it inexcusable that federal authorities did not issue a similarly clear directive as the 22 October directive for ex-prime ministers Shaukat Aziz and Shujaat Hussain to protect Bhutto.

REHMAN MALIK

Rehman Malik described his role to the Commission as Ms Bhutto's "national security advisor", not her physical security advisor. He also liaised with the federal authorities on behalf of Ms Bhutto and participated as her representative in negotiations with General Musharraf and his aides. However, most PPP leaders understood Mr Malik's role as encompassing all aspects of Ms Bhutto's security. Many also said that he coordinated with Ms Bhutto's protection detail, including with Major Imtiaz and Mr Tauqir Kaira. The Commission finds that, in addition to what Mr Malik himself described, he performed a significant role in the overall management of Ms Bhutto's

⁴ UN Commission report paragraph 120

⁵ UN Commission report paragraph 120

security. His letters to the authorities regarding threat warnings and requesting specific security support reflect this involvement⁶.

Even though Mr Rehman Malik claimed that he was not an adviser on physical security, the letters he wrote to authorities, and his liaison role with security and intelligence agencies shows that he was deeply involved in the overall management of Ms Bhutto's security. His departure from the scene at Rawalpindi after the attack allowed her damaged vehicle to become isolated. The rapid departure of the only back up vehicle, in which Mr Malik and other senior PPP leaders rode, was a serious security lapse. After moving a safe distance away from the scene of the attack, the occupants of the vehicle should have waited to see for themselves if Ms Bhutto's vehicle was able to depart safely and if there was a need for a back up vehicle. As the back-up, their vehicle would have been a necessary part of the convoy whether Ms Bhutto's vehicle was damaged or not⁷.

THE GOVERNMENT

Particularly inexcusable was the government's failure to direct provincial authorities to provide Ms Bhutto the same stringent and specific security measures it ordered on 22 October 2007 for two other former prime ministers [Chaudhary Shujaat Hussain and Shaukat Aziz] who belonged to the main political party supporting General Musharraf⁸.

POLICE OFFICIALS

The UN panel has lambasted the Punjab police and other security agencies.

AIG ABDUL MAJEED MALIK

AIG Abdul Majeed told the Commission that he saw no need to establish the authenticity of the intercept or the basis for its analysis, including the voice identification and the interpretation of the conversation as a reference to the Ms

⁶ UN Commission report paragraph 65

⁷ UN Commission report paragraph 236

⁸ UN Commission report paragraph 259 V

Bhutto's assassination. The Commission finds this approach to the investigation contrary to best practices and inconsistent with a genuine search for the truth⁹.

The Commission has identified other significant flaws in the Joint Investigation Team investigation led by the Punjab Additional Inspector General Abdul Majeed. It lacked direction, was ineffective and suffered from a lack of commitment to identify and bring all of the perpetrators to justice. This delay further hampered the gathering of evidence. Despite indications that there are links between the Karachi and Rawalpindi attacks, there has essentially been no communication between the investigators on those two cases¹⁰.

ASSISTANT SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE (ASP) ASHFAQ ANWAR

The Security Plan for Ms Bhutto was more complex in that it envisaged security for Ms Bhutto's convoy by an Elite Force unit under the supervision of Assistant Superintendent of Police (ASP) Ashfaq Anwar, which was to establish a box formation around Ms Bhutto's vehicle during movement. The police said that the Elite Force unit formed a box around Ms Bhutto's vehicle at the Faizabad junction, which is the jurisdictional limit between Islamabad and Rawalpindi. The Commission, however, believes that this did not occur¹¹.

Both ASP Ashfaq Anwar who was the supervisor of the Elite Force unit and Inspector Azmat Ali Dogar, the unit's commander, told the Commission that they accompanied Ms Bhutto all the way to the back of the stage according to the Security Plan. However, video footage and pictures show that as Ms Bhutto drove on much of Liaquat Road, her vehicle was flanked only by her private security vehicles. The Elite Force vehicles were nowhere near her vehicle. In fact, the Commission has identified Inspector Dogar among the crowd some distance from Ms Bhutto's vehicle. Contrary to the police assertion, there was no police-provided box formation around Ms Bhutto as she arrived at the rally, and the Elite Force unit

⁹ UN Commission report paragraph 171

¹⁰ UN Commission report paragraph 259 XIV

¹¹ UN Commission report paragraph 80

did not execute their duties as specified in the security deployment. Furthermore, the Commission does not believe that the full escort as described by the police was ever present¹².

The Rawalpindi District Police claim that police vehicles from the Elite Force unit headed by ASP Ashfaq Anwar were waiting outside the outer gate to escort Ms Bhutto's convoy and that they were about to go into a protective box formation when the attack on Ms Bhutto took place. However, forming the box at this point was impracticable given the narrow width of Liaquat Road and the number of people who had already started to surround Ms Bhutto's vehicle. In any event, video footage shows very few uniformed police on the scene available to push back the crowd to create space for the box formation. Furthermore, video and photographs taken shortly before the blast as well as Commission interviews indicate that the Elite Force unit was not in position to go into a box formation. The Elite Force unit was in place neither for the entry nor the exit of the convoy and did not afford the protection they were tasked with, thus failing spectacularly in their duty¹³.

SSP MAJOR IMTIAZ

Major Imtiaz did not provide leadership after the attack, although he was assigned to the team precisely for this reason. It is understandable that others in the vehicle would be overwhelmed by the shock of the attack, but as the lead security professional in the vehicle, he would have been expected to provide leadership at that critical moment¹⁴.

SP KHURRAM SHAHZAD

Within one hour and forty minutes of the blast, SP Khurram ordered the fire and rescue officials present to wash the crime scene down with fire hoses. He told the Commission that the police had collected all the available evidence by then. Police

¹² UN Commission report paragraph 90

¹³ UN Commission report paragraph 102

¹⁴ UN Commission report paragraph 237

records show that only 23 pieces of evidence were collected, in a case where one would normally have expected thousands¹⁵.

According to SP Khurram and other senior Rawalpindi police officials, including some who were not present at the scene, hosing down the crime scene was a necessary crowd control measure. They claim that some at the scene, mainly PPP supporters, were very upset when they learned that Ms Bhutto had died and that some supporters were dipping their hands into the blood on the ground, believing it to be Ms Bhutto's, and rubbing it on themselves. SP Khurram asserted that the PPP supporters could have become disruptive. Therefore, the police needed to wash away the blood from the scene as a public order measure. SP Khurram and other police officials also stated that there were reports of vandalism not far from the crime scene, requiring the redeployment of the police who were at the scene. Once the crime scene was hosed down, they claim, the crowd did disperse, going to Rawalpindi General Hospital, which permitted the police at the scene to redeploy to those other crowd control situations¹⁶.

Others, including police officials familiar with the case, dispute the assertion that there was a public order problem in Rawalpindi. They further disagree that the presence of an unruly crowd would prevent the establishment of a police cordon around the scene of crime and justify hosing it down. No one apart from SP Khurram told the Commission that they saw anyone smearing blood on themselves. Even SP Khurram, himself, ultimately told the Commission that he saw only one person doing that. Sources have also pointed out that Rawalpindi was not a stronghold of the PPP and that, therefore, the police allegations were exaggerated. Sources have noted also that even at Rawalpindi General Hospital, where many PPP supporters were gathered, the disturbance was minimal¹⁷.

¹⁵ UN Commission report paragraph 127

¹⁶ UN Commission report paragraph 128

¹⁷ UN Commission report paragraph 129

CPO SAUD AZIZ

The Rawalpindi District Police's actions and omissions in the immediate aftermath of the assassination of Ms Bhutto, including the hosing down of the crime scene and failure to collect and preserve evidence, inflicted irreparable damage to the investigation. The collection of 23 pieces of evidence was manifestly inadequate in a case that should have resulted in thousands. The one instance in which the authorities reviewed these actions, the Punjab committee of inquiry into the hosing down of the crime scene was a whitewash. Hosing down the crime scene so soon after the blast goes beyond mere incompetence; it is up to the relevant authorities to determine whether this amounts to criminal responsibility. Furthermore, CPO Saud Aziz impeded some Joint Investigation Team investigators from conducting on-site investigations until two full days after the assassination. The failure of provincial authorities to otherwise review effectively the gross failures of the senior Rawalpindi police officials and deal with them appropriately constitutes a broader whitewash by Punjab officials¹⁸.

The deliberate prevention by CPO Saud Aziz of a post mortem examination of Ms Bhutto hindered a definitive determination of the cause of her death. It was patently unrealistic for the CPO to expect that Mr Zardari would allow an autopsy on his arrival in Pakistan at Chaklala Airbase nearly seven hours after his wife's death and after her remains had been placed in a coffin and brought to the airport. The autopsy should have been carried out at Rawalpindi General Hospital long before Mr. Zardari arrived¹⁹.

The Commission is persuaded that the Rawalpindi police chief, CPO Saud Aziz, did not act independently of higher authorities, either in the decision to hose down the crime scene or to impede the post-mortem examination²⁰.

There was a series of memos from CPO Saud Aziz and his superiors regarding the absence of a post-mortem examination.

¹⁸ UN Commission report paragraph 259 viii

¹⁹ UN Commission report paragraph 259 ix

²⁰ UN Commission report paragraph 259 x

The CPO wrote a memo to his immediate superior, the IGP of Punjab, dated 27 December, but actually written in the morning of 28 December, in which he reported that an autopsy could not be conducted because her husband had refused to authorize one. The IGP then sent a memo, also dated 27 December (and written on 28 December), to the Home Secretary of Sindh Province reporting Mr Zardari's refusal and suggesting that the matter be taken up by the Home Department of Sindh Province²¹.

The Commission finds the letter written by CPO Saud Aziz to be fundamentally misleading. Nothing in the letter explains why the autopsy had not been carried out earlier, during the preceding five hours while Ms Bhutto's remains were at RGH. Rather, the letter focuses solely on Mr Zardari's refusal to approve an autopsy – and portrays even that refusal in misleading terms. The letter is clearly intended to hide CPO Saud Aziz's fundamental failure to carry out his legal obligation regarding the autopsy and, instead, to redirect blame for this failure to Mr Zardari. The effort to pin responsibility for this failure on Mr Zardari is unacceptable. CPO Saud Aziz placed Mr Zardari in an impossible situation – one which almost compelled Mr Zardari to refuse the request for an autopsy²².

ESTABLISHMENT

Ms Bhutto faced serious threats in Pakistan from a number of sources; these included Al-Qaida, the Taliban and local jihadi groups, and potentially from elements in the Pakistani Establishment. Notwithstanding these threats, the investigation into her assassination focused on pursuing lower level operatives allegedly linked to Baitullah Mehsud. The Commission finds it disturbing that little was done to investigate Baitullah Mehsud himself, Al-Qaida and any individuals or organizations that might have worked on, supported or otherwise been involved directly or indirectly in the planning or execution of the assassination. Investigators also dismissed the possibility of involvement by elements of

²¹ UN Commission report paragraph 148

²² UN Commission report paragraph 149

the Establishment, including the three persons identified by Ms Bhutto as threats to her in her 16 October 2007 letter to General Musharraf²³.

The Establishment is generally used in Pakistan to refer to those who exercise de facto power; it includes the military high command and the intelligence agencies, together with the top leadership of certain political parties, high-level members of the bureaucracy and business persons that work in alliance with them. The military high command and intelligence agencies form the core of the Establishment and are its most permanent and influential components²⁴.

AMERICA

In September 2007, after she announced the date she would return to Pakistan, Ms Bhutto began to raise her concerns and needs regarding her personal security in these discussions, especially with her contacts in the United States Government. Representatives of the United States Government told the Commission that they provided advice to Ms Bhutto on hiring Pakistani private security firms used by diplomatic missions and spoke at least once with the Musharraf camp about her security arrangements. The same officials said, however, that the United States had not accepted any responsibility for Ms Bhutto's security in Pakistan. Other sources close to Ms Bhutto told the Commission that she had expected the United States to play a strong role in urging General Musharraf to provide her with all of the security support she needed²⁵.

²³ UN Commission report paragraph 13

²⁴ UN Commission report paragraph 213

²⁵ UN Commission report paragraph 25

PAKISTAN'S REBUTTAL

The reaction of the government and the military to the UN Commission report

In an official statement, issued almost 20 hours after the release of the UN report, President Asif Ali Zardari said the report had confirmed the apprehensions of the Pakistan People's Party about the assassination of Benazir Bhutto. He said the PPP had been claiming that the Musharraf government was responsible – first, for the criminal neglect in providing security to Bhutto and, second, by hushing up available evidence to cover up the crime. Except for blaming the previous regime, the president did not mention any thing on the report's findings that also mentioned failure of the PPP in providing a foolproof security cover to Bhutto and conducting a result-oriented investigation to unveil faces despite a lapse of over two years. In the meanwhile, the military pressured the government to deny whatever had been said in the report about the army, the military intelligence agencies and personnel. Foreign Secretary Salman Bashir and Pakistan's Permanent Representative to the UN Abdullah Husain Haroon advised against sending out a denial to the UN, which they said, could complicate the whole affair. Haroon even offered to resign. Sources say army chief Ashfaq Pervez Kayani himself whetted the letter addressed to the UN Secretary- General as President Zardari and Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani looked on passively. A copy of the letter written to the UN and the UN reply follow:

MAIN POINTS

- The Commission focused more on the army than the murder itself.
- It relied on unnamed sources to implicate the establishment in the killing.
- The lack of source attribution leads to vagueness and ambiguity in some parts of the report which has undermined its credibility as a fact-finding report
- Afghan President Hamid Karzai was ready to meet the Commission but his meeting was not fixed for unknown reasons.
- Evidence from other countries was not gathered directly. Instead, the Commission relied on dubious reports.
- No information has been provided on the funding sources, contacts and logistics.
- Reservations were shown on 'untenable opinion and observation'
- Observations on the 'military-Taliban nexus' went beyond the Commission's mandate
- Observations on the ISI were beyond the Commission's terms of reference
- Opinion on the army should not have been presented at international forums as a precedent.
- Little attention has been paid to any international dimension of the Dec 27, 2007 killing of the former prime minister.
- The events of the day of assassination have been documented quite well.
- The Commission should have been given more time to gather information from other countries.

United Nations
General Assembly
24 June 2010
Sixty-fourth session
Agenda item 106
Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Letter dated 23 June 2010 from the Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit the letter of H.E. Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Qureshi, Foreign Minister of Pakistan, dated 14 June 2010 (see annex). The letter, along with its enclosure, may be circulated as a document of the General Assembly under agenda item 106.

(Signed) Abdullah Hussain Haroon

Ambassador and Permanent Representative

Annex to the letter dated 23 June 2010 from the Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to forward herewith the comments/observations of the Government of Pakistan on the report of the Commission of Inquiry on Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto (S/2010/191) (see attachment).

It is requested that the present letter and its attachment be circulated as a document of the General Assembly.

(Signed) Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Qureshi

ATTACHMENT

Comments and observations of the Government of Pakistan on the report of the United Nations Commission of Inquiry on the assassination of the former Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto

1. The Government and the people of Pakistan extend their appreciation for the work done by the Commission, which certainly will provide the authorities in Pakistan a basis to commence a serious and credible criminal investigation against those who planned and executed the assassination and to bring them to justice.
2. However, the Government of Pakistan also wishes to avail itself of this opportunity to invite the attention of the Secretary-General to certain concerns that it is necessary to bring forth in respect of the report and which are explained in the following three parts.

PART I

3. Paragraph 2 (c) of the terms of reference of the Commission of Inquiry allowed the Commission access to all sources of information, including documentary material and physical evidence, freedom to interview representatives of governmental, as well as other institutions, and to any individual whose testimony was necessary, whereas paragraph 3 of the terms of reference allowed the Commission to approach third States with a request for cooperation in the collection of material or information relevant to the case.

Information about such sources, material or information should be made part of the report for its true comprehension for all purposes. The Commission should have not only given more time to the Government of Pakistan to arrange cooperation with third States, as requested by the Government of Pakistan, and the Commission should have not only itself made efforts in this regard, but should have also extended the date for the finalization of its report, since such evidence may have had significant bearing on the ultimate findings of the Commission.

4. This lack of source attribution leads to vagueness and ambiguity in some parts of the report, which has undermined its credibility as a fact-finding report. Similarly, the Commission did not mention the procedural yardsticks by which it had tested the documents, materials or information before their incorporation in the report. They ought to have been added in order to give greater weight to the findings in the report. While we appreciate the need for discretion when dealing with sensitive issues, undue confidentiality about disclosure of different sources of information, including evidence both documentary and oral, undermined the overall value of the report in terms of its reliability.

5. The Government of Pakistan is taking necessary steps to investigate the assassination of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto in a credible manner. However, keeping in view the contents of the report, the following deficiencies are pointed out with relevant observations in this regard, which impaired the credibility of the report as a fact-finding report and which could have been relied on otherwise for further criminal investigations:

(a) The Commission neither mentioned the names of the persons interviewed by it nor included such names as part of the report for use by investigators in Pakistan;

(b) The report does not mention documentation and the accessibility of those documents prepared on the basis of oral, recorded (audio) or circumstantial evidence examined by the Commission;

(c) The report does not provide any information about persons whom the Commission intended to examine or interview but could not do so, with the reasons for such failure;

(d) The report lacks procedural details regarding the manner and method of interviewing persons or witnesses by the members of the Commission, that is, whether it was individually or collectively;

(e) There is no indication or mention about persons or any list of persons who were interviewed outside Pakistan;

(f) The report does not provide any information about identification and possession of different records or materials

examined by the members of the Commission, either inside or outside Pakistan;

(g) It is also not mentioned whether the materials, record of documents or documents prepared on the basis of interviews or evidence of individuals are in the possession of the Commission or have been handed over to the United Nations office for recording and preservation for their use in a criminal investigation, if needed in future by Pakistani authorities.

PART II

6. The Government of Pakistan is also grateful to the Commission for documenting a very systematic and sequential arrangement of facts, particularly relating to the day of the occurrence and related events.

7. In addition to the above, the Government of Pakistan has some concerns regarding certain portions of the report of the Commission and observations thereon that relate to matters and issues that, in our judgement, were not strictly within the framework of the terms of reference. The Government of Pakistan is quite sure that there was no intention of the Commission members to influence foreign policy or Pakistan's long-term strategic interests through such observations or comments. It is the understanding of the Government of Pakistan that even if the members of the Commission had dispensed with the said observations, it would not have diminished the usefulness of the said report for our investigations.

8. In this regard, the Government of Pakistan is pleased to make the following observations for the record of the Office of the Secretary-General:

(a) The report states that it remains the responsibility of the Pakistani authorities to carry out a serious, credible criminal investigation and to bring those responsible to justice, a conclusion with which the Government of Pakistan fully concurs;

(b) However, the above objective is difficult to achieve in view of the absence of clarification of certain matters stated by the Commission in its report. Although substantial questions are

raised about the security provided to Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto and the conduct of criminal investigations after the assassination of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto, no referential information or supporting material on which such questions are based has been indicated. Similarly, the role of different persons is discussed without any proofs or materials which could have been used for further criminal investigations as desired in the report. Such supporting and relevant material would have assisted in fixing responsibility of persons mentioned therein during different stages of the provision of security to Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto or other arrangements which might have saved her life and which is now necessary to determine their due role or inadvertence in performance of their duties;

(c) However, it has been noted with some concern that instead of confining its findings strictly to the determination of “facts and circumstances” of the assassination of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto, as per the terms of reference provided by the Secretary-General in his letter dated 2 February 2009, the members of the Commission of Inquiry have gone on to bring a particular focus on the Pakistan Army (referred to as the “Establishment” or “military high command” at various places in the report). Several comments and observations in respect of the “Establishment” are not stated to have been properly verified, nor is any material referred to in support of the opinion that the members of the Commission arrived at;

(d) To illustrate, section III of the report was given the title “Threats, responsibilities and possible culpabilities”, and in that section members of the Commission “assess hypotheses” of the culpability of entities. In a subheading entitled “Threats from the Establishment”, the report simply reproduces the belief of an unnamed source that “the Establishment ... was involved in or bears some responsibility for her assassination”. No evidence has been provided in the report to support this belief. No material is mentioned. No document is referred to. There are no affidavits. Such an observation, which is unsubstantiated, has an adverse effect on other matters that have no relevancy to the mandate of the Commission;

(e) It is also noteworthy that in many aspects the Commission's report is beyond the ambit of its terms of reference and mandate. In paragraph 216, a superficial judgement accusing the so-called Establishment is based on evidence that is not specific or substantial in value;

(f) It is the sense of the Government of Pakistan that the Commission members, by accepting requests for anonymity of sources without stating justifiable reasons, have not exercised their discretion in conformity with the purpose of preparing the report, which was expected to make a detailed disclosure of the sources and material it relied upon. It is a universally recognized practice that in all fact-finding or inquiry commissions, the sources and necessary evidence, in all details, are brought on record to substantiate findings, which was not done in this case;

(g) Certain observations and discussions in the report have the effect of influencing regional matters, which may affect positions that Pakistan has been taking in certain sensitive bilateral relations.

9. The Commission completely ignored the mandate given to it according to paragraph 3 of the terms of reference, which required the Commission to approach third States with a request for cooperation in the collection of material or information relevant to the case and provision of expert personnel. The Commission relied upon and tried to establish linkages between some organizations operating internationally or some international sources belonging to third States, such as the British Broadcasting Corporation, Al-Qaida groups or Afghan Taliban belonging to a neighbouring country, that is Afghanistan, authorities of the United Arab Emirates, and the United States Central Intelligence Agency, as mentioned in paragraphs 201, 202, 203, 205, 206, 207, 209, 211 and 219 of the report. All these sources are apparently relevant and the Commission also relied upon information disseminated from these sources, but the Commission did not exercise the power available to it under paragraph 3 of the terms of reference. There was a need that some concerned authorities of such third States should have been interviewed. This was the more so, since letters were written to persons residing in various parts of

the world by the Government of Pakistan, information of which was provided to the Commission. The Commission should have made greater efforts to insist that third States provide access for interviews and to their archives or concerned authorities to acquire direct evidence, instead of relying on newspaper or other reports having doubtful evidentiary value.

10. There is a possibility that thorough questioning of international sources might have proved useful in unearthing any international link to Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto's assassination. Individuals located outside Pakistan who have some relevance to the incident and are also equally important in providing some leads to the actual perpetrators and executors of the plan should have been contacted by the Commission itself for interviewing by making greater efforts to do substantial justice. In this connection, it is relevant to mention that the Government of Afghanistan conveyed to the Government of Pakistan that H.E. Mr. Hamid Karzai, President of Afghanistan, was willing to meet the members of the Commission in Kabul on any day before 25 April 2010, which fact was brought to the notice of the Commission. However, the Commission neither met him nor gave any reason in its report for not meeting him.

11. It has been a general observation and assessment of the people of Pakistan that the plot to assassinate a leader of international stature and fame was not possible without planning, executing and financing from international sources in addition to their executors at local or national level, with their possible channels of communication and transfer of funds. Keeping this view in mind, the Commission was empowered to approach third States. The Commission itself mentioned this aspect but thereafter did not provide any further information in this respect. It is a flaw in this fact-finding report of the Commission. This is especially so in terms of the provision of financing, the method and type of communications and the provision of the logistics necessary to carry out the assassination.

12. The Government of Pakistan also expresses its concern that unsubstantiated observations and comments on the Pakistan

Army, in particular, have the consequence of affecting the credibility and standing of the Pakistan Armed Forces and thereby adversely affect the morale of its officers and Jawans at a time when they are laying down their lives and fighting against those who have not only waged war against Pakistan but also threaten the peace of the world. The decisive role of the Pakistan Army in reducing the global threat relating to terrorism is appreciated by all States and their leaders.

13. The Government of Pakistan also expresses its reservations on certain observations in the report that imply a nexus between the Taliban and the Pakistan Army. It is clear from the terms of reference that such an assessment was not within the scope of the work given to the Commission. The Government of Pakistan submits that such formulations undermine the method, manner and commitment of actions undertaken by the Pakistan Army against the terrorists on its soil, which are welcomed domestically and have won wide appreciation and support from the international community as well.

14. Likewise, the excessive discussion on the alleged role of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and intelligence agencies is carried out at various places in the report, but the same is not supported by any reference or evidence. The report fails to identify the material, documents and specific interviews on which it relies to come to the conclusions regarding the role of ISI. In any case, observations and comments on the history of ISI, its purpose, its past and present role and area of work are extraneous to the purpose of the mandate that the Commission of Inquiry was given. Therefore, the Government of Pakistan feels that the said observations have little relevance to the terms of reference given to the Commission.

15. The Government of Pakistan also considers that while making "assessments" of various hypotheses, the Commission of Inquiry has not exercised its discretion reasonably, as it has devoted disproportionate space to a hypothesis relating to the Pakistan Army and Establishment and intelligence agencies, while neglecting to make exhaustive discussions on other hypotheses.

16. The Government of Pakistan also has some concerns in respect of the report making observations and findings that absolve or hold persons or entities responsible, whereas in the letter of the Secretary-General dated 2 February 2009, it was explicitly mentioned that its mandate shall not be to carry out a criminal investigation.

PART III

17. The Government of Pakistan, in view of the above and without detracting from much of the good work done by the members of the Commission relating to the determination of the facts and circumstances of the assassination of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto, states its position with regard to the Commission's report as follows:

(a) That comments and observations about the Pakistan Army, ISI or the so-called Establishment, are only the opinions of the members of the Commission. They do not represent authenticated determinations based on any fact or evidence, and the same shall neither form a precedent nor a basis to lend credence to a political position in this regard, in the practice of States and/or that of international organizations;

(b) The Government of Pakistan maintains that any comments, observations or findings given in the report in respect of all matters except those that are directly relevant to the facts and circumstances of the assassination of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto shall not be viewed as having determined any fact that relates to any matter of foreign policy of Pakistan, neither shall it have the effect of influencing any position that the Government of Pakistan has been adhering hitherto;

(c) The report has a serious flaw because the Commission has failed to approach third States or to provide some reliable information to unearth, if any, international linkages perpetrating, planning, financing or abetting the assassination of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto, although there is mention and reliance on such sources belonging to third States. No doubt there were hiccups, and the Commission should have taken more time and effort in this regard, but unfortunately it appears that it paid scant attention to this aspect and instead has tended to focus on internal matters. The international

linkages were an important aspect of the mandate of the Commission under paragraph 3 of the terms of reference which remained unfulfilled. This is notwithstanding the fact that due to its United Nations backing, the Commission was in a far better position to carry out this inter-State inquiry owing to its global or international mandate rather than a domestic inquiry team;

(d) Further, the Government of Pakistan wishes to present the clear understanding to the Office of the Secretary-General that the comments and observations so made by the members of the Inquiry Commission in the report, which are not authenticated and referenced, shall not be used or adopted by any State or institution as “facts determined”, and in the event that any State or institution makes an attempt to rely on them, then the said reliance shall not hold any credence whatsoever.

THE UN REJECTS PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT STANCE ON ITS REPORT

13 July 2010: UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon rejected the Pakistan government's position on the Benazir Bhutto Inquiry Commission report, saying that "the work of the commission is complete".

In a letter delivered to Pakistan's permanent mission to the United Nations, the UN chief "reiterated his strong support for the commission and stated that the commission carried out its work professionally in fulfilment of the Terms of Reference agreed between the government of Pakistan and the secretariat and noted by the Security Council".

The UN chief said "the report speaks for itself and can be helpful to any subsequent investigations".

Ban asserted in the letter that "the terms of reference of the commission called for the commission to conduct an inquiry into the facts and circumstances of the assassination of Ms Bhutto".

"The report painstakingly sets out the facts regarding the assassination and provides an extensive description of the circumstances around the crime," he said.

JIT II

The latest inquest

The UN Commission's report did not reveal any explosive truths but it was a damning indictment of the then government, the Rawalpindi police and intelligence agencies. Interior Minister Rehman Malik designated a Joint Investigation Team headed by Khalid Qureshi to probe Benazir Bhutto's assassination. The JIT report did try to identify some culprits. The report relied on two types of evidence: confessions of arrested suspects and phone intercepts. Almost all the conspirators had links to the Madrasa Haqqania in Akora Khattak and further arrests were made by the JIT from Akora Khattak. The JIT visited Mohmand Agency and tried to find out whether Nasrullah alias Ahmad and Nadir alias Qari Ismail had actually been killed in an encounter. A key conspirator, Hasnain Gul, had confessed that two suicide bombers had stayed at his house a day before the assassination. The suicide bombers left a shawl, a cap and a pair of joggers at Hasnain's residence. Some 20 months after the assassination, these articles of clothing were sent to the FBI Laboratory in Quantico for DNA analysis. The FBI report was then compared to the DNA obtained from body parts of the suicide bombers recovered from Liaquat Bagh. That the two samples matched corroborated Gul's confession and firmly linked the two suicide bombers with the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) led at the time by Baitullah Mehsud. Amazingly the JIT did not try to look for any links to the al-Qaeda. Important findings of the report follow:

TASKS UNDERTAKEN BY FIA JIT

- a. Police investigation mainly relied upon confessional statements of five accused, which have been corroborated.
- b. Statement of the author of intercepted CD recorded.
- c. Statements of officials of mobile phone companies recorded.
- d. Call record of all linked phone numbers of suspects obtained for identification of active terrorists.
- e. An analysis of suspects' phone numbers conducted.
- f. Two diaries containing telephone numbers recovered from Hasnain Gul analyzed.
- g. Arrest of proclaimed offenders.

RECORD OF ACCUSED VERIFIED FROM MADRASA DAR-UL-ULOOM HAQQANIA IN AKORA KHATTAK, DISTRICT NOWSHERA

During the earlier investigation it was reported that some of the accused had studied and resided in Madrasa Darul Uloom Haqqania, Akora Khattak before and during the day of occurrence of Liaquat Bagh, Rawalpindi. So, Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa was requested to provide necessary assistance to the JIT to verify the madrasa record on the spot. On May 12, 2010 an SIG team headed by Inspector Naseer Ali Khan visited the madrasa and met Wasal Ahmed, Nazim-e-Taalimaat [administrator].

The administrator produced all the relevant registers of admission and discharge for inspection, during which particulars of the following accused were found by the investigation team:

- a. Abdullah alias Saddam s/o Ali Rahman of Village Lakaro, Mohmand Agency (original admission form)
- b. Nadir alias Qari Ismail s/o Musafar of Khazana Kalabat, District Swabi (original admission form)
- c. Rasheed Ahmed alias Abdur Rahim Turabi s/o Qudrat Shah of Village Srikh Morzai, P.O. Batagram, Tehsil

Shabqadar, District Charsadda (original admission form)

- d. Faiz Muhammad s/o Shah Nazar of Village Zaida, District Swabi (original admission form)

The team seized original forms carrying Registration No. 21716, 17816, 18642 and 23629 confirming that the four suspects studied at the madrasa. The administrator promised to produce the original admission registers in court as and when required.

The administrator in his statement also disclosed that accused Said Arab, s/o Azim Khan of Chota Lahore, Swabi, Gul Roz s/o Ali Akbar of Chota Lahore, Swabi, Muhammad Shafique s/o Badshah Gul of Gar Tajik, Peshawar and Rasheed Ahmed alias Abdul Raheem Tarabi s/o Qudrat Shah of Village Srikh Morzai, P.O. Batagram, Tehsil Shabqadar, Distt. Charsadda were also students of the madrasa. Police had arrested them in Kamra missile attack case 2008 for their alleged connection with the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan.

VERIFICATION OF DEATH OF ACCUSED NASRULLAH ALIAS AHMED AND NADIR ALIAS QARI ISMAIL IN MOHMAND AGENCY

The SIG team visited Khapakh checkpost, Ghalanai, Mohmand Agency to verify the reported death of two accused Nasrullah and Nadir on January 15, 2008. It met Additional Political Agent Saeed Ahmed Jan and Assistant Political Agent Roshan Khan Mehsud who verified that according to record, on January 15, 2008 a jeep was stopped by MR at Khapakh checkpost. Two of the three persons sitting in the jeep tried to escape whereas the third one who was a young boy of 10/11 years remained seated in the jeep. He later exploded himself. One of the two fleeing persons was shot dead who was later identified as Nadir alias Qari Ismail of Khazana Kalabat through the CNIC he carried. The second fleeing person was overpowered by the MR personnel and was identified as Nasrullah of Dandi Sedgi. Nasrullah was taken to hospital where he died after 6/7 days. His body was shifted to Ghalanai Hospital. Nasarullah's body was handed over to a person named Noroz Khan s/o Haji Jan Khan of Dandi Sedgi, Miran Shah, Tehsil Ghulam Khan, North Waziristan, bearing CNIC No 21504-6212434-1. The SIG team obtained copies of the

following documents from the office of Political Agent, Mohmand Agency:

- a. Letter of Political Agent (DSR-ii).
- b. Special Report of Naib Tehsildar (15-01-2008).
- c. Letter No. 316 of Political Naib Tehsildar.
- d. Letter of Noroz Khan who received Nasrullah's body.
- e. Attached copies of telephone numbers and addresses.
- f. Photocopies of CNIC of Noroz Khan.

DNA COMPARISON REPORT BY FBI LABORATORY

One of the key conspirators, Hasnain Gul, who was arrested on January 5, 2008, had confessed that the two suicide bombers had stayed at his house a day before the assassination. The suicide bombers left a shawl, a cap and a pair of joggers at Hasnain's residence. On Sept 12, 2009, some 20 months after the assassination, these articles of clothing were sent to the FBI Laboratory in Quantico for DNA analysis. The FBI report was then compared to the DNA obtained from body parts of the suicide bomber recovered from Liaquat Bagh.

That the two samples matched corroborated Gul's confession and firmly linked the two suicide bombers with Mehsud's network.

COMPARISON OF CELLULAR AND LANDLINE PHONE RECORDS

Another connection has also been established by comparing cellular and landline phone records, which have linked the conspirators to each other and to the penultimate telephone conversation between a man identified as "Maulvi sahib" and "Ameer sahib". That discussion of the assassination was intercepted by the Inter Services Intelligence shortly after Bhutto's assassination and was made public by former president General Pervez Musharraf's interim government. Ameer sahib was identified as Baitullah Mehsud by one of the arrested men. An ISI official confirms in the report that he had recorded the telephonic conversation.

The report accused Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan chief Baitullah Mehsud and Ibadur Rehman, Abdullah and Faiz Muhammad (ex-students of Madrassa Akora Khattak, Nowshera),

Investigation After Investigation

History of phone calls of accused from 26th to 28th dec 2007

No	Name of caller	Phone number	Name of person taking the call	Phone number	Date	Time	Summary of the conversation according to the alleged criminal's own statement
1	Iskander Rehman using Nasrullah's phone	0304-9684538	Hassein Gul alias Ali	0332-5699682	26 December 2007	17:24	Iskander Rehman uses Nasrullah's phone to call him to send Saad alias Bilal and Idrarullah
2	Nasrullah alias Ahmad	0304-9684538	Hassein Gul alias Ali	0332-5699682	26 December 2007	22:35	Nasrullah calls to say they are all coming
3	Nasrullah alias Ahmad	0304-9684538	Rafiqat Hassein	031-5013836	27 December 2007	00:43	Contact by phone; and Nasrullah, Saad/Asad Idrarullah are picked from P.O. Wazir Khan
4	Nasrullah alias Ahmad	0304-9684538	Hassein Gul alias Ali	0332-5699682	27 December 2007	13:20	Nasrullah tells him secretly that there is nothing at home so he must bring lunch
5	Rafiqat Hassein	0331-5013836	Hassein Gul alias Ali	0332-5699682	27 December 2007	14:02	Rafiqat says he is coming to collect the volunteers
6	Hassein Gul alias Ali	0332-5699682	Rafiqat Hassein	0331-5013836	27 December 2007	14:15	The volunteers are ready; Rafiqat says he is just outside
7	Nasrullah alias Ahmad	0304-9684538	Hassein Gul alias Ali	0332-5699682	27 December 2007	15:05	Nasrullah called when Ms Bhuno arrived at the entry site
8	Hassein Gul alias Ali	0332-5699682	Rafiqat Hassein	031-5013836	27 December 2007	17:35	After the tragedy, Hassein calls to tell Rafiqat he is standing outside Mowjib Cinema
9	Hassein Gul alias Ali	0332-5699682	Nasrullah	0304-9684538	27 December 2007	17:41	Nasrullah asks where he is to get a taxi from
10	Nasrullah alias Ahmad	0304-9684538	Rafiqat Hassein	031-5013836	27 December 2007	18:09	Contact gain; a taxi has been caught, and the drive to the stop is on
11	Mamun's Sabin Ahmad	096-5238387	Nasrullah	0304-9684538	28 December 2007	07:51	Mamun calls Nasrullah on his number
12	Amir (Badrul Mabsud)	092-4310491	Mamun's Sabin	096-538387	28 December 2007	09:14	Congratulatory exchange of Ms Bilano's killing, while it is admitted that their men Bilal and Farmanah did the deed; Aliza Sabin recognized Amir's voice as that of Badrullah Mabsud's, this is the number at which Nasrullah received calls

Ikramullah (the suicide bomber), Aitzaz Shah, Sher Zaman, Hasnain Gul, Muhammad Razaqat, Rasheed Ahmed, Nasrullah and Nadir of helping and financing the attack.

The JIT said that forensic examination of three cell phones (35640512608494-359554016785688 and 35195501382647449) recovered from Hasnain Gul and Mohammad Razaqat were conducted in SIG Forensic Laboratory.

The International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) analysis of the SIMs of these cell phones showed that the cell phone recovered from suspect Razaqat at the time of arrest was in use of Hasnain Gul on the day of occurrence. The call record analysis and RBS locations of six cell phones (03049684538, 03325609682, 0331-5013836, 0344-6654236, 0344-9666465 and 0346-9442498 and two PTCL numbers (0928-230493, 0965-238387) revealed that Nasrullah, Hasnain Gul, Mohammad Razaqat, Qari Ismail, Abadur Rehman and two other people remained in contact between December 2, 2007 to December 27, 2007 during planning, facilitation and execution of the suicide bombing in Rawalpindi and their escape to Dir. The forensic analysis also brought to surface the name of the dead Baitullah Mehsud as the only mastermind or the handler of the bombing.

ISI special operator Mohammad Ismail in his statement recorded by the JIT said he had been attached with the ISI for five years, and that he knew Pushto language well. His duties included hearing and recording telephonic conversation of commanders of different organizations. On December 28, 2007, just a day after the bombing, the ISI intercepted a telephone call from a phone number 0928-230493 (registered in the name of Mazharuddin) to a phone number 0965-238387 (registered in the name of Haji Shah Wali Khan). Through experience, Ismail identified the caller from the phone number 0928-230493 as Baitullah Mehsud. He recorded the conversation on a CD whose duration was just one minute and 13 seconds.

During the forensic analysis of these cell numbers, the JIT discovered that user of one suspicious but currently active cell number (0345-3818989) had switched to a new cell phone number (0305-2761582), active in Karachi.

LATEST CHALLAN

In his statement of Brigadier Javed Iqbal Cheema, the then Director General of the National Crisis Management Cell (NCCM), who conducted a press conference 24 hours after the incident, categorically held former president Pervez Musharraf responsible for his premature press conference on the investigation of the case. He said that under his (former president) orders and clear cut instructions, he (Cheema) held the press conference on December 28, 2007, on the investigation of the case in Rawalpindi without consulting the Punjab Government. The Punjab government had yet to notify the JIT on December 31, 2007. "It shows that as president, he was the single source of authority in the country," says the report.

The meeting at the President's Camp Office in Rawalpindi was also confirmed by former DG IB Ejaz Shah in his statement to the JIT. The report states that the former president ordered the hasty press conference with the motive to influence the police investigation. It says the then prime minister, Punjab chief minister and the provincial police had not been consulted.

The report contains "overwhelming circumstantial evidence" that Musharraf would be the main beneficiary from the removal of Bhutto and her party's failure during the elections without her leadership.

It says that Musharraf's government had ordered VVIP security to two former prime ministers - Shaukat Aziz and Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain - but had deliberately denied the same to Bhutto despite repeated requests.

Syed Saud Aziz, former Rawalpindi police chief, and Khurran Shahzad, former Rawal Town SP, have been charged with criminal negligence of duty and hosing down the crime scene.

The JIT says that already established security breach and destruction of evidence on the day of assassination is not accidental criminal negligence but apparently is part of a wider conspiracy to eliminate Bhutto from the political scene before the elections.

The JIT also found that CPO Syed Saud Aziz deliberately avoided conducting the post mortem in an attempt to obstruct and impede investigation. CPO Saud Aziz in his statement before the JIT tried to shift this legal responsibility but the JIT finds his explanation as implausible and untenable.

A February 7, 2011 supplementary challan contains the names of 133 people as prosecution witnesses.

ASHFAQ ANWAR'S CONFESSION: TRUE OR FALSE


The Rawalpindi District Police prepared a written plan dated 26 December 2007 for security arrangements to cover the PPP rally, which Bhutto was to attend. The Security Plan envisaged security for her convoy by an Elite Force unit under the supervision of Assistant Superintendent of Police (ASP) Ashfaq Anwar, which was to establish a box formation around her vehicle during movement. In his statement before a district magistrate, Anwar said CPO Saud Aziz told him to go to a PML-N rally that had been fired at and thus hampered formation of the box formation.

ANALYSIS OF THE STATEMENT

The statement seems to be a mix of truth and lie. It is true in confirming for the first time that the box formation did not occur. Anwar's name was on the exit control list while he was to go to the UK for LLM. The confessional statement seemingly follows a deal because he was allowed to go for education after that. The statement is an exaggeration in Anwar blaming it all on his seniors. Had he, being the Elite Force unit head, formed a protective box, Bhutto would have been safe. Also included is a statement by Police Control's wireless operator Ahmad Nawaz. He says the police record has been tampered with. He confirms that Aziz told Anwar to leave his place. This operator had previously spoken in Aziz's defence. A constantly evolving and sometimes contradictory explanation of the events has only clouded the issue. But truth will ultimately come out.

Phone and suspects movement

- 12.26 Nasrullah alias Ahmad calls Qari Naif from Quaid-e-Azam Colony
- 13.20 Nasrullah alias Ahmad calls Hasnain Gul from Quaid-e-Azam Colony and tells him in code words to bring the would-be suicide bombers home. Gul follows the instruction.
- 14.02 Rafiqat tells Nasrullah alias Ahmad he is coming to pick the would-be suicide bombers
- 14.15 Hasnain Gul in Quaid-e-Azam Colony asks Rafiqat to pick the suicide bombers. Rafiqat at Dhok Syedan Road says he has already arrived with a taxi.
- 15.05 Nasrullah alias Ahmad at Committee Chowk [Square] in front of Liaqat Bagh calls Gul in Quaid-e-Azam Colony that Benazir Bhutto has arrived at Liaqat Bagh
- 15.08 Gul in Quaid-e-Azam Colony shares the information with Rafiqat on his way to Liaqat Bagh
- At the time of incident, Rafiqat and Nasrullah alias Ahmad were at Liaqat Bagh and Gul in Quaid-e-Azam Colony
- 17.35 Half an hour after the blast, Rafiqat at Liaqat Bagh tells Gul in Quaid-e-Azam Colony that he is standing near the Novelty Cinema
- 17.41 Gul in Quaid-e-Azam Colony calls Nasrullah alias Ahmad near Liaqat Bagh. Nasrullah asks where he can take a taxi from.
- 18.09 Nasrullah calls Rafiqat and tells him that he is going to the Daeewo station by taxi.



Suicide bomber's DNA

DNA, or deoxyribonucleic acid, is the hereditary material in humans and almost all other organisms. Nearly every cell in a person's body has the same DNA. The investigators referred some body parts – a facemask, hennaed hands, two pieces of skull, two legs and one finger -- to Forensic Science Services, London for DNA tests. The lab concluded that all the body parts were of one person suspected to be the suicide bomber. The bomber's DNA also matched that of the people from FATA. However, personal identity of the bomber could not be ascertained.

The real hero

It was Forensic Laboratory Sihala's retired SP Aftab Ahmad Khan who prepared a plaster of Paris copy of the escape hatch and found it consistent with the size and shape of the wound. This finding was later confirmed but never acknowledged.

Blood

The interior was covered in blood and some brain material was found from the vehicle indicating the intensity of wound. However, Bhutto's shoes which she had put off to rise through the escape hatch and a napkin box remained unstained.

Bhutto's court shoes

Quite weird incidents followed Benazir Bhutto's murder. A hubbub followed the information that the black court shoes belonging to her had gone missing. On the intervention of the Punjab inspector general of police, it transpired that a police inspector had taken the shoes home. The shoes were ordered back.

The UN Commission report says: "Bhutto's Land Cruiser was initially taken to the City Police Station by Inspector Kashif Riaz sometime after midnight early on 28 December and then taken to Police Lines. In the early hours of 28 December, CPO Saud Aziz went to see the Police Lines, together with others, including ISI officers,

who were the first to conduct a forensic examination of the vehicle. An investigating police officer on the orders of the CPO, removed Bhutto's shoes and took them to the City Police Station. Sometime thereafter, the shoes were ordered back into the car. This was clearly interfering with the integrity of the evidence."

Lie detector

An investigator said they used lie detectors while grilling the suspects who, except for one, sounded true. However, former caretaker interior minister Hamid Nawaz said he knew the device was used during investigation. However, according to him, it was not all that reliable an instrument.

Striker sleeve

The investigators were perplexed at the possibility of one person firing shots – which requires raising one's forearm -- and exploding oneself afterwards. Conventionally, a pen or tube-like device is strapped to the forearm of a suicide bomber. When he raises his hand above the shoulder the mercury shifts to the other end completing the circuit, thus detonating the explosive. However, later they concluded that it was possible through the use of striker sleeve, a mechanism that the suicide bomber manually pulls to detonate the bomb.

Voice identification

Former caretaker interior minister Hamid Nawaz said investigators had resolved the "whole mystery" behind the assassination. He said their government had intercepted a conversation between Baitullah Mehsud and Maulvi Omar congratulating each other over Bhutto's murder. He said voice signatures with the intelligence agencies and confirmation by the arrested suspects were enough evidences to prove that Mehsud was behind the suicide attack on Bhutto. Who is behind Mehsud is not yet known.

Alive and on the run?

As the telephone intercept suggests, two persons had been designated to attack Bhutto. Saeed, who also went by the alias Bilal, fired three shots in less than a second and then set off his suicide bomb. His associate Ikramullah fled and, according to some reports, returned to Waziristan. His whereabouts are not yet known.

The phone trap

The ISI monitored suspects' mobile phones and verified their presence at the crime scene through International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) and International Mobile Subscriber's Identity (IMSI), and ascertained the place they used the phone at through Radio Base Station Locations. The investigators verified the presence of Nasrullah alias Ahmad, Hasnain Gul and Muhammad Razaqat around Liaqat Bagh through this technology.

THE REAL KILLER

An objective analysis of the conspiracy theories

Pakistan's history is dotted with unexplained political assassinations. Benazir Bhutto's killing has all the elements to spring multidimensional conspiracy theories. She was brought back to Pakistan from exile as part of an international deal. Then she was killed – and all traces of evidence were immediately swept away. Despite Scotland Yard probe and the United Nations commission of inquiry, many key questions about her murder remain unsolved. Almost everyone in Pakistan has a theory about who did it. In the pages that follow, we will analyze five conspiracy theories and the evidence and argument backing them. This chapter concludes with a discussion on whoever the real killer might be, based on the role of different entities, institutions and persons.

Conspiracy theory I

THE US INVOLVEMENT

People in developing countries including Pakistan perceive the United States as wielding so much influence in their politics not a leaf shakes there without its consent. The US hand can be detected in the making and breaking of any government in Pakistan. Benazir Bhutto maintained friendly relations with the US though her father Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had described the US as vindictive as a “White Elephant” which was out to punish Pakistan for its defiance in being a nuclear power. Many a worker of Bhutto’s party, the Pakistan Peoples Party, considered his hanging a sort of revenge.

FRIEND OR ENEMY

Several PPP workers burnt American flags and chanted “down with America” customarily, when Benazir Bhutto returned in April 1986. She denounced the practice sending a message she had no enmity with US. The US administration, on the other hand, took keen interest in her return. Several critics of Benazir Bhutto’s gave her the title of “Darling of the West” because of her deep-rooted relations with the western world. But, analyzing the Benazir Bhutto-America diplomatic ties and contacts rationally, one finds them seesawing between good and bad. The US supported her over many issues but showed indifference on others. Reservations and concerns were expressed discreetly and openly.

The US was not happy with Benazir Bhutto when her second government was dismissed in 1996. Talks with India remained deadlocked during her second term in office. Despite repeated warning from America, the nuclear program kept progressing. Bhutto brought in missile technology from North Korea, a country in the US rival camp. She passed through years of strain owing to Swiss accounts and cases in the Pakistani courts after her dismissal. Though she did not voice the stress, she must have felt the US indirect push for a “red warrant” or international media campaign against her, or cases in Switzerland. And that was the US revenge for bringing the missile technology from North Korea to Pakistan.

With the passing of time after 9/11, the war on terror lost people's backing. The impression in the western world that Bhutto and her party could make the war against terror acceptable for the people deepened. And so, the international powers-that-be made Bhutto's return possible. Issues relating to the National Reconciliation Ordinance were settled. The US establishment was confident of Bhutto extracting on her return the required people's support for war on terror that General Musharraf had failed to win over. On her part, Bhutto anxiously wanted an end to her exile and run for elections to fill the gap created by years of her absence. The US, the UK and other powers brokered an agreement between Bhutto and General Musharraf. Through this understanding, they wanted both Bhutto and Musharraf run the next set-up and jointly fight against terrorism.

BLACKWATER?

On Bhutto's return to Pakistan, suicide blast at a Karachi rally she was leading killed several people. She accused some militant and political elements of planning the blast. She did not hint at any international conspiracy. Later, she was killed in Liaquat Bagh, Rawalpindi suicide blast on December 27, 2007. It was later said the blast was well-planned and it was not an act of Taliban but an international conspiracy.

Former army chief General Mirza Aslam Beg said in a statement that US got Benazir Bhutto killed. He said: "She violated the deal she struck with the establishment and the US after she sensed a change in the situation in Pakistan". Later, in an interview General Beg said the US agency Blackwater killed her and General Musharraf had sanctioned their entry into Pakistan. Given that General Beg's previous predictions like the US defeat in Iraq had proved false, this statement of his had no takers.

KOREAN MISSILE

Shyam Bhatia, a British journalist of Indian origin, narrates his friendship with Benazir Bhutto which started at Oxford University in his book titled "Goodbye Shahzadi" in 2008, several months after her murder. On page 41, referring to an off-the-record talk with her, he says: The gist of what she told

me was that before leaving Islamabad [during her second stint as prime minister 1993-1996] she shopped for an overcoat with the 'deepest possible pockets' into which she transferred CDs containing the scientific data about uranium enrichment that North Koreans wanted. ... She had acted as a two-way courier, bringing North Korea's [Nodong or Ghauri] missile information on CDs back with her on the return journey. ... On page 42 he says: On the record at a later date, she changed her story to insist that the Nodong was a strictly cash deal.

Whichever version is correct, conspiracy theorists say the US must have registered the slip-up that Bhutto brought in missile technology from a country it considers hostile.

SPYING ON BENAZIR BHUTTO

Ron Suskind, a Pulitzer Prize winning US journalist who worked at the Wall Street Journal as senior national affairs writer, published a book "The Way of the World" in 2008 that revealed that the US agencies had been tapping Benazir Bhutto's phone calls. Suskind, who is said to have contacts in the US establishment, has quoted short transcripts of her talk with different personalities. The US establishment and the administration have not denied directly or indirectly the disclosures made in his book.

SECRET ACCOUNTS

The US secret agencies continued tapping Benazir Bhutto's phone wherever she was -- in the US, the UK, the UAE or in Pakistan. Why did they do so? Ron Suskind on page 292 of his book *Way of the World* writes: "The NSA [the National Security Agency]... [has] been listening to her calls for months, including an earlier call she made to her son, Bilawal. ... In that call, she told him about the secret bank accounts that hold the family's fortunes - huge reserves of money that investigators have long suspected are ill-gotten."

On page 293, Suskind says: "The NSA, meanwhile, has harvested a number of portentous conversations of Benazir Bhutto's. This should help the United States play its under the table, cut-throat games more effectively. The intercept will be cited inside the US government as evidence of Bhutto's unfitness, her corruption. It will be used as part of a wider

"carrot and stick" programme begun in the spring, in which the United States let Bhutto know they were happy to work with her in setting up a [political] marriage with Musharraf, but they could make her life difficult if she started to improvise and freelance. What they'll overlook is the context and her tone in the many calls they eavesdrop on -- overlook the fact that she's scared and preparing for the possibility of imminent death."

THE REAL DEAL?

Ron Suskind writes on page 265: (She is sure the United States is behind her; Condi [Condoleezza Rice, former US Secretary of State] and [Richard] Boucher [former Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs] have told her as much. Her faith in them exists because she detects comforting self-interest: they want an advertisement for how democracy can work, whatever the underlying reality. In her mind, the appearance of a step forward for democracy will be plenty, as long as she can return to power.

Her problem is that she knows Musharraf better than anyone in the United States. He was a rising commander in her second term as prime minister, and she feels he'll accede to this power-sharing deal only under duress. He must be forced into it by the United States.

Boucher has told her not to worry, that Musharraf's on board. But he says she needs to work out her complex issues with the general and negotiate a win-win deal. Bhutto's demands are not insubstantial and hinge on being granted amnesty from long-standing corruption charges and being made eligible for a third term as prime minister, something forbidden under Pakistani law, but Bhutto holds a trump card in her hand: legitimacy. If, Musharraf accepts her demands and agrees to step down as army chief, she'll stop her party, the PPP, from resigning from the national and provincial assemblies, as other opposition parties are threatening to do. With the large and populist PPP voting in the assemblies, Musharraf's reelection as president on October 6 - a parliamentary plebiscite by his ruling party will appear far less illegitimate. Then following the election, Musharraf would "take off his uniform" and Bhutto would return triumphantly to lead her party, the country's largest, as the de facto prime

minister until the parliamentary elections install her in the actual post. Work all this out, Boucher has told Bhutto, and Musharraf has assured the United States "he'll keep you safe."

MUSHARRAF'S BITTER TONE

Ron Suskind has quoted another revealing phone talk between Benazir Bhutto and General Musharraf at the office of a US Congressman. Suskind (page 268 of the *Way of the World*) quotes the talk like this: "Bhutto takes the call from Islamabad. "The twice-elected provision is important to me," she tells Musharraf. "If you're retreating from that, what can you give me? May be some real reform in the election commission?"

He says she shouldn't be hoping for much there, either. In their many calls, he's been surprisingly cordial, often quite reasonable. But something has changed. His voice is harsh, almost mocking her.

She asks if the US officials have had conversation with him that makes it clear that her safety is his responsibility.

"Yes, someone has called", Musharraf says, and then laughs. "The Americans can call all they want with their suggestions about you and me, let them call," he tells her. His change of tone, she doesn't realize, arises from those very talks with American leaders in which she's invested hope. Musharraf has been in a running conversation with Bush and Cheney since the two men arrived in their high offices, right up until a few days ago. He knows that when confronted with a choice between power and principle, they'll go with power, not even recognizing the sway of certain principles that they loosely espouse. Democracy, accountability, justice? Americans won't be backing up any of those ideals with force and consistency, Musharraf knows. Not in this era. Such ideals are just means, when convenient, not ends. Bush and Cheney have made that perfectly clear. All things being equal, they'd prefer someone freed from those lofty principles to face down the angry Islamist threat. What Musharraf can't believe is that Bhutto - a very tough strategist, deep down, -- doesn't get this. That's why he's laughing in her face.

He finishes the call with a dose of fair warning. "You should understand something," Pervez Musharraf says, finally to Benazir Bhutto. "Your security is based on the state of our relationship."

MUSHARRAF THREAT

"Your security is based on the state of our relationship." The world media viewed this utterance as a threat to Benazir Bhutto by Musharraf. However, it is evident from this talk that Rice and Boucher had assured Bhutto her life would be protected. But the promise was only to be forgotten.

RICE'S ROLE

Suskind cites the ups and downs in the negotiations between Bhutto and Musharraf and the changing role of the US. On pages 280, 281 he says: "The first bad break for the United States comes in early September: Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher, who's been handling the Bhutto-Musharraf talks, falls ill and needs to be hospitalized. Condi Rice tries to step in. She calls a London hotel where Bhutto is meeting Pakistani supporters. Bhutto does not take the call. "Someone said that Condi Rice was on the phone," she (Bhutto) said later, I thought they were joking." On the third try, Rice reaches her. She and Bhutto talk several times through a long night and into the next morning, ironing out some sticking points with Musharraf. Bhutto tells her she's concerned about her security but doesn't recount the harrowing Capitol Hill conversation with Musharraf. She's suspicious that the United States sees her value mostly as a means to shore up Musharraf – rather than as a champion of democratic ideals – and to describe her exchange with the general would show just untenable a couple they would make. Musharraf, meanwhile, accedes to several of Bhutto's demands and assures the State Department that her security will not be a problem. Though he commits thousands of troops and police officers to patrol Karachi for her return, it is committed intelligence work or a back-channel deal with the country's radicals – not troop strength – that's needed to stop an attack. That he won't do."

SECURITY PLAN

“Two days before she boards the plane, Bhutto is concerned. Her team has been frantically trying to beef up her security. Everyone has his responsibility. Her husband, Asif, believes in bodies - surrounding Benazir with as many Pakistani security personnel as possible. He has several hundred lined up to meet her. The rest of the team doesn't think what will be adequate. Mark Siegel and Larry Wallace, Bhutto's American advisers, have been working the problem with Blackwater. In September, representatives from the firm flew to meet with Bhutto at her home in Dubai and laid out several security plans, each costing about \$400,000 per month. They intended to work in conjunction with affiliated firms inside of Pakistan, because Musharraf had blocked visas from being issued to imported Americans security personnel for Bhutto. Bhutto herself is anxious about being ushered into the country with security forces from America and connecting herself to Blackwater. She turns the firm down. She knows that the United States has accepted Musharraf's assurance that he had her security under control, but she does not trust him and sends an “in the event of my death” note, identifying various hardline Islamist officials in his orbit who should be held responsible in the event that she is killed.”

HOW ASSETS ARE FROZEN

Ron Suskind arrived in Pakistan after Bhutto's return and met her in Quetta. Phone tapping and his analysis and the US lack of interest in Bhutto's security, all here on “The Way of the World” page 335:

She starts running through leading officials, their names and profiles - from top ministers to intelligence chiefs. “And the key is no warning,” she adds, “which is what Americans do too much of - always threatening this and that. Then people will hide their money. No, freeze it and say it will be unfrozen if certain things happen.”

This, after all, is not a far cry from what the United States threatens to do to her the previous summer, to get her to accede to its term, to support Musharraf, to behave, to do as she was told. Bhutto didn't know about the NSA [National

Security Agency] intercepts, but a U.S. official let her understand that the United States could, if need be, “constrain her assets,” just as she was now suggesting they do to Musharraf.

The darker question in Bhutto’s mind: Why hasn’t the United States done the same to Musharraf and his team?

“The vice president needs to make the call—he’s the only one that Musharraf will respect—and say, ‘Here, boy is how things will work,’” Bhutto says, her eyes flashing. Then she broadens out strategically, beyond her frozen accounts idea, to the larger issue of the manifold threats to her life.

“I’m in a different position, but it’s not a complicated one. The vice president needs to make a call that I know, from talking to diplomats, he’s not made. He needs to call Musharraf and say, ‘You hold the cards. If something happens to her, we will hold you responsible.’ Why can’t he make that call?”

CHENEY DOES NOT TAKE BHUTTO’S CALL

Benazir Bhutto wanted America to get General Musharraf put into effect the assurance given to her regarding her security, but US Vice President Dick Cheney did not deem it fit to reply the call she made to him. He didn’t even ask Musharraf about the security firmly. Actually, the US government, in the meantime, had settled the matters with General Musharraf, rather they intended to stop Benazir Bhutto from coming to Pakistan before elections. Some people are of the view the actual agreement stipulated that Bhutto will return to Pakistan after, and not before, the polls.

JOE BIDEN’S THREAT

A Bhutto confidant told the author on anonymity that Democratic Party Senator Joe Biden went to Dubai especially to meet her. Republican Party was in the government at that time, and everyone was expecting Democratic Party’s win in the elections. According to him, Biden told Bhutto during the talks: “A change in America is imminent. A Black will be the president for the first time in the history of America. So, you should tread cautiously”. Biden then changed his tone saying: “Your return to Pakistan [before elections] will not be an appropriate decision, and if you go back immediately, you

yourself will be responsible for the consequences". According to the confidant, after Biden's departure Bhutto said: "Americans are hurling threats and warnings. They know I'm returning to my own country, yet their behavior is strange".

Bhutto told Suskind: "I took a gamble on democracy, and all I asked of the United States is that they cover my bet. She says, suddenly hard eyed, is that too much to ask? But what I am beginning to think is that they have made their choice. That is why Cheney is not calling. They decided to go with their favorite dictator rather than this most cherished American ideal. Why would anyone do something like that." (The Way of the World, page 336).

WILY WAYS OF THE US

Suskind analyses Bhutto's murder and the behavior of the US government in these words (Page 258): It is a tragedy that American leaders, so convinced of their tactical skills and the shrewdness of their power plays, would ignore the unexpected - Bhutto's evolution - and not see how she might turn into the next great narrative of this period, capturing the imagination far and wide and turning it away from destructive certainty. The United States should have done whatever was necessary - including sending over a few hundred Secret Service agents or pulling together a small international security team - to make sure Bhutto lived to see Election Day. It was a matter of will. Cheney never made the call Bhutto was hoping for. He and the president, once again, trusted illegitimate power over stated principles. They went with Musharraf."

OTHER STORIES

The doubts about America do not end here. In 2009, an Arabic TV (May 18, 2009), referring to another Pulitzer Prize winner 70-year old American journalist Seymour Hersh, claimed American special squad killed Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and Benazir Bhutto. This squad was not accountable to anyone in the US government. It carried out its activities under the control of American Vice President Dick Cheney. Seymour Hersh strongly denied (May 19, 2009) after breaking of the news saying he had not given any such interview.

"Vice president Cheney does not have a death squad. I have no idea who killed Mr Hariri or Ms Bhutto. I have never said that I did have such information," Pakistani daily Dawn quoted Hersh as saying.

ANY ANSWERS?

Although Cheney's direct involvement in Bhutto's murder has been ruled out after Hersh denial, yet it does not clear the US. It's time we analysed the US role now. Probably no one may answer these questions for now but history surely will:

Question 1- Is it true the US brokered the deal between Benazir Bhutto and General Musharraf? What did the US want to achieve?

Question 2- Is it true the US gets frozen assets of those who don't accept terms it sets and releases assets of those who oblige? Does a democratic country like the US have any legal and moral justification for doing so?

Question 3- Is it true the US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Boucher had assured Bhutto of complete security after her return to Pakistan?

Question 4- Is it true the US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice finalized the terms of the deal between Benazir Bhutto and General Musharraf after talks with her?

Question 5- Is it true American National Security Agency tapped Bhutto's phones? What was the moral justification?

Question 6- Bhutto made several phone calls to the US Vice President Dick Cheney and left messages for him to ask Musharraf for security but he did not reply. Why?

Question 7- Did US hold Musharraf accountable after the death of Benazir Bhutto?

Going through these questions and taking the whole conspiracy theory minutely, one finds that the US could have protected Bhutto's life as assured. Was it a criminal laxity or a part of some big conspiracy? Human blood doesn't remain silent forever. Cheney, Rice and Boucher will have to break their silence. The UN Commission set up to investigate Bhutto's murder was denied access to these officials. History will ask for whatever the US was hiding.

Conspiracy theory II

THE GENERAL CONNECTION?

The relationship between Musharraf and Bhutto had never been one of trust. Musharraf was the first person to be fingered at after Bhutto's killing. There was a general impression that Musharraf eliminated her to prolong his rule. This notion led Muslim League-Q, which was working under the tutelage of General Musharraf, to being called Killer League. The agreement brokered by the US stipulated that General Musharraf would retain his position as president while Benazir Bhutto would be the prime minister. Bhutto's widowed husband Asif Zardari did not see Musharraf after her murder. Zardari pressured Musharraf to quit the office and ended up as president after his party won the general elections. People tracing the conspiracy believe General Musharraf master-minded Benazir Bhutto's murder.

BHUTTO'S ACCUSATIONS

Bhutto had been making it clear during her last days that General Musharraf was after her life. Normally, the names given out by a victim before death can be considered as an FIR [First Information Report or police complaint].

Bhutto sent an email to CNN senior correspondent Wolf Bulitzer a few days before her murder. Received on October 26, the email said General Musharraf Pervez would be to blame if she was murdered. Bulitzer read out the email after Bhutto's killing. BB writes in email: "If it is God's will, nothing will happen to me. But if anything happened to me, I will hold Pervez Musharraf responsible. I have been made to feel insecure by Musharraf's minions".

DID MUSHARRAF KILL HER?

In her last meeting with investigative journalist Amir Mir who has been writing on the establishment's role in Pakistan's politics for long, Bhutto declared Musharraf her killer (See Amir Mir's *If I was murdered*).

Bhutto told me [the author] during a stroll at the Hyde Park, London that General Musharraf and his administration would never miss an opportunity to insult and frighten her. Because of the red warrant issued against her, she said, every time she boarded a plane on a foreign tour she as a former prime minister feared being arrested causing disrepute to Pakistan. She said she did not trust Musharraf for he just wanted to see me insulted and get an obstacle in his way removed.

MINIONS OF MUSHARRAF

All the persons named by Bhutto were Musharraf's confidants. Brigadier Ejaz Shah, Chaudhary Pervez Elahi and the ideological leader of extremists General Hamid Gul. Whenever I met Bhutto I got the impression that General Musharraf had contacts with religious extremists through whom he intended to get her killed.

WAITING FOR A BIG NEWS

According to reliable sources, a Bhutto family friend informed Zardari that Musharraf had sent all the servants including the cook and maids at his house on leave a day before Bhutto was killed. It seemed Musharraf was anticipating some big news. Zardari was also told that all the lights at the official residence of Musharraf were switched off early in the evening for a mysterious quietude and darkness. Denial of security and jammers to Benazir Bhutto, refraining from an autopsy of her body and hosing down of the crime scene hint Musharraf was not only aware of her impending assassination, but may have played a more direct role, the friend thinks.

IN BHUTTO'S OWN WORDS

Benazir Bhutto writes in her posthumous book "Reconciliation: Islam, Democracy and the West" (Page 218): I returned to Pakistan after eight years abroad on October 18, 2007, and was greeted in Karachi by crowds estimated by Sindhi press and party officials to be up to three million people. It was a moment I had dreamt of for so many years. I was overwhelmed by emotion as I touched the land of my birth and saw the love of the people. It was a love I returned with all my heart and soul. Politics started out as a duty for me. Over the

years of pain, suffering, sacrifice, and separation, of young men and women tortured and killed, it had become an all consuming passion.

WOULD I BE KILLED?

Bhutto writes: When I returned, I did not know whether I would live or die. I was told by both the Musharraf regime and a foreign Muslim government that four suicide bomber squads would attempt to kill me. These included, the reports said, the squads sent by the Taliban warlord Baitullah Mahsud; Hamza bin Laden, a son of Osama bin Laden; Red Mosque militants; and a Karachi-based militant group. I said farewell to my children, husband, mother, staff, friends, and family not knowing whether I would ever see their faces again. I told my children, "Do not worry. Nothing will happen to me. God will protect me." I wanted to reassure them, but I also told them, "Remember: God gives life, and God takes life. I will be safe until my time is up." I wrote a letter to General Musharraf. I told him that if I was assassinated by the militants it would be due to the sympathizers of the militants in his regime, who I suspected wanted to eliminate me and remove the threat I posed to their grip on power. Deep in the heart of Karachi, the crowd celebrated people's power in joy and festivity. Suddenly the streetlights went dim and shut off.

WHEN BOMBS WENT OFF

On page 219 she says: The jammers we needed to prevent improvised explosive devices from going off stopped working after eight hours. Senator Rukhsana Zuberi went to the KESC, the power station, to try to get the lights switched on, which was necessary for our security to work effectively. The lights stayed off. Ten hours after my arrival, I went down to the compartment in the truck to take off my sandals. My foot had swollen from standing for so long, and the sandal was cutting into it. Now I was physically closer to street level.

Suddenly two powerful bombs went off in the space of 45 seconds. In between a flamethrower was used to that sent a blaze of orange fire into the sky. The truck rocked from side to side, sickeningly. Two dents in the side of the armoured truck meant it had been hit directly. I looked outside. The dark night

was bathed in an orange light, and under it dead bodies, crumpled bodies, lay scattered in the most horrific scene of bloodshed and carnage. The music had gone, the songs of celebration were silenced. There was only a deathly quiet, the quiet of the graveyard.

WHAT DID BHUTTO WITNESS?

About thirty minutes before I went down to loosen my sandals in the compartment on the lower deck of the truck, I saw a man holding up a baby. The baby was dressed in PPP colours and was about one or two years old. The man gesticulated repeatedly to me to take the baby. I gesticulated to the crowd to make way for him. But when the crowd parted, the man would not come forward. Instead he would try to hand the baby to someone in the crowd. Worried that the baby would fall and be trampled upon or be lost, I would gesticulate no, you bring the baby to me. Finally he pointed to the security guard, I asked the security guard to let him up on the truck. However, by the time he came to the truck, I was going to the compartment. Agha Siraj Durrani, a PPP parliamentarian, was watching the access to the truck by the stair. When the man tried to hand the baby up the truck, Agha Siraj told him to get lost. The man then went to a police mobile to the left of the truck, which refused to take the baby. The man moved to the police mobile in front of the first. A woman councilor of the PPP, Rukhsana Faisal Baloch, was on this mobile, as was a cameraman. As the man tried to hand the baby to the second policemobile, the first policemobile made an announcement: "Don't take the baby, don't take the baby, don't let the baby up on the truck." Both these policemobiles were exactly parallel to where I was sitting in the armored truck. We suspect the baby's clothes were lined with plastic explosives. As the man scuffled with the police in the van to hand the baby over, the first explosion took place on the van. Everyone in that van was killed, as were those around it. Human flesh, blood, and body pieces flew everywhere. The blood and gore rose up to the truck, sticking to the clothes, hair, and hands of the people I had been standing up with earlier. The van went on fire right next to the truck.

Within fifty seconds, a fifteen-kilogram car bomb was detonated, throwing people up far and wide, penetrating them with pellets, shrapnel, and burning pieces of metal. According to some eyewitnesses, snipers began firing at this point. Had the jammers worked, the bombs could not have gone off. Had the lights been on, the car with the bomb would have been spotted.

Although I came out of the truck about eight minutes later, there seemed to be some chemical in the air. I suffered like others from both a perforated eardrum and a racking dry cough, the like of which I had never had before. Meanwhile, instead of rushing away, the Jaan Nisaar Benazir (my security guards) rushed toward the truck to secure me, taking the place of their brothers who had been killed. Less than an hour earlier, I had been talking to those in the front of my truck. We had been passing water to one another. I can still see their smiling faces, their eyes lighted up with the joy of the victorious reception. I shall see their faces till the day I die.

Dr. Zulfikar Mirza, who helped take the dead and wounded to the hospital, told me of the strange state of the bodies. The clothes of some were totally burned off. Others were clothed, but when one moved to pick up the body, it would melt and disintegrate. Many with pellet wounds subsequently died, making us suspect that the pellets had been soaked in poison.

When all the bodies had been counted, the number of those killed went up to 179 dead and nearly 600 wounded, some disabled for life. Yet the flame of hope burned so brightly that one mother told me, "I lost one son. I would sacrifice another to bring change." A young widow, married two months earlier, said her husband insisted, "I will take Bibi home safely and then return even if I have to give my life." Humera Alwani, a PPP parliamentarian, told me she had heard a chief minister say on television, "Benazir's procession will be over after midnight and she will never get to Bilawal House (my home)." The first bomb struck at 12:06 A.M. on the morning of October 19, 2007. Later, as I watched a video of the blast, I could hear the faint cry of "Jeay Bhutto"-- "Long live Bhutto"-- from the wounded as they lay dying in the streets.

Back at Bilawal House, our first thought was to arrange blood for the wounded and ensure they got to the hospital. Twenty of the dead around the truck could not be identified. They were so badly blown up that only body parts remained. Sixteen of them had heads separated from the bodies. We plan to bury them in the shadow of my father's final resting place at Garhi Khuda Bux Bhutto in my hometown of Larkana with honor and respect. Every year when the party gathers from the four corners of Pakistan to pay tribute to my father on the anniversary of his martyrdom, we will pray for the victims of Karsaz, the bridge near which the explosions took place in Karachi.

WHO MASTERMINDED THE ATTACK?

On page 221, Bhutto writes: Later, I was informed of a meeting that had taken place in Lahore where the bomb blasts were planned. According to this report, three men belonging to a rival political faction were hired for half a million dollars. They were, according to my sources, named Ejaz, Sajjad, and another whose name I forget. One of them died accidentally because he couldn't get away fast enough before the detonation. Presumably this was the one holding the baby. However, a bomb maker was needed for the bombs.

Enter Qari Saifullah Akhtar, a wanted terrorist who had tried to overthrow my second government. He had been extradited by the United Arab Emirates and was languishing in Karachi Central Jail. According to my second source, the officials present at Lahore had turned to Qari Saifullah Akhtar for help. His liaison with elements in the government, according to this source, was a radical who was asked to make the bombs, and asked for a fatwa, or edict, making it legitimate to oblige. He got the edict.

The bomb blasts took place in the army cantonment area in Karachi. When the army officials arrived on the scene, the wounded hooted them down. Rightly or wrongly, the perception in Pakistan is that the military is responsible for the rise of militancy and all the horrific consequences that it entails for Pakistan and its people. Militancy started with the Zia military dictatorship. Its heirs destabilized democracy until

military dictatorship was once again imposed. The Musharraf military dictatorship, notwithstanding its public pronouncements, has presided over the mushrooming growth of militant groups and militant acts that have exacted a heavy human toll.

The crime scene was not quarantined. The evidence was contaminated. The government of Pakistan refused to allow forensic experts from the FBI and Scotland Yard to assist in the investigation, fueling speculation that it had something to hide."

Reading through this long quote, one comes to know the background of October 18, 2007 blasts in Karachi for which Bhutto clearly held the government responsible. She thought that certain people in authority released Qari Saifullah from the jail to use him against her.

MUSHARRAF'S THREAT

The major proof against General Musharraf is the talk between him and Bhutto which was tapped by the US National Security Agency and later quoted by Ron Suskind in his book "The Way of the World (page 265): While Bhutto, 54, insisted on the repeal of the provision prohibiting a third term for the prime ministers, Musharraf refused to give in and ended the conversation on a threatening note. "You should understand something," Musharraf said, "Your security is based on the state of our relationship."

The conversation took place during Bhutto's meeting with US lawmakers at Capitol Hill, including John Kerry, and State Department officials, Suskind says.

Bhutto also enquired whether some US officials had called the military ruler to make it clear that her safety is his responsibility.

"Yes, someone has called," Musharraf replied, adding, "The Americans can call all they want with their suggestions about you and me, let them call."

The conversation was later considered as a threat to Bhutto.

SECURITY NOT PROVIDED

Benazir Bhutto called several sessions on security before her return. On page 281-282 Suskind writes: Mark Siegel and Larry Wallace, Bhutto's American advisers, have been working the problem with Blackwater. In September, representatives from the firm flew to meet with Bhutto at her home in Dubai and laid out several security plans, each costing about \$400,000 per month. They intended to work in conjunction with affiliated firms inside of Pakistan, because Musharraf had blocked visas from being issued to imported American security personnel for Bhutto. Bhutto herself is anxious about being ushered into the country with security forces from America and connecting herself to Blackwater. She turns the firm down. She knows that the United States has accepted Musharraf's assurance that he had her security under control, but she does not trust him and sends an "in the event of my death" note, identifying various hardline Islamist officials in his orbit who should be held responsible in the event that she is killed."

BEGINNING OF RECONCILIATION

The NRO and the reconciliation between Peoples Party and General Musharraf have been quite controversial. The most creditable witness in this regard is Benazir Bhutto herself. On page 223 of her book *Reconciliation* she says: There had been an ongoing dialogue between the PPP and the Musharraf regime from the very outset of his rule. These negotiations failed every time because I insisted on a road map to democracy. With the failure of each round would come a new round of persecution. It was a mutual cycle of running around in circles. In 2000, I was asked to quit politics for ten years, in exchange for my husband's release and the dropping of unproven charges against us. I refused.

In 2002, I was rung up by my husband at my cousin Professor Ahmed Ispahani's house in California. High ISI officials were sitting with him. If I agreed to quit politics for ten years, he told me, he would be released and all persecution, for that is what the allegations were about, would end. I couldn't do it. I thought of my father in the squalid death cell and how he had refused to abandon the people of Pakistan at the cost of

his life. In 2004, some of my friends intervened and my husband was released unconditionally. We hoped that this would help defuse the political tension in the country. It didn't. When my husband returned to Pakistan after visiting me, his reception was disrupted and he was repeatedly arrested and released. PPP supporters were also arrested, released, rearrested, their homes raided, their lives disrupted, their families traumatized.

WHAT DID BENAZIR BHUTTO WANT?

On pages 224 and 225 she says: I had been lobbying internationally for a return to democracy and for my safe return to Pakistan, just as my party had been working on these issues in Pakistan. The question arose as to how there could be a smooth transition to democracy when General Musharraf was a key ally in the war against terrorism and the PPP, the most popular party, according to the elections of 2002, and he were at loggerheads. It seemed inevitable that a rapprochement was needed if Pakistan were to break the cycle of dictatorship feeding into the needs of an extraordinary security situation as the world confronted the forces of extremism.

For the PPP it was essential that General Musharraf retire as the army chief of staff. The PPP had consistently fought against military dictatorship, and therefore, it was impossible for us to reconcile with a president who was also chief of the army. Yet for General Musharraf the army uniform was like a second skin. It was essential for the PPP that democracy be restored, and that could only occur through fair elections in which all political parties had a level playing field.

I refused to meet General Musharraf's emissaries, who insisted that as a precondition I opt out of the next general elections. Each offer was followed by a fresh bout of pressure in a ruthless abuse of the judicial system. Finally they dropped the precondition, but I did not want to meet them unless General Musharraf called me to assure me that they had his mandate.

MUSHARRAF CONTACTS BHUTTO

On page 225 Bhutto writes: I was in New York in August 2006 when General Musharraf called. He said that he wanted

the moderate forces to work together. He asked for my support for a bill related to women's rights. I agreed, subject to a parliamentary committee's working out the details. It was agreed that a team would meet with me. This included the director general of the ISI, who has now become the strongest man in the army as its head, and the national security advisor. A step had been taken for confidence building between the two sides in August 2006. The passage of the women's bill gave momentum to the process of negotiations, although deep suspicions existed. To overcome this suspicion, I had suggested direct talks, believing that if General Musharraf met with me it would demonstrate concretely that he was willing to review his public posture that there was no place for me in national politics.

THE CHARACTERS AND THEIR ROLES

On pages 225 and 226 Benazir Bhutto writes: Throughout the process of dialogue, I kept London and Washington and a small group of PPP leaders briefed on the progress. As General Musharraf's biggest international supporters and key donors to Pakistan, the voices of London and Washington in support of democracy were essential.

In life small incidents are catalyst to bigger changes. The former mayor of Blackburn, England, Mr. Salis Kiani, was such a catalyst. He hailed from the same constituency as British foreign secretary Jack Straw. At a time when I was *persona non grata*, he kept pushing Britain to lend support to a democratic Pakistan. He persuaded Jack Straw to meet with me to discuss the political situation in Pakistan. I used my time internationally to meet policy makers and make new friends who could help me put across the argument for a democratic Pakistan.

If there is a silver lining to the cloud of living away from home, it is in the people I met and the friends I made in those years. I met PPP leaders to discuss what our agenda should be in talks with General Musharraf. These issues in particular crept up: the uniform issue, fair elections, lifting of the ban on a twice-elected prime minister seeking office a third time, the

balance of power between the president and prime minister, and an end to political persecution.

THE ABU DHABI MEETING

On pages 226 and 227 she says: After several rounds of talks with General Musharraf's emissaries, a meeting was set up between General Musharraf and myself in Abu Dhabi, the capital of the United Arab Emirates. Even as the negotiations continued, so did the harassment, leaving me to conclude that the regime wanted to provoke me to pull out. So began a process, a dialogue that appeared at critical points to be moving the country forward to a democratic transition.

General Musharraf and I met in Abu Dhabi in January 2007. A helicopter was sent to pick me up, and I landed in the green gardens of the palace where the meeting was to take place. I thought of the time that I had earlier visited His Highness Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, who had always treated my father like a brother and me like a daughter. I thought of my father, who used to say, "The wheel of fortune turns, and in its revolution is a better future." General Musharraf, the man who had sworn to finish me politically, was now going to meet me to discuss the future of Pakistan.

Much to my surprise, the meeting was both long and cordial. We had a one-to-one meeting for several hours. I brought up all the critical political issues, the contentious issues, and General Musharraf's response to all of them was positive. I said that it was absolutely necessary for him to shed his uniform as army chief of staff. I made it clear that there had to be free, fair, and transparent elections that were internationally monitored and that a new, impartial Election Commission must be formed to supervise the elections. I said the elections must be open to the participation of all parties and all party leaders and that procedures must be in place to guarantee not only free voting but accurate counting. I said the ban on twice-elected prime ministers that he had written into the Constitution must be lifted. I said that for true reconciliation, charges brought against parliamentarians from all political parties since he had taken office that had not resulted in convictions, must be dropped. He readily

acknowledged that the charges that had been brought against me and my family had been politically motivated and designed to destroy my reputation, and I said he must indicate that not only privately but also publicly.

MUSHARRAF GIVES IN

On pages 227 and 228 she says: To my utter surprise he not only agreed in January 2007 to retire as army chief to pave the way for an understanding with the PPP and for national reconciliation but also took me into confidence that it would be done in October 2007, before the presidential election. As the PPP did not recognize the legality of the elections by the existing Parliament, General Musharraf, who had a majority, did not ask for our votes. We decided to leave the legality issue to the courts. It was decided that I would be in Pakistan by December 31, 2007, New Year's Eve, and General Musharraf said he would join me at Bilawal House for New Year's Eve if I invited him. The return issue was big, and it was resolved, too. He promised me to implement what he could constitutionally do through the PPP fair election paper. He agreed to explore a compromise on the problematic issue of the president's power to dismiss Parliament. At the end of the conversation, without my mentioning it, General Musharraf said that for confidence building he would finish the cases that had been lodged against us and gotten nowhere.

BHUTTO'S RESERVATIONS

On page 228 Bhutto writes: Used to fractious, long-winded arguments with opposition parties, I could not believe everything had gone so well. In fact, it had gone too well. Being cautious by nature, I insisted that a schedule be worked out: the first phase should conclude before the presidential elections, the phase for fair elections before the general elections, and the third phase after the elections. I said the PPP would agree to an understanding based on a sequence of events rather than a one-go arrangement.

I was worried: while all the major demands, including retiring as army chief and lifting the ban on twice-elected prime ministers had been agreed to, what were we to do if at

the end the general and his team walked away after a rigged election, leaving us high and dry?

Therefore, I did not want to agree to an understanding on behalf of my party until certain benchmarks were met. General Musharraf and his emissaries kept assuring me that a strategic decision had been made for the moderate forces to work together irrespective of the election results. However, it was the inability to meet benchmarks and to move in the direction of a sequential implementation of what had been agreed to that subsequently led to wrangling and the threat of the agreement coming apart.

SECOND MEETING

On pages 228 and 229 she has the detail: General Musharraf and I met again in Abu Dhabi in July 2007. He asked to see me urgently. We were meeting after two important events - first, the removal and reinstatement of Chief Justice Iftikhar, and second, the Red Mosque rebellion, which had left more than a hundred people dead. General Musharraf wanted the PPP's support in reducing the age of retirement for members of the superior judiciary. I could not agree to this, believing it would start a new round of confrontation with the judiciary. Second, he said that he could not finish the cases as he had promised. I told him it was okay if he could not finish the cases. Perhaps he could instead lift the ban on a twice-elected prime minister to show movement? He agreed. Again nothing happened.

In August I called PPP leaders to New York. There we discussed giving General Musharraf a "nonpaper" of what we expected. Makhdoom Amin Fahim gave the "nonpaper" to General Musharraf on August 18. The "nonpaper" said that unless there was movement, by the end of August both sides would be free to go their own ways. General Musharraf and I had a long conversation over the phone that night. He said he would send a team to see me at the end of August.

The team met me in London at my flat in Queens Gate. They discussed a whole new constitutional package. We increased the political price for the new package. They said they would come back in two days. They didn't. As the deadline approached for calling off talks, I got a call that the

deadline would be extended. It was, but there was silence from the Musharraf camp.

THE NRO PRICE

On page 229 she says: The PPP and I met in London in September, and I announced that the date of my return to Pakistan would be given on September 14, 2007, from all the capitals and regions of Pakistan. I wanted the date announced from my homeland. The talks with Musharraf remained erratic. He didn't want us resigning from the assemblies when he sought reelection. There wouldn't be much difference in his winning whether we boycotted or contested, but we used this to press him to retire as army chief. He cited judicial difficulties. It was a harrowing period. After many, many late-night calls, he passed a National Reconciliation Ordinance, rather than lift the ban on a twice-elected prime minister seeking office a third time, which he said he would do later.

In exchange for the NRO, we reciprocated by not resigning from the assemblies, although we did not vote for him. We knew the matter still had to be decided by the Supreme Court. We thought Musharraf took the wrong decision to seek reelection from the existing Parliament, that it would only compound the crisis. But he had made his choice.

The NRO was taken up by the courts. They did not stay it but left it undecided for a future date. The ruling party crowed that they had "tricked" the PPP, but we knew that they had only complicated the political situation for General Musharraf and for the country. Following the Supreme Court intervention in admitting the NRO for hearing, none of the persecution against my party or others ended. It upset me to read in the press that I had returned to Pakistan after General Musharraf finished the politically motivated cases against me. None of them was finished. Of all the hearings against my husband and myself that had concluded in the previous eleven and a half years, we had won everyone on merit and not on the basis of the NRO.

General Musharraf had agreed to allow free and fair elections under international monitoring. He agreed to an independent Election Commission. He agreed to create a

neutral caretaker government. He agreed to allow the newly elected Parliament to revise the rather absurd prohibition against Pakistanis being elected more than twice as prime minister. (This should not be confused with the concept of "term limits" under the presidential system in the West. I was elected for two five-year terms, thus elected to serve for ten years. But the intelligence agencies had twice brought my government down, and I had served for a total of only five years as prime minister. General Musharraf admitted in his autobiography, published in 2006, that the only reason he had rammed through the two-term prohibition was to ensure that I could never be elected prime minister again.) The general also agreed to drop unproven charges against parliamentarians of all major political parties that had not led to convictions in the eight years of his dictatorial rule. If Musharraf had fulfilled his promises, Pakistan could have had an orderly democratic transition, closing the chapter on military rule once and for all.

But as the poet T. S. Eliot once wrote, "Between the idea and the reality falls the shadow." Was General Musharraf merely stalling for time to try to consolidate power? I can't say. But on November 3, 2007, he declared martial law by suspending the Constitution. It put him on a collision course with both the people of the country and the PPP.

INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE

On page 231 Bhutto says: All through the years of the Soviet Empire, its Politburo had conducted so-called elections. Calling something an election and actually having an election are obviously very different things. When I was imprisoned in Lahore, under house arrest, surrounded by 4,000 Pakistani militia with bayonets drawn, it was clear that free elections were impossible. Justices, lawyers, political activists, journalists, human rights activists, and students were in prison or under house arrest. The independent media were shut down. A foreign journalist was expelled. The political opposition of democratic parties was banned from campaigning and organizing and denied access to the media.

However, for once domestic pressure and international reaction synchronized. British foreign secretary David

Miliband spoke to me, as did U.S. senator Joseph Biden, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; U.S. deputy secretary of state John Negroponte; and others. The international community was also calling for the lifting of the emergency, setting a date for elections, General Musharraf's keeping his commitment to retire as army head, releasing of political prisoners, and lifting of the gag on the media.

On November 16, 2007, John Negroponte visited Pakistan. We spoke on the phone. He wondered whether it was possible to put the derailed democratic transition back on track through dialogue. I shared with Mr. Negroponte the PPP's concern that the regime was using the dialogue process to discredit the opposition without actually making concessions. Though the lifting of the emergency, the retirement of General Musharraf as army head, and setting a date for elections were important, it was also important that an independent Election Commission deal with the nuts and bolts of what made an election fair. I thought that if General Musharraf would respond by lifting the emergency rule (which was, as noted, tantamount to martial law), retiring as army chief, sticking to the announced date of the elections, and taking specific and concrete steps to guarantee the sanctity of the voting and counting process, the political tension in the country could be reduced, enabling a peaceful transition to democracy.

General Musharraf, in response to the domestic and international pressure, announced that elections would go ahead on January 8, 2008. This put to rest the Pakistan Muslim League (Q)'s plans to postpone elections by two years even as the militants advanced from the tribal areas into Swat, the beautiful valley in Frontier Province.

Much to the nation's relief, General Musharraf did retire as army chief, did give a date for lifting the emergency on December 16, and stuck to the January date for elections. However, he did not move on the Election Commission issue.

RIGGING

On page 232 she says: The PPP continued to get reports of widespread rigging preparations. These included bulk transfers and postings of the judicial officers who have custody

of ballot papers. We worried about ghost polling stations as well as the use of government funds in aid of government-sponsored candidates.

To build pressure for the holding of fair elections, I met with former prime minister Nawaz Sharif on December 4, 2007, at my house in Islamabad. I tried to convince him and his allies to participate in the elections, believing it would be more difficult to rig against all of us.

At times I worry whether we as a nation can survive the threat of disintegration. Since the overthrow of my government, the militants have made many inroads into the very structure of governance of Pakistan through their supporters and sympathizers. Pakistan is a tinderbox that could catch fire quickly. It is my home, the home of my children, the home of all the children of Pakistan for whom such enormous sacrifices have been made.

Sixty years after Pakistan's creation, the case study of our nation's record with democracy is a sad chronicle of steps forward and huge steps backward. But this too will change. In the words of the great Pakistani poet-philosopher Iqbal, "Tyranny cannot long endure."

The US authorities presumably took Musharraf's recorded words that "You should understand something, your security is based on the state of our relationship" seriously after Benazir Bhutto's murder. Considering them as a threat to her, they regarded an ouster the minimum a punishment he deserved.

VENGEANCE

Benazir Bhutto told me and some other journalists at the Khosa House in Lahore that General Musharraf was against her return. He put pressure on her, in one way or the other, to stop her. She said Musharraf failed in appointing General Ashfaq Pervaiz Kayani as Chief of the Army Staff on the date he had promised he would. (General Kayani had not been made army chief by then).

Neither he announced election schedule, nor shed his uniform. Benazir said Musharraf had failed to honor his promises. Some people are of the view Musharraf might be

involved in the murder plot, as Benazir returned much to the annoyance of the General, and he had to shed his military uniform which he loved more than his skin.”

PHOTO FINISH

General Musharraf’s associates say he is quite pragmatic and logical and listens to the opposition patiently. According to one of his friends Hafiz Ghulam Muhyuddin, an old guard of the PPP and now the chairman of his own party, once played host to the general and the Lahore corpse commander. A keen watcher of politics, Iqbal Tikka told Musharraf he was having a free ride but the real bout would start with Benazir Bhutto’s return. “Death and jail can’t scare her. She would be on one side of the fence, while the army and the Muslim League-Quaid-e-Azam on the other. It would not be an easy task to win elections with Bhutto in the field. As in a race, where a photo finish occurs when multiple competitors cross the finishing line at nearly the same time. It will be a close call; anybody can win. Benazir Bhutto might come out triumphant”, he said.

Analysts observe that the fear of defeat and losing of power might have induced Musharraf to get involved in the murder conspiracy.

ANY ANSWERS?

The doubt-stained questions raised about Musharraf’s involvement in the tragedy are:

- 1- Is it true General Musharraf had promised the US he would provide security to Benazir Bhutto? If true, why was there no special arrangement in place?
- 2- Was any action taken against perpetrators of the attack on her at Karsaz, Karachi?
- 3- Benazir Bhutto accused Musharraf government of releasing a dangerous terrorist extradited from Dubai and assigning him the task of her murder. Is the accusation true?
- 4- Why were no army personnel or Rangers deployed for the security of the most popular leader of the country?

5- Why do Americans accuse Musharraf of cheating them and not averting Bhutto's murder so no one shared power with him?

6- Why did General Musharraf, despite having a deal with her, want Bhutto not to return for a certain period of time? Did he aim to win elections by doing so?

7- The UN Commission quoted a meeting chaired by Musharraf a day after Benazir Bhutto's murder which, even before an enquiry was carried out, decided to go to the Press to say that the escape hatch lever struck her. Was it done so to hide any crime?

General Musharraf may never answer these questions. But the UN panel has given credence to these doubts in its report. It says in the report's executive summary:

"Bhutto's assassination could have been prevented if adequate security measures had been taken. The responsibility for Bhutto's security on the day of her assassination rested with the federal government, the government of Punjab and the Rawalpindi District Police. None of these entities took the necessary measures to respond to the extraordinary, fresh and urgent security risks that they knew she faced.

The federal government under General Musharraf, although fully aware of and tracking the serious threats to Bhutto, did little more than pass on those threats to her and to provincial authorities and were not proactive in neutralizing them or ensuring that the security provided was commensurate to the threats. This is especially grave given the attempt on her life in Karachi when she returned to Pakistan on 18 October 2007."

The report is an indictment of General Musharraf and his government.

GENERAL MUSHARRAF CAN'T STOOP SO LOW

Rejecting the possibility of General Musharraf's involvement in Benazir Bhutto's assassination, his spokesman [and now a PPP politician] Chaudhary Fawad Hussain said: "General Musharraf is not a cruel person. He allowed his sworn enemy Nawaz Sharif to leave the country and then return to Pakistan. Not a single opponent during his government was made target of violence. And he had an understanding with Bhutto. The same group of Taliban and al-Qaida that had made several murderous attacks on Musharraf had hit her. There is not a fraction of truth in the charges against General Musharraf, which were leveled just to gain political mileage".

GENERAL MUSHARRAF'S STANCE

A special interview on Benazir Bhutto's murder

The interview with General Musharraf was conducted at the Chief of the Army Staff House on June 30, 2008. He was the President of Pakistan at that time. The quitting of the office of Chief of Army Staff had rendered him politically weak. It seemed he had lost the authority. He talked about a lot of political and non-political issues during the long interview. But, the focus remained on Benazir Bhutto's murder. Here is a summary of the interview which definitely throws light on some aspects of the incident.

Important points

- Benazir Bhutto was provided full security. Nothing would have happened to her had she not come out of her motor vehicle.
- You have to be careful yourself as security arrangements go in disarray after a public rally.
- The West wanted me to be the president and Benazir Bhutto the prime minister.
- Saudi Arabia wanted me to continue as president and Nawaz Sharif to become prime minister.
- The deal with Benazir Bhutto was oral, not written.
- Benazir Bhutto had to return after the elections but she violated the agreement.
- A brotherly Islamic country was not ready to accept Benazir Bhutto.
- Saudi Arabia brokered an agreement that Nawaz Sharif would not demand reinstatement of judges and challenge my presidency.
- A Gulf country's envoy played a very negative role. He sent a misleading report to his government on the violation of the agreement.

INTERVIEW

Benazir Bhutto's killing was a big incident. Was it not your government's responsibility to protect the life of the most popular leader of the country?

Pervez Musharraf: She was provided complete security. She had two police squads when she was attacked outside the Liaquat Bagh. No one would have killed her had she not come out of her bullet-proof vehicle. She got injured when she came out in a fit of emotions. I give you an example. The security staff restrains me from mixing during foreign tours. But I continue with it, which is totally wrong for security. Security is on alert when you go to a public meeting. But when it ends, the apparatus gets disarranged. You have to be careful yourself then.

Does investigation by international agencies ever help?

Musharraf: We called in Scotland Yard. They installed two cameras here, and two there. They could comprehend one thing, but failed to understand the other. Our investigation agencies are more competent than those of the United Nations and Scotland Yard. We got a detailed inquiry report just two days after Bhutto's murder. And only that report is credible. It said the vehicle's lever and not the bomb blast or bullet claimed her life.

How many times did you meet Bhutto and what did you agree on?

Musharraf: I met her twice in Dubai. No one knew about the first meeting but the news about the other did leak out. We reached an oral agreement and nothing was written down. We didn't sign any paper. The aides from both sides, however, took notes of the deal. We agreed in the meeting that Benazir Bhutto would return after the elections but she didn't abide by the agreement and came back.

What forced you to have a deal with Bhutto after seven to eight years of hostility?

Musharraf: Several of our allies including western countries and the US viewed that the deal with the PPP would strengthen liberal forces in Pakistan. They thought it would be the best combination with me as the president and Benazir

Bhutto the prime minister. However, a brotherly Islamic country was not ready to tolerate Benazir Bhutto.

What did the brotherly country want?

Musharraf: The Saudis desired that I continue as president with Nawaz Sharif becoming the prime minister. After Benazir Bhutto returned, Shah Abdullah said he always believed in fairness and so, it would be unfair to restrain Nawaz Sharif from arriving in Pakistan. Shah Abdullah also told me he was under tremendous pressure to allow Nawaz Sharif to go back.

You held negotiations with Bhutto and reached an oral agreement with her. Was there any such deal with Sharif as well?

Musharraf: Saudi ruler Shah Abdullah considered me a brother. He knows I have always favoured Nawaz Sharif. I happily allowed Shahbaz Sharif to go abroad for treatment when he fell ill. Nawaz Sharif was also allowed to leave Saudi Arabia when his son was very ill. In fact, he left the country under a deal and returned under a deal too. There was an oral deal through Saudi Arabia for his return which stipulated that they would not go for an alliance with the PPP; they would not demand restoration of judges; and would not challenge the validity of my presidency.

But Muslim League-N maintains a clear stand over these issues. They say there was no such a deal.

Musharraf: Let them do what they like. The fact of the matter is that the role of a diplomat was negative. We told Saudis the agreement was being violated. We are a sovereign country. We have our priorities and not dependent on anyone. And we should not run the country on the dictates of others.

One-on-one conversation: (June 30, 2008)

Conspiracy theory III

ZARDARI'S INVOLVEMENT

There have been accusations, albeit subdued, of Asif Zardari's involvement in his spouse Benazir Bhutto's murder. In a developing country like Pakistan when a wife dies an unnatural death, husband becomes the first murder suspect.

Asif Zardari had never remained a popular personality in the party since his marriage to Benazir Bhutto. This may also have been one of the reasons that fingers were pointed at him when she was killed.

As the PPP workers could not oppose the marriage openly, they made Zardari a "villain". The macho image of Asif Zardari with big mustache also went against him. Zardari was also blamed for the sour relations between Benazir Bhutto and her brother Murtaza Bhutto. And later, Asif Zardari was accused of connivance in the murder of Murtaza Bhutto when Benazir Bhutto was prime minister and Farooq Leghari president of the country.

BENEFIT AND DOUBT

Who benefited most from Benazir Bhutto's murder? The PPP opponents propounded a conspiracy theory that since Asif Zardari became president courtesy Benazir's death and inherited all her assets, he would have orchestrated her murder for personal gains. They alleged that the murder was skillfully planned.

LONGING FOR LEADERSHIP

The PPP rivals put forward another "reason" also for Zardari's possible involvement in Bhutto's murder. They say Zardari suffered inferiority complex while living with such a great leader as Benazir Bhutto. He wanted to be a leader himself but it was not possible while she was around. People close to Zardari portray him as an intelligent and wise person, expert in drawing room politics and a smart negotiator. Many of his confidants rated Asif Zardari a bigger leader than Benazir Bhutto. But he could not become a leader in her

presence. So this also is a reason he is accused of his hand in the murder of his wife.

DEAL WITH THE ARMY

Asif Zardari is a brave and courageous person. He remained steadfast during his confinement. He used to meet military men in jail and it was here that it dawned on him that PPP could get along well with the military. He came out of jail in the same frame of mind. He proceeded to Dubai after his release from jail and when he returned from Dubai, there was an impression in the military circles that he could become the prime minister. But, later the idea was dropped. Zardari's adversaries say that Benazir Bhutto didn't like his return to Lahore from Dubai and the reception he was given there. She showed a little indifference towards him, as perhaps she was not happy over his deal with the army. Many friends of Naheed Khan and Safdar Abbasi hinted poor reception in Lahore angered Asif Zardari but Bhutto sided with Khan.

SULLENNESS?

Although there was no proof, rumours were abuzz that the relations between Asif Zardari and Benazir Bhutto were not as warm as they used to be. Bhutto lived in Dubai while Zardari was in New York. However, Bhutto kept on defending Zardari till the end and never gave any credence to the talk of personal differences between them. She would flare up if someone tried to discuss this. She was very upset and vehemently denied when Islamabad-based journalist Mariana Babar published a news item about their separation. Her close female friends say Benazir Bhutto was a loving wife, and always thought differences were a part of life. She never allowed anyone to interfere in her personal matters.

WHO IS KHALID SHAHANSHAH?

The opponents of Asif Zardari in the Peoples Party say Khalid Shahanshah was a mysterious character. He had been the security guard of Asif Zardari in New York and was very close to him. They say Shahanshah was a very aggressive person by nature and would not hesitate taking out guns over trifles.

They allege that Zardari entrusted Shahanshah with Benazir Bhutto's security with the purpose of executing the conspiracy. They say that everyone noted Shahanshah making peculiar signs and gestures during the Liaqat Bagh public gathering. "If you observe these signs closely, you will find out that he was telling someone to shoot Bhutto in the head because she was wearing a bullet-proof jacket", they said. Shahanshah is also alleged to have visited Wana in the start of 2007, where Benazir's assassination plot was hatched. The murder of Shahanshah was to wipe out a crucial character of the conspiracy from the scene. The police Station House Officer who killed Murtaza Bhutto was terminated the next day in a similar manner, they said. Some close friends of Naheed Khan's disclosed that Shahanshah had contacted her. He was scared and wanted to say something. Had death spared him, he could have revealed a lot.

A MESSAGE FROM ASIFA

The proponents of conspiracy theories often ask: "Who sent the last SMS to Benazir Bhutto?" They believe Asifa sent a cell phone message to her mother asking her to stand up as "We are watching you live". They also claim that Asifa sent this message on the direction of her father. Did BB receive any message? It could have been checked. But Bhutto's BlackBerry cellular phone was switched off soon after her murder. Naheed Khan said she handed over the mobile phone to a private servant (Razzaq Soomro) of the Bhutto family. Soomro, then handed it over to Asif Zardari. The phone remained switched off for some days. Zardari made calls to different people from the same number and it went silent again.

Naheed Khan does not have anything to say about the SMS. Amin Faheem says he was sitting with Benazir Bhutto in the Land Cruiser, but knew nothing about the text message. Bashir Riaz, who is very close to the Bhutto family, has rejected the SMS story. He says: "I am aware of the psychology of Asifa and Bakhtawar". "They would not do that. They could rather do the opposite and ask Benazir Bhutto not to get out of the car and wave as it could be dangerous."

WHY WAS POSTMORTEM NOT CARRIED OUT?

Critics of Asif Zardari believe that his refusal to have the autopsy done destroyed some strong evidences. The record presented to the UN Commission by the Punjab government included a paper with the signatures of Asif Zardari. According to the statement, the body of Benazir Bhutto was handed over to Asif Zardari at 1:10 am on December 28, 2007. A secret and most urgent letter sent to Inspector General of Police, Sindh, by the Punjab IGP on December 27, 2007 is also part of the record submitted with the Commission. The letter states: "After the death of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto, a request was made to her husband Asif Zardari for the autopsy to fulfill the legal requirements, but he refused. In an emotionally charged atmosphere the body was handed over to him. It is requested the Sindh department raise this matter and postmortem be carried out before the burial to fulfill the legal requirements". Asif Zardari's opponents term the refusal of medical examination of the body a conspiracy.

DOUBTS OVER THE WILL

There are suspicions over Benazir Bhutto's will about her political legacy. Zardari's critics doubt its genuineness. It is alleged that this fake will was "written" by a hand-writing expert who was released from a jail. It is believed that if the will had been genuine, Bhutto would have brought it to the notice of many during her lifetime as she was not in the habit of doing things in that fashion. There are a lot of English grammar mistakes also in that piece of writing. An educated person like her would not make such mistakes. Critics say it is a handiwork of some handwriting expert.

ANY ANSWERS?

The investigators of the UN Commission told the media that no member of the Bhutto family was behind the murder. Asif Zardari got a clean chit. But the Commission used strong words against Rahman Malik and his fellows for driving away from Liaqat Bagh after the crime calling it a drastic security lapse. The army and police officers held responsible for the washing down of the crime scene, and restraining the autopsy need to be investigated. Asif Zardari would be under the

sword of allegations, if he spares friends and targets his political opponents.

A TALK WITH ASIF ZARDARI

In an informal interview in October, 2010 for the book, then Pakistan's President Asif Ali Zardari said: "We requested the United Nations to hold inquiry, and we welcomed their report. But I'm not satisfied with the UN investigation because the precise details were incorrect. The UN was given a vast mandate to hold inquiry anywhere in the world, and the authority to seek cooperation from every government. But, the Commission limited itself to the reporting of the events only. Pakistani agencies had all the information about the events. The requirement was to find out who was behind the conspiracy. Millions of dollars were supposedly spent on the murder conspiracy, but nothing was investigated to find out the financiers. Who paid for the training of suicide attackers, buying the explosive and for their lodging? It needs to be probed. Anyone can trace the killers to Baitullah Mehsud. He was only an operator, not the mastermind. The mastermind needs to be traced out".

To a question, he said, "Don't you see the Pakistani establishment was provided with a clean chit by writing a letter against the Commission report? The present leadership of the army had no role in the murder. If it was so, the GHQ would not have been attacked by the Taliban. The target killing of the only son of the Peshawar Corps Commander at Parade Lane was an ample proof that the incumbent leadership was as much against the extremists as the Peoples Party."

Recalling the time spent with Benazir Bhutto, he said: "Whenever I look at her picture, or watch a video tears roll down my eyes. It seems improper to weep before the people, but there is a sea of memories that doesn't stop. A foreign publisher asked me to write a book. The royalty offered to me was much more than what was paid to Mohtarma for her book "Reconciliation". I excused. I become overwhelmed by her memories whenever I try to recollect my time spent with her. Mohtarma had reached the status of a statesman. Her words

were pearls of wisdom. She was my teacher, and I take guidance from her spoken words at every stage”.

Talking about the slow court proceeding of Benazir Bhutto murder case, he said Rahman Malik was taking care of that. “The real task is to find out the mastermind, who will be traced at last.”

When asked why Naheed Khan and Safdar Abbasi often criticize the Peoples Party for not solving the murder puzzle, he said: “It’s cheap politics. PPP is fighting a big battle. We gave political ownership to the war on terror, and had BB been alive, she too would have done so. Democracy is the best revenge.”

KHALID SHAHANSHAH TELLS HIS STORY

A special talk with the security guard

Khalid Shahanshah had been the personal security guard of both Benazir Bhutto and Asif Zardari in Pakistan and abroad. The mysterious gestures he made at the Liaqat Bagh rally gave rise to several theories. Shahanshah was interviewed at Naudero a few days after the Benazir Bhutto's killing. He remained in contact with the author through telephone later as well. During the interview, Shahanshah was asked about his life, political career, Benazir Bhutto's murder and details of the incident:

Important points

- Stopping Benazir's car was a conspiracy; the people present there did not belong to PPP.
- One of the levers was opened by Naheed Khan, while the other by Abdul Razzaq.
- We talked through signs not to disturb Benazir Bhutto.
- I was talking to the cameraman through signs. My signs and gestures were blown out of proportion by conspiracy theorists.
- No police were around when we came out of Liaquat Bagh.
- I got security training from the US, and Benazir Bhutto too had security knowledge.
- Wherever BB went, I accompanied her.
- I was the security guard of Asif Zardari during the time he spent in the US.
- My wife and children are settled in America, but I live in Pakistan.
- I was the PPP candidate in 1993 and 2002 from MQM stronghold.
- My family never asked me to quit security job, but they are always worried.
- The Karsaz incident did not scare BB; she rather gave instructions to everyone what to do.
- I was not in possession of any weapon; the local workers were doing their security job.
- I carried and moved the 'injured' BB from one car to the other.
- BB was hit by bullet and the blast followed.

INTERVIEW

What is your full name?

Shahanshah: Khalid Ali

Why are you called by the name Shahanshah?

Shahanshah: Actually, my father called me Shahanshah. I myself write down my name as Khalid Ali.

When did you get affiliated with the PPP?

Shahanshah: I can't recall when I joined PPP. I was very young at the time of elections in 1970. I remember my grandfather taking me to a PPP public rally. Bhutto Sahib made a speech at the rally. Since that day, I find myself affiliated with the Peoples Party. I started working for the party formally in 1982 or 1983.

Were you a part of party's organizational set-up?

Shahanshah: I have always been a worker. I did what the party asked me to do. I contested election from Azizabad constituency of Karachi for a National Assembly seat in 2002. This constituency was an MQM stronghold. BB Shaheed told us that we are a party of the federation, and should not leave any seat uncontested. I could not win but left an impact on the political atmosphere in that constituency.

Was it difficult to contest election from Azizabad? What were the difficulties?

Shahanshah: There were many hurdles indeed, but I crossed all. It was made possible because I was the resident of that area, and my neighbours and other residents of the locality supported me.

What was the number of votes cast in your favour? That's the citadel of MQM!

Shahanshah: I can't recall. Majority of the people assured us support during the campaign, but did not turn up to cast vote out of fear.

It's believed you have immigrated to the US?

Shahanshah: My wife and children reside in America, but I spend most of my time in Pakistan. When Asif Zardari shifted to the US, Benazir Bhutto instructed me to take care of his

security there. When BB came over, I was in charge of her security there. Wherever BB went, I accompanied her.

What do you know about security? Have you received any training?

Shahanshah: Yes, of course. I got training from the US. BB herself knew a lot about the security requirements. She used to give us tips on security. She told us that changing the departure time, arriving earlier than scheduled and changing the route are effective tools to stay safe.

Security duty is full of risks, you live in constant fear. Your family lives in the US. Don't they ask you to come over there?

Shahanshah: They remain worried, but don't ask me quit my job. When 170 people were killed in Karsaz blast, they were definitely frightened.

Do you do your duty voluntarily, or is it a paid job?

Shahanshah: All the people in People's Party are volunteers. They are not paid. The vigor and enthusiasm of PPP workers can't be found in other parties. Take the example of those 170 workers of the party who sacrificed their lives in Karachi without any fear.

You were with Bhutto at the time of blast in Karachi, what was her instant reaction?

Shahanshah: At the time of blast, and after that, BB showed more courage than anyone else present there. With her feelings under control, she passed instructions to us. We have learnt a lot from her. She was aware of the security matters. We, the security personnel, wanted BB to leave the place immediately after the bomb blast but she asked us to wait as there was another blast. But, when the truck caught fire, we rescued her.

How many police personnel were on duty outside Liaquat Bagh when you left the venue of the public meeting?

Shahanshah: There were no police at that time.

It is said the police force was withdrawn from Liaquat Bagh after some disagreement between the police and PPP leadership during the rally.

Shahanshah: The police are not supposed to get annoyed and walk away from their duty. The annoyance might have been created intentionally. I was with BB at that time and didn't know what was happening outside.

You are accused of making some signs at the dais during the rally. The police and Arbab Ghulam Rahim had declared you suspicious, and released a picture of you.

Shahanshah: We could not speak loudly while doing security job. When needed, we replied someone with the movement of our hands, and with other gestures. The purpose had always been not to disturb BB, and the others too. The video released by the government focused me alone. The other video showed me with a man. I was gesturing to a TV channel's cameraman. That was what actually happened, and this was blown out of proportion. You see, a man adjusts his necktie or moves his body when standing. And the same is shown in the video.

What were Bhutto's engagements on December 27?

Shahanshah: BB was scheduled to meet Afghan President Hamid Karzai at 12:00 noon. After the meeting she came back to her home in Islamabad. Then we drove towards Liaquat Bagh.

Did you observe anything unusual on that day?

Shahanshah: Nothing unusual, I felt no change.

Were you with Bhutto in the car?

Shahanshah: Yes, I was on the seat behind BB.

Were you armed, and what weapon did you carry?

Shahanshah: No, I had no weapon. The problem is when you go to Islamabad from Karachi it is a lot of hassle to carry arms with you. You have to book them and then wait for long periods of time. That's why we did not bring arms with us when we took the flight for Islamabad. The local workers provided the armed security.

What was the security apparatus when you left for Liaquat Bagh?

Shahanshah: We had four security vehicles, police vehicles and motor cars of workers.

You reached Liaquat Bagh safely, and nothing unusual happened?

Shahanshah: Nothing unusual.

When the Liaquat Bagh meeting was over, Bhutto's car started to move, then why was it stopped?

Shahanshah: A crowd gathered outside the Bagh after the public meeting and the car had to stop due to the crowd.

Were they workers of Peoples Party?

Shahanshah: Was stopping BB's car a conspiracy? It's a big question. The party workers always gave way to BB's car, and never stopped it. I think this might have been a part of the murder plot.

When you people came out of Liaqat Bagh, how many security vehicles were with you?

Shahanshah: The same four cars. No police vehicles were around, perhaps they had moved ahead of us.

Did police offer you a safe return route?

I was with BB, no one asked us to change the route. We did learn about it later on, but it's not true.

Did Mohtarma stand up on her own when the crowd stopped the car? Did nobody request her not to do so? Wasn't it risky for her security?

Shahanshah: Mohtarma was a great leader. She could not be kept away from the people. She returned to Pakistan for the people. Keep in mind one thing, whenever we tried to stop the people for security reasons, she got annoyed and said: "You want to create a gap between me and the people, let them meet me".

When she stood up did any one follow? Or they remained seated?

Shahanshah: No, no one stood up. There was no place and no justification too.

For standing up, the sunroof had to be opened. Who opened it? Did BB do it herself?

Naheed Baji (elder sister) opened one lever of the sunroof lever, while Abdul Razzaq opened the other.

Many people say you and perhaps, Makhdoom Amin Faheem opened the levers.

Shahanshah: No, I can recall clearly the levers were opened by Naheed Khan and Abdul Razzaq.

What was the atmosphere like inside the car when everyone boarded it after the meeting?

Shahanshah: Very pleasant. BB was very happy. Greetings were exchanged over the success of the rally.

Then what happened?

Shahanshah: People were raising full-throat slogans when BB came out through the sunroof. In the meantime, firing started. BB fell down when third bullet was fired.

It was bomb blast first, or the firing?

Shahanshah: Bullets were fired first then the blast occurred.

How could you keep your nerves in such a situation?

I did not have much practical experience but I had learnt how to control the nerves after the Karachi incident.

And what was the situation after the blast?

Shahanshah: BB collapsed after the third fire. For a few moments, no one knew what had happened. Then Naheed Khan said: "BB has got an injury". BB did not cry. In fact, she was very courageous. On the other hand, we went blank. We could not find a way to rush to a hospital.

Was the vehicle also changed?

Shahanshah: Yes, we had to change the vehicle on way to the hospital. The tires burst due to the bomb blast, and it was moving on its rims.

What was BB's schedule after the Liaqat Bagh rally?

Shahanshah: BB was to return home.

What happened at the hospital?

Shahanshah: I knew it was over even before reaching the hospital. I had shifted Mohtarma to other vehicle. I could see she had surrendered herself to the will of God. When BB got injured, I promised myself that I would control my nerves, and take her to the best hospital in no time. But, it did not happen that way.

Scotland Yard report said that bullet did not kill BB. She died from the head injury she received by hitting the sunroof.

Shahanshah: The report contradicts what I saw myself. BB came down when a bullet hit her, and the bomb exploded after that.

(Face-to-face interview: January, 2008, Naudero, and telephone talk)

WHEN RAHMAN MALIK BURST INTO TEARS

An old friend of Bhutto family's disclosed that he was in a meeting with Asif Ali Zardari when Rahman Malik arrived there. Pointing towards Malik, the friend told him in a fit of emotions: "You are responsible for the death of BB". Malik burst into tears and said: "Not me, Naheed Khan is responsible for BB's murder. She should not have let BB stand up in such a perilous situation". The Bhutto family friend says he said to Malik in a soft tone: "Malik Sahib, you were responsible for the security". To this he replied: "Naheed Khan had taken over the security responsibility in Rawalpindi. No one was ready to listen to me".

RAHMAN MALIK SPEAKS

A talk with Benazir Bhutto's chief security officer over her murder

Rehman Malik was made Benazir Bhutto's chief security officer on her return to the country. During Bhutto's exile, Malik's house in London was the rendezvous for party meetings and consultations. Be they secret negotiations for Bhutto's return to Pakistan or her international engagements, Malik was always found active.

Fingers were pointed towards the chief security officer soon after Bhutto's murder. The first allegation was that he could not make elaborate security arrangements for her. He along with Dr Babar Awan did not stay at the blast site after the explosion and "fled away" in the backup bullet-proof vehicle. The third allegation is that Benazir Bhutto had succumbed to her injuries, but Malik was telling the TV channels she was all right. The author spoke to him on May 30, 2009 when he was the country's interior minister during a drive from the Services Hospital to the Garrison Club in Lahore. Malik asked his staff to make a round of the city as the talk lengthened. Here is a summary of the talk:

Important Points

- Afghan President Hamid Karzai offered BB to land in Kabul in the face of dangers.
- President Musharraf didn't want BB to return before December 31st.
- Suicide bomber was faking the identity of his brother.
- ISI chief talked about risks in general and not about the Liaqat Bagh rally.
- In view of the security risks, arrangements had been made for Benazir Bhutto's speech through video screen.
- I intended to talk to Mohtarma about the security, but Naheed Khan said: "Don't scare BB, nothing will happen to her".
- Naheed Khan made an awful blunder when she asked BB to "stand up, they are old workers".
- Khalid Shahanshah made no mysterious gestures. He was killed by the gambling mafia.
- Khalid Shahanshah's murder is not linked to Bhutto's killing.
- Asifa has "fits problem since long. The story of her sending SMS to BB to stand up is baseless."
- Four motor vehicles were converted to make them bullet-proof for Rs 40 million.
- Al-Qaida, people with vested interests and locals are behind the murder conspiracy.
- Want the killers of my sister exposed before my death.

INTERVIEW

You had some alterations done from United Arab Emirates on the vehicles for Benazir Bhutto. How much did you pay for that?

Rahman Malik: Approximately Rs 40 million, 10 million apiece for two Land Cruiser jeeps and two Mercedes cars.

You were in a separate motor car at the time of Bhutto's murder. You did not stop to see what had happened, so fingers were pointed at you.

Rahman Malik: Mohtarma had herself decided that we both would not sit in the same vehicle, and would rather travel at a distance. I had standing instructions: "You will not stay where I am present".

There is an allegation against the government that it has still not lodged an FIR for Benazir Bhutto's murder. Isn't it a show of negligence on the part of the government?

Rahman Malik: So many things happen because of misunderstandings. Benazir murder FIR has been registered and inquiry has proceeded well. We do not make hollow claims. We are rather carrying out serious investigations. The problem is that we want to apprehend the whole group who plotted the murder, not just the person who fired the bullet or financed the plot. Any investigation agency cannot do that single-handedly. It was an international conspiracy. What we have found out till today is that some people were involved individually and then there were some interest-seekers, some leaders of Al-Qaida and some less known people. The conspiracy was hatched and executed skillfully and precisely.

You are in charge of the interior ministry. Why have no details come out despite passage of a long period of time?

Rahman Malik: The real identity of the killer (alleged name Saeed) has not been found yet. The persons who provided assistance to him have been nabbed, but the real accused are absconding. Baitullah's name is there. There are also traces leading towards Al-Qaida. People from Pakistan's tribal areas and from outside Pakistan too were involved.

What's the identity problem of the killer?

Rahman Malik: According to my investigation, a person faked the identity of his real brother, and got involved himself in the conspiracy.

Why was the UN requested for an inquiry if you had found out so much?

Rahman Malik: I met United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. The UN has recognized it as an international conspiracy, and the UN tribunal has started its work. [The UN panel had not released its findings by then]

A statement attributed to internationally reputed journalist Seymour Hersh said a US group led by Vice President Dick Cheney killed Bhutto and Hariri. What is your take?

Rahman Malik: We have reviewed the statement. Both Hersh and Cheney have denied it strongly.

It is said Afghan President Hamid Karzai informed BB about the security risks on the day of her murder?

Rahman Malik: Afghan President Hamid Karzai always praised Mohtarma. He sent Benazir Bhutto a message telling her not to go to Pakistan and then offered her to land in Kabul before returning to Pakistan. Former president General Pervez Musharraf insisted on her returning after December 31.

Then ISI chief met Mohtarma a night before her murder. It is said that during the meeting he asked her not to go to Liaquat Bagh rally but you rejected the plea.

Rahman Malik: The ISI chief visited Mohtarma a little late at night when I was about to leave but BB asked me to join them in the meeting. The discussion was about transparent polls and the situation after the elections. The focus was on the post-election scenario. Security risks were discussed but in general terms. She was asked not to attend public meetings but there was nothing specific.

Don't you think special security arrangements were required after being warned by Afghan President Hamid Karzai and the ISI chief?

Rahman Malik: We discussed the matter with Mohtarma and planned video screens instead of attending public meetings. It was decided that BB would address the audience at the rally from the Bilawal House. But unfortunately, the plan was not implemented.

You were chief security adviser to BB. What were the security matters you discussed with her? Why was she not restrained from coming out of the vehicle?

Rahman Malik: She had agreed she would not come out of her vehicle. However, during her tour of Sukkur, she came out of the vehicle, and the security staff informed me. I phoned BB's security officer Major Imtiaz telling him I wanted to talk to Benazir Bhutto urgently. I requested BB not to come out of the vehicle. She agreed, but next day she did the same in another district.

BB had the realization of security hazards; you and other people were telling the same, then why did the violations continue?

Rahman Malik: Mohtarma was a public leader. Despite the security dangers, it was not acceptable to her to keep herself away from the people. Naheed Khan was against restraining Bhutto. One day, I was sitting in the back seat talking to Mohtarma about the security. Naheed Khan sitting beside BB said: "Don't scare BB, nothing would happen to her". Obviously, it creates more difficulties for the leader and the security staff.

Naheed Khan, Aslam Chaudhry and some old Peoples Party workers accuse you and Asif Zardari of negligence regarding the security plans. What would you say in defence?

Rahman Malik: Naheed Khan says so out of hatred [for us]. She made a blunder herself when she told Benazir Bhutto: "They are old workers, stand up". Everyone in the vehicle heard these words uttered by her. Allegations are simply shameful. Time will tell who is right and who is wrong.

People from the Naheed Khan camp accuse you of launching a campaign to make Asif Zardari chairperson of the party even before Benazir Bhutto's will had been made public.

Rahman Malik: Mohtarma called me in Dubai. It was after the October 18 incident. Asif Zardari was present in the meeting. BB told me while holding Asif Zardari's hand: "Will you look after my darling, exactly the same way you look after me". I nodded. BB repeated the sentence twice or thrice, and said: "I'm not in the habit of repeating words. Note it down", she said. In reply, I told BB I had taken mental notes. I think BB had indicated before her will what status she gave to Zardari.

Did Benazir Bhutto ever talk to you about her death?

Rahman Malik: Benazir Bhutto was a friend of God. She was aware of her death, and talked about it in different ways. On the day she was returning to Pakistan, Asif Sahib told BB not to go. There was a disagreement too over whether Rahman Malik would accompany her or not.

It is said Benazir Bhutto received a call from Asifa telling her to stand up and so, she has been having seizures since her mother's death.

Rahman Malik: Fits problem is old. It's all incorrect to create misunderstandings. She never made any call to Mohtarma.

The mysterious gestures made by Khalid Shahanshah during the Liaqat Bagh rally caused scandals to emerge. Later, he was killed in mysterious circumstances. Several questions were raised on the matter.

Rahman Malik: Khalid Shahanshah didn't make any mysterious signs. It's all baseless. Intelligence reports said he was murdered by the gambling mafia. The murder has no link to BB's martyrdom.

When will the Benazir murder mystery be solved?

Rahman Malik: I'm the prime target of terrorists. But, it's my desire to die only after the killers of my sister are exposed.

(May 30, 2009, Lahore)

CLARIFICATION BY RAHMAN MALIK

The United Nations Commission report said Rahman Malik drove Benazir's backup car away. He was not supposed to do so. The report also said Malik's claim that he was not responsible for Bhutto's security was not true. I [the author] had a telephonic talk with Rahman Malik over the matter. He said he did not clarify the point after the release of the UN report. It seemed improper to go on clarifying the matter. Everything would become clear after the final report. "That was not a backup vehicle as declared by the UN. And I was not the only person: Farhatullah Babar, Dr Babar Awan and General Tauqir Zia were also sitting in the vehicle with me. We had consensus on reaching the Bilawal House as early as possible," Malik said. He said he was not the chief security adviser to BB, but the national security advisor. "I was supposed to arrange security through correspondence, and not work as a security guard. All the people who made a "human-chain" around BB were killed." He said: "Wait for some time, everything will become clear."

(Telephone talk, July 14, 2010)

Conspiracy Theory IV

SECRET AGENCIES' INVOLVEMENT

Secret agencies are perceived as movers and shakers of politics in Pakistan. The establishment is so strong and formidable people see its hand behind every happening with great consequences. Whether it is the murder of first Pakistani prime minister Liaqat Ali Khan, hanging of ZA Bhutto or the removal of democratic governments, fingers point to the establishment which wields its power through secret agencies and state institutions. The Bhutto family has been facing discrimination since long. Dictatorial regimes have always considered this family an enemy, and remained active against it. Whether it was Shahnawaz Bhutto's poisoning in 1985 in France or Murtaza Bhutto's murder in 1996 in Karachi, secret agencies were somehow blamed. Shahnawaz Bhutto and Murtaza Bhutto were ZA Bhutto's sons and Benazir Bhutto's brothers. When Benazir Bhutto was murdered outside Liaqat Bagh, it was said the killing was not the work of Taliban or Al-Qaida; the precision with which the crime was carried out indicated the killer was highly trained or he might have been planted by some secret agency.

BENAZIR BHUTTO'S SUSPICIONS

Bhutto wrote in her posthumous book "Reconciliation: Islam, Democracy and the West" on page 221: "Later I was informed of a meeting that had taken place in Lahore where the bomb blasts were planned. According to this report, three men belonging to a rival political faction were hired for half a million dollars. They were, according to my sources, named Ejaz, Sajjad, and another whose name I forget. One of them died accidentally because he couldn't get away fast enough before the detonation. Presumably this was the one holding the baby. However, a bomb maker was needed for the bombs.

Enter Qari Saifullah Akhtar, a wanted terrorist who had tried to overthrow my second government. He had been extradited by the United Arab Emirates and was languishing in Karachi Central Jail. According to my second source, the officials present at Lahore had turned to Qari Saifullah Akhtar

for help. His liaison with elements in the government, according to this source, was a radical who was asked to make the bombs, and asked for a fatwa, or edict, making it legitimate to oblige. He got the edict.

The bomb blasts took place in the army cantonment area in Karachi. When the army officials arrived on the scene, the wounded hooted them down. Rightly or wrongly, the perception in Pakistan is that the military is responsible for the rise of militancy and all the horrific consequences that it entails for Pakistan and its people.

Reading through lines, there are strong hints that Bhutto believed government elements (agencies) were collaborating with terrorists to kill her.

CONSPIRACY?

Benazir Bhutto accused four persons of conspiring to kill her in a letter written on October 16, two days before she returned to Pakistan from eight years in self-exile. She named Chaudhary Pervez Elahi, then Punjab chief minister, Arbab Ghulam Rahim, then Sindh chief minister, Hasan Waseem Afzal, the former deputy chairman of the National Accountability Bureau (NAB), retired brigadier Ijaz Shah, then Intelligence Bureau chief, as those who posed a threat to her life in a letter to President Pervez Musharraf.

People's Party viewed them as political opponents, who could go to any extent. Hasan Waseem Afzal had played active role in cases against Benazir Bhutto. Shah was in charge of the Intelligence Bureau; Elahi and Rahim were rivals to PPP in Punjab and Sindh. An FIR was got registered on the basis of this letter in Karachi by the government. These four were named again as persons behind the murder.

RETIRED ARMY PERSONNEL WILL BE USED

On November 10, 2007, Pakistan Peoples Party-Parliamentarian secretary general, Raja Pervez Ashraf wrote a letter to the country's interior secretary to inform him about a long march the PPP had planned for November 23. The letter said Chaudhary Pervez Elahi had hired the services of retired army men who would be inducted into the long march in the

guise of PPP workers. These men would then pick a fight with the PPP workers. The interior secretary was asked to restrain the Punjab government from such an adventure.

SECRET ACCOUNT

According to unconfirmed reports, a secret account surfaced during Bhutto murder inquiry. Money, arranged by an unknown person and a group of politicians, from the account was transferred to Waziristan and used for plotting the murder. No investigation agency confirmed this report. The matter might be disclosed at some later stage.

WHICH AGENCY?

Secret agencies in Pakistan mean the ISI, the Military Intelligence and civilian agency, the Intelligence Bureau. Bhutto apparently had no issue with the ISI and the MI, as the then ISI chief Ashfaq Pervez Kayani was engaged in talks with her over the NRO and reconciliation. Brig Ejaz Shah was very close to Chaudhry Pervez Elahi, and the PPP circles, taking clue from Bhutto's accusation, suspected his involvement in the murder plot. The investigators of the UN Commission met Ejaz Shah twice and asked him some questions. There are no remarks against Ejaz Shah in the UN report. The UN Commission also called on General Kayani.

KILLER AN AGENT?

Saeed alias Bilal, who exploded the bomb outside Liaqat Bagh does not seem to be a Taliban suicide bomber. Generally, they are between 15 to 20 years of age, determined but untrained. Saeed was trained. He is considered to be an operator of the agencies, as he looked like a person from the middle class and not the lower middle class. Suicide bombers usually come from poor or lower-middle class. Also, he did not look like a student of some religious school or madrasa. Most of Taliban bombers are madrasa students.

BRIGADIER EJAZ SHAH'S STANDPOINT

A talk on Benazir Bhutto's murder

Brigadier Ejaz Shah was an important character in General Musharraf's regime. As ISI head in Lahore, the Punjab home secretary and then chief of the Intelligence Bureau, Shah was an important pillar in the executive branch of the government and a key player in politics. Benazir Bhutto included his name in the list of persons she thought had plotted her murder. During a meeting on February 12, 2010 at his residence in Defence Housing Authority, Lahore he talked on controversies surrounding him. Here is what he says in his defence.

Important Points

- Don't know who Qari Saifullah is, and who got him released from jail.
- When the boss was engaged in talks with Benazir Bhutto, how could the IB have her killed?
- I refused to oblige Nawaz Sharif when he asked me to get Zardari entangle in a drugs case.
- I prayed to God for Benazir Bhutto's safety on her return to Pakistan.
- No animosity with any party. Never did anything illegal.
- Not familiar with Omar Saeed Sheikh, but I know his family quite well.
- Was taunted during Musharraf government for speaking for Sharifs.
- When Nawaz Sharif held a press conference in Attok, Musharraf said I was soft on Sharifs.
- When I went to see Chaudhary Zahoor Elahi in a jail in Balochistan to meet he called me "our General". I was a major then.
- Had Shahbaz Sharif and I not been there, Nawaz Sharif would have been removed in January 1999.
- Nawaz Sharif likes flatterers. Shahbaz Sharif can listen to opposition.
- Nusrat Shahbaz would cook for me. So how could I conduct a raid at a sister's house.
- Talked to Shahbaz Sharif on phone during his exile, had contact with Hamza Shahbaz.
- Benazir Bhutto turned against me after Iqbal Z. Ahmad complaint.
- It was my considered view that Benazir Bhutto and Muslim League-Q would lose if Musharraf struck a deal with the PPP
-

INTERVIEW

What were the offices you held?

Brigadier Ejaz Shah: I am a military man. My experience spanned several years. I was station head of ISI in Lahore. Before that, I worked for Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF). I also served as Punjab Home Secretary. Later, I was head of the Intelligence Bureau. I am a recipient of high civil and military awards.

Were you inclined towards any political party during your military service?

Brigadier Ejaz Shah: I had been neutral, but I did have contacts with a variety of people. When Chaudhary Zahoor Elahi was in Balochistan jail, I went there to meet him as a major. He used to call me a general not major. A brother-in-law of mine was in Peoples Party. I had no animosity with any party, and never did I do anything illegal.

It's said you played a role in the dismissal of Nawaz Sharif government?

Brigadier Ejaz Shah: Totally incorrect. You will be surprised to know, I was taunted during the Musharraf government for advocating for the Sharif family. One day, Nawaz Sharif held a press conference in Attok during his trial. General Musharraf called me and asked harshly: Is it true you are soft on Sharifs? I replied: Sir, Attock falls in the army domain. How can I be blamed?

Did you take part in the negotiations during the final days of the Sharif government?

Brigadier Ejaz Shah: Let me speak the truth. If Shahbaz Sharif and I were not there, the Sharif government would have been removed in January, 1999. Actually, the fight had started at the time when General Musharraf reshuffled Nawaz Sharif's favorites in the army. Shahbaz Sharif and I tried at our levels to put out the fire. Nawaz Sharif likes flatterers around him, while Shahbaz Sharif can bear opposition.

How did you treat Sharif brothers during their exile?

Brigadier Ejaz Shah: Very good. I had contacts with Hamza Shahbaz. Nusrat Shahbaz once came to Pakistan. Punjab Governor Lt-Gen Safdar called me and asked me to send her

back immediately. She had come to Pakistan with the consent of the ISI and the MI. I sought two days time. Then I called Hamza Shahbaz telling him the police would raid their house if his mother did not go back. I had dined on the meal cooked by sister-in-law Nusrat Shahbaz several times, and did not like her house to be raided. We talked to Shahbaz Sharif over the phone, and she went back in two days.

Benazir Bhutto accused you of involvement in her murder conspiracy. Why?

Brigadier Ejaz Shah: I met industrialist Iqbal Z. Ahmad on October 3, 2007. He was active in brokering a deal between General Musharraf and the Peoples Party. I advised him against going for any such a deal, which I thought would result in the defeat of both Muslim League-Q and the PPP in the elections. In my view people would not accept this and PML-N would benefit politically. The NRO will come under criticism giving political advantage to Nawaz Sharif. I think Iqbal Z. Ahmad had briefed Benazir Bhutto on my meeting with him because the next day she told media persons the IB DG (Ejaz) was against reconciliation, and he intended to rig the elections. In my capacity as the IB head it was my duty to present a correct analysis of the political situation to my boss. And he was the authority to take decision. I was of the considered view there was no need for reconciliation with the PPP. The Q League was a better option. October 1999 was an appropriate time to reconcile with the PPP if there was a need for that. On the other side, National Security Council Secretary Tariq Aziz was in favour of dialogue with PPP. We were briefed on the talks between the government and Bhutto. Our internal differences would be leaked to Bhutto and so, I became a target of accusations.

What was your reaction to the allegations?

Brigadier Ejaz Shah: I remained silent in the beginning. Later, I wrote to President Musharraf and Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz telling them that I was a government official and was being defamed by name. In reply, the prime minister recognized my capabilities. He said allegations were part of politics, and had nothing to do with my duty.

Politics apart, how can one be charged with murder without any basis?

Brigadier Ejaz Shah: Look, how could the IB and the ISI murder Bhutto when their boss, General Musharraf, was engaged in a dialogue with her for reconciliation? Institutions have only to give their opinion. When their boss decides something, they have to follow him. On her return Bhutto had given a statement in favour of the Lal Masjid operation. Then she said she could allow the US launch surgical strikes against terrorists. The situation was deteriorating. Two attempts had already been made to kill General Musharraf. Even serving corps commanders had been targeted. After the Lal Masjid incident, all the terrorist groups and organizations had joined forces. Baitullah Mehsud had declared that suicide bombers were present in every city to hit Benazir Bhutto. And so, she was asked not to return but she did not oblige. So complex is the situation that the attackers of a police training camp in Manawan [in Lahore's suburbs] spent the night at Mansoor Bazaar and attacked the police training centre in the morning. I prayed to God for Bhutto's safety on her return.

In her book, Benazir Bhutto wrote about your role in politics and the changing of loyalties in the 2002 elections?

Brigadier Ejaz Shah: These are mere allegations. I had arrested drugs smuggler Arif Baloch when working for the Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF). Nawaz Sharif asked me through a message to get Asif Zardari entangled in the case as a co-accused. I refused. Sheikhpura deputy commissioner approached me, but I refused again. As a punishment for the refusal, Maj-Gen Mushtaq was replaced with Muhib Asad. Asad told me the government was insisting on getting Zardari caught up as a co-accused in the case. I replied through a letter that Asif Zardari was not involved. Chief of the Army Staff General Jahangir Karamat was abroad when General Mushtaq was replaced. On his return, General Karamat took a tough stand on General Mushtaq and so, the government bowed to his assertion. Later on, the same Arif Baloch case registered with a Lahore police station and Zardari was made a co-accused in it.

Benazir Bhutto wrote in her book a secret agency's office-holders held a meeting with Qari Saifullah Akhtar in Lahore to plot her murder. Qari Saifullah was released from the jail for the same purpose?

Brigadier Ejaz Shah: Qari Saifullah was a jihadi. I don't know him. I have never met him. I don't even know who released him from the jail and when.

Several international secret agencies accuse you of having contacts with well-educated extremist Omar Saeed Sheikh and him being arrested from your house?

Brigadier Ejaz Shah: Omar Saeed Sheikh was one of the militants whom Indian government had released for safe return of the passengers of an Indian Airlines plane hijacked in 1999. The ISI seized him on his return to Pakistan. I was the ISI Lahore commander then. He remained in the ISI custody for one year under my command but I never met him. His father belongs to the same city as mine. His mother is from Sheikhpura. Our relationship with this Sheikh family spans several generations. When Daniel Pearl was slain, Interior Minister Mueenuddin Haider told me over phone it was Omar Saeed's work. By then the police had been sent to his house. I sought time from the police. I called Omar Saeed's maternal uncle Rauf Sheikh, then sessions judge, Lahore, and now a Lahore High Court judge and informed him about what had happened and that either Omar Sheikh should surrender or police would pester his family members. The next day, Rauf Sheikh brought Omar to my house. Omar sat in the car outside. I did not meet him. I phoned Lahore Deputy Inspector-General of Police Javed Noor who lived in my neighbourhood and sent Omar to his house from where he was arrested. I have nothing to do with him.

Conspiracy Theory V

BAITULLAH MEHSUD'S INVOLVEMENT

According to Pakistani investigating agencies; the police, the FIA, the Special Branch and the ISI, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan chief Baitullah Mehsud spearheaded Benazir Bhutto's murder plot. The persons arrested by the police, their statements in the custody and the murder traces all led to Mehsud and his outfit. The agencies have claimed finding clues to all the characters of Bhutto murder conspiracy through phone calls, recordings and confessional statements (For details see Investigation after investigation chapter). All these characters were linked directly or indirectly to Mehsud.

BENAZIR BHUTTO TESTIFIES

Evidence of a murder provided by the deceased is considered as the most credible. Bhutto in her posthumous book "Reconciliation: Islam, Democracy and West" clearly points out the persons involved in her murder plot. Baitullah Mehsud tops the list. She writes: "When I returned, I did not know whether I would live or die. I was told by both the Musharraf regime and a foreign Muslim government that four suicide bomber squads would attempt to kill me. These included, the reports said, the squads sent by the Taliban warlord Baitullah Mehsud; Hamza bin Laden, a son of Osama bin Laden; Red Mosque militants; and a Karachi-based militant group." It seems the governments of Afghanistan, the UAE and Pakistan had informed Bhutto that bombers from Mehsud and other groups would try to kill her.

STATEMENT BY SENATOR SALEH SHAH

Before Bhutto's return, a statement by a FATA Senator, Saleh Shah, was quite alarming. Published on the front page of English-language newspaper "Daily Times", the statement quoted Mehsud as saying his bombers were waiting in the wings to "welcome" her on return. Shah, a close friend of Mehsud's, was trying to broker a deal between the Mehsuds and the government for the release of around 250 abducted soldiers.

There was a strong reaction to this news item both inside and outside the country.

Clarifying his statement, Senator Shah said he was misquoted.

Rahimullah Yousafzai, an internationally famed journalist who frequently writes on Taliban, in his analysis (The News, October 18, 2007) cited unnamed sources saying Maulana Saleh Shah, who belongs to Maulana Fazlur Rahman's JUI-F, made some comments about the possibility of suicide bombings targeting Benazir Bhutto once she returned to Pakistan. As he has been meeting the elusive Baitullah Mehsud in his South Waziristan hideouts as part of tribal Jirgas that mediate between the militants and the government, it is normally assumed that he has access to the militants and their military commanders and enjoys their trust.

"On a number of occasions, he has proved a timely source of information for the media about the events in South Waziristan. But the recent reports from South Waziristan suggest that Maulana Saleh Shah has lost some of that trust.

"Though it is clear that Baitullah Mehsud hasn't threatened Benazir Bhutto with suicide bombing, one should keep in mind that anyone intending to launch such an attack would not brag about it publicly. Benazir Bhutto has provoked the militants and Jihadis with some of her recent pro-US and anti-al-Qaeda and anti-Taliban statements and one should, therefore, not rule out the possibility of suicide bombings targeting her. But that could happen once she is in power and has the authority to order military operations against the militants. At present, she doesn't possess the authority to cause harm to the militants and it appears that the latter would prefer to wait and see as to how she acts once she is in power."

WHO DID IT?

In his statements to newspapers and in an interview with me, Senator Dr Safdar Abbasi said Baitullah Mehsud was not behind Bhutto's murder. He was in contact with Mehsud directly or indirectly. Mehsud told him he was not involved in the killing. Senator Abbasi's detractors hold the view a killer would not tell you he was going to kill you and would keep his

plan hidden. As Bhutto was an international personality, Mehsud could not own up to killing her. Such was the hatred against Bhutto in North Waziristan that there was celebratory gunfire in the regions under the Taliban control to mark her death. Did Mehsud act on his own, or he was just a pawn?

WHO WAS THE PATRON?

South Asia expert and British journalist Christina Lamb in a January 13, 2008 report published in The Sunday Times said: British officials say that evidence amassed by Scotland Yard detectives points towards Al-Qaeda militants being responsible for the assassination of Benazir Bhutto.

British and American officials believe Mehsud is behind most of the suicide bombings in Pakistan.

The gun fired at Bhutto has been checked for fingerprints by the Scotland Yard detectives. A government minister told The Sunday Times that these have been traced through identity cards to a man in Swat, an area where Mehsud's men have been fighting.

MAJOR EVIDENCE

The investigating agencies are in possession of a recorded telephonic talk in Pashtu between Baitullah Mehsud and an unidentified person called Maulvi Sahab. During the talk they greeted each other. Believing it as hard evidence, the government put online the phone conversation, secretly recorded hours after the assassination. This is the transcript of the tape.

Maulvi Sahab: Asalaam Aleikum.

Baitullah Mehsud: Waaleikum Asalaam.

M: Chief, how are you?

BM: I am fine.

M: Congratulations, I just got back during the night.

BM: Congratulations to you, were they our men?

M: Yes they were ours.

BM: Who were they?

M: There was Saeed; there was Bilal from Badar and Ikramullah.

BM: The three of them did it?

M: Ikramullah and Bilal did it.

BM: Then congratulations.

M: Where are you? I want to meet you.

BM: I am at Makeen [a town in the south Waziristan tribal area], come over, I am at Anwar Shah's house.

M: OK, I'll come.

BM: Don't inform their house for the time being.

M: OK.

BM: It was a tremendous effort. They were really brave boys who killed her.

M: Mashallah. When I come I will give you all the details.

BM: I will wait for you. Congratulations, once again congratulations.

M: Congratulations to you.

BM: Anything I can do for you?

M: Thank you very much.

BM: Asalaam Aleikum.

M: Waaleikum Asalaam.

The UN Commission said it was not in a position to evaluate the authenticity of the purported intercept. "Any further investigation into Ms Bhutto's assassination must include steps for such authentication," he said.

CHRISTINA LAMB'S EVIDENCE

Lamb writes: Musharraf was quick to blame the killing on Baitullah Mehsud, a tribal leader from the Afghan border area of southern Waziristan with links to Al-Qaeda. The interior ministry released a transcript of a purported telephone conversation between Mehsud and a militant cleric in which, though Bhutto's name was not mentioned, he appeared to

congratulate him on the death, saying: "Fantastic job. Very brave boys, the ones who killed her."

The transcript was met with scepticism . . . But British and American officials, who have examined the transcript, say they believe it is genuine and share Musharraf's view that Mehsud is behind most of the suicide bombings in Pakistan."

DID AL-QAIDA PULL THE STRINGS?

Most of the investigators, the US authorities and the PPP leadership believe al-Qaida was behind the murder plot executed by Baitullah Mehsud.

AL-QAIDA OWNED IT UP

Claiming the responsibility for the murder, al-Qaida leader and main spokesperson Mustafa Abu Yazid told Italian news agency Adnkronos International (AKI) in a phone call from an unknown location: "We terminated the most precious American asset which vowed to defeat [the] mujahadeen".

Al-Yazid, then the main al-Qaeda commander in Afghanistan, spoke in faltering English.

In the same report, AKI and Asia Times correspondent Syed Saleem Shahzad said: It is believed that the decision to kill Bhutto was made by al-Qaeda No. 2 Ayman al-Zawahiri in October. Death squads were allegedly constituted for the mission and ultimately one cell comprising a defunct Lashkar-i-Jhangvi's Punjabi volunteer succeeded in killing Bhutto. Shahzad who reported this news quoting his sources in al-Qaida was kidnapped and killed in 2011.

WHO WAS MUSTAFA ABU YAZID?

Born in Egypt in 1955, Mustafa Abu Yazid was part of the Egyptian contingent that had dominated al-Qaeda's leadership since the network's founding. He served time in prison in the early 1980s with deputy leader Ayman al-Zawahiri for their role as conspirators in the 1981 assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat.

Also known as Sheikh Saeed al-Masri, he was an original member of al-Qaeda's Shura leadership council and has been a trusted adviser to bin Laden and al-Zawahiri for more than a

decade. When bin Laden and the al-Qaeda leadership were exiled from Pakistan to Sudan in the 1990s, Abu Yazid served as financial manager for some of bin Laden's business enterprises there.

The Sept. 11 Commission identified Abu Yazid as al-Qaeda's "chief financial manager" and said he opposed the Sept. 11 hijackings "because he feared the US response to an attack." He is reported to have helped the hijackers with some of their financial arrangements.

Abu Yazid was known as an amiable personality and was well versed in the social customs of the tribal people. He took on a greater role as a liaison with other militant networks, such as the Taliban and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, both of which are active along the Afghan-Pakistani border.

Abu Yazid headed a 13-member consultative council -- Shura Ittehad-al-Mujahideen -- in the tribal region of Pakistan comprising four members from Baitullah Mehsud group, four from Maulvi Nazir Waziri group and four from Maulvi Gul Bahadur group. The council decided the local disputes and the future line of action.

Later, he oversaw al-Qaida affairs in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran, and was in charge of jihad in Uzbekistan and Turkistan. He was reported as having been killed in a US drone attack in Pakistan on May 21, 2010. His death was confirmed by US officials and al-Qaeda.

AL-QAIDA-TALIBAN LINK

Researchers and investigators are often confused about the link between al-Qaida and Taliban. The head of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, Mullah Umar, is seen as Amir-al-Momineen [chief of the faithful] in the al-Qaida and Taliban circles. The Emirate was founded in 1996 when the Taliban began their rule of Afghanistan and ended with their fall from power in 2001. Osama bin Laden has been the Amir or head of Jihad and Abu Yazid the head of a consultative council represented by all militant groups and Taliban factions in the tribal areas of Pakistan. The top leadership makes plans, which are passed on to local leadership for execution.

MURDER DECREE

Background interviews with the former members of al-Qaida and Taliban revealed it was the al-Qaida leadership that decided Bhutto's killing. Customarily, the person to be targeted is declared as an infidel through a fatwa (edict). There is an impression the edict for Bhutto killing may have been obtained from Al-Qaida's second-in-command, Sheikh Abu Yahya al-Libi. Born Mohamed Hassan Qaid, he graduated from Wafaq-al-Madaras Arabia-Pakistan (Deobandi), after taking part in Afghanistan war. Seen as group's "general manager," he was killed in Pakistan in June 2012 in a US drone strike.

DECISION ON BHUTTO KILLING

After securing the fatwa on Benazir Bhutto, militant groups were collectively tasked with the killing. Sources say the decision about suicide attacks is generally made by the leadership. Sometimes, however, militants themselves approach leaders for a nod to an attack. The sources say Baitullah Mehsud and other outfits might have acted on the al-Qaida decree.

Lawrence Wright writes on page 318 of his 2007 Pulitzer Prize winning book, *The Looming Tower Al-Qaida's Road to 9-11*: "Al-Qaida had developed a management policy that it called "centralization of decision and decentralization of execution." Bin Laden decided on the targets, selected the leaders, and provided at least some of the funding. After that, the planning of the operation and the method of attack were left to the men who would the responsibility of carrying it out."

On the same lines, al-Qaida leadership appointed Baitullah Mehsud as the leader. Other militant groups extended their cooperation to him. Mehsud then formed different teams, gave them the target, funded them and sent them to different cities. The rest was for the squads to deliver.

BAITULLAH MEHSUD

Baitullah Mehsud is a major character in Benazir Bhutto murder. Written by Taliban spokesman Azam Tariq for the fifth edition of Urdu-language magazine *Hiteen*, which propagates international jihad, an article on Mehsud says:

“Born Ubaidullah in 1975 in Kotkanoorbaz Daudshah, Bannu, he enrolled in a madrasa as Baitullah, a name he was to be called by for the rest of his life. He belonged to Shabikhail Zaraykhail tribe, a branch of Mehsud tribe. His ancestral village is Mehsud “Zangara” and “Nargosahi”. His father Maulvi Muhammad Haroon was a religious scholar. Mehsud had four brothers: Zahir Shah, Yahya, Ishaq and Yaqub. Yahya has been “martyred”.

He married twice. His first marriage was solemnized in 2003. His wife belonged to Afridi tribe. In 2008, he got married for a second time to Haji Ikramuddin Shabikhail’s daughter. She had obtained religious education, and was “martyred” along with her husband.

He was of medium height, and had wheatish complexion, smiley face, long black beard, thick hair and big black eyes. He had good health and strong nerves. He was humble, adventurous, devoted to jihad, resolute, and had gift of the gab and leadership qualities.

After initial instruction in Qaida Baghdadi at home, he learnt the Quran orally from a religious school (Pipal Madrasa) in Bannu. Then he went to another religious school in Asadkhail. He also spent some time at a Deoband seminary in Akora Khatak. However, he got a major part of education from Madrasa Nizamia in Mir Ali, South Waziristan.

Besides religious education, he received contemporary schooling too: primary education from Maati School, middle from Ayaz Middle School and matriculation from Bannu City School. Then he devoted all his time to religious education, the final stages of which too were consumed in jihadi activities.”

BEGINNING OF JIHAD

“Besides religious education, he took an active part in Afghan jihad [war] since 1993, initially without the knowledge of his father who would stress on receiving modern education.

After the fall of the Islamic Emirates of Afghanistan in 2001, he helped al-Qaida fighters move to safer places for quite some time. When the Afghan ‘mujahideen’ started regrouping against the US onslaught, Baitullah Mehsud set up Tanzeem-i-

Taliban (Mehsud circle), with the consent of the leaders of Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.

“The organization for the first time met in Barund and chose Mehsud its Amir (leader). With Mehsud in the chair, the second meeting in Makin focused on the call for jihad and so, saw more people responding. A significant number of people enrolled themselves for jihad at the third meeting where funds were also raised. A group was formed here. Its fighters launched successful activities inside Afghanistan, made the enemy suffer a great loss and returned safely.

“The qualities of a leader and those of a fighter embedded in him naturally. And so, the Baitullah Caravan added a new and bright chapter to Afghan ‘jihad’. He opened an office adjacent to Madrasa Nizamia for jihadi activities. The youth of Islam continued joining the Caravan in great number increasing the mujahideen strength. New centers were opened in Miranshah and Degan. As attacks on the ‘imperialist forces’ in Afghanistan increased ‘invincible’ army camps were destroyed and big districts fell to the mujahideen. The Baitullah Caravan changed the face of jihad against the US invasion”.

SUICIDE SQUADS

According to Azam Tariq, the induction of suicide squads into the militant force by Mehsud startled the ‘infidels’ who would boast of their military might and thought drone attacks and long-range missiles were the answer to mujahideen. But the suicide squads took their enemies by surprise and made them lick the dust, and invigorated the mujahideen. This way of sacrifice earned Mehsud the hatred of the US-Europe combine and the love of all the mujahideen in the world.

The ‘infidel forces’ went all out in plotting against the mujahideen inducing their ‘stooges’ Pakistan’s government and the army to face the Baitullah Caravan. And so, Mehsud shifted his centers from North Waziristan to his native region Mehsud, and continued with the jihadi activities there.

TEHREEK-I-TALIBAN PAKISTAN

According to the Taliban magazine Hiteen, after the dispute with Pakistan over the 'arrest'¹ of its army men, Mehsud focused on uniting jihadi outfits active in different tribal areas and setting up an organized force. He toured different tribal areas, met jihadi leaders and explained to them the importance and utility of setting up the Tehreek-i-Taliban. The mujahedeen included people not only from the tribes but also from settled regions like Swat and other city areas.

"The organizations formed Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan appointing Baitullah Mehsud as its Amir and Maulvi Fazal-ullah from Swat and Maulvi Faqir Muhammad from Bajur his deputies, and Maulvi Muhammad Umar central spokesman. So, Mehsud got several scattered jihadi forces together under the banner of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan. [The alliance formed in December 2007 comprised about five militant groups.]"

CONTACTS

According to Hiteen, despite fighting Pakistan military, Mehsud remained engaged in activities against the US and allied forces inside Afghanistan. He would always remain in contact with the leaders the Islamic Emirate [Mullah Umar, Osama bin Laden, Mustafa Abu Yazid etc] and put their instructions into effect strictly. Mehsud is thought by US military analysts to have commanded up to 5,000 fighters.

WHEN MISSILES HIT

According to Hiteen, while he was staying with his second wife at his father-in-law's house in Zangara on the night of August 5, 2009, a US drone attacked the premises ultimately leading to his demise.

"Baitullah's life is an example for the whole Muslim world, and a bright chapter in the Islamic history. We request all the Muslims, especially the young ones to follow in his footsteps.

¹ In July 2007, shortly after the Red Mosque siege, militants declared an end to a 10-month truce in Waziristan and launched a series of bombing attacks that took 70 lives in just two days. The military suffered important losses in the region, with at least 250 soldiers taken as hostages in August by the Taliban, led by Baitullah Mehsud. After negotiations between the government and Mehsud, the hostages were exchanged in November for about 57 captured militants.

They should stand up to the infidel and fight for the cause of Islam.”

The write-up in the Hiteen by Taliban spokesman Azam Tariq has been quoted because of its importance. It throws light on several aspects of Mehsud’s elusive life and hints at the link between al-Qaida and Taliban.

CONTRADICTION AND THE TRUTH

Many people including several PPP leaders take Baitullah Mehsud’s denial of his involvement in Benazir Bhutto’s killing as true. “He had no involvement in this attack,” spokesman Maulvi Omar said in a telephone call to newspaper offices. “This is a conspiracy of the government, army and intelligence agencies.”

“Why would we kill her? We had no enmity with her. It is against tribal tradition and custom to attack a woman,” Omar quoted Mehsud as saying at an emergency consultative meeting.

He said the transcript released by the government, allegedly of a phone call between Mehsud and a militant discussing Bhutto’s death after the fact, was a “drama” and expressed sadness over her assassination.

He said it would have been "impossible" for militants to get through the security cordon around the campaign rally where she was killed.

"Benazir was not only a leader of Pakistan but also a leader of international fame. We express our deep grief and shock over her death," Omar said.

The denial sounds quite strong. But investigating agencies, the people who knew Mehsud and those having knowledge of the al-Qaida and Taliban network, do not give credence to the denial and see Mehsud pulling the strings.

MEHSUD INVOLVEMENT

Pakistani investigation reports, the Director of the United States Central Intelligence Agency Michael Hayden’s statement in a January 18, 2008 Washington Post interview and Scotland Yard report all confirm Mehsud’s involvement in Bhutto’s murder. After his killing in a drone hit, there is no chance he would ever own up to killing her. The biggest tangle in the

murder case is the ascertainment of the suicide bomber's identity. Abu Yazid had claimed the Punjabi Taliban were involved in the killing while an FIA inquiry officer saw the involvement of 'boys from the Jaish Muhammad' in the killing. It seems it was a joint plan of several groups. Baitullah Mehsud provided weapons and logistics while the attackers came from some other group. But all belonged to Waziristan.

UN COMMISSION RESERVATIONS

The United Nations Commission has expressed reservations over Pakistan investigators implicating Baitullah Mehsud in Benazir Bhutto's murder. According to the UN report: The investigation focused on pursuing lower level operatives allegedly linked to Baitullah Mehsud. The Commission finds it disturbing that little was done to investigate Baitullah Mehsud himself, Al-Qaida and any individuals or organizations that might have worked on, supported or otherwise been involved directly or indirectly in the planning or execution of the assassination.

QUESTIONS

History may come up with the answers to these questions on Baitullah Mehsud.

- Why would Baitullah Mehsud be inimical to Benazir Bhutto?
- Whether Mehsud decided about the murder himself or he acted on al-Qaida's instructions?
- Why did Mehsud deny his role while people around him in Waziristan celebrated the killing?
- What did al-Qaida and Taliban gain from the murder?
- Did Mehsud issue the denial in the face of strong reaction to Bhutto's killing?
- Didn't Bhutto killing make Mehsud vulnerable?
- Is it true the US avoided targeting Mehsud for quite some time and then launched attack after attack?
- Would al-Qaida or Taliban ever claim responsibility for Bhutto's murder and dish out details on the murder plot and the assassins after Mehsud's killing?

MAULANA FAZL-UR-RAHMAN'S OPINION

Baitullah Mehsud's truth or expediency

Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam chief Maulana Fazl-ur-Rahman is a man of insight. He has the ability to see deep into complex matters, and can sum up a whole story in a couple of sentences. I met him on board a Lahore-Manchester flight on July 26, 2008 and sought his version on Baitullah Mehsud's involve-

ment in Benazir Bhutto's killing. Here is whatever his take was. One may need to read between the lines!

CRUX OF THE CONVERSATION

Maulana Fazl-ur-Rahman said: "When Benazir Bhutto started speaking against terrorism I sent her a special message to tell her she should avoid giving hostile statements on such a sensitive issue. I personally know her statements had disgruntled the Taliban".

About Baitullah Mehsud, Maulana said he had once met him. "Of short height, he would hop rather than walk briskly. In a show of respect, as is customary in religious schools, he pressed my legs and said he owed to us whatever he had learnt."

Maulana Fazlur Rahman had a great respect for Benazir Bhutto, and a good working relationship with her. He evaded saying clearly whether people from Fata were involved in her killing. "The Taliban have a complicated network. They may or may not kill. A denial doesn't mean not being involved. Persons involved in such matters have a specific strategy; they serve convenience sometimes and speak the truth at others."

THE TALIBAN VERSION

Taliban Media Center replies

All the national and international investigating agencies had been pointing to the Taliban as Benazir Bhutto's likely killers. Through different sources, I tried to contact Baitullah Mehsud when he was alive to know his standpoint, but to no avail. Later, after his killing in a drone strike, a new leadership emerged. I then requested Taliban spokesman Muhammad Omar by phone and email for answers, approved by Hakeemullah Mehsud or Qari Husain, to questions about the Taliban involvement in Bhutto's murder. Omar was a Talib from Lahore who would often call me to know Lahore's weather or cricket scores. The acquaintance worked and on his demand, I emailed him the questions but I had to be quite persistent for getting the answers that could let the readers understand the Taliban stance. Later, Omar told me he had married an Uzbek woman. But before his honeymoon was to be over, he got killed in Taliban infighting.

Here are the questions and their answers by Taliban spokesman Muhammad Omar, which have been edited for clarity:

1: Is it true that Taliban had serious differences with Benazir Bhutto?

Not only Taliban, other outfits too had great differences with “Mrs Zardari” [Benazir Bhutto]. She was not a leader herself but media and shadowy forces portrayed her as the greatest woman leader of the Muslim world. She was unaware of the geopolitical issues of the world.

How can you call her [Benazir Bhutto] patriotic who when in government talks of democracy and keeping the country intact, but ousted, she strongly defends her idea of confederation with India? She was only a puppet in the hands of her husband who indulged in a record corruption and raised voice against Taliban and mujahidin. She just wanted everything tagged “Bhutto”. Her husband, Mr Zardari, once known as Mr 10 percent and now as Mr 110 percent, is acting as a viceroy of the United States of America (USA) for a maximum hold on government. Mrs Zardari followed the diktat of her secret friends [the US] to win them over. American influence in Pakistan's internal and external matters, especially the foreign policy, dramatically increased in Mrs Zardari's era. She was so “patriotic” she was ready to hand over Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan to American agencies and closing down the Kahuta atomic plant and AQ Laboratories was also on her agenda. Toeing the same line, the media too portrayed Taliban (mujahidin) as the most horrible creatures of the universe.

The difference between our thinking and theirs is very simple. Islam has no boundaries; if a Muslim man or woman needs any help anywhere, we are ready to rescue them. Above all, our struggle is aimed at achieving a khilafat [caliphate] system, which establishes the authority of Allah on earth and follows His diktat in every sphere of life including government, economy and politics.

Unlike a former general and some politicians, we put Islam and establishing Allah's authority and not Pakistan first. We are not against the common people of any country. If people are sensible, they will not go to the polling stations to vote for their “great leaders who get billions of rupees from banks and

never return and who get kickbacks from multinational companies and accept their demands, and hike prices of daily provisions so much as to make them beyond the reach of even the middle class". A majority of the nation is living below the poverty line. Those, who were rich once, are just living hand to mouth. Interest-based banking has also taken this nation closer to bankruptcy. Not a single industry has been set up under this so-called democracy. Now, many people believe General Zia-ul-Haq's regime (the martial law) to be the best regime for this country. Not Pakistan army, we, the common people of Afghanistan and Pakistan, are the ones who defeated the Red Bear [the USSR] and were eulogized in the Hollywood movies. When mujahidin from all over the world conquered Afghanistan, these brave and gallant people were dubbed terrorists overnight just because they actively opposed democracy and dictation from the US.

Differences don't mean we are some kind of nuts who are habitual to resolving every issue through gun. We can resolve issues on their merit.

2) *Did Benazir Bhutto's presence in Pakistan pose any threat to Taliban?*

Mrs Zardari herself was not so important as to do any harm to Taliban. She was just an ordinary woman and an underling to Mr 110 percent and the US and the UK agencies. Though she was born rich, it was her father's death that turned this hippy teenage girl into the first woman prime minister of the Islamic world. How could a stooge pose any challenge to anyone? Definitely, she was unable to do any harm to Taliban or mujahidin. In her first era, Mrs Zardari met [then Indian prime minister] Rajiv Gandhi and tied a Rakhi² on him. She handed over a list of Khalistan movement³ leaders to him as a gift to

² Raksha Bandhan, (the bond of protection) or Rakhi is a Hindu festival primarily observed in India, Mauritius and Nepal, which celebrates the relationship between brothers (shaurya), cousins and sisters (shreya). The central ceremony involves the tying of a rakhi (sacred thread) by a sister on her brother's wrist. This symbolizes the sister's love and prayers for her brother's well-being, and the brother's lifelong vow to protect her. The festival falls on the full moon day (Shravan Poornima) of the Shravan month of the Hindu lunisolar calendar.

³ Khalistan movement refers to a global political secessionist movement which seeks to create a separate Sikh country, called Khālistān ("The Land of the

her brother. According to media reports, the Indian government cracked down on the movement's leadership. They were either killed or arrested. This is another example of her patriotism. What would the scenario have been, had she not handed over the list to her brother?

3) *Did Benazir's assassination help Taliban politically?*

No difference. Whether it's Mrs Zardari, General Musharraf, Mr Zardari or any other politician in Pakistan, to quote William Shakespeare, there is small choice in rotten apples. A great statement of Adolf Hitler goes like this: Democracy is the cause of every evil. Just read it carefully and you will discover the truth. Democracy has pushed the nation into a blind alley. There is no way out for them. Civil and military bureaucrats, politicians and leading businessmen know well Pakistan is a sinking ship, and so, most of them have dual nationalities, their businesses established offshore and families settled abroad. They are living here just to rule this country else they have no faith in this country and people. Not a political struggle, ours is a war against terror. We have to look after every Muslim on earth. This is the duty given to us by Allah and prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him). Our goal is Khilafat, which will not be established through ballot. The mujahidin are in for a long struggle against "the crusaders". The world has seen the economic recession and will soon witness the breakup of the USA and its allies.

"What is being said is not always truth, try to understand the silence."

If Mrs Zardari or any other politician is so patriotic and sincere, they should donate their assets to the nation and live in 240-yard house anywhere in Pakistan. If they do so, their daily provisions will be the state's responsibility. Why are they sincere to the country only when they are in power? Don't you have the example of the killer of Hakeem Muhammad Saeed becoming the governor of Sindh? The issue is limited to Pakistan; it's the same across the globe.

Pure") in the Punjab region of South Asia. The territorial definition of the proposed country consists of the state of the Punjab region.

4) *Were Saeed and Ikramullah (suspected of killing Benazir Bhutto) anyway linked to the Taliban?*

Who says Saeed and Ikramullah are the killers of Mrs Zardari's? Who is the beneficiary of Mrs Zardari's insurance. Who got the most out of this incident?

Media always discuss icons and personalities, and not the killing of innocent children, women and men in Balochistan, Swat, Waziristan, Afghanistan, Somalia, Sudan, Bosnia (worst holocaust of the history), Chechnya, Burma, East Timor etc. Aren't they important to us? Are they not listed among human beings? One puppet woman is so important you have so much spare time to write a whole book on her.

Mir Murtaza Bhutto was assassinated during Mrs Zardari's government. Why are his killers still alive and moving freely? Zardari is the president of the country. Why doesn't he bring the killers to the fore? He won't. Because killers are those who want to catch the killers. What exactly is Rahman Malik's role? Why and on whose orders were all the evidences hosed down?

There is some kind of Taliban phobia in the media. There is no free media in the world. No one can say the truth. Do you remember the Amnesty International (Germany)'s report on the Taliban era in Afghanistan? Better consult the documentation and reveal the truth.

5) *Was some fatwa [edict] issued against Benazir Bhutto in Waziristan?*

No fatwa was issued specifically against Benazir Bhutto in Waziristan. In fact, every politician (MPA, MNA, Senators, City and town nazims, councilors, former or present), government employee of any cadre, military and law enforcing agencies, in short every person who in any way acts as an ally of "the crusaders" should be killed without any prior notice.

WHO REALLY IS INVOLVED?

Much lamentation followed the murder of the country's most popular leader in broad daylight at a critical time in the history of Pakistan. Even the sworn political rivals of Benazir Bhutto declared her a martyr. The killing needs to be investigated seriously to mitigate the severity of the grief. If the killers of the most influential politician of the country and a popular woman leader of the Islamic world go untraced, the general public will lose their trust altogether in the investigating authorities and the courts.

Having interviewed investigators and Bhutto's confidants in my bid to seek every detail of the incident, and read through different books and Scotland Yard and UN Commission reports, I saw several elements playing role in the killing. Let us analyse who is involved, and how much, in Bhutto's murder.

THE US SIN

The Bush administration in the US was quite serious in the early extermination of Taliban and al-Qaida. They thought it was possible only with the public support in Pakistan to the war on terror. To ensure the backing, the US government intended unpopular General Musharraf and popular Benazir Bhutto to enter into an alliance. The deal brokered in this regard stipulated holding of general elections after Musharraf shedding his military uniform and withdrawing the cases against Benazir Bhutto and ensuring security to her after her return to Pakistan. There is ample evidence that the US administration had indicated they would ensure Bhutto remained safe in Pakistan. The US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice and her deputy Richard Boucher were a part of the talks and had remained in touch with General Musharraf on the issue. Bhutto had made several telephone calls to the US

Vice President Dick Cheney so he would ask General Musharraf to make security arrangement for her. But Cheney did not even take the calls.

True, Benazir Bhutto was the opposition leader of an unimportant developing country. The superpower left her abandoned before the savage killers like a sheep after sending her to Pakistan under an undeclared agreement. Dick Cheney, Condoleezza Rice and Richard Boucher may not answer today, but history will hold them answerable. Ron Suskind in his book *The Way of the World* writes:

Bhutto met John Kerry in Washington, three weeks before going back to Pakistan. The priority of this trip is to get Bhutto the security support she lacks. October 18 is only three weeks away. Kerry is swift off the mark: "This is a volatile situation you're walking into, Benazir." The United States, he says, is generally hesitant to ensure the protection of anyone who is not a designated leader, a provision to prevent US forces from becoming embroiled in the internal disputes of sovereign nations.

"Senator Kerry, I want Pakistan to provide me with the security I am entitled to under the laws of my country. I'd be grateful if you would talk to the Musharraf government and tell him the US expects he will fulfill those obligations."

Kerry sighs. Of course, he, a senator, can't conduct unilateral foreign policy. "Well, Benazir, I will certainly talk to the State Department about that point being made to Musharraf," he says as forcefully as credulity will allow... Her current fortune, however, are in hands of a half-a-dozen people beyond her orbit: a tight circle of policy makers in senior posts at the State Department and in the Vice President's Office. All official contacts with Pakistan on Bhutto's behalf must be channeled through this small group, overseen, in essence, by Cheney and Rice, a duo with a long history of internecine combat. Most of it dominated by the vice president."

Rice, Boucher and Cheney may not be directly involved in the killing but are responsible for not ensuring Bhutto's security. And it's a big transgression and so is the US denying

the UN Commission access to its officials. The US authorities will ultimately have to clear their position.

MUSHARRAF'S MISDEMEANOR

General Musharraf wanted Benazir Bhutto to return only after a government of his liking was in place after elections. But Bhutto was of the view that her party wouldn't perform well in the polls if she stayed away. She was well aware of the security risks. Citing threats, General Musharraf's emissaries would advise her against return. Despite these threats, the Musharraf government did nothing to ensure her safety.

The UN Commission report clearly says, "Particularly inexcusable was the government's failure to direct provincial authorities to provide Bhutto the same stringent and specific security measures it ordered on 22 October 2007 for two other former prime ministers [Shaukat Aziz and Ch Shujaat Husain] who belonged to the main political party supporting General Musharraf." Not providing security to Benazir Bhutto despite her repeated statements, telephone calls and reminders is cruelty and should be taken as conspiracy.

UNBRIDLED SECRET AGENCIES

The UN Commission has provided evidence for the establishment's intervention and its role in avoidance of postmortem and hosing down of the crime scene. The intelligence agencies' role in the national affairs is unrestrained. The ISI, the MI and the Intelligence Bureau are nowhere there as an institution, but aspersions are often cast on the integrity of several people affiliated them. The UN Commission report paragraph 259-xvi says, "The ISI conducted parallel investigations, gathering evidence and detaining suspects. Evidence gathered from such parallel investigations was selectively shared with the police. What little direction police investigators had was provided to them by the intelligence agencies. However, the bulk of the information was not shared with police investigators". Paragraph 259-xvii says, "On virtually every issue the Commission addressed, intelligence agencies played a pervasive role".

The UN Commission has questioned the roles of powerful military officials ISI chief General Nadeem Taj, Military

Intelligence chief Nadeem Ejaz, ISI Deputy Director Maj General Nusrat Naeem and ISI Detachment Commander, Rawalpindi Jahangir Akhtar. Only an inquiry can clear them. Brig Ejaz Shah (retired) got his name cleared after satisfying the Commission.

BAITULLAH MEHSUD'S COMMAND?

The easiest way to trace Benazir Bhutto's murder is to set aside all the conspiracy theories and focus on the person who first fired the shots and then exploded the bomb, and find out his handler(s). Wearing black glasses, a man opened fire on Bhutto just a few steps away from the Liaquat Bagh. Investigators learnt from the arrested suspects that young Saeed alias Bilal was brought to Rawalpindi and trained specifically to target Bhutto. It was evident from the Scotland Yard forensic report that the same person had first shot bullets and then carried out the suicide blast. The Scotland Yard and Pakistani scientists found that the DNA of the bomber resembled to that of some people living in Waziristan. The man presumably hailed from Waziristan. (Cristina Lamb says he was a resident of Swat). Very little information is available about the attacker. Apart from Rahman Malik's assertion that the bomber used the identity of his brother, no one knows for sure whose son he was or who trained him or brought him to Rawalpindi from Waziristan.

It is quite strange that Saeed alias Bilal, supposedly a hero of the Taliban for eliminating Benazir Bhutto, remains unknown to a vast majority of the student militia. The inquiry revealed that Qari Nadar alias Ismaeel and Nasrullah alias Ahmad were Saeed's handlers and provided him full assistance. Both Nadir and Nasrullah had stayed at Jamia Haqqania, Akora Khattak, as their names were found on the rolls of this religious seminary. Muhammad Razaqat and Hasnain Gul gave shelter to Saeed and later accompanied him to Liaquat Bagh. Pakistan intelligence agencies traced the accused through phone calls and arrested them. None of those arrested -- Muhammad Razaqat, Hasnain Gul, Abdul Rashid Turabi, Sher Zaman and Aitzaz Shah -- is the plotter. They all

provided help. The real plotters were Nadar alias Ismael, Nasrullah alias Ahmad, Abdullah alias Saddam and Abadur Rahman alias Usman alias Nauman. They supposedly had direct contact with Baitullah Mehsud. None of the plotters remained in police custody and later it was said they had been killed. The ISI told the police Qari Nadir and Nasrullah were the handlers but the actual orders used to come from Baitullah Mehsud.

An eminent police investigator revealed that when a team arrived in Dera Ismael Khan to arrest Aitzaz Shah, an elder of the locality (Khan) said to the team, "you are taking with you a child, but the real man is Baitullah Mehsud, why don't you arrest him?" (The area at that time was completely under Mehsud's sway). The Khan told the police that Mehsud was moved from Waziristan to Islamabad in a cavalcade of luxury vehicles a few days before Bhutto's murder. Mehsud stayed in the Capital for two days and was later taken back to Waziristan. The investigator and the Khan implied that Bhutto's murder was the result of collaboration between some Establishment people acting privately and Mehsud. The author told the investigator the theory would remain just a tale until proven. At that time Mehsud was working both against the State and the Army. So his coming down to Islamabad in the darkness of the night and holding talks there is beyond comprehension. The investigator listened patiently and then said: "To obtain proof, the Political Agent of the region needs to be questioned whether he had taken Baitullah Mehsud to Islamabad for talks with the operatives of ISI, or not." He then posed a counter-question: "Why was the Political Agent not questioned?"

On the other hand, the evidence put forward so far to support the accusation of Mehsud's involvement in the murder is just a telephonic talk. In the talk, a prayer leader congratulates Mehsud over Bhutto's murder, saying his boys had killed her. According to the UN Commission head General Kayani doubted the veracity of this evidence. The UN panel observed that Mehsud could not be held responsible for the murder on the basis of that telephone talk only. However, CIA Director Michael Hyden, Scotland Yard and Pakistani agencies

all believe that Baitullah Mehsud was the man behind the murder.

THE REALITY IS DIFFERENT?

The UN Commission report said that the ISI shared with police only a fraction of the information they possessed. The ISI arrested the accused and handed them to police. An investigator, on the condition of anonymity, said that the ISI had not only captured Muhammad Razaqat, but also the plotters Nasrullah alias Ahmad and Qari Nadar alias Ismaeel. After several days of investigation, they were shifted to an undisclosed location, while the ISI gave the custody of Muhammad Razaqat and Hasnain Gul to the police. A jail official revealed that Razaqat was very rude to the investigators and would often badmouth Bhutto.

Some people say that the ISI presumably already had a tape with the recorded voice of Baitullah Mehsud. After the comparative analysis of the recorded voice and the voice in the telephone call, it was ascertained that it was Mehsud talking to a prayer leader who congratulated him on Bhutto's murder. Nasrullah and Qari Nadir revealed the names of their patrons and masters during the investigation.

MYSTERIOUS QARI

Qari Nadir alias Ismaeel is the main character in the Benazir Bhutto murder conspiracy. Nasrullah alias Ahmad, Abdur Rahman alias Nauman alias Usman and Abdullah alias Saddam acted as his aides. A go-between, Qari Nadar, maintained contact with the killers and the person (either Baitullah Mehsud or some al-Qaida leader) who wanted Bhutto killed. It was Qari Nadir who persuaded Muhammad Razaqat and Hasnain Gul to engage in jihadi activities. Nasrullah accompanied suicide bomber Saeed to Rawalpindi, and remained present in the vicinity of Liaquat Bagh at the time of the bomb blast. There would have been no mystery shrouding the murder if Qari Nadir and Nasrullah were handed over to the police alive. This would have led to the exposure of the elements behind Bhutto's killing. But when the names of Qari Nadir and Nasrullah started surfacing during investigations, and when it was almost established that both of them were the

main characters in the murder conspiracy, it was announced that both had been killed in a shootout.

A secret official letter dated February 19, 2008 said: "Nadir alias Qari Ismaeel and Nasrullah alias Ahmad were killed by Mohmand Rifles in an armed encounter. Qari and Nasrullah were accompanying a young suicide bomber. When they were stopped for search, the bomber triggered the bomb and was killed while Nadir alias Qari Ismaeel and Nasrullah alias Ahmad were killed in the encounter that ensued with the Mohmand Rifles".

However, the investigators refuse to buy this story. They are of the view that Nadir alias Qari Ismaeel and Nasrullah alias Ahmad were captured by the ISI just after Bhutto's murder. They were investigated for one month, and were then killed in a suspicious encounter. The officers believe that the both were shot dead on purpose. The reasons they quote are: firstly, all the information had been siphoned off from them, and there was no use of keeping them alive; secondly, the establishment killed them as Nadir and Nasrullah had masterminded several attacks on the army; the third reason put forward has dangerous connotations -- Qari Nadir and Nasrullah were witness to the contacts between Taliban and the establishment. They knew the elements involved in the murder conspiracy by names, which the establishment desired to remain secret, and so, they were removed from the scene.

WHERE IS THE OTHER QARI?

Two men with the same first name "Qari" are believed to be involved in the two incidents - Karachi blasts on October 18, 2007 and the 27th December 2007 Liaquat Bagh attack. Benazir Bhutto believed that a man by the name of Qari Saifullah Akhtar was mainly responsible for the blasts in Karachi. The name of Qari Nadir surfaced after the Liaquat Bagh incident. However, a female leader, who knows the working of the jihadi organizations, claimed in a private meeting that it was the same Qari Saifullah, the ameer (head) of Harkatul Jihad Islami, who Bhutto named as the protagonist of her murder plot in her book "Reconciliation" which was published posthumously and released on February 26, 2008.

She revealed in this book that Qari Saifullah was brought from the United Arab Emirates and kept in Central Jail Karachi from where he was later released and assigned to make bombs. Bhutto writes that a fatwa (decree) was obtained against her at a formal meeting in Lahore.

Qari Saifullah was arrested by the Musharraf administration two weeks after the release of Bhutto's book and investigated for his role in Karachi blasts.

According to the book of an eminent journalist Amir Mir "Fluttering Flag of Jihad", Qari Saifullah Akhtar is considered an operative of Pakistani intelligence agencies. He was living at the mausoleum of Syed Ahmad Shaheed, at Ferozwala, a locality near Lahore, since his release from jail in May 2007 from where he was arrested on 26h Feb 2008 along with his three sons. Qari was produced before the Anti-Terrorist Court on the same day. A month later on March 26, 2008, Justice Khawaja Naveed of Sindh High Court released him on bail. However, he was not set free but arrested again under the law of Maintenance of Public Order. Sindh Home Department released him after two months. He was presumably freed on the insistence of secret agencies. After some days, he travelled to Mandi Bahauddin and had never been heard of ever since. Analysts believe Qari Saifullah is hiding in Waziristan and has remained active along with Taliban commander Ilyas Kashmiri. Kashmiri is accused of kidnapping film distributor Sateesh Anand for ransom, murder of Maj General Faisal Alvi and jihadi activities in Kashmir. It is believed Kashmiri [killed in a drone strike] had had strong contacts with the establishment. The question is: who was behind Qari Saifullah's release? If these were some elements in the establishment, they should be exposed.

THE ROLE OF HAQQANI GROUP

According to the information emanating from Waziristan and the confessional statements of the arrested accused, Baitullah Mehsud was provided with suicide bombers by the Haqqani Group led by Sirajuddin Haqqani. Jalaluddin Haqqani, the father of Sirajuddin, is the leader of a prominent group of Afghan Mujahideen. Both Sirajuddin and Jalaluddin

are viewed by the international media as agents of Pakistani establishment. Sirajuddin Group is active in Afghanistan, not in Pakistan. The word Haqqani is drawn from the Jamia Haqqania, Akora Khattak for their affiliation with it. The operatives and their aides who killed Benazir Bhutto too were from Jamia Haqqania. One, however, wonders why Haqqani Group would provide Baitullah Mehsud with suicide bombers and that too for Bhutto's murder. The analysts who have understanding of the situation in Waziristan say that all the militants have contacts with each other at some level or the other. All the extremists intended to terminate Benazir Bhutto because they considered her an American asset. The suicide attackers from Baitullah Mehsud are generally between the age of 14 and 20, and are untrained. But, the bombers sent by Haqqani Group were well trained.

Since the Haqqani Group communicates with the establishment, this creates an impression that al-Qaida, Baitullah Mehsud, Haqqanis and extremist elements in the establishment are behind Benazir Bhutto's murder. The UN Commission report raised doubts over the inclusion of Mehsud's name in the list of murder accused in haste, and later not following up on the inquiry in this regard. The report said that the evidence provided by the police and investigative authorities was not enough. The report observed that further investigation was required to find out whether al-Qaida was involved in the murder.

So what was the animosity between Haqqani Group and Benazir Bhutto? The argument put forward in this regard is that Haqqanis are fighting against Hamid Karzai and American troops in Afghanistan. They think that with Benazir Bhutto taking control in Pakistan, the support from Pakistan would stop, and US-Benazir-Karzai collusion would hurt them badly. Strangely all the plotters of Bhutto murder -- Nadir, Nasrullah and Abdullah used the words "Haqqani Group" as part of their names. It is not clear whether it was because of their affiliation with Jamia Haqqania or it showed their loyalty to Siraj Haqqani. It is doubted that some elements of the establishment in Pakistan were in league with the Haqqani Group in

Afghanistan. Whether the matter was not investigated on that presumption, is anybody's guess.

IT'S AL-QAIDA

The UN Commission pointed out in its report that al-Qaida was involved in Benazir Bhutto's murder. Though Al-Qaida leader Mustafa Abu Yazid claimed the responsibility for the murder, the matter was not investigated, the report said. Abu Yazid had confessed in his statement that they had eliminated "the most valuable asset of America in Pakistan." He also revealed that Punjabi Taliban too were involved in the murder.

Strangely, Pakistani agencies didn't proceed with the inquiry into the matter. One possible reason could be lack of access to al-Qaida and it was very difficult to get information about this organization. No one bothered to know about Mustafa Abu Yazid and his ranking in al-Qaeda. Similarly no effort was made to find out the veracity of his claim about this high-profile murder.

Mustafa Abu Yazid was actually another name of Abu Saeed Al Masri, one of the major Al-Qaida leaders. The 9/11 Commission report described Al Masri as the head of Al-Qaida finance committee. Al-Qaida sent Al Masri to the tribal areas of Pakistan to oversee the administrative affairs of the organization there after the attacks on Afghanistan. Baitullah Mehsud worked as his subordinate. They launched operations after developing a working relationship with Sirajuddin Haqqani. Benazir Bhutto's murder was one such operation in which several groups collaborated.

ANWAR AL SADAT AND BENAZIR BHUTTO

At least two planners behind the murder of two illustrious leaders of the Muslim world are the same. Al-Qaida's second-in-command Ayman al Zuwahri and chief of the Shura Ittehad Qabail, Mustafa Abu Yazid, are believed to have done the planning for assassination of Anwar Al Sadat of Egypt and Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan. Both al Zuwahri and Abu Yazid were nominated in the murder of Anwar al Sadat in Egypt and so, they kept running away from Egypt on different occasions and finally got together years later in Afghanistan to launch Al-Qaida. They played main role in the planning for the murder of

Benazir Bhutto. Sheikh Saeed Al Masri claimed the responsibility for Bhutto's murder, and said Ayman al Zuwahri wanted her dead. It appears that the wave of religious terrorism that started with the murder of Anwar al Sadat in Egypt will culminate into the situation emerging after the killing of Benazir Bhutto. Earlier Al-Qaida had been waging a war against the states and their systems, but now they have declared a war on the whole world.

AL-QAIDA INVOLVEMENT

Lead Pakistani prosecutor in the assassination of former prime minister Benazir Bhutto, Chaudhry Zulfikar Ali was gunned down in 2013 in a hail of bullets as he drove to court in Rawalpindi. The police recovered a bag at the scene of his assassination containing an Italian gun and a pamphlet inscribed with a message from "Mujahideen-e-Islam" owning up the murder and stating, "Whosoever acts against Islam would face same tumult." Following intense investigations, the Islamabad Police arrested Abdullah Umar for the killing from Islamabad who turned out to be the son of a former Army officer, Colonel Khalid Mahmood Abbasi, who was arrested, court-martialed and dismissed from service for allegedly colluding with a banned jihadi organization to assassinate Musharraf in 2003.

FROM PLANNING TO THE MURDER

The planning to kill Benazir Bhutto had been done before her return to Pakistan. Extremist elements in the Pakistani establishment, al-Qaida and Taliban were on the same page. They believed that coming into power of Benazir Bhutto would hurt their interests both in Afghanistan and Pakistan. That's why they are being accused of hatching the conspiracy to kill her. The elements in the establishment who back Taliban and Al-Qaida are in favour of terrorist activities. Ayman al Zuwahri, deputy to Osama bin Laden, ordered murder of Benazir Bhutto (Saeed Al Masri alias Mustafa Abu Yazid confessed to that). Abu Saeed Al Masri was the head of Shura Ittehad Qabail, which formulated the implementation strategy. Joint operation was approved by the Shura for the avoidance of charges against any one group. Haqqani Group was to provide

trained shooters and suicide attackers for the operation, and Baitullah Mehsud was to make available needed facilities to them. Baitullah's men Qari Nadar alias Ismael and Nasrullah alias Ahmad accompanied bombers to Rawalpindi and Muhammad Razaqat and Hasnain Gul took bomber Saeed alias Bilal to Liaqat Bagh where he opened fire and exploded the bomb. The second bomber Ikramullah and his accomplice Nasrullah returned to Waziristan. Nasrullah was later arrested along with his accomplice Qari Nadir.

WHO WILL DARE QUESTION THE MILITARY?

One point has been raised time and again in connection with the Bhutto murder inquiry: Army was the first to investigate the tragedy, they had all the details, but the information provided to the police and other international investigation agencies was very limited and insignificant. Taking this laxity into account, the UN Commission gave some acrid remarks about the establishment in its report. If the agencies continue to keep this matter secret in the coming days, the mystery shrouding the murder will deepen. If any individual or a group in the establishment is suspected of involvement in the murder, the army should not hesitate in exposing them. The sacrifice of a few would salvage the prestige of the institution as a whole. Additionally, this will not only answer some questions about the murder but would also pacify the emotions of the nation to some extent. If this is not done, the history and time will definitely expose the criminals who also damaged the credibility of the institution.

ALL WERE KILLED

It's more than six years now since Bhutto was murdered. Let's see what happened to the alleged killers during this period. Al-Qaida leader Mustafa Abu Yazid, who owned up to the murder, was allegedly killed, along with his wife, three sons, a grandson and some other men and women in a drone attack in 2010.

The name of Baitullah Mehsud surfaced many times in connection with this murder. Mehsud was hit by a drone missile while having a foot massage by his wife on August 5, 2009, a year and eight months after Bhutto's killing.

Nadir alias Qari Ismael and Nasrullah alias Ahmad, who reportedly received instructions directly from Baitullah Mehsud, were killed in an encounter with the army in Mohmand Agency just two months after Bhutto's killing.

Abadur Rahman alias Nauman alias Usman, son of Rehmatullah, an expert in explosives and weapons, who is said to have arranged weapons and suicide jackets, was eliminated in a drone attack in June 2010, two and a half years after Bhutto's murder.

Apart from those arrested, another would-be suicide bomber Ikramullah and his comrade Abdullah are absconding.

And if al-Qaida names are included Osama bin Laden is already dead while Ayman al Zuwahri is far away from the arm of law.

MAULANA SAMIUL HAQ SAYS:

Doesn't know the killers personally

Jamia Haqqania, Akora Khattak, is regarded as one of the highly respected and big religious schools belonging to the Deoband school of thought. Maulana Abdul Haq, a student of Deoband, laid the foundation of Jamia Haqqania around 1947. After his death, Maulana Samiul Haq took over as the administrative head of the Jamia (school). The accused arrested for the murder of Benazir Bhutto had named in their confessional statements Nadir alias Qari Ismael and Nasrullah alias Ahmad as the persons involved in the murder conspiracy. Both the men were staying at the Jamia Haqqania. Administrator of Jamia Maulana Samiul Haq was asked about

the mysterious activities of these accused over the phone but he expressed his ignorance.

INTERVIEW

Maulana Samiul Haq, the administrator of Jamia Haqqania (a religious seminary), expressed his ignorance about the activities of Nadir, Nasrullah and Abdullah Saddam who were students at his seminary. Haq said: "People from the intelligence agencies visited our Jamia. We told them that there are thousands of students and we cannot keep track of every individual student. We can't say anything about the activities of a student in his room." Haq said he could not imagine that such a thing would happen to Benazir Bhutto, or someone would commit such a blunder.

When asked about the murder conspiracy believed to have been hatched in room number 111 and 83 of his seminary, Haq said that people named in the inquiry used pseudonyms to engage in terrorist activities. Their names on the rolls of the hostel were different from the names they used outside the hostel. "After an inquiry, we found that one of them was not even student of our institution. He worked at a bookshop in Akora Khattak, and stayed at the Jamia with his friend. Nasrullah belonged to Attock, and was a former student of the Jamia. Another boy is still in the custody of police". The Maulana said the arrested boy should be asked about his identity, his relations and accomplices. "But, he has not given away any information to the police so far," Haq said.

"We are scared of terrorism. We have students at the Jamia who hail from Waziristan. We are very apprehensive that a suicide bomber could enter the Jamia someday," Haq said. He said he did not know the students involved in the Bhutto murder conspiracy personally.

(Telephonic interview: March 24, 2010)

IN NUTSHELL

After reviewing the investigations and the conspiracy theories, it can be said conclusively that Benazir Bhutto's murder was not a chance happening but the result of a well-planned conspiracy. People involved in the conspiracy were not only individual young extremists, but militant outfits, their patrons and several groups affiliated with the establishment. There also appears to be some poor planning by the Musharraf government officials, their backing to some extremist elements and some blunders by the Peoples Party leaders.

All the investigation reports clearly say that the police arrested accused Hasnain Gul and Razaqat. But they were seized by the Counter-Terrorism Intelligence wing of the ISI. Col Fayyaz, the head of this cell, handed them over to the police. The police officers are of the view that the ISI had uncovered the whole network behind the murder, and arrested the plotters Nadir and Nasrullah and killed them in a suspicious encounter after extracting all the information. The officers said that the handing over of accused to the police would have exposed covert support to terrorists by some elements in the establishment and exposed some names.

Relevant facts cannot be exposed without investigating Col Fayyaz. Analysts say that if no agency was involved then why the people linked to this murder were killed in a fake military encounter. Their killing has become a missing link in the chain of the murder inquiry and placed a thick veil over the identity of many plotters behind this conspiracy. No one denies that Nasrullah and Qari Nadir were captured by the agencies. A smiling picture of both the accused obtained from the agency proves this. This photograph makes it clear that the accused were first captured and then killed.

Khalid Shahanshah's death has further deepened the mystery. The killing of Bhutto's private guard needs to be investigated

by the court to unveil the motives behind it. Asif Zardari is unlikely to come out clean unless Shahanshah murder puzzle is solved.

- The allegations leveled against the ISI and the army should be investigated by the military. The UN Commission clearly mentioned the name of Military Intelligence Chief Maj General Nadeem Ejaz in the context of hosing down the crime scene. When the JIT 2 called him, he did not appear and rather sent a two-page letter. He thought it enough to have a meeting with General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani. It's expected that General Kayani would set up an inquiry to question General Nadeem Ejaz and Rawalpindi ISI commander Col Jehangir Akhtar to erase the impression that the army and the agencies played a controversial role. It is also expected that the inquiry carried out by the ISI and Military Intelligence into Bhutto's murder would be made public.
- The investigators demand that the Political Agent of North Waziristan Agency be investigated. It is said he took Baitullah Mehsud to Islamabad in a convoy of motor vehicles. Mehsud met some officials of an agency in the Capital. What was the agency's name and who was the officials Mehsud met?
- The UN Commission in its report said Babar Awan and Rahman Malik drove away the back-up vehicle. They should have returned to the blast scene. Both of them would continue to face the allegation until they were proved innocent. Asif Zardari will have to answer the history if he fails to track the killers down during the tenure of his government.

These are the mysterious affairs no one dares hint at. Unfortunately, the establishment doesn't want such riddles unraveled fearing the country might be seen as a "rogue" state. But, if it has so happened and the army opts for a cover-up, history will reveal the real culprits. They will be exposed, no matter how powerful they are, or how influential the institution they are affiliated with is.

ASIF ZARDARI VS NAHEED KHAN

Charges against each other, from A to Z

These allegations and counter-allegations are based on the statements of the two personalities, their off-the-record conversations, and background interviews of close companions. After reading through their points of view, it is easy to understand their differences. It is possible that neither may own these things on the record, but their companions do echo these feelings of theirs. Thus the accusations and counter-accusations have been given in the third person, so that whatever is said off the record may be brought on the record. For the readers' ease, each accusation has a hand pointing to the direction it came from.

Asif Zardari' s position	Naheed Khan's position
<p>☞ A Naheed Khan and her husband Safdar Abbasi got out of control. They tried to impose their will on everyone. On several occasions, their behaviour even towards the Chairperson was disrespectful. Had Benazir Bhutto been alive, she would have moved Naheed Khan into the background. She was only waiting for elections to take place</p>	<p>A Only Benazir Bhutto was everyone's leader and ideal. Everything happened on her orders. No one could think of disobeying her or being rude to her. Yes, there would be heated exchange6s on political matters, but the chairperson took the final decision, and everyone then implemented it. Ms Bhutto was never angry with Naheed Khan</p>
<p>☞ B Naheed Khan deliberately made faulty arrangements for Asif Zardari's return to Pakistan from Dubai so that her 'dominance' did not end. Things were so handled that the whole Lahore leadership was arrested and he did not get a welcome in Lahore, which caused both Zardari and the PPP political loss and General Musharraf and Pervez Elahi both extended the tenures of their governments.</p>	<p>B For Zardari's return to Pakistan, Naheed Khan and her husband Safdar Abbasi made all-out efforts. She spent a week and a half in Lahore, where she held meetings. The real mistake was Zardari's, in that he changed his time of arrival at the last minute. If he had landed in Lahore in the afternoon, there would have been a fight in every street in Lahore, and hundreds of arrests. It wasn't the PPP, but Asif Zardari, who lost by this deal, and he went to the USA in anger, but the PPP continued its struggle.</p>

Asif Zardari' s position	Naheed Khan's position
<p>☞ C In London, during the ticket distribution for the 2007 elections, Naheed Khan was rude to Ms Bhutto. It so happened that Naheed wanted the ticket for a Rawalpindi seat to go to Agha Riazul Islam but Ms Bhutto gave the ticket to Aamir Fida Piracha. At this, Naheed Khan spoke loudly and rudely, and said that Riazul Islam's sacrifices were greater. At which Ms Bhutto said that she knew Amir Fida's family before she knew her.</p>	<p>C The incident is true to the extent there was disagreement over tickets, but there was no rudeness, nor was there any exchange of harsh words. Everyone spoke on party matters, and the purpose used to be the betterment of the party. When Ms Bhutto had once made a decision, all talk would end. This happened that time too.</p>
<p>☞ D When a PPP ticket on women's reserved seats was given to Hussain Haqqani's wife Farah Naz Isphahani, Naheed Khan returned her own ticket in protest. She did so because Haqqani had divorced her and married Naheed Khan's sister, which led to Khan being hurt. Ms Bhutto did not try at all to persuade Naheed Khan to reconsider, and accepted her ticket's return, because she never liked taking dictation from Khan.</p>	<p>D This is true to the extent that Naheed Khan returned the ticket on women's special seats, but the reason was not the award of a ticket to Farah Naz Isphahani or anyone else, but the truth was that Naheed Khan did not want to enter the Parliament in 2002, Ms Bhutto forced her to. This time, as Ms Bhutto had returned to Pakistan, and she wanted to work with her, she returned the ticket with thanks. There was no element of anger in this.</p>

Asif Zardari' s position	Naheed Khan's position
<p>E</p> <p>Malik Ghulam Mustafa Khar never gave statements at Asif Zardari's behest. Actually the Naheed Khan camp gave out that Ms Bhutto was upset by Asif Zardari 's arrival at Lahore, although this was incorrect. If this had been correct, Ms Bhutto would not have tied an <i>imam zamin</i> to Asif herself nor seen him off at the airport. Such statements show her bad intentions. She was afraid that with Zardari's arrival her leadership would end and Ms Bhutto would find out the truth.</p>	<p>E</p> <p>→ After Asif Zardari' s arrival in 2004 at Lahore Airport, Malik Ghulam Mustafa Khar suddenly began giving statements that Asif Zardari could not be given a reception because of the lack of cooperation from Naheed Khan and Dr Safdar Abbasi. Naheed Khan showed Ms Bhutto these statements, and she said, "You can give counter-statements in the newspapers that this proves how powerful you are."</p>
<p>F</p> <p>Asif Zardari never thought of himself as a leader, and also thought of Ms Bhutto as the head of the party, always accepting her decisions wholeheartedly. Naheed Khan and her companions make accusations using the names of unknown people, which are completely baseless. Even now, Asif Zardari is governing in the name of Ms Bhutto's leadership.</p>	<p>F</p> <p>→ For a long time, Asif Zardari had wished to become a leader, while Naheed Khan was not ready to accept anyone as leader except Ms Bhutto. When Ms Bhutto returned to Pakistan the last time, the security people Zardari has given stayed at Naheed Khan's on the Islamabad leg. They said to Naheed's servants, "Here [in the drawing-room] there isn't a single picture of our leader." When they were</p>

Asif Zardari' s position	Naheed Khan's position
	<p>asked who that was, they said, "Asif Zardari". To which they were answered: "The PPP has only one leader, and that is Benazir Bhutto."</p>
<p>☞ The worst thing Naheed Khan did was turning back from Multan 170 people Asif Zardari had sent from Sindh for Ms Bhutto's security. The responsibility for sending back security lies on Naheed Khan. In Rawalpindi and Multan she repeatedly said that she was herself responsible for security. Complaints were made against security people and there was interference in their functioning. After returning the security at Multan, Abdul Qadir Shaheen was made in charge of security, even though he had no experience of security. Whenever given advice about security, Naheed Khan always said: "Nothing will happen to Ms Bhutto."</p>	<p>G The accusation of returning security at Multan is totally baseless. Ms Bhutto herself sent back this detail, Naheed was sitting far off. Shah Mehmood Qureshi was listening to the conversation. And it is incorrect there were 170 people. There were 16 or 17. Multan's former Mayor Salahuddin Dogar had had his ticket confirmed then. He can be asked about the number. All the people stayed at Javed Warraich's house in Rahim Yar Khan. He can also be asked about the number. This accusation is made deliberately. The truth is that Rehman Malik was in charge of security. Was he made Interior Minister as a reward for the excellent security for Ms Bhutto? Zulfiqar Mirza was made provincial home minister and Siraj Durrani was also made a minister. Shouldn't</p>

Asif Zardari' s position		Naheed Khan's position	
			these people have been asked about the lapses in security?
H	<p>☞ On arriving in Rawalpindi, Naheed Khan took security into her own hands, and she was the one giving everyone instructions, which created complications. Naheed Khan had said in front of everyone that 200 workers would form a barrier in front of BB, but after the rally not a single worker got off the stage. Naheed Khan had the mobile numbers of Rehman Malik, Babar Awan and the driver. Couldn't she have phoned after the accident to recall the car?</p>	H	<p>Naheed Khan knew nothing of security. There were four bulletproof vehicles for Ms Bhutto's security: two Mercedes and two jeeps. Rehman Malik and Babar Awan took one Mercedes to Islamabad. Had this car had been nearby Ms Bhutto could have been taken to hospital faster, while two bulletproof vehicles were in Karachi. These arrangements were made by Asif Zardari and Rehman Malik, and Naheed Khan knew nothing of them.</p>
I	<p>Khalid Shahanshah was an old PPP worker. He had fought elections on the party ticket. He was sincere to the party and its leadership. If you look at the gestures he made onstage, another camera would show were for a photographer. His murder was investigated; what has come up so far is that it was the result of a personal</p>	☞ I	<p>In the 27 October rally at Liaquat Bagh Khalid Shahanshah's gestures were very suspicious. If you look at the film closely, it seems that Khalid Shahanshah is gesturing to a sniper that Ms Bhutto is wearing a bulletproof jacket, so she should be shot on the neck or above. Khalid Shahanshah was loyal to Asif Zardari. He first put</p>

Asif Zardari' s position	Naheed Khan's position
<p>enmity. It has also been learnt that those who carried out the murder sponsored gambling.</p>	<p>him afar, then made him in charge of security for Bilawal House. Then he was mysteriously murdered, giving rise to numerous mysteries.</p>
<p>☞ All those traveling with Ms Bhutto after the 27 October rally bear some responsibility for the tragedy. All knew the risks and dangers. They should have stopped Ms Bhutto from standing up. Naheed Khan was sitting next to Ms Bhutto, and had influence on her. Not only did she not stop her from standing, she told her to answer the slogans. Thus she is responsible for putting Ms Bhutto in danger.</p>	<p>It's true that all knew the threats to Benazir's life. But Ms Bhutto was everyone's leader, and when she wanted to stand up, no one could stop her. She wasn't afraid of anyone, and didn't want to stay far from the people out of fear. Ms Bhutto wouldn't stand on anyone's say-so. Naheed Khan didn't make her stand up, but Ms Bhutto herself said, "Safdar, Let's have some <i>naaras</i>." And herself raised slogans of 'Long Live Bhutto.'</p>
<p>☞ Naheed Khan's biggest crime was that in such a dangerous situation she herself opened the lever of this safest of vehicles and put Ms Bhutto's life in danger. If Naheed Khan had not opened the lever, Ms Bhutto might have been among us today</p>	<p>If Ms Bhutto ordered her to open the lever, could Naheed Khan refuse? Not at all. How could she dare refuse? Actually, this lever opened by force, and always Khalid Shahanshah would open it, applying force. Naheed Khan never opened the lever. So why would she do so on that day?</p>

Asif Zardari' s position		Naheed Khan's position	
L	<p>Naheed Khan accepted in the beginning that she pulled the lever of Ms Bhutto's vehicle at the time of the tragedy. When this was criticised, and suspicion was expressed, she changed her statement. Now she refused she had anything to do with the lever, even though everyone in the vehicle, including the driver, said she had pulled it. As long as Khalid Shahanshah was alive, Naheed Khan made apologetic statements, but now her statement has changed.</p>	L	<p>There was actual planning to lump Naheed Khan with Ms Bhutto's murder. Immediately after Benazir's death, Farooq Naik coerced driver Javed, a resident of Mardan, and Ms Bhutto's personal servant, Razzaq, into making this statement that "Naheed Khan opened the lever." After taking the statements, the driver was handed over to the police. There too, he was made to give the same statement. How can a driver look back while driving?</p>
M	<p>It's completely false and plain accusation. Asifa sent no such message and there was no live coverage at that time. It's all a lie, and amounts to involving the children in dirty politics. Because Asifa is the youngest, she had a great love for her mother and misses her a lot. There's no such message on the Blackberry. Asifa has been having fits since childhood.</p>	M	<p>The last message Ms Bhutto got on her Blackberry was from Asifa in which it was perhaps said: "Mama. I'm in front of the TV. I'm watching you. Stand up and waive so that I can see you live." It is suspected that Zardari made Asifa send the message. If this message had not come, Ms Bhutto wouldn't have stood up. That's why Asifa couldn't sleep for several days and has fits. She injures her arms and wrists. If this message on her</p>

Asif Zardari' s position		Naheed Khan's position	
			Blackberry could be checked, the facts would come out.
N	The UN Commission and Scotland Yard don't confirm this. This is all mental invention, and the attempt to lessen a sense of guilt. The purpose of such talk is to spread confusion	→ N	Ms Bhutto was surrounded and killed. Bullets were fired from all sides. Professional killers were used. Ms Bhutto was not killed by the bomb explosion but a bullet. The bomb exploded later. Everyone in the vehicle will bear witness to that.
→ O	Those in Ms Bhutto's vehicle caused unnecessary delays in getting her to hospital. If these people had shifted her to the ambulance standing nearby, maybe Ms Bhutto's life could have been saved. Dr Safdar Abbassi should have given her artificial respiration. Someone could have tried to stop the blood.	O	It is true that there was a delay in transporting Ms Bhutto to hospital. Actually, the incident was so big that everyone lost their senses. The vehicle's tyres had burst. She was then shifted to a second vehicle. True, all this took time, but Ms Bhutto had died during the attack. Safdar Abbassi is also a doctor. He checked Ms Bhutto's breath, and felt the danger right then.
P	A day after Ms Bhutto's murder, lobbying started in Naudero for Asif Zardari. Dr Babar Awan and Rehman Malik began saying: "Now the party chairperson should be Asif	→ P	After Ms Bhutto's death, the immediate problem was to fill the leadership. There was no lobbying for this, though there was consultation. The party ranks were totally united.

Asif Zardari' s position	Naheed Khan's position
<p>Zardari." Even though at this time the will had not been brought forward. Naheed Khan said that it would not be easy to sit in Ms Bhutto's chair, people would not accept Asif Zardari as Chairperson so easily.</p>	<p>Naheed Khan wanted to be given importance in all matters. The party's leaders were not willing to do this. That's why she's angry.</p>
<p>Q Asif Zardari has never accused Naheed Khan of Ms Bhutto's murder, even though blunder like sending back a security detail, opening the lever and not stopping Ms Bhutto from standing up, have been pointed out. While Naheed Khan and a few followers have been spreading rumours about Asif Zardari making allegations, and have now been making up stories, allowing the real criminals to get away.</p>	<p>Q This is not true, Naheed Khan never accused Asif Zardari, though she does say the killers must be unmasked, an FIR registered and investigations carried out. What is wrong with that? Yes, if anyone finds the shoe pinches, what can be done about that?</p>
<p>R Naheed Khan didn't object to Ms Bhutto's will at the party Central Executive. In fact, husband and wife, Dr Abbassi and Naheed Khan, said to the press: "This is indeed Ms Bhutto's will." No one knew about Ms Bhutto's will. Maybe she</p>	<p>R Ms Bhutto's will was mentioned on the third day after her assassination. That Ms Bhutto gave it to her maid or manservant after writing it by hand doesn't make sense. The objection that this wasn't Ms Bhutto's practice. She didn't</p>

Asif Zardari' s position	Naheed Khan's position
<p>wrote her will in a hurry and gave it to her maidservant. It seems Naheed Khan wanted to become Chairperson herself, or else make some weak person Chairman and also her puppet. When this didn't happen, she was upset.</p>	<p>mention the will to Naheed Khan or any other companion. The will has English grammatical mistakes that Ms Bhutto couldn't make. The interesting thing is that the preparations to make Asif Zardari chairperson were made before the will was made public. Why?</p>
<p>→ No action was taken against Naheed Khan and Safdar Abbassi, It is the prerogative of a party chief to pick a team of his own choice.</p>	<p>The truth is that neither Naheed Khan nor Dr Safdar Abbassi wanted to work with Asif Zardari, so they themselves went into the background, because they knew that Asif Zardari didn't have the ability to run either the party or then government.</p>
<p>→ Naheed Khan and Safdar Abbassi were obviously working against party interests. They were making a grouping within the party. When they toured Punjab, they advised people to vote for Nawaz Sharif's candidates in the Senate election, so that Asif Zardari may be let down. They kept on making statements against the party position during</p>	<p>Despite Asif Zardari's injustices, neither Naheed Khan nor Dr Safdar Abbassi can imagine leaving the party. No group has been formed, even though whenever he meets an officebearer, he strips the office off. In Sindh, everyone has been made a minister indiscriminately, except Dr Safdar Abbassi's brother Haji Munawwar Abbassi, even though the</p>

Asif Zardari' s position	Naheed Khan's position
<p>the judges' restoration movement. They also joined the Long March against the party. They are trying everything to weaken the party and co-Chairman Asif Zardari.</p>	<p>relationship of the Bhutto family with the Abbassi family is several generations old. Joining the lawyers' movement was in support of Ms Bhutto's stance, because she had promised that the Chief Justice would be restored.</p>
<p>U Every day there would be complaints received about the PPP Secretariat that people's problems weren't solved, which is why the administration there was changed. The people-friendly Chaudhry Munawwar Ahmad was put there. Now there's a lot of activity there. Workers, peasants and activists are all pleased.</p>	<p>U At the PPP Secretariat in Islamabad, not only was Naheed Khan's room vacated, but all sincere workers were expelled. Is this service to the party or a clear example of destruction? Now such a pass has been reached that no one is willing to go to the Secretariat, because no one is there who can do anything to help.</p>
<p>V It's all a lie. Such a thing never happened, now or then. Actually, such things are said to increase one's value. The truth is that everyone in the party was thankful for them being set aside. She was harsh with everyone and didn't allow anyone to work. She had made a monopoly of the party for her favorites. This was broken. She was</p>	<p>V Someone who sat with Asif Zardari, sent a message to Naheed Khan, whether in warning or as a threat, that she needed to protect herself, to which she replied:" Look, life is a trust from God, but the killers don't know that murderers are followed for generations. "</p>

Asif Zardari' s position	Naheed Khan's position
<p>saddened that the party was made happy by this change.</p>	
<p>W Such an incident simply didn't happen. Children today are very smart, and who can stop them if they want to meet someone? By saying such things, it is tried to gain sympathies. Asifa, Bilawal and Bakhtawar all love their father, so why would they want to meet his opponents?</p>	<p>W Asif Zardari and his companions have so arranged things that Naheed Khan cannot meet Ms Bhutto's children. Recently, Asifa was in Islamabad and phoned Naheed asking her to meet her. She said she would be over in two or three hours. In this meanwhile, Asifa was sent back to Dubai.</p>
<p>X By removing Naheed Khan and Safdar Abbassi, Asif Zardari has fulfilled Ms Bhutto's wishes</p>	<p>X This is completely false. Ms Bhutto's relationship with Naheed Khan, of trust, remained right till the end. When she arrived at Karachi, the first kiss she gave was to Naheed. After the Liaquat Bagh rally, she congratulated her for its success, and the last kiss she gave in her life was to Naheed Khan.</p>
<p>Y At the Liaquat Bagh rally, Dr Safdar Abbassi had a fight with DSP Ishtiaq, which led to the police re-calling the 200 men on duty. This gave the killers the time to execute their plan</p>	<p>Y The fight with DSP Ishtiaq was over his rudeness to workers, but the police came back soon. Was the injustice with workers fair? Naheed Khan would stand in front of Benazir in</p>

Asif Zardari' s position		Naheed Khan's position	
			readiness to give her life for her. Such accusations are only based on bad intentions.
Z	If the rally had been cancelled, Naheed Khan would have made the most fuss. The ISI head had spoken about general threats and at that time it was suspected that the purpose of stopping the rally was to keep Ms Bhutto away from the people. You can say what you want afterwards, but at the time it seemed that going to the rally was the right decision.	→ Z	If Rehman Malik had told Naheed Khan about the meeting with the ISI head on the night between 26 and 27 October, she would have taken the responsibility on herself to cancel the rally. Once the ISI chief had intimated the dangers, why was Ms Bhutto allowed to go to the rallying point and Naheed Khan kept in ignorance?

THE KILLER AND THE KILLED: HANDS SAY IT ALL

A comparative study of the hands of the suspected assassin and Benazir
Bhutto

It is hard to say whether astrology and palmistry are scientific in approach but given the fondness of people for the art and the study of palm in the subcontinent, follows an analysis of the hands of the suspected killer and Benazir Bhutto by astro-palmist Sadiq Mehmood Malik. Springing surprises, the study shows the suspect as mature and trained in some disciplined force.



Handprint of Benazir Bhutto



Handprint of suspected assassin

Findings: BENAZIR BHUTTO

1	Age: 54 Date of birth: June 21, 1953 Death: December 27, 2007
2	The health line cuts through the lifeline around 54 years of age indicating an unnatural death.
3	Seven mounts are prominent on the hand indicative of deathless and selfless politics. Developed countries' politicians and Z A Bhutto have seven mounts on their hand. Several leaders of the developing world including Nawaz Sharif have five mounts hinting at their desire for power.
4	The luck and sun lines go up to the mount of Saturn, meaning achievement of a high point in politics and fame. However, incomplete lines mean she couldn't travel full distance.
5	Girdle of Venus indicates a deep aesthetic sense and love for art and beauty. The heart line cutting across the palm hints at her being emotional. People with such a line cannot control their emotions. Perhaps under the influence of this line she could not help responding to the crowd's cheers and stood through the escape hatch despite security risk.
6	Her hand is normal. It, however, shows the possibility of accidental death in heart, brain and life lines starting at one point.

Findings: Suspect Saeed alias Bilal

1	Age: above 25 Date of birth: Not known Suicide: December 27, 2007
2	Unlike usual suicide bombers who are between 18 and 24 years of age, this person is more than 25 because his hand is meaty with strong fibers.
3	The hand has five mounts, the mount of moon being suppressed. A person with such a hand lacks consistency and so, can tread any line. This man does not seem to have studied at a madrasa. Nor does he look a middleclass person. He may be a member of some disciplined force.
4	Sun line is quite clear and bright indicating yearning for fame. He is rather set to achieve notoriety 10 years after his suicide when he will be identified.
5	Heart line bends a bit as it starts from the mount of Jupiter. People with such a line long for such a feat as could help them be known. The brain line is wavy. People with such a line can be easily taken into doing anything good or bad. Second and third fingers are of the same length, indicative of the inclination for taking any type of risk.
6	The hand is small but mounts are prominent and heavy hinting that his thoughts changed after he had trained at some institution and after he had turned adult.

WILL: REAL OR FAKE

Opinion of international and national handwriting experts

A couple of days after the killing of Benazir Bhutto, the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) released the slain former prime minister's handwritten political will. Under this will, Zardari was made joint chairman of the PPP along with Bhutto's 19-year-old son, Bilawal Bhutto-Zardari. With Bilawal currently a student at Oxford University, Zardari became de facto leader. The will became controversial as soon as it was made public. Senator Safdar Abbasi and his spouse and Benazir Bhutto's political secretary Naheed Khan initially accepted it but later repeatedly questioned its genuineness saying it carried grammatical mistakes and that it did not reflect her style. Keeping such qualms in mind, I sought opinion of handwriting experts from the US, the UK and Pakistan, providing them with a copy each of Benazir Bhutto's standard writing sample and the will for comparison. Follow the observations of the experts:

BRITISH EXPERT

Handwriting Experts Graphology Services UK's founder Margaret Webb M.BIG (Dip) is a known expert in graphology with a highly regarded, world-recognised qualification in handwriting analysis. Margaret Webb is a Graduate Member of the British Institute of Graphologists, London. Webb also serves as a consultant for expert witness reports and has helped resolve several complex cases. Known corporations like Mercedes, DaimlerChrysler, Sainsbury and the Next are benefiting from her services. She was contacted through the UK's Urdu-language newspaper Urdu Times to analyse samples of Benazir Bhutto's known writing and her alleged political will. Her observation follows:

FINDING

PROFESSIONAL OPINION

I have examined the questioned Political al Will handwriting Q1, with the five pieces of handwriting of a known author, K10 through to K14.

After using methodology for examining handwriting consisting of applying accepted forensic document examination principles and techniques, where appropriate in this particular case, and consisting of connections/penlifts, letter construction, lateral variations and lateral expansion/width of letters, letter height proportions, slant or slope and spacing, it is my professional opinion as a Certified Document Examiner, that the questioned handwriting on the questioned document (Q1) shows sufficient similarities, when compared to the known handwriting K10 through to K14 to support the view that all handwriting examined is authored by the same individual.

Therefore, in my opinion, the questioned Political Will handwriting is from the same hand as the five pieces of known handwriting.

Although sufficiently clear for examination purposes, this opinion was reached using documents that were not originals.

Original documents should be submitted for examination prior to preparing a fuller report for submission to Court because details such as writing pressure and indentations on an original are lost on a copy, erasures may not be clear on copies. Dots and dust specks may be added. The colour of the ink is not visible and the condition of original documents cannot be determined from assessing photocopies. This is merely to produce provide additional evidence.

Signed: Margaret Webb cde, MBIG (Dip)
Certified Document Examiner

Dated: 10th June 2010

Pakistan Peoples Party

To the officials and members of Pakistan Peoples Party I say that I was honoured to see you. No leader could be as proud of their party than dedication, devotion and discipline to the mission of Quaid e Azam Zulfikar Ali Bhutto & Federal Democratic and Egalitarian Pakistan as I have been proud of you. I salute your courage and your sense of honour. I salute you for standing by your sister through two military dictatorships.

I fear for the future of Pakistan. Please continue the fight against extremism, dictators, poverty and ignorance.

I would like my husband Asif Ali Zardari to lead you in this turbulent period until you and he decide what is best. I say this because he is a man of courage and honour. He spent 11 1/2 years in prison without yielding despite torture. He has the political stature to keep our party united.

I wish all of you success in fulfilling the manifesto of our party and in serving the down-trodden, discriminated and oppressed people of Pakistan. Dedicate yourselves to freeing them from poverty and backwardness as you have done in the past.

Benazir Bhutto

October 16, 2007

A copy of Benazir Bhutto's controversial will released after her killing

A copy of Benazir Bhutto's known handwriting. The sample dates back 1984, when she was in her first exile, 23 years before the release of her purported will.

Recd (1) Page 6.25
Overseas
Peoples Party Press Release

The Pakistan Peoples Party will observe July 5, 1984 ~~the~~ as a black day of protest against the illegal usurpation of power by the military regime against the constitutional and legitimate government of Pakistan.

Protest rallies will be held in front of Pakistan ~~Emb~~ mission and consulates throughout Europe, North America and United Kingdom.

~~The programme for United Kingdom is as follows:~~

In the United Kingdom protest rallies will be held in Manchester, Birmingham, Bradford, Glasgow and London ~~in the afternoon~~ ~~between 3.00-5.00 pm~~. Those

0 -

(2)

interested in participating
 may contact: ~~Bradford Captain~~
~~Hukundad~~, Man Manchester -
 MR. Zafar Chowdry; Bradford
 Captain Hukundad; Birmingham
 MR. Mohammad Aslam; Glasgow
 MR. Adil Bhatti; London MR. Ahi.

~~There will be a women's
 protest rally in London to voice
 the anguish of the women against
 the oppression and victimization
 and ~~abuse~~ of children and mothers
 by arresting them~~

There will be a women's
 protest rally ^{in London} on the same day in
 front of the Pakistan Embassy.
 Those interested in attending may
 contact ~~the~~ ^{Sister} Nusrat Bokhari or
~~the~~ ^{Sister} Fakhanda Bokhari.

The exiles will be observing
 a night vigil. Those interested in

(3)

attending may contact Mr. Handeni
in London.

Any further details may be
obtained from ~~the~~ Press Spokesman
at London

European and North American
organisations are requested to
contact their Party Presidents
for local details.

~~Handeni~~ ~~London~~

~~Mr. Handeni~~

1. Tang. 7.30

2.

Dear Sir,

Please find enclosed a cutting from a Pakistani newspaper ~~owned and run by the~~ Haroon family. Mr. Mehmud Haroon is ~~by~~ a close associate of General Zia and has been identified with the military regime since its inception. At present he is General Zia's Minister of Interiors.

The report, which is based on "informed sources" reveals that former parliamentarians ~~and~~ ~~and~~ office bearers will not be permitted to contest General Zia's so-called "elections" on the basis of their record, a euphemism for their vigorous opposition to Marshal Zia's views.

The report confirms the prediction of Mrs. Benazir Bhutto that General Zia will hold "elections" and not ~~elections~~, and is ~~being~~ ~~sent~~ ~~for~~ ~~your~~ background information.

The clipping is being sent for ~~your~~ background information.

Sincerely,

Also enclosed is a letter on the Sindh situation ~~reproduced~~ taken from the weekly magazine "Viewpoint." It may be noted that the name of the student leader is Ahmed Ali Soomro.

The above material, along with the Jack Anderson report just received by the office, is being sent for information and discretionary use.

Sincerely,

()

INSTRUCTIONS

Instructions were received from Mr Abdullah Syed, Urdu Times Ltd., 126 A Upton Lane Forest Gate, London, E7 9LW.

If other instructions are issued or if further relevant information becomes available it may be necessary for me to reconsider my opinion.

I was asked to compare the questioned handwriting on a Political Will with copies of known and undisputed handwriting.

Observations

I have examined the handwriting with the naked eye and high power magnifier.

ITEMS EXAMINED

My opinion is based on examination of the following documents:-

<u>Item Documents</u>	<u>Description</u>
Q1 Questioned Document	Handwritten Political Will - undated
Support Documents K10 K11 K12 K13 K14	Page of A4 handwriting – begins ‘Overseas Peoples Party Press Release...’ Page of A4 handwriting – begins ‘interested in participating...’ Half page of A4 handwriting – begins ‘attending may contact...’ Four lines of handwriting Page of A4 handwriting – begins ‘Dear Sir, Please find enclosed a cutting...’

EXAMPLE OF HANDWRITING EXAMINED

Q1 - QUESTIONED HANDWRITING ON POLITICAL WILL

POLITICAL Will ?

Pakistan Peoples Party

To the officials and members of Pakistan Peoples Party I say that I was honoured to be

Rec'd (1) 19th 6.25-
Dover 10

Peoples Party Press Release

The Pakistan Peoples Party

FIRST PART - KNOWN HANDWRITING DOCUMENT 10

QUESTIONED HANDWRITING ON POLITICAL WILL

I wish all of you success in fulfill
manifesto of your party and in
ring the downbrodden, discriminated in
valued people of Pakistan. Dedicat
iselves to freeing them from poverty as
awards as you have done in the pas

Benzoni Blunt

October 11 2002

In the United Kingdom
protest rallies will be held
in Manchester, Birmingham,
Bradford, Glasgow and London
in the afternoon. Those

FINAL PART - KNOWN HANDWRITING DOCUMENT K10

HANDWRITING COMPARISON

SIMILARITIES

Comparison of Q1 and K10 (page two examples)

Words – Pakistan, Peoples, Party

Comparison of Q1 and K10, K11, K12 and K14

Letters- 'a', 'B', 'c', 'd' and D', e, some 'F', 'g', 'h', 'I', 'k', 'l', 'm', 'n', 'o', 'p and P, 'r', some 's', some 't', 'u', 'w' and 'y'.

Comparison of Q1 and K10, K11, K12 and K14

Handwriting Features

Letter disconnectedness is similar

Handwriting Style is similar

Positioning of words along baseline is similar

Size and letter height proportions is similar

General irregularity is similar

Width of letters is similar

The only dissimilarity is seen in the slant of the handwriting. The political will handwriting (Q1) is seen with a strong rightward slant and the known handwriting (K10-K14) is seen with a slight rightward/upward, irregular slant.

THE US EXPERT

The Center of Forensic Profiling is seen as an authority on handwriting and forensic analysis. Since 1987, this center, run by Treyce Montoya, has assisted in famous cases such as Michael Jackson's death. The center's professional opinion was sought through the US Urdu-language newspaper Pakistan Post. The centre's director of Questioned Document Lab Kaitlyn Jolly scientifically analysed the handwriting samples and handed out two reports.

FINDING

Kaitlyn Jolly, FDE

Center of Forensic Profiling
Office: 503-328-9956 * Fax: (603) 925-0345
cfpkdjolly@live.com
www.solvemycase.com

I, KAITLYN JOLLY, FDE, declare:

1. I am a Forensic Document Examiner, and have been employed by The Center of Forensic Profiling to render an opinion concerning the authenticity of the questioned document titled "Pakistan Peoples Party", dated October 16, 2007.
2. I have examined four (4) documents with the known writing of the alleged author of the questioned document. For the purpose of this examination I have labeled these exhibits 'K1' - 'K4' and will refer to them in this declaration as 'K' documents.
3. Today, I have compared the writings of the 'K' documents to the writing on the questioned document, identified heretofore as 'Q1', the "Pakistan Peoples Party", dated October 16, 2007, to determine if the author of the writing on the 'K' documents was the same author as the 'Q1'.
4. Based upon thorough analysis of these items, and from an application of accepted forensic document examination principles and techniques, it is my professional opinion that the same person that authored the 'K' documents is the same as the person that authored the 'Q1' questioned document.

Dated: July 6, 2010

Kaitlyn Jolly, FDE

Declaration Opinion of Kaitlyn Jolly, FDE

From: The Pakistan Post
[mailto:thepakistanpost@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 07, 2010 7:27 AM
To: Treyce Montoya
Subject: [SPAM] Re: Results are in !

Thanks Treyce. How soon can I have the report?

Thanks

Asma

On Wed, Jul 7, 2010 at 1:55 AM, Treyce Montoya
<treyce@treyce.com> wrote:


*** This is NOT the report, but instead is extra that the expert did for you so you can see some of the ways she examines documents. The report will follow in the next email ***

This is from my Fraud Department Director, Kaitlyn Jolly, who did the case:

This is not a forgery... I've done some overlays and the spacing and type and sizes are near identical. I can lay these words right over the top of the other words for a near perfect match with the exception of natural variations due to the date span of the writing samples (possibly 20 years which can naturally cause changes to biological make-up of the author). Please see the notes below:

Exemplars;

This is the Questioned document's Pakistan word from the title and the known 13.jpg's Pakistani word from the second line, second word.




A close-up of the handwritten word "Pakistani" from a questioned document. The letters are slanted to the right, and the 'i' has a distinct dot.

This one is from the same pages, questioned document's first sentence, last word compared to the same Pakistani word in known 13.jpg's second line second word




A close-up of the handwritten word "Pakistani" from a known document. The letters are slanted to the right, and the 'i' has a distinct dot.

This is the word United from the questioned document, 2nd to last paragraph's last word and Known 10.jpg's last paragraph, first sentence, third word;



A close-up of the handwritten word "United" from a questioned document. The letters are slanted to the right, and the 'i' has a distinct dot.

and same doc's, questioned document, 2nd to last paragraph's last word compared to the 2nd paragraph, last sentence 2nd to last word;



A close-up of the handwritten word "United" from a known document. The letters are slanted to the right, and the 'i' has a distinct dot.

The slant is different from the questioned documents, but all the spacing, letter sizes and shapes are similar with slight natural (biological) variations.

My opinion is that this is NOT a forgery, but IS a difference in time (dates) of the writings (a possible 20 to 23 years difference)

PAKISTANI EXPERT

A forensic expert from a known Pakistani forensic agency seeking anonymity rejects the reports by the US and the UK experts and calls the will fake. Comparing the will handwriting sample to Benazir Bhutto's known handwriting sample, he sees difference in positioning of words and style of handwriting. He says that the passage of even 20 years does not change the handwriting style.

According to the Pakistani expert the technique used in fabricating the will is not common in the US and Europe. He says the similarity between the words in the known handwriting and those in the will handwriting means an exact copy. To him if the will was ever challenged in a Pakistani court and an opinion sought from them, they would come up with one in detail. A brief comment follows:

FINDING


The slant of the handwriting on the disputed document written with a thick-tipped pen is rightward with an angle of 60 degrees. The known handwriting piece written with a fine-tipped pen has leftward, a slight rightward/upward, irregular slant.

It seems the disputed document has been fabricated copying the known handwriting, and even tracing some words. But original documents are needed to prove forgery and form a final opinion.

Difference in writing the letter "f"



Questioned



Known

Difference in writing the letter "N"




Questioned




Known

Difference in writing the word "and" and letters "a" and "d"



Questioned



Known

Questioned

→ manifesto

Known

magazine

Difference in writing the letter "m" and in slant

ANNEXTURES

Scotland Yard report

The UN Commission report

Code of conduct

Benazir Bhutto's medical report

Challan 2011



Working together for a safer London

Metropolitan Police SO15 Counter-Terrorism Command

New Scotland Yard

Report

Assassination of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto

Liaquat Bash Rawalpindi Pakistan

27th December 2007

Introduction

1. This report provides details of the Metropolitan Police SO15 Counter Terrorism Command deployment to Pakistan to assist in the investigation into the assassination of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto on 27th December 2007.
2. The report is made available for the sole purpose of assisting the authorities of Pakistan in providing clarity regarding the precise cause of Ms Bhutto's death. It may not be used as evidence in any court or tribunal without the prior written authority of the Metropolitan Police Service. In no circumstances may it be used in, or for any purpose that may result in, proceedings that are capable of the imposition of the death penalty on any person.
3. The report is not a review of the Pakistan Police investigation into Ms Bhutto's assassination, but is an assessment and analysis of the facts in order to meet the objectives of the Terms of Reference of the UK Police deployment.
4. The report is based on fact in the form of forensic analysis, video media footage, photographic evidence, eyewitness accounts and documentary evidence. Any opinion relied upon is that of certified expert witnesses.
5. The assassination took place outside Liaquat Bagh Rawalpindi, as Ms Bhutto was leaving a Pakistan People Party (PPP) rally she had just addressed. She was travelling in a custom built armour plated Toyota Land Cruiser along with seven of her closest aides and confidants.
6. Ms Bhutto was appointed leader of the PPP following the death of her father and founder of the party, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, in 1979. She was twice elected Prime Minister of Pakistan; firstly from 1988 to 1990 and then from 1993 to 1996. In 1999 she and her family went into a period of self imposed exile, living primarily in Dubai and London.
7. Ms Bhutto is survived by her husband Asif Ali Zardari and children, Bilawal (aged 19 years), Bakhtawar (aged 17 years) and Aseefa (aged 14 years).

8. Following the announcement by President Musharraf that elections would take place on 8th January 2008, Ms Bhutto returned to Pakistan on 18th October 2007 to spearhead the PPP election campaign. Within hours of arriving in Karachi that day Ms Bhutto's election bus, in which she was travelling, was subject to a double suicide blast. Although she escaped relatively unscathed, one hundred and seventy people were killed and over six hundred injured in the attack.
9. Following the Karachi bombing and a string of other suicide attacks across the country, President Musharraf declared a state of emergency and suspended the country's constitution on 3rd November 2007. Shortly afterwards the general election was postponed and rescheduled for 18th February 2008.
10. The three main parties, the PML-N headed by former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, the PML-Q headed by Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain and the PPP headed by Ms Bhutto effectively suspended their electioneering. A number of political rallies were cancelled including a PPP event that had been scheduled to take place at Liaquat Bagh, Rawalpindi, on 9th November 2007.
11. The PPP is described as a secular, social democratic party and campaigns under the slogan, '*Bread, Clothes and Shelter*'. The party has governed Pakistan on three occasions; Ms Bhutto's two terms and from 1973 to 1997 under her father's premiership.

SO15 Terms of Reference

12. On 31st December 2007 the UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown offered President Musharraf expert technical and forensic assistance in the investigation into Ms Bhutto's assassination. The offer was accepted by the President and it was agreed the assistance would be provided and coordinated by the Metropolitan Police Service SO15 Counter Terrorism Command.
13. Prior to the deployment, the SO15 Counter Terrorism Command Senior Command Team (SCT) compiled specific terms of reference in which the team would operate. The terms were agreed by the Foreign and

Commonwealth Office (FCO) in London and Pakistan Interior Ministry and are as follows:

At the request of the Paldstan Government, New Scotland Yard's Counter Terrorism Command (SO15) is deploying a team of investigators to support the Pakistan Law Enforcement Agencies responsible for investigating the death of Benazir Bhutto. The principal purpose of the SO15 deployment is to assist the local authorities in providing clarity regarding the precise cause of Ms Bhutto's death.

The team will provide forensic expertise and other investigative assistance as appears appropriate to the senior officer, Detective Superintendent MacBrayne who will lead the MPS team. The MPS Officers will assist and report to the Pakistan senior iqvestigators. The primacy and responsibility for the investigation remains with the Pakistan authorities.

The MPS team will consist of experts in the areas of crime scene investigation, forensics and evidence analysis.'

14. The intention of the deployment was to establish the precise cause of Ms Bhutto's death. The team possessed the necessary skills and experience to carry out the objectives as per the terms of reference. To have conducted a wider investigation, including reviewing security arrangements and possibly identifying those responsible for the assassination, would have been complex, labour intensive and have impacted on the due process of a sovereign country.
15. Despite the publication of the terms of reference, there has been considerable speculation suggesting a broader remit, incorporating responsibility for the attack. The terms of reference have been strictly adhered to and at no point will the issue of responsibility be referred to in this report.
16. The SO15 team comprised of five detectives led by the Senior Investigation Officer, Detective Superintendent John MacBrayne. Each Officer was experienced in terrorist investigations having conducted complex investigations both in the UK and abroad.
17. Apart from Detective Superintendent MacBrayne, the SO15 team comprised of two experienced forensic experts,

an expert in analysing and assessing video media and an experienced investigating Officer. The team arrived in Pakistan on 4th January 2008 and spent two and a half weeks conducting extensive enquiries. The team was supplemented during the deployment by scientists from the UK Forensic Explosive Laboratory and technicians from the Metropolitan Police Computer Modelling Bureau. Full co-operation was provided by both the local investigation team and senior PPP Officials.

Liaquat Bagh

18. Liaquat Bagh (Park) was formerly known as Muncipal Park but was renamed ih 1951 following the assassination at the same venue of Liaquat Ali Khan, Pakistan's first Prime Minister. It has become a focal point for political rallies with all three main parties due to hold functions at the venue during the current election campaign. As stated above, the PPP were forced to postpone a planned rally at the venue under the terms of the state of emergency. The PML-N party were due to hold a similar rally at Liaquat Bagh later in the campaign.
19. Liaquat Bagh is effectively a public park, laid mainly to lawn and is located at the *Chowk* (Junction) of Murree Road and Liaquat Road - two of Rawalpindi's busiest thoroughfares. The park covers an area of approximately three acres with its perimeter secured by a combination of metal railings and chain link fencing. There are two buildings locatd within the park, a police building on the south east corner and a press club located on the south west corner. There is also a purpose built stage situated at the west side of the park, adjacent to the VIP car park.
20. The park is overlooked from the north and east by a series of multi storied office blocks, hotels and apartment blocks. There are residential premises to the south of the park and immediately to the west is a newly formed art college.

Security Arrangements pre Rally

21. Rawalpindi Police were responsible for policing the PPP rally on 27th December 2007. The Officer in charge of the operation was the head of Rawalpindi Police, Deputy Inspector General of Police (DIG) Syed Saud Aziz. His

deputy that day was Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP) Yaseen Farook.

22. Approximately ten days before the event, Ms Bhutto's personal police security advisor, Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP) Major (ret) Imtiaz Hussein met DIG Saud at his office in Rawalpindi. Major Imtiaz is actually a serving Police Officer but was seconded to Ms Bhutto's entourage at her personal request prior to her return from exile on 18th October 2007. DIG Saud and Major Imtiaz discussed a number of security issues and agreed on policing arrangements for the impending rally. DIG Saud was also in contact with other officials PPP officials regarding similar issues prior to the event.
23. On 25th December 2007, SSP Yaseen held a security briefing on behalf of DIG Saud with PPP officials to discuss the security of the event further. A code of conduct was apparently agreed which included the following points:
 - The function was to end before nightfall (approximately 1730 hours);
 - No vehicles, other than Police and official PPP vehicles, would be permitted in the vicinity of Liaquat Bagh;
 - All the main junctions around the venue would be blocked by a Police cordon to allow rapid, unhindered vehicular access;
 - The buses containing PPP supporters would be parked some distance away from the venue, with passengers having to make the remainder of the journey on foot; and
 - General expectations of both the Police and PPP.
24. SSP Yaseen has provided details of the security arrangements carried out on 26th December 2007. He stated that Police Officers searched all the hotel rooms overlooking Liaquat Bagh and recorded the names and addresses of all those with room reservations for the relevant period. The Officer also stated that a fingertip search was carried out within the park and that it was guarded by armed Police Officers overnight.

25. On the day of the rally, sniffer dogs were deployed inside the park and a further fingertip earch was conducted round the stage area. Entry to the park was via three walk through security gates, each equipped with metal detectors. Two gates were designated for males and the third for females. One Assistant Superintendent of Police (ASP) was responsible for managing the security procedure at the gates. Each gate was staffed by one Inspector, ten Constables and four Special Branch Officers – a total of forty six Police Officers. The gates opened at 0900 hours and SSP Yaseen stated that everyone, including PPP officials, were physically searched before they entered the park.
26. SSP Yaseen stated that there was a Police constable positioned every fifteen feet within an inner cordon around the perimeter fence. This was to deter people jumping over the fence or throwing objects into the park with a view to retrieving them later. SSP Yaseen also stated that for practical policing purposes, the park was spilt into two sectors with each sector policed by one Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP), two Inspector and sixty Constables – a total of one hundred and twenty six Officers.
27. In addition to the inner cordon, SSP Yaseen stated that ninety Constables, under the supervision of one Inspector and a DSP, were deployed along Liaquat Road from Liaquat *Chowk* to the outer gates near the water tower.
28. SSP Yaseen further stated that eighteen Police snipers were deployed on various rooftops surrounding the venue. As well as being armed with rifles, some were equipped with binoculars.
29. A total of one thousand three hundred Punjab Police Officers were drafted in to Rawalpindi that day specifically to Police the PPP rally. DIG Saud stated that the number of Police Officers on duty was unprecedented for such an event.
30. The podium on the stage from which Ms Bhutto was to address the rally was bullet proof and, in addition, an eight foot high chain link fence was erected one hundred and

eighty feet from the stage. That created a sterile area in which no one was permitted to enter. As well as a number of PPP security personnel, the stage area was guarded by twelve Punjab Police 'Elite' Commander under the supervision of an Inspector. The only access to the stage was from the grounds of the art college via set of custom built wooden steps.

27th December 2007

31. The PPP rally was attended by people from all over Pakistan. The majority had travelled in buses that were parked some distance away, with the party faithful having to make the final kilometre or two on foot. It is estimated that between fifteen and twenty thousand People had gathered inside Liaquat Bagh to hear Ms Bhutto's address
32. At about 1415 hours, responsibility for the security of Ms Bhutto's convoy travelling to Liaquat Bagh was taken by a mobile detachment of Punjab Police 'Elite' commandos at the Faisalabad/Rawalpindi district limites. The 'Elite' detachment consisted of a Traffic Police 'pilot' jeep, the Commanding Officer's jeep and three Toyota Hi Lux pick up vehicles, each containing five Police Officers armed with a variety of weapons, including Kalashnikov AK47 rifles and 9mm automatic handguns.
33. Major Intiaz was responsible for Ms Bhutto's private convoy and was travelling with her in the white armour plated Toyota Land Cruiser along with the driver and five of her close associates. There were four other PPP security vehicles in the convoy, each containing a number of armed plain clothes security guards.
34. The journey through Rawalpindi was uneventful until the point the convoy reached the outer gates of Liaquat Bagh. The Toyota Land Cruiser slowed down and Miss Bhutto emerged from the roof escape hatch to acknowledge and wave at PPP supporters who had gathered at the gates. Slogans were exchanged between Ms Bhutto and the crowd before the vehicle entered the park.
35. The convoy then drove through the two security gates to the rendezvous point at the rear of the stage, near to the specially constructed wooden stairs. After briefing her

staff, Ms Bhutto went straight to the podium and began addressing the crowd. The vehicles remained in the VIP parking area throughout the rally.

36. Both the Police and PPP officials agree that at one point there was a disagreement over the manner of the policing of the event. After a short standoff, co-operation was restored and the rally continued without further incident.

Security Arrangements Post Rally

37. For security purposes, the Police Officer in charge of the event insisted that the rally finish before 1730 hours (dusk). The PPP adhered to the edict and shortly after 1700 hours Ms Bhutto finished her address. She and other party workers left the stage via the temporary wooden steps. After briefly speaking to members of her entourage, Ms Bhutto got into her armour plated Toyota Land Cruiser motor vehicle.
38. The imported left hand drive vehicle was built to Ms Bhutto's specification by a specialist armour conversion company based in the United Arab Emirates. The 2008 (latest) specification Toyota Land Cruiser was fitted with 'B6' armour that was designed to withstand gunfire and certain bomb blasts. The vehicle was also fitted with two purpose built escape hatches. The first was the standard escape hatch fitted to the rear; the other was an 'optional extra' fitted to the roof of the vehicle. The roof hatch was designed and fitted to provide an alternative mean of emergency escape in the event of the rear door hinges becoming buckled following exposure to a bomb blast, gunfire or a road traffic accident. The roof hatch was not designed for anything other than a means of escape.
39. The hatch is measured at sixty three-centimetres in length, sixty three centimeters in width and a depth of nine centimetres. The depth is in the form of a lip constructed of armoured plates and finished in a fine layer of upholstery.
40. The vehicle, registration number BF7772, is an eight seat Sports Utility Vehicle (SUV) and was imported under licence to Pakistan in November 2007. It is fitted with a lightweight aerodeck roof rack upon which two large loud speakers are fitted – front and back. A microphone for the

public address system had been fitted to the dashboard at the front of the vehicle.

41. With all the occupants in their vehicles, the convoy prepared for the relatively short journey to Ms Bhutto's home in Islamabad. The PPP convoy was exactly the same as that which had driven to the rally. Police security was again supplied by the 'Elite' commando detachment. Before setting off, the 'Elite' commander recalls reminding both his staff and the PFP security officials of the paramount need for a quick get away from the car park.
42. The occupants of the Land Cruiser comprised of Major Imtiaz, the driver, Ms Bhutto and five of her closest confidants. All the occupants entered the vehicle conventionally apart from the extreme rear seat passengers, who all entered via the rear escape hatch. Ms Bhutto sat in the middle of the rear seat.
43. The planned route for the convoy was to turn right out of Liaquat Bagh into Liaquat Road and then left into Murree Road. According to SSP Yaseen all subsequent roads to the boundary between Rawalpindi and the Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT) had also been cleared of traffic. At that point the Islamabad Police would have taken over the security of the convoy.
44. Before the official convoy embarked on its journey to Islamabad, a senior PPP member left the VIP car park a few seconds earlier in a white Toyota Prado motor vehicle and turned right into Liaquat Road.

The Incident

45. The Police traffic 'pilot' and 'Elite' command vehicle emerged from the outer gate of Liaquat Bagh and turned right into Liaquat Road. They were followed by two of Ms Bhutto's convoy – a Mercedes Benz and an estate vehicle. Three Punjab Police 'Elite' Toyota Hi Lux pick up vehicles were positioned around the exit of Liaquat Park to receive Ms Bhutto's Land Cruiser and her back up vehicles.
46. At about 1710 hours Ms Bhutto's Land Cruiser emerged slowly from Liaquat Bagh and began to turn right into Liaquat Road. As it approached the central reservation, it slowed further and became surrounded by a crowd of

predominantly PPP supporters. At the same time those inside the park began climbing over the fence and added to the numbers around the vehicle.

47. The planned quick getaway was not occurring much to the alarm of DIG Saud. He recalled contacting SSP Yaseen via radio in an attempt to establish the cause of the delay. At the same time the 'Elite' commanding officer stated he also became concerned and stepped out of his vehicle and began walking back towards the outer gates, also in an attempt to establish the cause of the delay.
48. Whilst the Land Cruiser slowly approached the reservation, the crowd began chanting slogans such as '*Long live Bhutto*', which were audible to those inside the vehicle. Ms Bhutto waved to the crowd in response and at the same time was enthusing how well the rally had gone. She particularly praised two of her aides for their roles in organising and managing the event.
49. The crowd had swelled in numbers to a few hundred and Ms Bhutto apparently stated "I should stand up". It is not clear by whom, but one of the occupants in the second row in the rear of the vehicle deployed the heavy mechanism of the roof escape hatch and opened it.
50. Before she stood up, Ms Bhutto asked one of the occupants to shout slogans at the crowd using the vehicle's public address (PA) system. The microphone was on a long enough lead for it to be passed from the front to the rear of the vehicle. Ms. Bhutto stood up on the seat and emerged from the hatch; her head and shoulders were clearly visible. The hatch's two steel armoured plates flanked her left and right sides and were also clearly visible.
51. At the time, Ms Bhutto was wearing a purple dress, a brown *Pashmina* shawl across her shoulders, her customary white silk *dopata* (head scarf) and garlands around her neck. She was also holding tissues in her right hand and was occasionally dabbing her nose. One of the occupants of the vehicle recalled that it had been particularly cold day.

52. Whilst Ms Bhutto waved at the crowd, the PA announcer began shouting slogans in Urdu, '*Cheers for Bhutto*'. The crowd responded by shouting, '*Long Live Bhutto*'.
53. It is not clear why, but because the vehicle was not making the intended swift progress, it became surrounded by alert PPP security guards. Two security staff climbed onto the rear bumper and protected the rear near and offside. Guards also took up positions at the front rear and offside.
54. At one point there was a minor scuffle at the nearside of the vehicle when a young PPP supporter climbed onto the running board, apparently with the intention of touching Ms Bhutto. He was forcibly pulled away by PPP security personnel.
55. Immediately after the scuffle, a dark haired male wearing sunglasses, and who had been mingling in the crowd edged towards the vehicle. As he did so, for a short period, he positioned himself at the front of the vehicle on the nearside. He then repositioned himself where there were fewer people in the crowd. Having reached the point between the front and rear passenger doors on the nearside of the Land Cruiser, he produced a black automatic handgun and held it in his right hand.
56. The vehicle continued to make slow progress and began to angle away from the gunman as it turned right into Liaquat Road. From a distance of no more than two to three feet, he raised the weapon and fired three shots in quick succession in the general direction of Ms Bhutto. After each discharge of the weapon the gunman changed the position of his gun hand. The three shots were fired in less than one second.
57. There appeared to be correlation of movement between the firing of the second shot and the movement of the rear of Ms Bhutto's *dopata* and hair upwards. She did not start to move downward into the vehicle until after the third shot was fired. Her movement appeared to be downward but with a head movement inclined slightly forward and to the right side.
58. Having fired the shots, the gunman lowered his right arm back to his side and looked downwards towards the ground. At that point the explosive device was detonated. The blast

was in the form of an orange flash accompanied by a sharp, loud bang and black acrid smoke.

59. There did not appear to be anyone between the gunman and the vehicle at the time of the detonation. Ms Bhutto was out of sight below the top of the lip of the escape hatch for less than one second prior to the detonation.
60. At the point of detonation, the Land Cruiser was moving forward more quickly but still turning away from the gunman. His final position at the time of detonation was at a point at the junction between the nearside and rear of the vehicle. He appeared to be positioned within two or three feet from the vehicle at all times.
61. Witness 'A' inside the Land Cruiser recalled Ms Bhutto 'flopping' down from the escape hatch at about the same time as the blast. He stated she was initially in a kneeling position on the seat and then fell sideways into witness 'B's' lap. She lay in a foetal position with her left hand resting on her left leg and her right arm outstretched towards the rear offside door.
62. Witness 'A' also recalled a huge impact on the nearside of the vehicle at the time of the blast. He recalled the vehicle rocking but was not aware of any surge in air pressure or vacuum following the blast. He did however feel something impacting on his left leg and left shoulder.
63. Witness 'C' recalled hearing three shots ringing out and shortly afterwards Ms Bhutto fell down into the vehicle quickly, rather than in a controlled movement. She ended up with the right side of her head resting on his witness 'B's' lap. He heard witness 'B' say, "please get up, what's happened?" Witness 'C' immediately felt that something "bad had happened". At that point he saw blood on his witness 'B's' lap.
4. Major Imtiaz stated that just before the shooting and explosion, he was becoming anxious at the convoy's lack of progress. He was particularly concerned at the size of the crowd gathering round the vehicle. He attempted to contact DIG Saud and SSP Yaseen by cell phone to highlight his concern, but without success. The Major recalled the traffic

'pilot' vehicle being ahead and stationary outside the Akbar Hotel on Liaquat Road.

65. Major Imtiaz could not recall precisely when Ms Bhutto stood up as he was concentrating on his own task. However, he suddenly heard three or four shots and recalled Ms Bhutto falling down after the second or third shot. He did not see exactly how she fell but stated the shots were immediately followed by a huge explosion, which rocked the vehicle. After the explosion he turned around and saw Ms Bhutto lying down with her head on witness 'B's' lap. He recalled witness 'B' crying out, "BB has been hurt".
66. Witness 'A' recalled there being a lot of dark smoke around the vehicle and it then being driven off. He also noticed that Ms Bhutto was not moving and saw that blood was trickling from her left ear. Witness 'B' was crying and at one point stated, "BB's bleeding". Witness 'C' also called out to Ms Bhutto, but without response.
67. Apart from Ms Bhutto, none of the other occupants of the vehicle received any serious injury during the blast. Witness 'C' received some minor scratches on his head from flying glass and witness 'A' bruised his left shoulder and left leg. The remainders were unscathed.
68. The driver managed to manoeuvre the vehicle away and made progress along Liaquat Road, where he picked up the Police traffic pilot and the 'Elite' commander's vehicle. The occupants of those vehicles were aware there had been an explosion but, according to the 'Elite' commander were unaware of Ms Bhutto's condition. Initially they were the only three vehicles in the convoy, but were later caught up by two other 'Elite' Toyota Hi Lux pickups. The remaining vehicles had been caught up in the blast and were immovable.
69. The 'Elite' commander stated that the convoy turned left into Murree Road and headed towards Islamabad. He recalled the road being clear due to the well worked original Rawalpindi Police plan to provide the convoy an unhindered passage to the ICT boundary.

70. As the convoy headed along Muree Road, it became clear to those inside the Toyota Land Cruiser that Ms Bhutto had suffered a serious injury. At the same time it was becoming increasingly difficult for the driver to manoeuvre the badly damaged vehicle, especially as all four tyres had been punctured and he was effectively driving on the alloy wheel rims.
71. It is not clear by whom but contact was made with the PPP PPP members, who, as stated, had left the rally in a Toyota Prado just before the convoy. The official agreed to meet the damaged Land Cruiser with the intention of transferring Ms Bhutto to the Prado and conveying her to the nearest hospital. By this time the convoy had passed Rawalpindi General Hospital, which is located on the east side of Murree Road (the other side from which the convoy was travelling). It would have been impossible to turn right into the Hospital grounds, as Murree Road at that stretch is separated by a large concrete central reservation.
72. The Land Cruiser continued along Murree Road and performed a U turn at Rehmanabad Chowk. It pulled up a short distance later at Sadiq Ahmed Bus Stop, where it was joined by the Toyota Prado. Ms Bhutto was carefully placed onto the rear seat of the Prado, and the vehicle made its way towards Rawalpindi General Hospital. Also in the Prado with the PPP official and driver were Major Imtiaz and three of the occupants of the Land Cruiser.
73. The journey to the hospital was extremely slow because the Prado was travelling in the heavy traffic that had built up as a result of various junctions having been blocked to allow the convoy a clear road on the opposite carriageway. This accounts for the relatively long journey time from the scene of the incident to the hospital.

Rawalpindi General Hospital

74. Rawalpindi General Hospital is located in Murree Road, approximately three kilometres from Liaquat Bagh. The hospital is comparatively modern and has a range of facilities including a well equipped Accident and Emergency Department. According to Dr Habib Ahmad Khan, the hospital's Medical Superintendent, special

contingencies were in place on 27th December due to two major political rallies taking place in Rawalpindi that day. Extra staff were on duty, despite the hospital not being under obligation to supplement resources.

75. Ms Bhutto arrived at the Accident and Emergency Department at 1735 hours. She was placed onto a stretcher in the car park and carried into the resuscitation room where she was initially treated by Dr Saeeda Yasmin. Staff in the resuscitation room were extremely busy treating victims of the shooting that had occurred at the PML-N rally earlier that day. It is also worth mentioning that five people were killed by gunfire during that event, but there is no suggestion, or indeed evidence linking the two incidents.
76. Dr Saeeda was not immediately aware of Ms Bhutto's identity but recalled one of her entourage shouting "It's Benazir – save her!" Dr Saeeda noted that Ms Bhutto was pale, unconscious and not breathing. Her pupils were fixed, dilated and did not react to light. There was also a wound to her right temporoparietal region from which blood was trickling. Dr Saeeda described the wound as a 'boggy' mass and noted that there was whitish material visible within it. The patient's clothing, especially on the right side, was soaked in blood.
77. Dr Saeeda immediately began cardiopulmonary resuscitation on Ms Bhutto. She also noticed that there was blood mixed with secretions present in the patient's throat. The material was suctioned out before Ms Bhutto was intubated with an endotracheal tube. She was also ventilated by way of an Ambu bag. External cardiac compressions were started and, with difficulty, a cannula was placed into the back of her right hand from which intravenous fluids were injected. Dr Saeeda also noticed that there was blood trickling from both the patient's ears and nose.
78. Dr Aurangzeb the, senior registrar, entered the resuscitation room at this time. He assisted Dr Saeeda and also examined the wound on the right side of Ms Bhutto's head. Four layers of light antiseptic gauze were placed over the wound. Neither doctor noticed any other injuries on the patient.

79. There was no improvement in Ms Bhutto's condition so it was decided by Aurangzeb to transfer her to the emergency operating theatre. The medical staff continued to perform emergency life support treatment whilst Ms Bhutto was being stretchered upstairs to the operating theatre. Once inside the room she was treated by Dr Aurangzeb and his team of anaesthetists and nurses.
80. Dr Aurangzeb had been made aware of the patient's identity and the fact that there had been an incident following the rally in Liaquat Bagh. He specifically recalled reports of an explosion and that shots had been fired. He also reported a commotion around Ms Bhutto whilst she was being transferred to the operating theatre. Dr Aurangzeb's team continued applying emergency treatment in the form of external cardiac massage. He also reported that there was no pulse present in either the patient's carotid or femoral arteries. Whilst attempting to resuscitate Ms Bhutto, Dr Aurangzeb noticed that there was still blood oozing from the wound on the right side of her temple.
81. At 1750 hours, Professor Mohammed Mussadiq Khan entered the Operating Theatre. He had been summoned to the hospital from his nearby clinic, located about two kilometres away.
82. When Prof Mussadiq entered the operating theatre, he saw Dr Aurangzeb carrying out external heart massage on the patient. After receiving a briefing on Ms Bhutto's condition, the professor took over the external heart massage from Dr Aurangzeb. He recalled carrying out the heart massage from the patient's left side. At the time Ashad, who had also joined the medical team, ventilating Ms Bhutto and continually checking her carotid pulse, alternating between the left and right sides. Dr Aurangzeb continued to check her femoral pulse but neither doctor felt anything from either artery.
83. At that point Prof Massadiq decided to carry out open, cardiac massage on Ms Bhutto. The professor made an incision in her chest and commenced open heart massage at 1757 hours. No blood was seen in the left thoracic cavity or the pericardium and neither was there any cardiac muscular activity seen.

84. Shortly after Prof Massadiq commenced the open heart massage, Dr Qudsiya Anjum Qureshi entered the operating theatre and took the responsibility for the ventilation procedure. She was followed into the room a few moments later by Professor Azam Yusuf. Both had been summoned to the hospital from nearby homes and workplaces respectively.
85. Dr Qudsiya continually checked for a pulse but to no avail. At one point she was asked to place an intravenous needle into the patient's neck but before doing so she removed two lockets from Ms Bhutto's neck. She did not see any injuries around the patient's neck at that stage. She also noticed that Ms Bhutto was wearing an earring in her right ear but nothing in her left ear. Dr Qudsiya also noticed blood oozing from both the patient's ears, but more so from the right ear. Blood was also trickling from Ms Bhutto's nostrils and the wound on the right side of her temple was bleeding profusely.
86. Prof Massadiq continued to perform open heart massage but without success. Ms Bhutto was administered intra cardiac ??? and calcium gluconate. The drugs administered intravenously. In between administering the intra cardiac adrenaline, Prof Massadiq carried out two defibrillations, whilst Dr Aurangzeb continued the open heart massage. There was no cardiac response to the treatment. Ms Bhutto's pupils remained fixed and dilated and there was no evidence of any cardiac or respiratory activity; nor did the ECG show any activity.
87. At 1816 hours Prof Massadiq consulted the medical team and it was decided, collectively, to stop resuscitation. At that point Ms Bhutto was declared dead. The thoractomy wound was closed by Profs Massadiq and Yusuf who, whilst doing so, noticed a fractured rib due to resuscitative thoractomy. With the patient having been proctored dead, Prof Massadiq ordered all males present in the to leave as a mark of respect.
88. Dr Qudsiya was given the responsibility of cleaning blood and body tissue from Ms Bhutto's head, neck and upper body. Dr Qudsiya was also given the responsibility of thoroughly checking Ms Bhutto's body for any further signs

of injury. Apart from the large wound to the side of her head and the thoractmy wound, nothing else was apparent. When she removed the endtracheal tube from the patient's mouth, she noticed secretions in Ms Bhutto throat.

89. At one point Dr Aurangzeb re-entered the room and assisted in levering Ms, Bhutto's body up to allow Dr Qudsiya to continue examining it. He describes placing his hands around the back of the patient's head in order to steady it. Again, apart from the large wound on the right side of her temple he too did not notice any other injury on Ms Bhutto.
90. All Ms Bhutto's clothing was removed and handed to her personal maid. The 'missing' earring was discovered amongst the clothing and was also handed to the maid along with the two necklaces that had been removed earlier by Dr Qudsiya. The *dopata* and garlands were not amongst the items handed to the maid and their whereabouts are unknown. Ms Bhutto was redressed in surgical clothing.
91. At no point during her treatment was Ms Bhutto's haircut, although Professor Khan pointed out that had she undergone brain surgery, part or all of her head would have been shaved.
92. With Ms. Bhutto's body having been cleaned and redressed Dr's Aurangzeb and Qudsiya placed further dressings to the wound on the right side of her temple whilst doing so, Dr Aurangzeb felt an irregular, jagged bone pattern around the wound. He also noticed a white grey matter seeping through the initial gauze dressing that had been applied by Dr. Saeeda.
93. At about 1900 hours;. Professors Mussadiq aand Yusuf discussed the ramifications of Ms Bhutto's continued presence at the hospital. They decided to carry out an X-ray on Ms Bhutto's head and also made arrangements for the security of her body pending its release to her family, or for an autopsy.
94. Given the chaotic and increasingly volatile atmosphere inside the hospital, there was no chance of transferring Ms Bhutto from the operating theatre to another part of the complex. In fact, so serious was the overcrowding inside

the A&E department, that blood and emergency equipment was to be carried up a makeshift bamboo ladder from the outside of the building to a small balcony adjacent to the emergency operating theatres.

95. As far as X-raying Ms Bhutto is concerned, she remained in the emergency operating theatre whilst radiographer Ghafoor Jadd took two X-rays of her skull using portable X-ray machine. Mr Gafoor developed the X-ray himself and his supervisor Munir Ahmed, wrote Ms Bhutto's name at the bottom left side of each print. Mr Ghafoor handed the images to Prof Mussadiq who sealed them in a brown envelope. The continuity and movement of the developed X-rays in the hospital appears to have been satisfactory. The findings of the X-rays are outlined in the medical notes as follows:

'Comminuted depressed skull fracture involving right temporoparietal bone is observed with a depressed fracture fragment measuring approximately 35mm (in X-ray measurement). Depressed fracture fragment distant from intact bony skull measures 12 mm from outer to outer skull table and 12 mm from inner to inner skull table. Two to three tiny radio densities underneath fracture segment are observed on both projections. Associated scalp soft tissue swelling & moderate degree of pneumocephalus is observed. Rest of bony skull is intact Radio-opaque dental fillings are evident.'

96. It is worthy of note that the reason a portable X-ray machine was used was because the radiography unit at the hospital does not operate on a 24 hour basis and was closed that evening. It would also have been impossible to transfer Ms Bhutto to the radiology department for the reasons outlined above.
97. Ms Bhutto's death certificate (number 202877) was completed and signed by Dr Aurangzeb. He recorded the cause of death as *'To be ascertained by autopsy.'* Her body remained in the emergency operating room until it was placed in a wooden coffin and removed from the hospital at about 2235 hours that evening. Ms Bhutto's body was signed for by her personal assistant and throughout that

time, a number of senior PPP members and close confidants remained with it.

98. The following day the seven physicians who had treated Ms Bhutto met in Medical Superintendent Dr Khan's office and compiled medical notes, which were signed by each individual. It was not possible for the doctors to have compiled their notes the previous evening as they were still attempting to save lives and treating the victims of the Liaquat Bagh bombing.

Scene Control and Initial Examination

99. Video footage, still photography and eyewitness accounts reveal a scene of utter chaos and confusion in the moments following the blast. Whilst this is quite understandable in the immediate aftermath and during the evacuation of the dead and injured, there was never any subsequent organized or structured scene control or forensic examination. The dead and injured were taken to two nearby hospitals – the Rawalpindi General Hospital and the nearby District Headquarters Hospital.
100. Twenty four people, including Ms Bhutto and the suspected bomber, were killed in the blast and ninety one injured. At the time of compiling this report a number of victims remain in various hospitals receiving treatment for serious injuries, including loss of limbs and internal damage.
101. Following the evacuation of the dead and injured, the blast affected Police and PPP vehicles were transported to the Rawalpindi Police Lines and kept undercover. An armed guard was posted to the vehicles.
102. According to senior Police Officers present, the scene was searched for approximately forty five minutes following the blast and only seventeen exhibits were recorded, including the following:
- The bomber's face. Recovered approximately one hundred and twenty feet east of the epicenter of the blast near the main pedestrian entrance to the park. (Exhibit BAGH/1)
 - One henna tattooed severed right hand. Recovered close to the face listed above. (Exhibit BAGH /2)

- One severed right hand. Recovered from near the second outer gate. (Exhibit BAGH/3)
- One henna tattooed severed left hand. Recovered from the front garden of Dr Asma Tanveer's house in Liaquat Road. (Exhibit BAGH/4)
- One pair of legs severed at mid-thigh, found lying near the epicenter of the blast. Both have identical brown size 42 'Servis' sandals, matching socks and fragments of blue material around the ankles. (Exhibit Legs No 2(A) and (B))
- One piece of skull. Recovered from the roof of a two-storey house adjacent to the PPP Office on the north side of Liaquat Road. (Exhibit RABH/703)
- One Steyr M9 9mm handgun, with what appears to be a pellet embedded in its magazine that contained five rounds of ammunition. Recovered from the road close to the point of detonation. (Exhibit RABH/201)
- One Mauser .30 Calibre handgun. Recovered outside the second outer gate. (Exhibit RABH/101)
- One damaged magazine containing six .30 calibre live cartridges. Recovered next to the .30 calibre handgun. (Exhibit RABH/500)
- One spent .30 Calibre cartridge case. Recovered near the second outer gate. (Exhibit RABH/401)
- One damaged bullet casing, without percussion cap. Recovered from same roof top upon which the piece of skull was recovered. (Exhibit RABH/301)
- One piece of circuitry. Recovered to the right of the second outer gates. (Since identified as originating from the Toyota Land Cruiser and formed no part of the explosive device). (Exhibit RABH/1)
- One damaged Sony Ericson mobile telephone. Recovered from the road surface close to the epicenter of the blast. (Since examined and identified as belonging to an innocent victim). (Exhibit RABH/704)
- Two steel pellets recovered near the epicenter of the blast. (Exhibit RABH/600)

- A number of identity and business cards. Recovered throughout the scene. (The cards appear to be from the wallet of an innocent victim). (Exhibit RABH/718)
 - The remains of a jacket recovered from the road surface near to the point of detonation. (The jacket belongs to an innocent victim of the incident. (Exhibit RABH/702)
103. It is important to point out that the above locations are those shown on the plan created by Police Officer, SHO Kashif at the time the exhibits, were recovered on 27th December 2007. The locations are not necessarily those at which the exhibits ended up following the explosion. Photographs taken in the immediate aftermath of the blast suggest that 30 calibre Mauser handgun, at least, had originally ended up near the epicenter.
104. As far as the exhibit numbers are concerned, those with the prefix 'RABH' are items that were transferred in the possession of the New Scotland Yard Officers for forensic examination in the UK. The remaining exhibit numbers refer to items that remained in the possession of the Pakistan authorities.
105. There was no forensic examination of the scene that evening. A senior Police Officer present recollected the growing hysteria and anger of the gathering crowd. Word had got through that Ms Bhutto had been injured, which had added to the antagonistic atmosphere. The officer had also received reports of people daubing themselves in the victims' blood, believing it to have been Ms Bhutto's. Whilst it is not absolutely clear, it is believed that senior Officer feared a total breakdown of law and order, which led directly to the request for the local fire service to hose down the scene. They immediately obliged and the scene was leaned within an hour of the bomb blast. The opportunity for a thorough forensic examination was lost.
106. A limited forensic examination of the scene was, however ever, carried over the following two days. This was obviously in an uncontrolled environment and little of any value was recovered.

Video and Other Media Footage

107. The PPP rally at Liaquat Bagh was covered by both national and international media. Video footage and photographs of the actual event, including Ms Bhutto's speech, are of excellent quality. However, when the rally concluded and Ms Bhutto began her journey to Islamabad, there were only a few film crews and photographers in Liaquat Road.
108. Most of the footage that captures the shooting and bomb blast is of poor quality but nevertheless appears conclusive. The gunman can be seen from a number of angles approaching the vehicle, aiming the gun with his right hand and firing three shots. It is not clear from any of the footage whether any shots struck Ms Bhutto.
109. The SO15 Counter Terrorism Command CCTV Unit was responsible for analyzing relevant visual media that has assisted in establishing the events leading to Ms Bhutto's assassination.
110. It was established that there was no CCTV coverage of the rally in Liaquat Bagh or of the exit route of Ms Bhutto's motorcade into Liaquat Road. The absence of CCTV in the vicinity of the attack diminished the ability to identify fully, through analysis of visual media, the *modus operandi* of those potentially responsible. The process would usually include a review of the suspect(s) arrival and preparation at the location, including any historical reconnaissance.
111. The subsequent review of visual media has been restricted to the available material recorded or obtained by news agencies covering the event and who were positioned to Liaquat Road when Ms Bhutto's vehicle emerged from the car park.
112. In total Unit were provided with twenty two pieces of media footage on DVD or CD disc format. Fourteen of those exhibits were recovered in Pakistan and the additional eight in the UK. Only one of these contains original unedited footage of the attack site prior to or during the incident and has been provided by Channel News in the UK. The other twenty one items contain various segments of edited footage from three main news agencies – Dawn

News (Pakistan), Sky News (UK) and Channel 4 News (UK).

113. The excerpts in general terms are of less than a minute in duration and show footage leading up to the gunshots discharged near the Toyota Land Cruiser, the subsequent detonation of the explosive device and the aftermath at the scene.
114. In order to provide the most detailed account of the incident, the Unit endeavoured to synchronise the three main segments of media footage. This was achieved by synchronizing the imagery based on shared visual movement in conjunction with one audio track.
115. The compilation of synchronized footage lasts for fifteen seconds and twenty two frames (there are thirty frames in a second). There is no date or time on the media, so a timer has been added on the NTSC format, which is consistent with the footage supplied to the SO15 CCTV Unit. The key timings of the Synchronized footage are as follows:
- 1st shot to 2nd shot: 13 frames (less than half a second);
 - 2nd shot to 3rd shot: 10 frames (one third of a second);
 - 3rd shot to detonation: 25 frames (just under second);
 - 1st shot to last shot: 23 frames (just less than a second);
 - 1st shot to detonation: 1 second plus 18 frame (just over one and a half seconds);
 - 3rd shot to Ms Bhutto's head disappearing out of view inside the vehicle: 3 frames (one tenth of a second) and
 - Ms Bhutto disappearing from sight of camera to detonation of the device: 22 frames (just over two thirds of a second).
116. A DVD compilation has been produced containing the original Channel 4 News material and the synchronized footage highlighted. The footage is captured at speed to allow detailed further analysis if required. The DVD is complemented by an album of still images. The sequence of footage is outlined earlier in this report in paragraphs 55 to 60.

Joint Punjab Police/FIA SIG Investigation

117. The incident was reported via First Instance Report (FIR) 471/07 and the initial investigation was headed by a Deputy Inspector General (DIG) of the Punjab Police. He was joined a day later by Additional Inspector General (Punjab) Abdul Majid who had been drafted in from Lahore. AIG Majid was appointed the Officer in over a charge of the investigation.
118. The investigation team was made up of Punjab Police CID Officers and personnel from the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) Special Investigation Group (SIG). The team based themselves at the Police Lines in Rawalpindi. The SIG are the agency within the Pakistan law enforcement system with the responsibility for conducting terrorist investigations.
119. One of the first duties of the investigation team was the grim task of assessing the dead and injured. A total of twenty four people were killed in the attack, including Ms Bhutto and the bomber.
120. The Pakistan investigation team managed to identify all but one of the dead – the bomber. All the bodies and body parts, apart from the right hand referred to above, were returned to the victim's next of kin. It must be noted that this process was carried out by visual identification of body and body part and not via any scientific process such as DNA identification and does not appear to have followed international Disaster Victim Identification (DVI) standard. Nevertheless, analysis of the data in the UK supports the calculation of twenty four dead.
121. SIG Officers attended the scene at Liaquat Bagh and carried out a further search of the area, including scouring elevated buildings and rooftops. Additionally, all the water was removed from drains in a two hundred foot radius of the explosion. Nothing was recovered from the drains but no sifting took place of the large quantity of sediment and sludge that was removed.
122. Major Shafkat Malik, the leading FIA SIG expert on both explosives and ballistics, and other senior SIG Officers delivered a presentation on the construction of suicide vests that had been recovered intact throughout Pakistan. The

devices were predominately made with slabs of high explosive with large numbers of steel pellets pressed in an even pattern into the surface of the explosive. Lengths of detonator cord were then used to link multiple slabs of explosives sewn into the vest. The favored method of initiating the device was by using a 'Striker Sleeve', which only requires the bomber to pull a small pin out of the sleeve, allowing a spring loaded pin within it to drop down onto a built, in detonator. Major Shafkat stated that the 'Striker Sleeves' tended to be of Russian manufacture.

Eyewitness Accounts and Summaries

123. A number of witnesses were interviewed both by Police and the media. Many claim to have witnessed the gunman approaching the vehicle and firing his weapon. At least one witness claims to have seen the gunman himself detonate the explosive device. However, understandable the accounts given are confused and do not provide absolute clarity.
124. Unlike standard UK police practice, no detailed written accounts have been taken from eyewitnesses by the local investigation team. Some accounts have been given directly to the media and consequently eyewitness accounts have not been relied on to any significant by SO15.

SO15 Forensic Examination

125. Upon arrival in Pakistan, the Scotland Yard team was provided unfettered access to the bomb scene at Liaquat Bagh, the blast affected vehicles, body parts stored at the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology in Rawalpindi and the District Headquarters Hospital, exhibits held at the FIA SIG-Headquarters in Islamabad, the Police Line in Rawalpindi and the ballistics laboratory in Lahore. A total of one hundred and fifty eight exhibits were gathered by the Scotland Yard team during the investigation.
126. To assist in examining and analyzing the dynamics of the bomb blast, three scientists from the UK Forensic Explosives Laboratory (FEL) joined the team and spent three days examining the bomb scene, the blast affected vehicles and X-ray of the suspected bomber's body parts.
127. Three technicians from the Metropolitan Police Computer Modeling Bureau (CMB) also joined the deployment and

spent two days conducting detailed photography at the scene Liaquat Bagh and the Police Lines in Rawalpindi. The purpose of the CMB's presence was to create a three dimensional virtual reality model of the incident.

128. In addition, Ms Bhutto's family have made a number of items available for inspection including her dental records, the clothing worn by her on 27th December 2007, documents and vehicles. The dental records and clothing were flown to the UK for forensic examination and analysis.
129. The Pakistan authorities also gave unprecedented authority for a number of significant exhibits to be handed over to the Scotland Yard team for further analysis in the UK. Exhibits included the two handguns, magazines and ammunition, DNA samples and the original X-ray images taken at Rawalpindi General Hospital on 27th December 2007. Without access to such exhibits, the SO15 ability to conduct thorough investigation would have been greatly diminished. The team are grateful for the Pakistan Police support in this regard.

Results of Forensic Analysis

DNA Results

130. DNA testing and analysis was carried out on a number of exhibits by the Forensic Science Service (FSS) in London. Profiles that had been obtained from the samples of outstanding body parts in Pakistan were also compared with profiles obtained from the two recovered firearms.
131. The FSS initially carried out DNA analysis on pieces of tissue and samples of blood from within the pieces of flesh taken from the suspected bomber's recovered body parts. The profiles from each body part matched and indicated a male donor and were labeled as 'unknown 2'. The matched profiles included:
 - The face mask (exhibit no BAGH/1);
 - The henna tattooed right hand (exhibit no BAGH/2);
 - Two pieces of skull (exhibit no RABH/7.3 & RABH/63)
 - The pair of legs (exhibit no legs 2(A) & (B)); and
 - One finger (part of exhibit BAGH/2)

132. The term 'unknown 2' originates from the order in which the profile was developed. There is no significance to the term and it is merely the order in which the profile was developed.
133. Despite extensive testing, the FSS were unable to obtain a DNA profile from the henna tattooed left hand (exhibit BAGH/4). One result gave an indication of a male donor but no further reportable discriminating information. More sensitive DNA analysis techniques could have been carried out on these samples, however if a result were obtained, it would not have been directly attributable to the tissue tested. It was therefore concluded that further DNA analysis of this sample would not assist in determining from whom these pieces of skin could be attributed. It is likely that the inability to obtain a profile is due to the degradation of the sample.
134. Nevertheless, notwithstanding the above, an identical DNA match was made by the Pakistan forensic scientists which is significant especially as the henna tattoo design on both hands appear to be identical. The only outstanding unidentified body part, therefore, is the right hand (exhibit BAGH/3) recovered from near the second outer gate at the vehicular entrance to Liaquat Bagh.
135. The other significant DNA profile was obtained from a piece of body tissue recovered from the inner rim of the aerodeck roof rack on the Toyota Land Cruiser. That profile was referred to as 'unknown 1'. This profile could have come from any of the victims and does not take the investigation any further.

136. DNA profiles were also obtained from the .30 bore Mauser handgun. The dominant profile present on that exhibit was discovered on the hammer and was that of 'unknown 2' - the suspected bomber. However, there were also lesser traces of 'unknown 1's' DNA on the weapon.
137. The DNA results obtained from the Steyr M9 9mm handgun (RABH/201) were unusable for meaningful comparisons with reference profiles. It was impossible to say from DNA analysis who had handled the weapon. Similar testing was carried out on both weapons' magazines and cartridges, with the same result.

Fingerprint Analysis

138. The two firearms, magazines, rounds of ammunition and mobile telephone were forwarded to the SO15 Counter Terrorism Command Fingerprint Team for a joint DNA and fingerprint examination.
139. A finger mark was chemically developed from the Steyr M9 9mm magazine together with a finger mark similarly lifted from a live round that had been contained in the undamaged magazine of the .30 bore Mauser handgun.
140. Both marks were checked against the fingerprints taken from the three severed hands (exhibits BAGH /2/3/ and 4) with a negative result. No other marks were obtained from any of the other exhibits.

Explosives Experts' Examination

141. As previously stated, three scientists from the UK Forensic Explosive Laboratory (FEL) spent three days in Pakistan examining the scene and blast affected vehicles. One of the scientists also examined the .30 bore Mauser handgun upon returning to the UK.
142. Upon examining the armour plated Toyota Land Cruiser it was noted that the nearside of the vehicle to a lesser extent, the rear of the vehicle bore a grey sooty residue and hundreds of small holes. Parts of the outer panelling of these areas were distorted, some fittings were missing and some outer panes of glass were missing, apparently broken. The panes of reinforced glass were cracked.
143. The damage to the vehicle had been caused by the explosive device, which had propelled hundreds of spherical balls at high speed. Some of the fragments had penetrated the outer skin and had impacted with the armour plating beneath, leaving indentations. None of the fragments had pierced the armour plating and no parts of the explosive device had entered the interior of the vehicle.
144. The pattern of holes created by the impact of the small fragments indicated that the device was initiated close to the rear nearside panel of the vehicle and slightly behind

it at a distance of between approximately one and two metres and a height of approximately one to one and a half metres. It is also highly unlikely that there was any object of significant weight or thickness, or indeed person, between the explosive device and the vehicle at the time of the initiation of the device.

145. The extent of the damage to the vehicle and nature of injuries to persons in close proximity were caused by the detonation of several kilograms of high explosive. The detonation of such a quantity of high explosive in such close proximity to the vehicle would have caused it to be subject to a violent motion. This would be likely to cause persons and loose objects within the vehicle to move suddenly and unpredictably.
146. As a result of this violent motion to the vehicle it is possible that if a person's head were in the vicinity of a hard metal object, the movement of the vehicle and persons within it in the moments directly following the blast could cause the head to impact with the object with quite some considerable force.
147. As far as the recovered body parts are concerned, the presence of parts of a head and traumatically amputated legs, as were apparent at the scene, have been noted at scenes of suicide bombings in recent years where the suspected suicide bomber is believed to have been wearing a suicide vest. This type of device allows an explosive

- charge (usually a high explosive) to be strapped around the chest of the bomber. The damage to the body parts viewed in the photographs is consistent with the use of such a high explosive device.
148. The FEL scientist was also of the opinion that the patterns of holes in the road at the scene were consistent with the suicide bomber wearing an explosive device strapped to their chest and back.
149. The scientist also noted in the photographs of the .30 bore Mauser handgun that there appeared to be body tissue distributed over it. At the time of physical examination, the firearm, upon returning to London the body tissue had been removed. The presence of the body tissue depicted in the photographs is consistent with the handgun having been in the proximity of an explosion where persons had sustained severe injuries.
150. The damaged .30 calibre magazine (exhibit RABH/500) and damaged .30 calibre cartridge case (exhibit RABH/301) both showed damage consistent with them having been in close proximity to an explosive event. For example it could have been in a pocket of clothing worn by the bomber, or it could have been in a pocket of someone very close (next to) the bomber. It was not possible for the scientist to be more specific.

151. Although it is not possible to be definite, the most likely scenario for the findings of the various explosives is that the device contained a military high explosive such as Composition B or similar, which is a mixture of RDX and TNT, together with a detonating cord, which commonly contains PETN. As noted above however, this is not a definite conclusion, and other scenarios are possible.

Firearms Examination.

152. The two firearms, magazines and ammunition were examined at the Forensic Science Service Firearms Department in London.
153. The .30 bore Mauser handgun (exhibit RABH/101) is a Chinese manufactured Tokarev TT54 marked with the export designation M20. There was no serial number immediately identified on the weapon and the marking on the left side of the slide appeared to be spurious. The weapon had a used appearance but was in working order, although attempts at pulling back on the slide without first cocking the hammer, proved difficult.
154. The 7.62x25 (Tokarev) cartridge case (exhibit RABH/101) that was recovered from the roof of the building adjacent to the PP7 Office in Liaquat Road was also examined. The cartridge was unfired. There was no bullet or primer in the case, which itself was crushed and deformed. The primer pocket in the base of the cartridge case was clean,

with no evidence that the missing primer had been fired. There was a circular impression mark on the side of the case. The round had suffered an event that had caused the bullet and primer to be ejected from the case without firing. Logically, this event was probably the blow the markings (38 and 87) on the base of the cartridge indicate that it may be of Soviet manufacture, possibly 1987 production.

155. The empty 7.62x25 cartridge case (exhibit RABH/401) that was recovered from near the second outer gate in Liaquat Road was examined and found to be the same type of ammunition as exhibit RABH/301. This was probably of Chinese (People's Republic) manufacture (marked 311 and 86). Firing marks on the cartridge were compared with test samples from the .30 Mauser and agreement was found between them. This showed that the cartridge case had been fired from the .30 bore Mauser.
156. The deformed cartridge magazine (exhibit RABH/300) that was recovered next to the .30 bore Mauser was of a type that would have been suitable for use with that particular firearm.
157. The cartridges from the magazine contained within the .30 bore Mauser are all the same and carry the headstamp '38' and '88'. This indicates the factory code and year of manufacture. Chinese production is indicated.

158. No examination was carried out on the Steyr M9 9mm handgun, as it is believed to have belonged to one of the PPP security guards and had not been fired.

Dental Records

159. In order to authenticate the X-ray images taken of Ms Bhutto's skull at Rawalpindi General Hospital on 27th December 2007, dental records were obtained from her dentist in Karachi. The dental records included a number of X-ray images taken of Ms Bhutto in 1992. Both the post and ante mortem X-ray images were forwarded to a forensic odontologist in London for comparison.

160. The odontologist concluded that in view of the demonstrable similarities between the dental treatment recorded ante mortem by her dentist in Karachi and the dental treatment extracted from the post mortem lateral skull radiograph, and in the absence of any incompatibilities, it was his opinion that the radiographic images are of the same individual, Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto.

Radiographers Report

161. The X-rays of Ms Bhutto's skull that were taken at Rawalpindi General Hospital on 27th December 2007, were examined by a radiographer at Addenbrook's Hospital, Cambridge.

162. The radiographer noticed that there was a depressed fracture in the right temporoparietal region of the skull with main fragment measuring forty millimetres in size with depression by approximately thirteen millimetres. There was no evidence of any bony injury affecting the left side of the skull.
163. The lateral view showed high density rounded areas, and their appearances are in keeping with artefacts (smudges) created at the time of processing the films. Some of the smaller ones (less than two millimetres) could possibly be shrapnel representing tiny shards of blast material but none of these represent ball bearings and there is no evidence of a bullet.
164. The cervical spine was only imaged on the lateral view from C1 to the mid portion of C5 and no fracture or dislocation was seen on this single projection. In the absence of a full radiograph series to evaluate a potential neck injury, the possibility of a cervical fracture lower down could not be discounted.
165. The radiographer concluded that the appearance of the fracture strongly suggested a blow to the right side of Ms Bhutto's head. There are no features to suggest a bullet entry or exit point. The extent of the skull fracture implies that Ms Bhutto must have hit the side of her head against a hard object with great force; it is unlikely she could have

caused this degree of injury by falling a short distance or crouching suddenly. It implies that her head must have been pushed by the blast.

166. The radiographer also viewed the X-rays of the suspected bomber's right hand (exhibit RABH/76). He concluded that the hand was of an individual with an unfused skeleton and had the appearance to suggest that it had come from a teenager. Using the WW Greulich and SI Pyle publication of "Radiographic Atlas of Skeletal Development of the Hand and Wrist" as a point of reference, the radiographer estimated the age of the individual at fifteen years and six months. This calculation is caveated by the standard deviation of 12.86 months.
167. An assessment was also made of the lower limbs (Legs No 2(A) and (B)) that are suspected of belonging to the bomber. They clearly come from an individual who is skeletally immature. Although not able to formally age the bones, the radiographer concluded that the degree of skeletal maturity was consistent with the legs belonging to the same individual in exhibit RABH/76.

Defence Science & Technology Laboratory (DSTL) Report

168. A senior scientist from DSTL was tasked by SO15 with providing a report into the potential injury mechanisms to Ms Bhutto and the injury mechanism evident in the

additional body parts recovered from the scene at Liaquat Bagh.

169. In order to assess injury mechanisms, the scientist was supplied with X-ray images both of Ms Bhutto's head and the suspected bomber's body parts. Copies of media footage and the report from the FEL were also made available.
170. It was concluded that the injuries to Ms Bhutto were more consistent with a high speed impact with a sharp edged protuberance, such as the impact with the edge of a thick rigid plate and are not consistent with the injuries from a bullet wound. The most likely explanation for the impact to Ms Bhutto's head is from the rapid acceleration of her head and neck complex, due to the blast, followed by a rapid deceleration from impact with a rigid object (probably part of the vehicle structure).
171. The scientist also concluded that the injuries to exhibit Legs No 2(A) & (B) were consistent with blast injuries, but are not consistent with traumatic amputation injuries caused by the detonation of an explosive to the side of the body with the associated shock and blast transmitted through the air and ground.
172. The injuries to the legs are more consistent with vertical loading downward from above associated with a blast and, therefore, it may be concluded that the legs belonged

to a person very close to the explosive, possible even the person wearing the suicide vest.

- 173 The scientist also concluded that any persons who were in the immediate vicinity of the bomber when the explosive device was detonated would not have survived the blast. This conclusion was drawn having viewed media footage of the scene filmed in the immediate aftermath of the blast, coupled with the evidence of blast dynamics provided by the FEL scientist.

Pathologist's Report

174. The pathologist appointed in this investigation was Dr Nathaniel Cary, an eminent Home Office Registered Consultant Forensic Pathologist, whose casework has included the notorious Soham murders in 2002, the 7th July 2005 terrorist attacks in London and the Litvinenko poisoning in 2006
175. In order to provide an opinion on the likely circumstances of Ms Bhutto's death, Dr Cary was provided with a number of exhibits and documents including
- Copies of the X-ray images of Ms Bhutto's skull taken at Rawalpindi General Hospital, together with a report by Dr Nasir Khan describing the nature of the head

- A PowerPoint presentation incorporating findings at the scene of the explosion, including views of the Toyota Land Cruiser in which Ms Bhutto was travelling;
- The forensic odontology report authenticated the skull X-ray images;
- A copy of the report prepared by the scientist from the FBI;
- Video recordings of the events leading up to the explosion; and
- A CD containing digital images of body parts and artefacts suspected to be from the 'suicide bomber'.

176. Dr Cary has come to a number of conclusions based on the information available to him. His findings are highly significant both in establishing the likely cause of Ms Bhutto's death and whether the gunman was also the bomber. Dr Cary's conclusions are included in this report in full.

177. I have carefully considered the possibility that the wound on the right side of the head could be a gunshot entrance wound. Quite apart from the fact that this wound is on the opposite side of the head to that which would be expected from a discharge from the weapon being brandished, in my opinion the external skin wound is much too large and the underlying skull fracturing does not show the typical internal beveling of an entrance wound. Rather, the lower edge of the skull wound where the depressed fragment has broken away is quite clean cut both externally and internally. In excluding the possibility of an entrance

wound I have taken account of the fact that the bullet from the 0.30 weapon in question would have been in stable flight due to the rifled nature of the barrel. The nature of the skull fracturing is also not in keeping with a 'key-holing' type effect, which may give rise to a larger skin entrance wound in these circumstances. In my opinion the possibility of the wound to the right side of the head being a gunshot entrance wound may be reasonably excluded. Of course if this were a gunshot entrance wound then there is neither evidence of a projectile remaining in the head nor is there any described or X-ray evidence of an exit wound.

178. I have also considered the possibility that the wound on the right side of the head being a gunshot exit wound. Although the location would be more appropriate for the exit of a bullet previously entering approximately from the line of fire from the weapon being brandished, both the nature of the skull fracturing (which would be expected to break outwards rather than inwards) and the absence of any described or X-ray evidence of a corresponding gunshot entrance wound on the left side of the head excludes this as a reasonable possibility.
179. In my opinion the nature and extent of the skull fracturing and of course the fact that the head injury was rapidly fatal are entirely inconsistent with some form of head impact simply as a result of ducking down or falling back into the vehicle in question in the very small window.

time available, in my opinion the only tenable cause for the rapidly fatal head injury in this case is that it occurred as the result of impact due to the effects of the bomb blast. There are two possible means by which this could have occurred. Firstly the head could have been moved suddenly and rapidly by the 'blast wind' passing across the escape hatch area. Secondly the car could have suddenly and rapidly moved towards the deceased's head. Either of these could have caused forceful impact again with some structure forming a hard edge within the hatch area of the vehicle. These two possible mechanisms are not necessarily mutually exclusive of one another and which of them mainly applied must be largely a matter of academic interest. The important point is that in my opinion there was a very forceful impact between the right side of the deceased's head and the escape hatch area as a direct consequence of the bomb blast.

180. The apparent blood deposits inside the vehicle are consistent with a rapid collapse with profuse bleeding from the right side of the head. The rapid deterioration to a state of cardiac arrest is consistent with a very severe head injury, with bleeding from the ears and the nose suggesting associated basal skull fracturing, which would not be unusual in an impact of this severity. There is also the possibility of an associated neck injury, which again would not be unusual in these circumstances. This possibility is not excluded on the basis of the limited X-ray examination of the neck that was carried out.

181. The possibility of a gunshot wound to the mid or lower trunk can be reasonably excluded on the basis of the shielding effect of the vehicle. I cannot absolutely exclude the possibility of a gunshot wound to the upper trunk or neck occurring during the incident. However there is no need to invoke this possibility to account for death given the nature and extent of the head injury present.
182. In my opinion Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto died as a result of a severe head injury sustained as consequence of the bomb blast and due to a head impact somewhere in the escape hatch of the vehicle. Although many victims of bomb blast die due to the effects of shrapnel, or if very close due to the disruptive effects of the blast itself on tissues, there are a whole variety of means by which death may be caused and this is simply an illustration of such an effect.
183. The medical reports and X-radiographs are received from Pakistan in good faith. It has however also been possible to independently confirm that the X-radiographs were indeed from Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto through the forensic odontological examination.
184. The opinions expressed above are based on the limited material available. In the ideal world a full forensic post mortem examination and further analysis of samples would be required to fully investigate this case. However

the reports and observations of the deceased in the A & E department, no doubt made in good faith, together with the observations of all those involved in investigating this case, do in my opinion allow a number of useful conclusions to be drawn and these are described above. It should be born in mind in considering the analysis above that the time frame in which the fatal injury occurred was very short and really only three possibilities need be considered in these circumstances, namely gunshot wounding or effects from an explosion or a combination.

185. I have also been asked to consider the possibility that the legs, hands and disrupted face illustrated in the material that I have been provided with might belong to a 'suicide bomber'. In my opinion the pattern of fragmentation, the charring pattern on the legs and the body disruption (assuming that the body parts can be associated with one another through DNA analysis) are consistent with them being from someone in very close proximity to the explosion and presumptively therefore from a 'suicide bomber'. The charred traumatic amputation of the right index finger of the Henna tattooed right hand raises the distinct possibility that the person who fired the 0.30 pistol might also have been the 'suicide bomber'. The pattern of amputation of the index finger in these circumstances could have arisen with the finger through the trigger guard of the gun. This possibility would appear to be reinforced by the damage to the gun magazine. It might be possible to carry out further work on this

weapon to attempt to determine how close to the gun is likely to have been to the bomb when detonation occurred

Post Mortem Issues

186. No post mortem examination was carried out on Ms Bhutto at Rawalpindi General Hospital, despite Dr Aurangzeb noting her cause of death as *To be ascertained by autopsy*. Establishing the cause of death was not a matter for Dr Aurangzeb and his colleagues; their primary concern was to save Ms Bhutto's life.
187. The legal requirements in Pakistan of when and by whom a post mortem examination is carried out are contained in section 174(3) Code of Criminal Procedure 1893 as amended by Act II 1997, which states:

'When there is any doubt regarding the cause of death, or when for any other reason the police officer considers it expedient so to do, he shall, subject to such rules as the Provincial Government may prescribe in this behalf, forward the body, with a view to its being examined, to the nearest Civil Surgeon, or other qualified medical man appointed in this behalf by the Provincial Government, if the state of the weather and the distance admit of its being so forwarded without risk of such putrefaction on the road as would render such examination useless'

188. The senior Police Officer on duty at Rawalpindi General Hospital that evening witnessed himself the chaotic and emotional scenes, as described, within the A & E department. It was also apparent that the distinct possibility of a serious disturbance and the potential breakdown of law and order in the city contributed to his decision to release Ms Bhutto's body without an autopsy having been conducted. The decision was therefore made to release the body to her personal assistant and, as stated, was despite the cause of death not having been established.
189. Ms Bhutto's body was conveyed to the family by Chaklala Air Force Base in Rawalpindi. Mr Zardari, together with his three children, arrived at Chaklala from Dubai approximately six hours after his wife's death. At the airport there was apparently a discussion between Mr Zardari and a senior Police Officer about the prospect of him consenting to a post mortem being carried out.
190. Mr Zardari declined the request, stating that an autopsy should have been conducted in the preceding six hours. He was also mindful of the effect a post mortem examination would have on his children. Mr Zardari also explained that the family were in a state of shock and grieving heavily, and as a result, wished to bury Ms Bhutto within the customary twenty four hour period.

The following day Ms Bhutto's body was prepared for a traditional burial in the family mausoleum in Naudero.

Sindh province. The duty of washing and clothing her fell to a maid and a female relative, who also happens to be a medical practitioner.

192. The relative stated that she and the maid washed Ms Bhutto thoroughly but due to the head wound did not wash her hair, which would have been customary in normal circumstances. She further stated that apart from the severe wound to the right side of Ms Bhutto's head and the incision made by Prof Massadiq on the left side of her chest, there was no other sign of injury. This corroborates the accounts given by Doctors Qudsiya and Aurangzeb.

Conclusion

193. In accordance with the terms of reference, the enquiry team sought to explain the sequence of events from the end of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto's speech through to the pronouncement of her death at Rawalpindi General Hospital. In order to achieve this within a practical timeframe considerable emphasis has been placed on scientific analysis and examination. Whilst other lines of enquiry such as eyewitness testimony have been considered, they have not necessarily been covered to the usual level of detail nor pursued to absolute finality. However I am satisfied that this does not materially affect the ability to reach conclusions within the stated terms of reference.

194. Two principal issues arise. The actual cause of death and whether the attack was carried out by one or two individuals. Turning to the first point of cause of death.
195. In considering this issue there are a number of critical factors. The absence of an autopsy has required considerable emphasis to be placed upon the X-rays taken at Rawalpindi General Hospital following Ms Bhutto's death. Additionally the accounts given by the medical staff involved in her treatment and that of family members who washed the body before burial provide valuable insight.
196. Independent expert comparison of the hospital X-rays with detailed dental X-rays have verified the X-rays taken were indeed of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto. The original X-rays have also been examined by a leading radiologist and opinion sought from a leading explosives expert and the eminent Home Office pathologist Dr Nathaniel Cary.
197. There is agreement between all experts that the only apparent injury on the information provided is the major trauma to the right side of the head. They have individually and collectively excluded this injury from being a gunshot entry or exit wound. Given the position of Ms Bhutto immediately prior to the shots being fired and the protection provided by the vehicle, the likelihood of a bullet wound to the head or lower trunk can also be reasonably excluded.

198. Equally there is agreement between the experts that no injury could not have been caused by Ms Bhutto hitting her head during the course of ducking down into the vehicle. Such an explanation can also be excluded as a reasonable possibility.
199. Given the limited range of the X-ray, the absence of a full post mortem examination and the lack of a CT scan, Dr Cary is quite properly not able to categorically exclude a gunshot wound to the upper trunk or neck. However when taking into account the description given by those who did have close contact with the body, which strongly suggests no such injury was present, there is little evidence to support the possibility of a gunshot wound to the upper trunk or lower neck. Dr Cary does exclude the possibility of a bullet to the neck or upper trunk as a relevant factor in the cause of death given the nature and extent of injury to her head.
200. Examination of the X-rays provided shows a depressed skull fracture to the right temporoparietal region. The main fragment measures 40 millimetres in size with a depression of 13 millimetres. The radiologist also reports seeing no evidence of either a bullet or a ball-bearing being present.
201. The overall view of medical opinion is clearly articulated by Dr Cary who states, "the only tenable cause for the

rapidly fatal head injury in this case is that it occurred as the result of impact due to the effects of the bomb-blast." He goes on to say, "in my opinion ~~Montarma~~ Benazir Bhutto died as a result of a severe head injury sustained as a consequence of the bomb-blast and due to head impact somewhere in the escape hatch of the vehicle."

202. In reaching the above conclusion Dr Cary was assisted by DSTL explosives experts. In essence the injury can be explained by either the blast pushing her head into the structure of the vehicle, the structure of the vehicle being pushed into the side of her head or indeed a combination of both. Whilst absolute clarity cannot be established, by far the most likely explanation is that the force of the blast pushed her head into contact with the escape hatch area of the vehicle.

203. It should be noted that high explosives of the type used in this device typically detonate at a velocity between 6000 and 9000 metres per second, such an explosion would cause significantly more than sufficient force to have such an impact when considering the quantities and distances relevant in this case.

204. It is also important to comment on the construction of the vehicle. It was imported to Pakistan under licence from a specialist armoured conversion company. It was fitted with B6 armour and designed to withstand gunfire and bomb-blast. In addition to a standard escape hatch to the

rear, this vehicle was fitted with a second optional escape hatch to the roof. It is an unfortunate and misleading feature of this case, that this escape hatch had been referred to as a sunroof. It is designed and intended solely as a means of escape. Another significant point is that it has a depth of 9 cms; this is in the form of a lip constructed of armoured plate and covered in upholstery.

205. The injury described is entirely consistent with Ms Bhutto's head impacting upon this lip. Detailed analysis of the media footage provides supporting evidence. Her head did not completely disappear from view until two thirds of a second before the blast. The footage also shows her moving forward and to the right as she ducks down from the vehicle. Whilst her exact head position at the time of the blast can never be ascertained, the overwhelming conclusion must be that she did not manage to get her head entirely below the lip of the escape hatch by the time of the blast resulting in the injury described and her tragic death.

206. In the light of the terms of reference and having considered all of the above together with the significant sensitivities, I have concluded that to request an exhumation and autopsy would be disproportionate. I am satisfied that whilst clearly desirable, such an examination would not materially alter the above findings, therefore no such request will be made by the New Scotland Yard team.

207. Moving to the second issue, there has been some speculation that two individuals were involved in the attack, in that one suspect fired the shot and the second suspect detonated the device. The following paragraphs seek to address this point but it is important to note this relates to the immediacy of the attack and does not and cannot provide any detail of how many suspects were involved in the commission, preparation or instigation of the attack either on the day itself or the preceding period.

208. Whilst the lack of a recognised disaster victim identification process is an issue, all the evidence indicates only one body remains unidentified. This body consists of the face, legs and henna tattooed hands, discussed in detail earlier in this report. DNA analysis has linked these parts as being from the same individual and expert opinion provides strong evidence that they originate from the suicide bomber. Additionally, there is evidence to suggest the severing of the finger of the right hand may be consistent with it having been in a trigger guard at the time of the explosion.

209. Analysis of the media footage shows the movement of the suspect with the handgun and of particular importance, the vehicle. It places the suspect at the rear of the vehicle and looking down immediately before the explosion, the footage does not show the presence of any other potential bomber. This should also be considered in conjunction with the findings of the forensic explosive expert, this


indicates the bombing suspect was within 1 to 2 metres of the vehicle with no person or other obstruction between him and it. It is almost inconceivable that anyone in the position of the suspect with the gun could have survived the blast to such an extent to allow escape.

210. In conclusion, all the evidence indicates that one suspect fired the shots before detonating an improvised explosive device when stood at or near the rear of the vehicle.

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- Forensic Pathology Services – Abingdon, UK.

211. I am also grateful for the assistance of the Pakistan authorities, the family and close associates of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto and Police Officers of SO15 Counter Terrorism command, New Scotland Yard.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'John MacBrayne', is written over a horizontal line. The signature is stylized and includes a large loop at the beginning.

John MacBrayne OPM

Detective Superintendent

SO15 Counter Terrorism Command

New Scotland Yard

UNO REPORT

REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE ASSASSINATION OF FORMER PAKISTANI PRIME MINISTER MOHTARMA BENAZIR BHUTTO

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On 27 December 2007, former Pakistani Prime Minister Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto was assassinated as she left a campaign event at Liaquat Bagh, in the Pakistani city of Rawalpindi. In the attack on Ms Bhutto, 24 other people were killed and 91 injured.

After a request from the Government of Pakistan and extensive consultations with Pakistani officials as well as with members of the United Nations Security Council, the Secretary-General appointed a three member Commission of Inquiry to determine the facts and circumstances of the assassination of the former prime minister. The duty of carrying out a criminal investigation, finding the perpetrators and bringing them to justice, remains with the competent Pakistani authorities.

The Secretary-General appointed Ambassador Heraldo Muñoz, the Permanent Representative of Chile to the United Nations as head of the Commission as well as Mr Marzuki Darusman, a former Attorney-General of Indonesia, and Mr Peter FitzGerald, a former Deputy Commissioner of the Irish Police, the Garda Síochána. The Commission commenced its activities on 1 July 2009 and provided its report to the Secretary-General on 30 March 2010.

In the course of its inquiry, the Commission received significant support from the Government of Pakistan and many of its citizens. The Commissioners and staff traveled frequently to Pakistan in the furtherance of its mandate. The Commission conducted more than 250 interviews, meeting with Pakistani officials and private citizens, foreign citizens with knowledge of the events in Pakistan and members of the United Kingdom Metropolitan Police (Scotland Yard) team that investigated aspects of the assassination. The Commission also reviewed hundreds of documents, videos, photographs and other documentary material provided by Pakistan's federal and provincial authorities and others.

The Commission also met with representatives of other governments such as Afghanistan, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the United States. Some relevant senior officials were not made available to the Commission, but the Commission is satisfied that this did not hinder its ability to establish the facts and circumstances of the assassination. Pertinent information from these sources, including on threats to Ms Bhutto, nevertheless, was already in the possession of Pakistani authorities and eventually came to be known by the Commission.

The Commission was mystified by the efforts of certain high-ranking Pakistani government authorities to obstruct access to military and intelligence sources, as revealed in their public declarations. The extension of the mandate until 31 March enabled the Commission to pursue further this matter and eventually meet with some past and present members of the Pakistani military and intelligence services.

The report addresses the political and security context of Ms Bhutto's return to Pakistan; the security arrangements made for her by the Pakistani authorities, who bore

the primary responsibility to protect her, as well as her political party, the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP); events immediately before and after the assassination; and the criminal investigations and actions of the Pakistani Government and police in the aftermath of the crime.

Ms Bhutto's return to Pakistan on 18 October 2007 and assassination on 27 December 2007 culminated a year of intense political conflict, revolving largely around the elections scheduled for later that year and their potential for opening a transition to democracy after eight years of military rule. It was also one of the most violent years in Pakistani history. She returned in the context of a tenuous and inconclusive political agreement with General Pervez Musharraf, as part of a process facilitated by the United Kingdom and the United States.

Ms Bhutto's assassination could have been prevented if adequate security measures had been taken. The responsibility for Ms Bhutto's security on the day of her assassination rested with the federal Government, the government of Punjab and the Rawalpindi District Police. None of these entities took the necessary measures to respond to the extraordinary, fresh and urgent security risks that they knew she faced.

The federal Government under General Musharraf, although fully aware of and tracking the serious threats to Ms. Bhutto, did little more than pass on those threats to her and to provincial authorities and were not proactive in neutralizing them or ensuring that the security provided was commensurate to the threats. This is especially grave given the attempt on her life in Karachi when she returned to Pakistan on 18 October 2007.

The PPP provided additional security for Ms. Bhutto. The Commission recognizes the heroism of individual PPP supporters, many of whom sacrificed themselves to protect her; however, the additional security arrangements of the PPP lacked leadership and were inadequate and poorly executed.

The Rawalpindi district police's actions and omissions in the immediate aftermath of the assassination of Ms Bhutto, including the hosing down of the crime scene and failure to collect and preserve evidence, inflicted irreparable damage to the investigation. The investigation into Ms Bhutto's assassination, and those who died with her, lacked direction, was ineffective and suffered from a lack of commitment to identify and bring all of the perpetrators to justice. While she died when a 15 and a half year-old suicide bomber detonated his explosives near her vehicle, no one believes that this boy acted alone.

Ms. Bhutto faced threats from a number of sources; these included Al -Qaida, the Taliban, local jihadi groups and potentially from elements in the Pakistani Establishment. Yet the Commission found that the investigation focused on pursuing lower level operatives and placed little to no focus on investigating those further up the hierarchy in the planning, financing and execution of the assassination.

The investigation was severely hampered by intelligence agencies and other government officials, which impeded an unfettered search for the truth. More significantly, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) conducted parallel investigations, gathering evidence and detaining suspects. Evidence gathered from such parallel investigations was selectively shared with the police.

The Commission believes that the failure of the police to investigate effectively Ms Bhutto's assassination was deliberate. These officials, in part fearing intelligence agencies' involvement, were unsure of how vigorously they ought to pursue actions, which they knew, as professionals, they should have taken.

It remains the responsibility of the Pakistani authorities to carry out a serious, credible criminal investigation that determines who conceived, ordered and executed this heinous crime of historic proportions, and brings those responsible to justice. Doing so would constitute a major step toward ending impunity for political crimes in this country.

I. INTRODUCTION

1. On 27 December 2007, former Pakistani Prime Minister Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto was assassinated as she left a campaign event at Liaquat Bagh, in the Pakistani city of Rawalpindi. In the attack on Ms Bhutto, 24 other people were killed and 91 injured.

2. In May 2008, the Government of Pakistan requested the Secretary -General of the United Nations to establish an international commission for the purpose of investigating the assassination of Ms Bhutto. After extensive consultations with Pakistani officials as well as with members of the United Nations Security Council, the Secretary-General decided to appoint a three member Commission of Inquiry to determine the facts and circumstances of the assassination of the former prime minister. It was agreed with the Government of Pakistan that the international commission should be fact-finding in nature and not be a criminal investigation. The duty of carrying out a criminal investigation, finding the perpetrators and bringing them to justice, remains with the competent Pakistani authorities. On the basis of this agreement, the Secretary-General wrote to the President of the Security Council, on 2 February 2009, informing of his wish to accede to the request and establish a three member Commission of Inquiry. The President of the Security Council responded on 3 February 2009 and took note with appreciation of the intention stated in the Secretary-General's letter. That exchange of letters, including the agreed terms of reference of the Commission, is attached as Annex.

3. The Secretary-General appointed in February 2009 Ambassador Heraldo Muñoz, the Permanent Representative of Chile to the United Nations as head of the Commission. Two additional Commissioners were later appointed: Mr Marzuki Darusman, a former Attorney -General of Indonesia, and Mr Peter FitzGerald, a former Deputy Commissioner of the Irish Police, the Garda Síochána. The Commissioners were supported by a small staff that included professionals with expertise in criminal investigation, law and political affairs.

4. The Commission was mandated to submit its report to the Secretary -General within six months from the start of its activities. The Secretary -General was to share the report with the Government of Pakistan and submit it to the Security Council for information. The Commission was to commence its activities on a date to be determined by the Secretary-General and officially communicated to the Government of Pakistan. The Secretary-General announced the commencement of activities of the Commission of Inquiry on 1 July 2009, after a period during which the Secretariat raised voluntary funds to support the work of the Commission and built its staffing and administrative structure. In December 2009, the Secretary-General announced an extension of three months of the Commission's mandate to 31 March.

5. The Commissioners travelled to Pakistan in July and September 2009 and in February 2010 in furtherance of the inquiry. They met with and interviewed a wide range of Pakistanis, both officials and private citizens. They also conducted interviews at locations outside Pakistan and met with representatives of other governments. Commission staff travelled frequently to Pakistan during the mandate period. Commissioners and staff conducted more than 250 interviews with Pakistanis and others both inside and outside Pakistan. Many of the persons interviewed by the Commission requested anonymity.

Therefore, the report does not include a list of those interviewed. The Commission also reviewed hundreds of documents, videos, photographs and other documentary material provided by federal and provincial authorities in Pakistan and others.

6. In the course of its inquiry, the Commission received significant support from the Government of Pakistan and many of its citizens. The Commission wishes to express its gratitude for this cooperation. At the United Nations, Pakistan's Permanent Representative, Ambassador Abdullah Haroon, provided valuable support as well. The Commission was mystified, however, by the efforts of certain high-ranking government officials to obstruct access to Pakistani military and intelligence sources, as revealed in their public declarations. The extension of the mandate until 31 March enabled the Commission, among other things, to pursue further this matter and eventually meet with some past and present members of the military and intelligence agencies. The Commission also made contact with representatives of several foreign governments and, in some cases, with their intelligence services. Pertinent information from these sources, including on threats to Ms Bhutto, nevertheless was already in the possession of Pakistani authorities and eventually came to be known by the Commission.

7. This report sets out the Commission's findings on the facts and circumstance of Ms Bhutto's assassination.

II. FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES

A. POLITICAL CONTEXT

8. Ms Bhutto's assassination occurred against the backdrop of a political power struggle in Pakistan over the continuation of military rule under General Pervez Musharraf, the President of Pakistan, or the restoration of democratically-elected civilian government. Ms Bhutto's return to Pakistan was a flashpoint in this struggle, the outcome of which would have significant consequences for the country's major political actors. In addition, as will be described below, 2007 was an exceptionally violent year in Pakistan, which saw sharp increases in violence carried out by Islamist extremists and by the state.

POLITICAL ASSASSINATION AND IMPUNITY IN PAKISTAN

9. Ms Bhutto's assassination was not the first time in Pakistan's brief national history that a major political figure had been killed or died in an untimely fashion. The country's first prime minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, was assassinated in 1951 in the same park where Ms Bhutto was assassinated; the assassin was killed by police on the spot, but broader responsibilities, including who might have been behind the killing have never been established. Ms Bhutto's father, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, president of Pakistan from 1971-73 and prime minister from 1973-77, was deposed in a military coup in 1977, charged with the murder of a political opponent's father and hanged in 1979. Many believe that the judicial process against Mr Bhutto was deeply flawed and politically-motivated. Later, General Zia ul Haq, the military leader who deposed Mr Bhutto and ruled Pakistan for 11 years, died in a plane crash together with the United States ambassador to Pakistan in 1988; investigations by the United States and Pakistan into the crash came to conflicting conclusions, and it remains the object of much speculation. Other killings of political figures that have never been solved include the deaths of Ms Bhutto's two brothers, Shahnawaz, who was killed in France in 1985 and Murtaza, killed in Pakistan in 1997. The list continues to grow, more recently with the killings, among others, of Nawab Akbar Bugti, a 79-year old Balochi nationalist leader in a military operation in August 2006 and three other Balochi nationalist leaders in April 2009, including Ghulam Mohammed Baloch.

10. There has been little concerted effort by law enforcement and justice sector institutions to bring to justice those who planned, supported, financed or carried out these and similar crimes. This situation has contributed to a widespread expectation of impunity in cases of political killings. People do not expect the perpetrators – beyond those at the lowest levels – to be identified and brought to justice.

POLITICAL AND SECURITY CONTEXT

11. Ms Bhutto's return and assassination culminated a year of intense internal political conflict in Pakistan. This revolved, in large measure, around the elections scheduled for late 2007, with their potential both for opening a transition to democracy after eight years of military rule and for engendering significant changes in the political forces that would head the new government. It was also one of the most violent years in Pakistani history, with dramatic increases both in extremist attacks carried out by radical Islamists against local targets, including suicide bombings, and in the use of force by the authorities against opposition movements. Finally, the year unfolded in a context of heightened international concerns about the strength of the Taliban and Al -Qaida in the region and increased pressures on Pakistan to take on a heavier role in the fight against them.

12. Pakistan had been under military rule since 1999, when General Musharraf, Chief of Army Staff, led a military coup that deposed an elected government. His regime first suspended the constitution and then modified it to provide a legal framework for the government and to strengthen presidential powers. Within that framework, power was concentrated in the person of General Musharraf, who, after elections in 2002, was both Chief of Army Staff and President of Pakistan. With this dual authority, General Musharraf drew on the power of the military, while at the same time building an alliance of political parties in the national and provincial assemblies, which ensured additional control over other important power centres. This alliance included the Pakistani Muslim League-Quaid-e-Azam (PML-Q), which controlled the provincial government in Punjab, the country's largest and wealthiest province, and in Sindh; the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) with its historic base in Karachi; and, during most of the period, the Mutahiddah Majlis-i -Amal (MMA), which comprised the bulk of the Islamist parties. General Musharraf's decision to consent to the United States request for Pakistani collaboration in the war on terror after 11 September 2001 also meant that he enjoyed the firm backing of the United States and its western allies.

13. General Musharraf also had the full support of what is known in Pakistan as the "Establishment", the de facto power structure that has as its permanent core the military high command and intelligence agencies, in particular, the powerful, military-run the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) as well as Military Intelligence (MI) and the Intelligence Bureau (IB). The capability of the Establishment to exercise power in Pakistan is based in large part on the central role played by the Pakistani military and intelligence agencies in the country's political life, with the military ruling the country directly for 32 of its 62 years as an independent state. General Musharraf finally stepped down as Chief of Army Staff (COAS) on 28 November 2007, handing the post over to his hand-picked successor, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani. This did not, however, change the military nature of the regime.

14. The post of prime minister has been suspended five times in Pakistan due to martial law or another form of military intervention, and no elected civilian prime minister has ever served a full five-year term in Pakistan. Most were deposed or dismissed through some form of direct or indirect military intervention. Before the election of 2007, Ms Bhutto, as the head of the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) had twice served as prime minister, from December 1988 to August 1990 and from October 1993 to November 1996.

Her first government ended after just 20 months, and her second lasted less than three years. Both times, she was dismissed by the sitting president, Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Farooq Leghari, respectively, based on allegations of corruption and nepotism. While both men were civilians, each had close ties to the military. Ms Bhutto and the PPP believed that it was the military, or more broadly, the Establishment, that forced her out.

15. By 2007, when new parliamentary elections and the Electoral College vote for the presidency were scheduled, there were increasing pressures for an end to direct military rule, both internally and internationally, including from the United Kingdom and the United States. Pakistan's two main opposition political parties, Ms Bhutto's PPP and the Pakistani Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), had put aside their long-term rivalry and worked together since early 2005 to define a common framework for a return to democratic rule. This agreement, the "Charter for Democracy", was signed in May 2006 by Ms Bhutto and Mr Nawaz Sharif, the respective leaders of the PPP and the PML-N.

16. Tensions deepened in the country after 9 March 2007, when General Musharraf suspended Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry. The Government brought an action for his removal based on allegations of his interference in matters before the lower courts and the abuse of power to gain favours for his son and to access state resources beyond those due his office. Nonetheless, numerous observers have identified two key issues at stake, both central to the political context. The first involved Supreme Court actions to summon and question senior military and intelligence officials in dozens of cases of people who had disappeared in recent months, brought by relatives who feared they had been illegally detained by state security forces. The Government maintained that the Court was undermining its efforts to combat terrorist groups. The second issue pertained to the composition of the Court and its increasingly independent decisions, which took on great relevance, given its authority to determine the legality of the upcoming presidential election, which was certain to face constitutional challenges.

17. Public response against General Musharraf's action was strong, especially from legal professionals, who cited the actions as a clear infringement on judicial independence. Organized by the country's Supreme Court Bar Association and local bar associations, they held scores of public debates, rallies and street demonstrations calling for the reinstatement of the Chief Justice. This opposition soon became the "lawyers' movement", growing over the year into one of the largest mass movements in Pakistan's history, as it galvanized a broad range of sentiments opposed to continued military rule. The movement became a key factor in the political dynamics that year, and its activities formed a backdrop for the intensifying struggle for political power.

18. Chief Justice Chaudhry was reinstated on 20 July 2007, by a 13-member panel of the Supreme Court. The dispute had not only sparked mass public protests, it also led to an unusually well-documented disclosure of participation by Pakistan's intelligence agencies in political and judicial matters. Chief Justice Chaudhry's affidavit to the Supreme Court in reference to the charges against him described how he was called to Army House by General Musharraf and told that he was being suspended. General Musharraf was accompanied at the meeting by Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz, five other active duty generals and one brigadier, including the Directors General of MI, the ISI and the IB and the President's military Chief of Staff. Affidavits by the Directors General of MI and the IB as well as the president's Chief of Staff were presented as part of the Government's case against the Chief Justice.

19. The year also saw a dramatic increase in political violence both by the state and by radical Islamists. Thousands of participants in the demonstrations called by the lawyers' movement were beaten and jailed; its leaders were put in solitary confinement, and many

charged with terrorism or sedition. Police raided at least two major television stations, some 250 journalists were arrested in the course of the year and severe restrictions were placed on the media. At the same time, reports by credible human rights organizations documented the disappearance of hundreds of Balochi nationalists and the extrajudicial killings of some, whom the government claimed were members of Islamist terrorist groups. Staged “encounters” in which detained terrorism suspects were killed by security forces, were on the rise, as well; according to the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, 234 people were killed in police encounters in Punjab province alone.

20. There was a steep increase in extremist violence by radical Islamists, especially after the government’s attack in July on pro-Taliban militants and their supporters at the Red Mosque, in the heart of Islamabad, which led to a week-long battle. The Special Investigations Group of the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA), which supports investigations in these cases, informed the Commission that 44 suicide bombings took place in 2007, killing some 614, a dramatic rise from eight such incidents in 2006. Of these bombings, 35 occurred after the Red Mosque siege. Credible non-governmental sources put the total number of suicide bombings at closer to 70, with more than 900 dead. The territorial reach of these actions was significant, with suicide bombings occurring in the North West Frontier Province, Punjab and Sindh and most major cities, including the capital, Islamabad, and Rawalpindi, where Army Headquarters is located. Suicide bombings and other attacks were often directed against police and military personnel. Other attacks were carried out in public places, causing many civilian casualties.

21. The government’s long-running campaigns against radical Islamist militants punctuated by intermittent truce attempts, particularly in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the Swat region of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), faced serious difficulties in 2007. In July, shortly after the Red Mosque siege, militants declared an end to a ten month truce in Waziristan and launched a series of bombing attacks that took 70 lives in just two days. The military suffered important losses in the region, with at least 250 soldiers taken as hostages in August by the Taliban, led by Baitullah Mehsud. After negotiations between the government and Mr Mehsud, the hostages were exchanged in November for about 57 captured militants. Earlier, in Swat, the NWFP provincial government, closely allied to General Musharraf, had struck a truce in May 2007 with the Tehrik-e-Nifaz -e-Shariah Muhammadi, which eventually joined up with Baitullah Mehsud’s Tehrik-i -Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The truce was seen by many analysts as giving the militants de facto control of Swat, but it soon broke down and fighting resumed there in September.

THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR MS BHUTTO’S RETURN

22. Ms Bhutto left Pakistan to live in Dubai in 1998, two years after she was deposed as prime minister in November 1996. She continued to lead the PPP during her nine years of self-imposed exile and was deeply involved in party affairs from afar. During this period, she fought against the corruption charges levelled against her in Pakistan, Spain and Switzerland, and struggled to have her husband, Asif Ali Zardari, released from Pakistani prison, where he faced charges both for corruption and his alleged involvement in the murder of Murtaza Bhutto. In her final book, *Reconciliation*, she wrote of the difficulties of being a persona non grata for years in international political circles because of the charges. Her determination to return to full political life in Pakistan led her to engage in a dialogue toward this end with General Musharraf, despite her sharp criticism of his military government.

23. Serious efforts at rapprochement between Ms Bhutto and General Musharraf had begun in 2004. Some of General Musharraf’s closest advisors told the Commission that

they encouraged him to open channels with Ms Bhutto believing that it would be better if General Musharraf had a broader base of political support for his next presidential term and that there were sufficient common interests between the two to make such an alliance feasible. A discrete process was set in motion, with at least five meetings in 2005 and 2006 between Ms Bhutto and General Musharraf's team, which included Tarik Aziz, former Secretary of the National Security Council, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, then Director General of ISI and, in later meetings, Lt. General Hamid Javed, General Musharraf's Chief of Staff. While these meetings were important for identifying areas of common interest, they did not produce any concrete agreements. To break the stalemate, a direct meeting between Ms Bhutto and General Musharraf was arranged, and the two met secretly on 24 January 2007 in Abu Dhabi. They met again on 27 July in Abu Dhabi. She and a few close advisers, which included Mr Rehman Malik and Makhdoom Amin Fahim, had ongoing contacts with General Musharraf's team.

24. The discussions were facilitated by the governments of the United Kingdom and the United States, which were deeply involved in the process. Both governments gave priority to ensuring a continued leadership role for General Musharraf, as they believed this was vital for the ongoing war against terror, while at the same time they believed the effort could be strengthened with a credible civilian partner heading the government. The United Kingdom played an early role (2004-05) in urging Ms Bhutto and General Musharraf to engage in discussions and in encouraging the United States to see Ms Bhutto as a potential partner. Later, the United States would play an increasingly active role in persuading General Musharraf to agree to an "accommodation" with Ms Bhutto. Both General Musharraf and Ms Bhutto had numerous contacts about the process with United States State Department officials at the highest levels throughout 2007.

25. In September 2007, after she announced the date she would return to Pakistan, Ms Bhutto began to raise her concerns and needs regarding her personal security in these discussions, especially with her contacts in the United States Government. Representatives of the United States Government told the Commission that they provided advice to Ms Bhutto on hiring Pakistani private security firms used by diplomatic missions and spoke at least once with the Musharraf camp about her security arrangements. The same officials said, however, that the United States had not accepted any responsibility for Ms Bhutto's security in Pakistan. Other sources close to Ms Bhutto told the Commission that she had expected the United States to play a strong role in urging General Musharraf to provide her with all of the security support she needed.

26. General Musharraf informed his close political allies, including the PML-Q leadership, about the process after his January 2007 meeting with Ms Bhutto. Throughout the year, most of them continued to express their deep reservations, even arguing against seeking PPP support for General Musharraf's re-election as president, confident that they could win alone, sure that they would carry the day in the parliamentary elections and concerned that a broadened alliance would diminish their power. Similarly, few in the PPP senior leadership believed that an alliance with General Musharraf would benefit the party.

27. As recounted to the Commission by interlocutors from all parties to the discussions, Ms Bhutto laid out several issues of concern in the meetings. The most central of these were: (i) her return to Pakistan to participate in politics; (ii) free and fair elections in 2007; (iii) Musharraf's resignation from the Army; (iv) amnesty in the criminal cases against her and her husband, Asif Ali Zardari; and (v) the elimination of the ban on third terms for former prime ministers, which would impede her from holding that office again. The

same sources indicated that General Musharraf's chief goals were to accommodate international interests in having Ms Bhutto return and to ensure his continuity in power.

28. Media coverage of the process led to a generalized perception that they would likely govern together after the elections, with General Musharraf continuing as president and Ms Bhutto serving as prime minister. A number of sources interviewed by the Commission confirmed that this option had been under discussion, but that the outcome depended on the results of the general elections. The PML-Q leadership had also been assured by General Musharraf that if they won the elections, their leader Chaudhry Pervaiz Elahi, would become the next prime minister. Other options, such as Ms Bhutto becoming Senate Chairperson had also been raised. The specific terms of a power-sharing agreement between Ms Bhutto and General Musharraf were fluid and never unequivocally finalized.

29. In August and September 2007, there were intense behind the scenes discussions between Ms Bhutto and General Musharraf and their respective teams. Both shared an increasing sense of urgency, but had different priorities. For Ms Bhutto, the most pressing concern was the creation of a legal mechanism to eliminate old criminal corruption charges against her and her husband; for General Musharraf, the most immediate issue was ensuring PPP support for his re-election as president. After a meeting in Dubai, other meetings in Islamabad and many last minute discussions, compromise agreements on both core issues were reached in the first week of October, less than two weeks before Ms Bhutto's announced return.

30. Negotiations on the question of the old cases were turned over to high-level representatives of the PML-Q and PPP, who met in September at an ISI safe house in Islamabad at least twice. During these and later meetings, they drafted what would become the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO), which provided a virtual amnesty for political figures "found to have been falsely involved for political reasons or through political victimization in cases" brought against them between 1986 and October 1999. On 5 October 2007, General Musharraf signed the NRO. On 6 October, General Musharraf was re-elected president by the Electoral College, composed of the members of the sitting Parliament and Provincial Assemblies. While the PPP members abstained from the vote, they stayed in the session, which was required for a quorum after other opposition party members refused to participate and withdrew. This allowed the PML-Q votes in favour of General Musharraf to carry the day.

31. According to several sources, General Musharraf was unable to convince the PML-Q to agree to support the lifting of the ban on third terms. Party leaders were deeply opposed to the measure, as they feared it would ultimately diminish their power, facilitate Mr Nawaz Sharif's return and give a boost in the elections to both Ms Bhutto and Mr Sharif. Thus, there was never any agreement to create the legal possibility of a third term for Ms Bhutto.

32. This situation increased the importance for Ms Bhutto that the elections be carried out in a free and fair manner. She wrote extensively in her book, *Reconciliation*, about election rigging in previous elections, detailing her assertions that the ISI and MI had played the key role in these actions. In addition to this history, there were well-documented problems with the voter lists in 2007, which had to be redone at mid-year, along with thousands of complaints from PPP and PML-N activists that PML-Q authorities were preparing the ground for local rigging. Yet for Ms Bhutto to become prime minister, the PPP would have to win the elections with a sufficient majority and build the needed alliances to ensure that, in a new National Assembly, they could pass legislation allowing a third term. This placed additional pressure on her, not only to be

vigilant on potential rigging, but also to carry out a vigorous public campaign to win votes.

BENAZIR BHUTTO'S RETURN TO PAKISTAN

33. Ms Bhutto's announcement on 14 September that she would return to Pakistan on 18 October 2007 to lead the PPP electoral campaign was made in this context. It was also a major point of contention with General Musharraf. He and others close to him believed that he had a firm agreement with her that she would return only after the elections, then scheduled for November. Several persons interviewed who have first-hand knowledge of the situation told the Commission that General Musharraf was furious when Ms Bhutto made her announcement and, according to one source, believed that her action represented "a total breach of the agreement". Other informed sources said that Ms Bhutto seemed equally stunned by General Musharraf's reaction.

34. The PPP had decided in July 2007 at a meeting of its Central Executive Committee meeting in London that Ms Bhutto would continue to head the party, that her participation in the campaign was critical to raising the chances of victory and that she would announce the date for her return in September.

35. Throughout the negotiations, General Musharraf's principal argument for insisting that Ms Bhutto postpone her return until after the elections was security concerns. He and his team emphasized the threats against her by extremist groups and the great risks of campaigning. When Ms Bhutto announced her decision to return to campaign, General Musharraf's team reiterated those arguments to her, as they continued to do after her return.

36. While Ms Bhutto expressed to many of her closest associates her fears about these and other threats, they say that she did not fully trust the warnings on threats that General Musharraf and his government passed on to her. According to diverse sources, she had a clear understanding of the serious risks she faced. However, Ms Bhutto believed that General Musharraf was using the security issue as a ploy to intimidate her, to keep her out of Pakistan and to prevent her from campaigning. Ms Bhutto's underlying distrust of General Musharraf and her fears that the elections would be rigged led her to carry out a very active campaign, with much public exposure, despite the risks she faced.

37. On 18 October 2007, Ms Bhutto returned to Pakistan from exile, flying into Karachi from Dubai. Her husband stayed behind, a deliberate decision made on security grounds. Enormous crowds met her at the airport in Karachi and along the Sharea-e-Faisal highway, slowing the progress of her cavalcade to her destination at the mausoleum of Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, where she had intended to deliver a speech. Shortly after midnight, near the Karsaz neighborhood, an explosion went off near the armoured truck in which she was riding. A second, much more powerful explosion followed. Ms Bhutto was not hurt, but many others were, with the official toll put at 149 deaths and 402 injuries.]

38. Ms Bhutto stated shortly after the attack that she was not accusing the government for the attack. However, on 21 October 2007, she attempted to lodge a formal complaint in the form of a First Information Report (FIR) to supersede the Karachi police's FIR, which she believed to be too narrow in scope. In her FIR, which was only registered long after her death, after a protracted court process, she referred to the threat against her posed by persons she named in a 16 October 2007 letter she sent to General Musharraf. While Ms Bhutto's FIR application does not name these persons, Pakistani and foreign media soon reported that Ms Bhutto's letter referred to Lt.General (ret) Hamid Gul, Director General of MI under the General Zia ul-Haq dictatorship and Director General of the ISI during

her first tenure as prime minister; Brigadier (ret) Ejaz Shah, Director General of the IB and former ISI official; and Mr Chaudhry Pervaiz Elahi, PML-Q Chief Minister of Punjab, one of General Musharraf's closest political allies. The Ministry of the Interior later discounted any involvement by these men in the attack.

39. The Sindh police investigation of the attack never advanced. A former high-level ISI official told the Commission, however, that the ISI conducted its own investigation and near the end of October 2007, captured and detained four suspects from a militant cell; the whereabouts of these four could not be confirmed by the Commission as of March 2010.

40. The relationship between General Musharraf and Ms Bhutto deteriorated further with General Musharraf's decision on 3 November 2007 to declare emergency rule, suspend the constitution, promulgate a series of measures that amounted to martial law, and again sack Chief Justice Chaudhry, together with a number of other high court justices. The Chief Justice and two-thirds of the country's senior judges were put under house arrest. General Musharraf explained the decision as necessary to contain the rise in extremist violence. Virtually all of the sources who spoke with the Commission about this decision, including some close to General Musharraf, believe that the decisive factor was, instead, the imminence of the Supreme Court ruling regarding the legality of General Musharraf's recent re-election as president and his eligibility to hold dual posts as president and Chief of Army Staff. General Musharraf believed that the Court was going to rule against him.

41. Led by the PPP and PML-N, political protests flared throughout the country against the emergency rule measures and against military rule. Violent confrontations between police and protestors occurred in a number of cities, with hundreds of injuries reported in the media. In November alone, the Government acknowledged the arrest of some 5,000 protesters; a number of PPP and PML-N candidates were among them. Some in the PML-Q began to call for a postponement of the elections, adding an additional degree of uncertainty to the situation. On 9 November, Ms Bhutto was briefly placed under house arrest. The next day in a speech in Islamabad, she broke with General Musharraf, denouncing his actions, calling for an end to the military government and announcing that any deal with him was off.

42. A number of sources close to the situation told the Commission that once back in Pakistan, Ms Bhutto increasingly understood that by contemplating plans for governing together with General Musharraf, she risked having to share with him the growing public ire against his government. She feared that her on-going political relationship with him could potentially weaken her politically, diminish her legitimacy and lessen possibilities for a solid PPP victory.

43. While Ms Bhutto reportedly later re-established contacts with General Musharraf through intermediaries, she turned more of her energies toward her campaign and to strengthening her relationship with Mr Nawaz Sharif and the PML-N. On 25 November, Mr Sharif was allowed to return to Pakistan from Saudi Arabia, following a failed attempt in September when he was detained at the airport and deported for violating the terms of an agreement that sent him into exile for 10 years after he was deposed as prime minister by General Musharraf in 1999. The PPP and the PML-N continued to discuss strategies for the elections, and in some districts decided to run a single candidate. Both Ms Bhutto and Mr Sharif reconfirmed their commitment to the Charter of Democracy and believed that there could be a strong PPP and PML-N alliance after the elections.

44. General Musharraf lifted the emergency rule measures on 16 December. Ms Bhutto was assassinated 11 days later. By the time of her assassination, the possibility of rehabilitating the relationship between the two had clearly waned. The Commission

received no compelling evidence that either Ms Bhutto or General Musharraf believed that she or he still needed the support of the other to achieve their ultimate political goals.

B. SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR Ms BHUTTO

Government security for Ms Bhutto

45. As Ms Bhutto's determination to return to Pakistan on a date of her choosing became clear, the Musharraf government began to make security arrangements for her. These arrangements included relaying intelligence warnings of threats against her, providing some security measures as well as deputing a police officer to act as Ms Bhutto's liaison with local authorities.

Threat warnings

46. The Commission reviewed numerous documents provided by the Ministry of Interior as well as provincial governments that noted intelligence warnings of threats against Ms Bhutto. The authenticity of these documents was confirmed through numerous interviews. These threat warnings were regularly communicated by the Interior Ministry or intelligence agencies such as the ISI and (MI) directly to Ms Bhutto, and through Mr Rehman Malik and Major (ret) Imtiaz Hussain, a police officer deputed as her liaison and personal protection officer.

47. The documents reveal significant threats to Ms Bhutto, particularly around three time periods – from just before her return to Pakistan in October, from early to mid-November, and from mid-to late December. For instance, on 20 December, the Military Operations Directorate informed Interior Secretary Syed Kamal Shah that Usama bin Laden had ordered the assassination of General Pervez Musharraf, Ms Bhutto and Maulana Fazal ur Rahman, a religious and political leader. Another warned that an attack on Ms Bhutto and Mr Malik could be launched on 21 December.

48. The Commission was told by present and former senior officials of the ISI that they had received intelligence regarding threats to Ms Bhutto from representatives of the Governments of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. In the case of the United Arab Emirates, their officials confirmed to the Commission that government to government information sharing occurred. The ISI officials stated that, on at least two occasions, representatives from both countries flew to Pakistan to provide this and other information, which generally coincided with their own. Some threat warnings were also relayed directly to Ms Bhutto or people close to her by foreign governments. The Commission learned that one such instance occurred in Dubai when she was urged by a high authority not to return due to the grave security situation in Pakistan. Ms Bhutto also mentioned in her final book that she was given specific information that four different groups were planning to send suicide bombers to attack her. Mr Rehman Malik informed the Commission that he received information from a "brotherly country" about another significant threat aimed at Ms Bhutto and himself. Mr. Malik did not specify the details of the threat. Notwithstanding the warnings received directly by Ms Bhutto or her aides, the main conduit of information flow regarding such warnings was between the ISI and foreign intelligence agencies.

49. The Director General of the ISI, Major General Nadeem Taj, met with Ms Bhutto in the early morning hours of 27 December at Zardari House in Islamabad. Directly knowledgeable sources told the Commission that they spoke both about the elections and about threats to Ms Bhutto's life; versions differ as to how much detail was conveyed about the threats. The Commission is satisfied, that at the least, Major General Taj told Ms Bhutto that the ISI was concerned about a possible terrorist attack against her and urged

her to limit her public exposure and to keep a low profile at the campaign event at Liaquat National Bagh (Liaquat Bagh) later that day.

50. The Interior Ministry, as a matter of routine, passed on many of these threat warnings, often in writing, to provincial authorities and advised them to take “foolproof” security measures. The Commission found that none of these documents contained clear and specific instructions to protect Ms Bhutto, and the federal Government took no measures to ensure that its advice was followed by provincial authorities.

51. In meetings with the Commission, the then Interior Secretary Mr Syed Kamal Shah minimized the federal Government’s role in her security, noting that these communications from the federal Government were merely advisory since under Pakistan’s federal structure, responsibility for policing and law and order are with provincial authorities. Several senior federal and provincial officials, however, asserted to the Commission that it was rare for provincial authorities to ignore or reject a federal request. “These are taken as instructions,” was how Mr Khusro Pervez, the then Home Secretary of Punjab, put it to the Commission. Similar views were expressed by then Inspector General (IG) of Punjab Ahmed Nasim. Moreover, when the federal and provincial governments are headed by the same political party or alliance, as was the case in 2007, then it is even rarer for provincial authorities to ignore a federal request.

52. The Commission has reviewed one Interior Ministry letter, dated 22 October 2007, which is clearly a federal directive. Sent to all provincial governments, it orders them to provide stringent and specific security measures for Messrs. Shaukat Aziz¹ and Chaudhry Shujat Hussain as ex-prime ministers. Both were from the PML-Q party and were General Musharraf’s close allies. The annex to the Interior Ministry letter instructed provincial authorities to provide VVIP-level security for the two ex-prime ministers, listing the specific measures to be implemented. Despite a search of their archives, at the request of the Commission, Punjab provincial authorities could not find a similar directive from federal authorities in the case of Ms Bhutto, also an ex-prime minister. The Commission was told by the then Interior Secretary Mr Kamal Shah that the 22 October directive was the result of an instruction from Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz. When asked why no such directive was issued to safeguard Ms Bhutto, he did not provide a clear answer, noting only that federal authorities had issued a directive on 18 October to Sindh provincial authorities to protect Ms Bhutto when she arrived from exile. The Commission finds it inexcusable that federal authorities did not issue a similarly clear directive as the 22 October directive for ex-Prime Ministers Aziz and Hussain to protect Ms Bhutto. This is all the more troubling as she had been attacked in Karachi just three days prior to the 22 October directive, and intelligence agencies had specific, on-going and credible threats to her. Security measures

53. Mindful of the complex security situation in Pakistan and of the threats against her, Ms Bhutto and her aides made frequent and specific requests to federal and provincial governments to augment her security. They asked for bullet-proof vehicles and vests, frequency jammers, permission to allow tinted windows for her vehicles, and additional trained security personnel as well as the Pakistani Rangers to protect her entourage and her residences. The government partially acceded to these requests.

54. Among Ms Bhutto’s first requests was permission to be accompanied by a foreign security detail when she returned to Pakistan from exile. General Musharraf rejected the request on national sovereignty grounds.

¹ Mr Aziz was prime minister when the letter was written, but was expected to step down in favour of a caretaker government. He did so on 15 November.

55. Federal and provincial authorities responded positively to some of Ms Bhutto's requests. For example, they posted policemen outside Zardari House in Islamabad and Bilawal House in Karachi and provided some police escorts when she travelled, but these escorts were generally minimal. The requests for jammers were met in some cases, but the PPP often complained that they did not work properly. Particularly in Sindh and the North West Frontier Provinces, the provincial governments provided some security support for Ms Bhutto in response to several specific requests by provincial and national PPP leaders, as well as by Ms Bhutto's security officer Major Imtiaz.

56. In November, citing security threats, the Government took two specific and controversial measures. Acting on the request of the Punjab Home Department, the federal Government restricted Ms Bhutto from leaving Zardari House in Islamabad on 9 November and thwarted a planned protest at Liaquat Bagh against General Musharraf's emergency declaration. The Punjab Home Secretary also issued a detention order against her on 9 November, citing the security threats against her as well as the vulnerability of the Liaquat Bagh venue to terror attacks. Although she was allowed to venture outside Zardari House on 10 November, she was again put under house arrest on orders of the Punjab Home Secretary in Lahore on 13 November, preventing her from leading a Long March for Democracy from Lahore to Islamabad to protest emergency rule.

57. Ms Bhutto, the PPP and many observers believed that these drastic measures were politically motivated. The Punjab Chief Minister at that time, Mr Chaudhry Pervaiz Elahi of the PML-Q, justified the house arrests as a preventive measure for her protection, considering the specific threats against her. While security may indeed have been a consideration, given the circumstances and timing of the house arrests, politics also played a key role. Indeed, one senior Interior Ministry official had no doubts that the motive for the house arrests was "political." Even the Punjab Home Secretary who issued both the detention orders told the Commission that they were for her protection and "administrative" reasons.

58. On 26 December, the Peshawar police made stringent security arrangements for Ms Bhutto's public meeting in that city. The Peshawar police chief Tanveer ul Haq noted that the local PPP cooperated with him in planning the event, although it took him three days to convince them to shift the original venue of the public meeting from a vulnerable location to the more secure local stadium. Reports that the police had arrested a potential suicide bomber at the venue were unfounded. The police did arrest a boy who was found to be carrying minute amounts of explosives without a detonator in his trouser pocket, the remnants from a wedding celebration he had attended earlier that day. Mr Haq said that the boy was released after the police were satisfied with his testimony.

Official security liaison

59. Just before Ms Bhutto returned to Pakistan, the government offered her two candidates to serve as her personal protection officer and more importantly as liaison with the Pakistani authorities. She chose Major (ret) Imtiaz Hussain, a Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP) whom she trusted as he had served with her during her tenure as Prime Minister in 1993-96. The ISI also offered three other candidates, according to ISI Deputy Director General, Major General Nusrat Naem, but Ms Bhutto turned them down.

60. Major Imtiaz was the only permanent government-provided security officer for Ms Bhutto. His main role was to be with Ms Bhutto at all times and to liaise with the local administration and police. He also made requests to federal and provincial authorities for specific security support such as jammers, bullet-proof vehicles and vests and trained police personnel to escort Ms Bhutto's entourage. Major Imtiaz did not receive adequate

support from the government to carry out his duties effectively. No support staff was assigned to him by the government; nor did it accede to many of his specific requests. Despite the Commission's efforts, it could not establish whom Major Imtiaz reported to other than Ms Bhutto while carrying out his duties, but he did coordinate with the other PPP security people surrounding Ms Bhutto.

61. Major Imtiaz also advised Ms Bhutto on her own security responsibilities. He noted that he had advised her many times not to expose herself by standing through the escape hatch of her armoured car to wave to the crowds, but she would usually ignore his advice and sometimes express anger at being told what to do. On the day of her assassination, Major Imtiaz did not advise Ms Bhutto not to stand up through the escape hatch.

62. The Commission finds that the federal Government did not have a comprehensive security plan to protect Ms Bhutto. It also failed to fix responsibility for her security in a specific federal official, entity or organization. Instead, the federal government expected provincial authorities to provide fool-proof security for Ms Bhutto, but did not issue the necessary, specific and detailed instructions commensurate to the threats and never followed up to ensure effective measures were undertaken. She was treated in a discriminatory manner in comparison to other ex-prime ministers. Despite the many threat warnings relayed to them, the provincial authorities, particularly in Punjab, failed to strengthen Ms Bhutto's security in December 2007.

PPP security for Ms Bhutto

63. The PPP is a political party, not a security agency. The responsibility for Ms Bhutto's security rested with the government. Nevertheless, Ms Bhutto believed that the government of General Musharraf could not be trusted to provide adequate security for her. The PPP therefore made its own security arrangements for Ms Bhutto to augment whatever level of protection the government afforded to her.

64. Mr Asif Ali Zardari, Ms Bhutto's husband, was deeply involved in planning Ms Bhutto's security for her return to Pakistan. Ms Bhutto and Mr Zardari relied to a significant extent on persons close to them to plan and organize the PPP's security for her. They included former senior FIA official Mr Rehman Malik and Sindh PPP leaders Mr Zulfikar Ali Mirza and Mr Agha Sirraj Durrani.

65. Mr Malik described his role to the Commission as Ms Bhutto's "national security advisor", not her physical security advisor. He also liaised with the federal authorities on behalf of Ms Bhutto and participated as her representative in negotiations with General Musharraf and his aides. However, most PPP leaders understood Mr Malik's role as encompassing all aspects of Ms Bhutto's security. Many also said that he coordinated with Ms Bhutto's protection detail, including with Major Imtiaz and Mr Tauqir Kaira. The Commission finds that, in addition to what Mr Malik himself described, he performed a significant role in the overall management of Ms Bhutto's security. His letters to the authorities regarding threat warnings and requesting specific security support reflect this involvement.

66. The PPP made specific security arrangements for Ms Bhutto in each of the provinces, but focused particular attention on Sindh and Punjab Provinces. The initial focus was on Sindh. The security arrangements for Ms Bhutto's return to Karachi were organized by Mr Mirza, a former army doctor who headed the PPP's reception committee in Karachi to welcome Ms Bhutto from exile. He was supported by Mr Durrani. They were soon joined by a Major General(ret) Ahsan Ahmed, who was appointed to head the PPP's security committee for Ms Bhutto's arrival. Messrs. Mirza and Durrani however, continued to function as the primary people responsible for Ms Bhutto's security in Karachi. Mr Mirza

oversaw the construction of a bulletproof truck for Ms Bhutto and her entourage to use in the planned procession from the Karachi airport to the mausoleum of Pakistan's founder Muhammad Ali Jinnah.

67. Messrs. Mirza and Durrani drew volunteers from the PPP's student and youth wings and organized them into the "Jaan Nisaar Benazir" (JNB) The JNB's main task was to form a human chain around Ms Bhutto to stop suicide bombers from reaching her, but they also performed additional security duties. According to the organizers, the JNB numbered around 5,000 of whom about 2,000 were uniformed and formed the human chain around Ms Bhutto's truck on 18-19 October. Mr Mirza said that he and some of the JNB volunteers were armed. The remaining 3,000 were ² and posted at key points along the procession route to deter potential trouble. Combined with the Sindh police security cover, the PPP security arrangements formed a formidable barrier. Despite this, two blasts hit the procession. Most of those killed were the JNB volunteers. In her posthumously published book, *Reconciliation*, Ms Bhutto credited the JNB with saving her life in the Karachi attack.

68. Messrs. Mirza and Durrani described the Karachi police cooperation as initially lukewarm but it improved as Ms Bhutto's arrival date neared. They also described Sindh government security deployment on 18-19 October as inadequate, but they credited the deployed policemen with doing a commendable job. The PPP's Sindh security committee and the Karachi police worked closely on all aspects of security for Ms Bhutto's return from exile, including an evacuation plan in the event of just such an attack. Messrs. Mirza and Durrani said the evacuation worked as planned.

69. After the Karachi attack, the PPP reviewed the security arrangements for Ms Bhutto. In light of the threat against her, Messrs. Mirza and Durrani decided that a core group of 250-300 JNB volunteers would always travel with Ms Bhutto throughout Sindh. A smaller number of them were also sent on two occasions to Punjab Province as added protection for Ms Bhutto, although they did not accompany her to Liaquat Bagh, the public park in Rawalpindi where Ms Bhutto's held her last public meeting on 27 December.

70. The PPP's security for Ms Bhutto in Punjab was not as elaborate as in Sindh, partly due to a lack of leadership and the absence of a JNB- like corps. Even so, Ms Bhutto was surrounded by two groups of PPP security throughout her travels in Punjab. These groups also accompanied her to Peshawar and Jammu and Kashmir.

71. One group of PPP security comprised 14 unarmed men under the leadership of Mr Chaudhry Muhammad Aslam, who coordinated his activities with Major Imtiaz and Mr Tauqir Kaira, leader of the second group. These men travelled with Ms Bhutto's entourage in Islamabad, Punjab, Peshawar and Jammu and Kashmir. Their main task was to form a security cordon around Ms Bhutto. All were PPP party activists, and many told the Commission that they had been with Ms Bhutto since 1986.

72. The other group of PPP security around Ms Bhutto was led by Mr Kaira, whose men were armed. This group provided the first line of defense around Ms Bhutto. Mr Kaira also had the role of coordinating Ms Bhutto's convoy, checking the vehicles and ensuring their place in the convoy. He coordinated his daily tasks with Major Imtiaz and Mr Chaudhry Aslam. The Commission could not establish whom he reported to on a daily

² The Urdu term Jaan Nisar Benazir means those willing to give their lives for Benazir.

basis, especially as the campaigning picked up in December. Mr Kaira died on 27 December while trying to protect Ms Bhutto.

73. Mr Khaled Shahenshah, a PPP supporter since his student days, accompanied Ms Bhutto on her travels in Pakistan and served as her personal bodyguard. He was with Ms Bhutto on the stage in Liaquat Bagh on 27 December and in her car when the fatal attack occurred. Mr Shahenshah was killed in Karachi a few months after Ms Bhutto's death. Media reports at the time attributed the killing to his alleged links in the Karachi underworld. Some people have pointed out to the Commission Mr Shahenshah's strange hand gestures while on the stage in Liaquat Bagh and alleged that he was involved in a conspiracy to assassinate Ms Bhutto. But others, including several PPP leaders, dismissed such notions. The Commission did not uncover any new facts that support the conspiracy theory surrounding Mr Shahenshah's behaviour.

74. Ms Bhutto's convoy included two main vehicles - an armoured white Toyota Land Cruiser and a bullet-proof black Mercedes-Benz car - and other vehicles for security staff and senior PPP leaders. She would choose one of the main vehicles for a trip, and the other would accompany as the decoy and back-up vehicle.

75. Ms Bhutto was acutely aware of the threats to her and had gone to considerable lengths to protect herself. Although the PPP had no standard operating procedures regarding security, she devised ad hoc security drills and, according to her closest aides, frequently wore a bullet-proof vest. However, she was also determined to campaign vigorously and openly, often interacting with crowds, thus exposing herself to potential attackers.

76. Despite considerable and valiant efforts by individual PPP members to protect Ms Bhutto, the PPP as an organization was inadequate to handle the challenges. There was no person in overall charge of the PPP's provision of security. As a result, the PPP's security for Ms Bhutto was characterized by a lack of direction and professionalism. However, the Commission reiterates that the responsibility for failing to protect Ms Bhutto lies with the Government of Pakistan. Liaquat Bagh security arrangements on 27 December

77. A public meeting at Liaquat Bagh, an open park located in Rawalpindi, was set for 27 December as part of Ms Bhutto's hectic campaign schedule. Rawalpindi, a city of some three million people, is located in the province of Punjab about 30 kilometers from Islamabad. The Pakistani Army is headquartered there. Liaquat Bagh is bordered by Liaquat Road to the north, Murree Road to the east, and Press Club Road to the south. Adjacent to Liaquat Bagh, on the Liaquat Road side, an outer gate leads to a general parking area; a second, inner gate, leads to a VIP parking area.

78. The Rawalpindi district administration and police held one formal meeting with the local PPP committee to prepare for the public meeting. According to the minutes of the meeting made available to the Commission, it was held on 25 December and was chaired by the District Coordinating Officer (DCO), Mr Muhammad Irfan Elahi, the highest-ranking civilian bureaucrat in the district. The PPP side was led by Mr Zamurrud Khan, the local PPP committee chair. A number of senior police officers were also present. The participants discussed the Code of Conduct for the Liaquat Bagh public meeting as well as issues relating to the management of the public meeting.

79. The local PPP committee members said that they understood the local administration to be responsible for all security measures for the Liaquat Bagh public meeting. Nevertheless, the PPP undertook to secure the stage where Ms Bhutto delivered her last

speech and stationed its workers at key entry points to the park to identify people and assist the police in maintaining security.

80. The Rawalpindi District Police prepared a written plan dated 26 December 2007 for security arrangements to cover two political meetings scheduled to take place the next day ("Security Plan"), one of which was at Liaquat Bagh for the PPP, which Ms Bhutto was to attend, and the other, at Gujar Khan, organized by PML-N, which Mr Nawaz Sharif was to attend. The Security Plan for Ms Bhutto was more complex in that it envisaged security for Ms Bhutto's convoy by an Elite Force unit under the supervision of Assistant Superintendent of Police (ASP) Ashfaq Anwar, which was to establish a box formation around Ms Bhutto's vehicle during movement. The police said that the Elite Force unit formed a box around Ms Bhutto's vehicle at the Faizabad junction, which is the jurisdictional limit between Islamabad and Rawalpindi. The Commission, however, believes that this did not occur.

81. The Security Plan listed a number of police officers responsible for various sectors in and around Liaquat Bagh. SSP Yaseen Farooq was responsible for overall supervision and was assisted by SP Khurram Shahzad. A command post was to be established at a building on the edge of Liaquat Bagh, called Rescue 15, used by local emergency services. City Police Officer (CPO) Saud Aziz – the police chief of Rawalpindi, DCO Irfan Elahi and members of intelligence agencies were present at the command post during the meeting.

82. The Security Plan provided for two security cordons at the PPP event: an inner cordon securing Liaquat Bagh and an outer cordon covering the area surrounding Liaquat Bagh, including Liaquat and Murree Roads. According to the plan 1,371 police officers were to be deployed at Liaquat Bagh. Three walk-through gates with metal detectors were placed at the public entrances to the park. The plan also provided for the deployment of police constables on the rooftops of the buildings surrounding Liaquat Bagh. According to the plan, these constables were supposed to carry automatic rifles and binoculars. However, none of the seven constables interviewed by the Commission had binoculars; they were not even aware that they were supposed to have carried them. The police were also expected to conduct random searches of people attending the meeting. According to the police, the park was closed to the public by the Special Branch, who swept it for explosives and handed it over to the police at 0700 hours on 27 December.

83. The Commission finds that the Security Plan was flawed as it placed inadequate focus on Ms Bhutto's protection and concentrated more on the deployment of police for crowd control. Furthermore, it was not implemented properly. Video footage and photographs examined by the Commission raised questions as to the number of police officers deployed at Liaquat Bagh. PPP officials who accompanied Ms Bhutto do not recall an Elite Force unit box around Ms Bhutto's vehicle on the way to the event, only a traffic escort. These and other matters related to the Security Plan's implementation are discussed below.

C. ASSASSINATION TIMELINE

84. In order to ascertain the timeline of the assassination, the Commission reviewed extensive video footage and hundreds of photographs, obtained from the Government of Pakistan, open sources and professional photographers. It also met in London with members of the Metropolitan Police (Scotland Yard) team that investigated aspects of the assassination. The Commission closely reviewed the analysis behind Scotland Yard's full report³ and interviewed Scotland Yard officers on their methodology and forensic analysis.

85. On the evening of 26 December 2007, Ms Bhutto arrived in Islamabad by road from Peshawar in the North West Frontier Province and went to her family's residence, Zardari House. She had a campaign event in neighbouring Rawalpindi scheduled for the next day. On the morning of 27 December, Ms Bhutto left Zardari House for a meeting at the Serena Hotel in Islamabad with Mr Hamid Karzai, the President of Afghanistan. She returned to Zardari House in the early afternoon and remained there until her departure for the event.

The Day of the Assassination: 27 December 2007

Departure from Zardari House for Liaquat Bagh

86. Around 1400 hours, Ms Bhutto left Zardari House, for Liaquat Bagh, in a convoy of vehicles. The convoy consisted of a black Toyota Land Cruiser used by Mr Tauqir Kaira, followed by Ms Bhutto's white armoured Land Cruiser and two of Mr Kaira's vehicles on either side of Ms Bhutto's vehicle. The latter two were a Mercedes-Benz van on the right and a four-door double cabin vehicle on the left. Immediately behind those vehicles were two Toyota Vigo pick-up trucks, positioned side by side. A black Mercedes-Benz car was behind these Vigos. This Mercedes-Benz, from Zardari House, was bullet-proof and served as the back-up vehicle for Ms Bhutto. The two Vigo pick-up trucks were also from Zardari House.

87. Mr Kaira was inside the lead vehicle with his security men. Accompanying Ms Bhutto in her vehicle were Mr Javed-ur-Rehman (driver, front- left seat), SSP Major (ret) Imtiaz Hussain (front-right seat), Makhdoom Amin Fahim (senior PPP member, second row- left seat), Ms Bhutto (second row-centre seat), Ms Naheed Khan (senior PPP member and political secretary of Ms Bhutto, second row-right seat). Seated in the back of the vehicle on two benches facing each other were Senator Safdar Abbasi (senior PPP member, rear-right bench), Mr Shahenshah (rear- left bench, facing ³ 24 Senator Abbasi) and Mr Razaq Mirani (personal attendant of Ms Bhutto, rear-right bench next to Senator Abbasi and to his left). Mr Kaira's two vehicles on either side of Ms Bhutto's Land Cruiser carried his men. The Vigo pick-up trucks carried members of Mr Chaudry Aslam's security team. Riding in the black Mercedes-Benz car were the driver, PPP official Mr Faratullah Babar in the front passenger seat and, in the rear passenger seat from left to right, two PPP officials Mr Babar Awan and Mr Rehman Malik and General (ret) Tauqir Zia.

Arrival at Liaquat Bagh

88. Ms Bhutto's convoy reached the Faizabad junction at about 1415 hours, according to the Rawalpindi District Police, who were to assume responsibility for security of the convoy. According to the police and the Security Plan, an escort was to be provided composed of a traffic police "pilot" jeep, a regular police jeep leading the convoy and three Elite Force Toyota pick-up trucks protecting Ms Bhutto's Land Cruiser on three sides. People in Ms Bhutto's vehicle claim, however, that there was no such escort except for one traffic police vehicle.

89. At about 1456 hours, Ms Bhutto's convoy turned right at the Murree Road - Liaquat Road junction and headed towards Liaquat Bagh. Video footage shows Ms Bhutto's convoy driving from the Murree Road - Liaquat Bagh junction to the inner security gate leading to the VIP parking area at Liaquat Bagh. The footage shows Ms Bhutto standing

³ A team of analysts and investigators from Scotland Yard traveled to Pakistan on 4 January 2007 to "assist the local authorities in providing clarity regarding the precise cause of Ms Bhutto's death". For more details on the Scotland Yard report, see paragraphs 188-196.

through the roof escape hatch of her Land Cruiser and waving at the large crowd around the vehicle while it moved slowly on Liaquat Road.

90. Both ASP Ashfaq Anwar who was the supervisor of the Elite Force unit and Inspector Azmat Ali Dogar, the unit's commander, told the Commission that they accompanied Ms Bhutto all the way to the back of the stage according to the Security Plan. However, video footage and pictures show that as Ms Bhutto drove on much of Liaquat Road, her vehicle was flanked only by her private security vehicles. The Elite Force vehicles were nowhere near her vehicle. In fact, the Commission has identified Inspector Dogar among the crowd some distance from Ms Bhutto's vehicle. Contrary to the police assertion, there was no police-provided box formation around Ms Bhutto as she arrived at the rally, and the Elite Force unit did not execute their duties as specified in the security deployment. Furthermore, the Commission does not believe that the full escort as described by the police was ever present.

91. At about 1516 hours, Ms Bhutto's convoy stopped for a few minutes at the inner gate of the parking area waiting for that gate to be opened, during which Ms Bhutto remained standing through the escape hatch. The police and some PPP members disagree as to the reason for the delay in opening the gate. While the PPP asserts that the police did not have the key to open the gate, the police said that they did not want the large crowd following Ms Bhutto to get into the VIP parking area. Altogether, Ms Bhutto stood through the escape hatch for the approximately 20 minutes it took to drive from the Murree Road - Liaquat Road junction to the gate of the parking area. This calls into question the claim of the Rawalpindi District Police 25 that they were surprised when Ms Bhutto emerged from the escape hatch on her way out of Liaquat Bagh.

92. Once the convoy passed through the inner gate, at about 1531 hours, it drove through the VIP parking area to the rear of the stage. At least the following three vehicles were in the VIP parking area: Ms Bhutto's Land Cruiser, Mr Kaira's lead vehicle and the black bullet-proof Mercedes-Benz car. Temporary wooden stairs had been built for the rally to access the rear of the stage directly from the parking area. Ms Bhutto climbed the stairs, went to the stage to wave to the crowd and took her seat before addressing the crowd.

93. Near the rear of the stage, a scuffle broke out between some workers of the PPP and police who tried to prevent them from climbing to the stage. This created tension between PPP workers and the police officers posted in that area. Accounts given by PPP representatives and the police with regard to the degree and nature of this event differ significantly. The police state that the dispute was minor and was settled immediately, whereas some on the local PPP side claim it was serious and led to bitter reactions from the police during the rest of the rally. They say that the police felt insulted and became more passive in their security role. The Commission finds that the police were indeed passive in their provision of security and believes it unprofessional if the Rawalpindi District Police reduced their level of alert to any degree as a result of wounded pride.

Exit from Liaquat Bagh

94. Several thousand people attended the event. Ms Bhutto was joined on the stage by a number of national - level PPP leaders and all of the parliamentary candidates from Rawalpindi district. The crowds were enthusiastic, and PPP leaders and activists considered the event to have been a great success. They say Ms Bhutto gave a strong and rousing speech, one of the best of her campaign, and describe her as having been radiant that day.

95. The public gathering concluded and, at about 1710 hours, Ms Bhutto descended the wooden stairs and entered her Land Cruiser. The occupants of the Land Cruiser and their

seating positions were the same as for the trip in to Liaquat Bagh. The composition of passengers in the black Mercedes-Benz car also remained the same.

96. The black bullet-proof Mercedes-Benz car was the first to leave the parking area. It is not clear how much distance there was between this vehicle and the rest of Ms Bhutto's convoy at the moment of the blast. Credible reports range from 100 meters to 250 meters. Some of those in the car said that they were close enough to Ms Bhutto's vehicle to feel the impact of the blast. Others at the site of the blast have said that the Mercedes-Benz left Liaquat Bagh so quickly that it was nowhere to be seen when the blast occurred. Indeed, the Commission has not seen this vehicle in the many video images of the exit area it reviewed. Despite the acknowledgement of some occupants of the vehicle that they felt the impact of the blast, the Commission finds it incredible that they drove all the way to Zardari House, a drive of about 20 minutes, before they became aware that Ms Bhutto had been injured in the blast. They should have stopped at a safe distance when they felt the blast so as to check on Ms Bhutto's condition, the condition of her vehicle and whether the back-up vehicle was required. Indeed, as the back-up vehicle, the Mercedes-Benz car would have been an essential element of Ms Bhutto's convoy on the return trip even if the occupants of that car had confirmed that Ms Bhutto had been unscathed in the attack.

97. Mr Kaira's vehicle was the next to leave the inner parking area after the Mercedes-Benz car, with Ms Bhutto's vehicle right behind it, followed by another of Mr Kaira's vehicles. The two Vigo pick-up trucks then followed from the outer parking area located between the inner and outer gates.

98. At 1712 hours, Ms Bhutto's Land Cruiser exited from the outer gate. Crowds of people who were already on Liaquat Road drew closer to the vehicle as it began to turn right onto Liaquat Road. In addition, many people left the park, swelling the crowd around the Land Cruiser, contrary to the police assertion that they did not allow anyone to leave the park before the departure of Ms Bhutto's convoy. Ms Bhutto emerged through the escape hatch of the vehicle and started waving to her supporters. When the vehicle approached the central road divider, it was slowed further by the crowd.

99. Major Imtiaz, who was sitting in the front seat of the Land Cruiser, said that he was worried that the convoy was being slowed down by the crowd. He wanted to call CPO Saud Aziz by cell phone, but he did not have the CPO's direct number. Instead he called CPO Saud Aziz's operator and the operator at the police station in Multan, another town in Punjab Province (where Major Imtiaz had recently served). The Commission finds that this lack of preparation was a major flaw in the security arrangements and reflects badly on the professionalism of Major Imtiaz who should have had full and rapid access to the Rawalpindi police command.

100. Questions remain as to the nature of the crowd that gathered around the Land Cruiser. Passengers in the Land Cruiser and some local PPP members recalled that they were mostly PPP workers, and they did not see any strangers or irregular movements among them. The Rawalpindi District Police and other PPP members, however, suggested that a group of people had deliberately stood in front of the Land Cruiser to prevent it from moving. Regardless of the accuracy of either account, it remains that the police did not control the crowd outside of Liaquat Bagh. As a result, the attacker was able to get as close as he did to Ms Bhutto's vehicle.

101. The Rawalpindi police authorities and some PPP workers dispute the exact exit route agreed for Ms Bhutto's convoy. The Rawalpindi District Police and DCO Elahi claim that the planned route for the convoy was to turn right onto Liaquat Road and then left onto Murree Road, retracing the convoy's entry route. Only in case of an emergency was the

convoy to make a left turn after exiting from the outer gate; a decision to take the emergency route had to be made by the senior police officer in charge of security on the scene. Some local PPP workers who attended the preparatory meeting with the police disagree with this account. They claim that the original plan was to make a left turn onto Liaquat Road and that the minutes provided by the DCO, which did not indicate this left turn, were inaccurate. In any event, photographs show two stationary police vehicles on Liaquat Road blocking the left-side drive lane where the left turn would have been made. As a result, even in an emergency, it would have been impossible for Ms Bhutto's convoy to make a left turn and use the escape route unless those police vehicles were quickly moved. The Commission learned that these vehicles were official vehicles of senior Rawalpindi police officers. The Commission finds it irresponsible that these vehicles were parked in such a way as to block the emergency exit route.

102. The Rawalpindi District Police claim that police vehicles from the Elite Force unit headed by ASP Ashfaq Anwar were waiting outside the outer gate to escort Ms Bhutto's convoy and that they were about to go into a protective box formation when the attack on Ms Bhutto took place. However, forming the box at this point was impracticable given the narrow width of Liaquat Road and the number of people who had already started to surround Ms Bhutto's vehicle. In any event, video footage shows very few uniformed police on the scene available to push back the crowd to create space for the box formation. Furthermore, video and photographs taken shortly before the blast as well as Commission interviews indicate that the Elite Force unit was not in position to go into a box formation. The Elite Force unit was in place neither for the entry nor the exit of the convoy and did not afford the protection they were tasked with, thus failing spectacularly in their duty.

103. Overall, video and photographic materials as well as the Commission's interviews establish that there were very few police deployed outside the outer gate and on Liaquat Road as Ms Bhutto's convoy attempted to depart the scene.

The Attack

104. From the exit, Ms Bhutto's Land Cruiser started to make a right turn onto Liaquat Road. As it slowly approached the central divider on Liaquat Road, the crowd began chanting slogans. There is some dispute over whether Ms Bhutto made the decision to stand up on her own or was urged to do so. Before she stood up, Ms Bhutto asked Ms Naheed Khan to make a phone call to Mr Nawaz Sharif, PML-N leader, to convey condolences for the deaths of some of his supporters who had been shot during the PML-N rally earlier that day. It had been reported that the shooting incident occurred between supporters of the PML-N and those of the PML-Q parties.

105. While Ms Khan was trying to reach Mr Sharif, Ms Bhutto stopped her and asked Senator Abbasi, who was sitting in the rear seat, to chant slogans to the crowd using the vehicle's loudspeaker. Ms Bhutto then stood on the seat and appeared through the escape hatch, with her head and shoulders exposed.

106. Ms Bhutto waved to the crowd. The vehicle continued to move slowly into its right turn onto Liaquat Road. At this point, a man wearing dark glasses appeared in the crowd on the left side of the Land Cruiser. Around 1714 hours, while the vehicle continued into its right turn, the man pulled out a pistol, and from a distance of approximately two to three meters, fired three shots at Ms Bhutto. According to video analysis conducted by Scotland Yard, the three shots were fired in less than one second.

107. The Commission examined video footage taken from a back angle, which shows Ms Bhutto's dupatta, her white head covering, and her hair flick upwards after the second

shot. However, there is no evidence of a link between the second shot and that movement. After the third shot, she started to move down into the vehicle.

108. After the third shot, the gunman lowered the gun, looked down and then detonated the explosives. At the time of the blast, the gunman was near the left rear corner of the vehicle. Video footage shows that at the time of the explosion, the Land Cruiser was still making the right turn. The Scotland Yard team's analysis shows that it took 1.6 seconds from the time of the first shot to the detonation of the bomb. In the Land Cruiser

109. Ms Naheed Khan recalled that immediately after she had heard the three gunshots, Ms Bhutto fell down into the vehicle onto her lap. Ms Khan said that she felt the impact of the explosion immediately thereafter. The right side of Ms Bhutto's head came to rest on Ms Khan's lap. Ms Khan saw that Ms Bhutto was bleeding profusely from the right side of her head. She noticed that Ms Bhutto was not moving and saw that blood was also trickling from her ear. Makhdoom Amin Fahim recalled that Ms Bhutto fell heavily and showed no sign of life after falling. According to Scotland Yard's video analysis, the flash of the blast appeared just over two-thirds of a second after Ms Bhutto disappeared from view.

110. No one else in her vehicle was seriously injured.

Transfer to the Hospital

111. After the explosion, Senator Abbasi told the driver to drive to the hospital (initially having in mind a hospital in Islamabad). Although all four of its tires were punctured by the blast, the Land Cruiser managed to drive along Liaquat Road for approximately 300 meters towards the junction with Murree Road where it turned left. As the Land Cruiser moved along Murree Road, it became increasingly difficult for the driver to manoeuvre on the metal rims of the wheels. The Land Cruiser made a U-turn at the Rehmanabad junction, located approximately four kilometres from the Liaquat Road-Murree Road junction, in order to get to the other side of the road where Rawalpindi General Hospital (RGH) was located. The occupants of the Land Cruiser recalled that at this point there was only one traffic police vehicle ahead of the Land Cruiser. No other vehicles were visible – neither the bullet proof black Mercedes-Benz car nor any Elite Force unit vehicle. Following the U-turn, the Land Cruiser stalled. The party had to wait for some time on Murree Road until a private vehicle that belonged to Ms Sherry Rehman arrived and took Ms Bhutto to the hospital.

At Rawalpindi General Hospital

112. Ms Bhutto was received by the Accident and Emergency Department of the Rawalpindi General Hospital (later renamed Benazir Bhutto Hospital) at around 1735 hours. In the resuscitation room, she was treated by Dr Saeeda Yasmin. At this time, staff was busy in the resuscitation room treating victims of the shooting at the Nawaz Sharif rally earlier that day.

113. Dr Saeeda told the Commission that Ms Bhutto was pale, unconscious and not breathing. There was a wound to the right side of her head from which blood was trickling and whitish matter was visible. Ms Bhutto's clothes were soaked in blood. Dr Saeeda immediately began efforts to resuscitate her. Dr Aurangzeb Khan, the senior registrar, subsequently joined Dr Saeeda to assist. Both doctors said that they did not observe any other injury. As there was no improvement in Ms Bhutto's condition, she was moved to the Emergency Operating Theatre located on the level above the ground floor to continue resuscitation efforts.

114. At around 1750 hours, Professor Mohammed Mussadiq Khan, the hospital's senior physician, arrived and took over. The doctors still had not detected a pulse. At 1757 hours, Professor Mussadiq opened Ms Bhutto's chest and carried out open heart massage. These efforts were unsuccessful.

115. At 1816 hours, Professor Mussadiq stopped resuscitation efforts and declared Ms Bhutto dead. He ordered all the men to leave the room so that the female doctors and nurses could clean the body.

Only medical personnel had been in the operating room throughout this process.

116. Dr Qudsiya Anjum Qureshi cleaned Ms Bhutto's head, neck and upper body and checked Ms Bhutto's body for further injury. She saw no wounds other than the one to the right side of her head and the thoracotomy wound. Ms Bhutto was next dressed in hospital clothing and her clothes given to her maid. The doctors stated that they had not seen her dupatta. The dupatta remains missing.

117. On three different occasions, Professor Mussadiq asked CPO Saud Aziz for permission to conduct an autopsy on Ms Bhutto, and the CPO refused each request. On the second request, CPO Saud Aziz is reported to have sarcastically asked the Professor whether an FIR had been filed,⁴

a matter that the CPO should know, not the Professor. DCO Elahi, who was also present outside the operating room, supported CPO Saud Aziz's position. The authorities however deny that the CPO deliberately ⁴refused to allow an autopsy. They insist that they wanted to get permission from Ms Bhutto's family. As will be discussed below, the police's legal duty to request an autopsy does not require permission from a family member.

118. Because he could not obtain police consent to carry out an autopsy, Professor Mussadiq called in X-ray technician Ghafoor Jadd, who took two X-rays of Ms Bhutto's skull with a portable X-ray machine. He did this without notifying or seeking the consent of CPO Saud Aziz. Though not present at the time, a radiologist examined the X-rays the next day.

119. Ms Bhutto's death certificate was completed and signed by the senior registrar, Dr Aurangzeb, who recorded the cause of death as "To be determined on autopsy".

120. An ISI officer, Rawalpindi Detachment Commander Colonel Jehangir Akhtar, was present at the hospital through much of the evening. At one point, the ISI Deputy Director General, Major General Nusrat Naeem, contacted Professor Mussadiq through Colonel Jehangir's cell phone. When asked about this by the Commission, Major General Nusrat Naeem initially denied making any calls to the hospital, but then acknowledged that he had indeed called the hospital, when pressed further. He asserted that he had made the call, before reporting to his superiors, to hear, directly from Professor Mussadiq that Ms Bhutto had died.

121. Ms Bhutto's body remained in the operating room until it was placed in a wooden coffin and removed from the hospital at about 2235 hours that evening and transported to the nearby Chaklala Airbase. Ms Naheed Khan signed for Ms Bhutto's body at the hospital. At around 0100 hours on 28 December, at the Chaklala Airbase, the remains were transferred to her husband, Mr Asif Ali Zardari, who had flown from Dubai and

⁴ In Pakistani police procedure, an FIR (First Information Report) is a record of the criminal complaint which is registered at a police station and initiates an investigation.

who signed an acknowledgement note to that effect. Following this, Ms Bhutto's body was flown to her home town Larkana, in Sindh Province, for burial.

The Day after the Assassination: 28 December 2007

122. On the morning of 28 December, the doctors who treated Ms Bhutto were convened at the hospital by DCO Elahi who requested that they submit a report concerning the treatment given to Ms Bhutto. DCO Elahi instructed the doctors to bring the original to him directly and further instructed that neither hard copies nor electronic copies of the report should be retained. A request for such a report had never been made before or after this incident. The report was prepared and submitted to DCO Elahi. On the afternoon of 28 December, Professor Mussadiq Khan gave a brief press conference on the orders of the DCO who received his instructions from the Home Secretary of Punjab Province. Senior Punjab officials told the Commission that this issue was discussed at a cabinet meeting of the government of Punjab.

123. On the evening of 28 December, a separate press conference was held by the Ministry of Interior in which the Government, through Brigadier (ret) Javed Iqbal Cheema, spokesperson of the Ministry of Interior, set out the cause of death as well as who was responsible for the attack. The main points of this press conference and the controversy it generated are discussed below.

124. In the afternoon of 28 December, Ms Bhutto was laid to rest in her family's mausoleum at Gahri Khuda Baksh in Larkana. Her death was followed by enormous grief and anger among her supporters. There was widespread violence throughout Pakistan over several days following her death.

D. THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS

125. This section discusses the criminal investigations into the assassination of Ms Bhutto and those who died with her. It also addresses government actions which impacted on the investigations, including two press conferences, the involvement of intelligence agencies and the PPP's interaction with the investigative agencies.

The hosing down of the crime scene

126. Soon after the blast outside Liaquat Bagh on the evening of 27 December, CPO Saud Aziz left the crime scene for Rawalpindi General Hospital; SSP Yaseen Farooq followed shortly thereafter. The most senior Rawalpindi police official remaining at the crime scene was SP Khurram Shahzad, who continued to take instructions from CPO Saud Aziz by telephone. The management of the crime scene and the collection of evidence by the Rawalpindi police during this time have generated considerable controversy.

127. Video footage immediately following the blast shows shock, fear and confusion among the people at the scene and little police control. The crime scene was not immediately cordoned off. The police did collect some evidence. Officers from intelligence agencies, including the ISI, the IB and MI, were present and also collected evidence, using, as one Rawalpindi police officer noted, better evidence collection equipment than the police. Within one hour and forty minutes of the blast, however, SP Khurram ordered the fire and rescue officials present to wash the crime scene down with fire hoses. He told the Commission that the police had collected all the available evidence by then. Police records show that only 23 pieces of evidence were collected, in a case where one would normally have expected thousands. The evidence included mostly human body parts, two pistols, spent cartridges and Ms Bhutto's damaged vehicle.

128. According to SP Khurram and other senior Rawalpindi police officials, including some who were not present at the scene, hosing down the crime scene was a necessary

crowd control measure. They claim that some at the scene, mainly PPP supporters, were very upset when they learned that Ms Bhutto had died and that some supporters were dipping their hands into the blood on the ground, believing it to be Ms Bhutto's, and rubbing it on themselves. SP Khurram asserted that the PPP supporters could have become disruptive. Therefore, the police needed to wash away the blood from the scene as a public order measure. SP Khurram and other police officials also stated that there were reports of vandalism not far from the crime scene, requiring the redeployment of the police who were at the scene. Once the crime scene was hosed down, they claim, the crowd did disperse, going to Rawalpindi General Hospital, which permitted the police at the scene to redeploy to those other crowd control situations.

129. Others, including police officials familiar with the case, dispute the assertion that there was a public order problem in Rawalpindi. They further disagree that the presence of an unruly crowd would prevent the establishment of a police cordon around the scene of crime and justify hosing it down.

No one apart from SP Khurram told the Commission that they saw anyone smearing blood on themselves. Even SP Khurram, himself, ultimately told the Commission that he saw only one person doing that. Sources have also pointed out that Rawalpindi was not a stronghold of the PPP and that, therefore, the police allegations were exaggerated. Sources have noted also that even at Rawalpindi General Hospital, where many PPP supporters were gathered, the disturbance was minimal.

130. One eye-witness said that there were about 100 to 200 people present at the crime scene after the blast and about 20 to 30 police officers.

One police official stated that there were about 40 police officers at the scene. The Commission finds that SP Khurram had a number of options for controlling the crowd at the crime scene short of the drastic measure of hosing down it down.

He could have ordered the police officers present to form a cordon around the immediate vicinity of the crime scene; he could have redeployed any of the 1,371 police officers on duty; he could have called for reinforcements.

He made no attempt to do any of these things. Senior police officials told the Commission that SP Khurram could, indeed, have redeployed police officers or sought reinforcements and should have.

131. Many senior Pakistani police officials have explained to the Commission that in law and practice, the ranking police official at the scene of the crime takes decisions relating to crime scene management. SP Khurram asserted that he made the decision to hose down the scene. Before issuing the order to the rescue and fire services, SP Khurram called his superior, CPO Saud Aziz, to seek permission, which was granted. Sources, including police officials familiar with the case, have questioned the veracity of SP Khurram's claim that the decision was his initiative.

132. CPO Saud Aziz's role in this decision is controversial. Many senior Pakistani police officials have emphasized that hosing down a crime scene is fundamentally inconsistent with Pakistani police practice. While they acknowledge that there is no uniformity of practice in crime scene management in Pakistan, the hosing down of a crime scene is considered extraordinary.

Indeed, with the exception of some Rawalpindi police officials, nearly all senior Pakistani police officials have criticized the manner in which this crime scene was managed. One senior police official has argued that hosing down the crime scene amounted to "criminal negligence". Several senior police officials who know CPO Saud Aziz were troubled that

an officer with his many years of experience would allow a major crime scene to be washed away, thereby damaging his reputation.

133. Sources informed the Commission that CPO Saud Aziz did not act independently in deciding to hose down the crime scene. One source, speaking on the basis of anonymity, stated that CPO Saud Aziz had confided in him that he had received a call from Army Headquarters instructing him to order the hosing down of the crime scene. Another source, also speaking on the basis of anonymity, said that the CPO was ordered to hose down the scene by Major General Nadeem Ijaz Ahmad, then Director General of MI.

Others, including three police officials, told the Commission that CPO Saud Aziz did not act independently and that “everyone knows” who ordered the hosing down. However, they were not willing to state on the record what it is that “everyone knows”.

This is one of the many occasions during the Commission’s inquiry when individuals, including government officials, expressed fear or hesitation to speak openly.

134. Some senior Pakistani police officials identified further factors suggesting that CPO Saud Aziz was not acting independently. They point out that, while the deliberate hosing down of a scene is unheard of in police practice, it has occurred on a few occasions, in each case when the military has been the target of such attacks and the crime scene was managed by the military directly. Even CPO Saud Aziz, when asserting to the Commission that there were precedents for hosing down a crime scene, acknowledged that all the incidents which he posited as precedents actually involved a military target. The police officials who point out this pattern saw it as further indication that the military was involved in having the crime scene hosed down.

135. Some media reports tied the hosing down of the Rawalpindi crime scene to the alleged washing of the crime scene in the October attack in Karachi. However, in Karachi, the need to put out fires in the vicinity of the blast led to the presence of water at the crime scene. The police collected debris from the crime scene and did not in fact hose it down. The Karachi police actions, while flawed, led to better preservation of the crime scene and better evidence collection, ultimately permitting investigators from the FIA to recover the suicide bomber’s striker sleeve. 136. The extraordinary nature of the hosing down of the crime scene generated such controversy that Punjab provincial officials recognized that some response was necessary. A committee of inquiry was set up by the Chief Minister of Punjab, to look into the washing down of the crime scene. The committee was composed of three senior Punjab officials. The Commission requested meetings with these individuals, which the facilitation committee was not able to arrange. No credible reason was provided.

137. The Punjab committee’s mandate was limited to the following:

- a. Inquire into the circumstances leading to the washing down of the scene;
- b. Determine whether it was done with any male fide intention; and,
- c. Determine whether it posed any difficulty in reaching a conclusion on the cause of death.

138. The committee started work on 14 February 2008 and concluded its work the next day on 15 February. While acknowledging that a crime scene should in principle be preserved “at least till a detailed search and thorough forensic examination” has been carried out, it accepted the Rawalpindi police explanation that the decision to hose down the crime scene was formed by the investigating police officer at the scene, SP Khurram, with permission from CPO Saud Aziz, on grounds of public order. It further found that

the decision was not made with any male fide intention and that washing the crime scene did not negatively impact on the conclusion as to the cause of death.

139. Several senior Pakistani police officials told the Commission that they did not consider the Punjab committee's findings credible. Indeed, it is difficult for the Commission to credit the committee's work. The terms of reference cast doubt on that committee's independence. The objective of crime scene management is the collection and preservation of evidence with the overall aim of solving the crime. By limiting its inquiry to the narrow question of whether washing the crime scene impeded the reaching of a conclusion as to cause of death, the committee inexplicably failed to consider the impact that hosing down the scene had on the broader criminal investigation. It was only because of the persistent efforts of FIA investigators that critical evidence was found in the sewers near the blast scene.

140. The very brief time spent by the Punjab committee in the conduct of its inquiry further compels the Commission to question its findings. In short, the Punjab committee constituted a whitewash of the actions of the Rawalpindi police in failing to manage the crime scene and destroy evidence. Not surprisingly, the work of the Punjab committee was counterproductive in that it further deepened the suspicion of many in Pakistan over the conduct of the police on 27 December 2007. Preservation of evidence

141. Even after the hosing down of the crime scene, questions continued to arise over the preservation of evidence by the Rawalpindi police, particularly in the period before investigators from the JIT started their work.

142. Ms Bhutto's Land Cruiser was initially taken to the City Police Station by Inspector Kashif Riaz some time after midnight early on 28 December and then taken to Police Lines.⁵ In the early hours of 28 December, CPO Saud Aziz went to see the Police Lines, together with others, including ISI officers, who were the first to conduct a forensic examination of the vehicle. An investigating police officer on the orders of the CPO, removed Ms Bhutto's shoes and took them to the City Police Station. Sometime thereafter, the shoes were ordered back into the car. This was ⁵clearly interfering with the integrity of the evidence. Furthermore, while the vehicle was parked at Police Lines, it was not properly preserved. The Commission was told that during a visit by some JIT members, people were seen in the vehicle cleaning it even though investigations were still on -going. When the JIT carried out its physical examination of the vehicle, they did not find any hair, blood or other matter on the lip of the escape hatch. Forensic analysis of swabs of the lip of the escape hatch later carried out by the JIT and Scotland Yard also found nothing. It is impossible to establish whether the interference with the vehicle resulted in the elimination of any matter that may have been present on the lip, or whether there was no such matter in the first place. It is clear, however, that such interference would have damaged any forensic evidence present.

On the decision not to carry out a post-mortem examination

143. The Commission was told that CPO Saud Aziz on three occasions refused the request of the doctors for permission to carry out a post-mortem examination on Ms Bhutto's remains. Pakistani law provides that in the case an unnatural death, the police must have a post-mortem examination report as part of their investigations. This requirement places the responsibility for initiating the examination on the police and not the hospital authorities.

⁵ Police Lines is an administrative centre for Rawalpindi District Police that includes barracks and other facilities.

Indeed, hospital authorities must get a request from the police before proceeding.

Numerous people interviewed, including all doctors and nearly all senior police officers, have reiterated this rule. Even CPO Saud Aziz himself acknowledged that this is the law in Pakistan 6 Only a District Magistrate may waive the need for a post-mortem examination. If the family of a deceased person does not wish to have a post-mortem examination carried out, it must apply to a judge for an order waiving the requirement.

144. Some people have suggested to the Commission that the practice is different from the legal requirement. Due primarily to religious considerations, permission from the family might be sought. There are sensitivities around conducting a post-

mortem examination of a woman in Pakistani culture. However, due to the forensic importance of the examination, the police might take steps to overcome any religious or cultural objections. One senior police officer explained that, in his experience, when family members have been reluctant to have a post-mortem examination, the police have taken time to convince them to change their position because the postmortem examination is so central to the conduct of any investigations

145. While denying that the doctors requested his authority for a post-mortem three times, CPO Saud Aziz told the Commission that because of the importance of the person of Ms Bhutto, he could not just have a post-mortem examination without first seeking her family's consent. He first sought the approval of the President of the PPP, Makhdoom Amin Fahim for a post-mortem examination. Mr Fahim told him⁶ that he was not in a position to give such approval and asked him to wait for Mr Zardari who was on his way to Pakistan from Dubai. When Mr Zardari arrived at Chaklala Airbase, the request for permission was made to him and he declined.

146. The Commission does not find that there are credible reasons for failing to carry out an autopsy on Ms Bhutto's. The body had already undergone invasive medical procedures when the open heart massage was undertaken. Moreover, a post-mortem examination limited to a complete external examination and not involving any invasive surgery could have been carried out. Even that limited exam was not conducted in this case. While one doctor did take a general look over the body, the doctors admit that this did not constitute a proper external post-mortem examination.

147. It is odd that Ms Bhutto's remains were moved to the Pakistan Air Force base (Chaklala Airbase) in Rawalpindi before Mr Zardari's arrival from Dubai. According to sources, the body was taken from the hospital around 2300 hours, on 27 December. The note signed by Mr Zardari accepting his wife's remains is timed 0110 hours on 28 December. If the police were genuinely waiting for Mr Zardari's permission before requesting a post-mortem examination, they should have left Ms Bhutto's remains at the hospital. Instead they moved her remains to Chaklala Airbase, thereby rendering such an examination more difficult. When questioned about this, senior Punjab officials stated that the plan was to carry out the examination at the base which also had medical facilities. However, the fact that Ms Bhutto's coffin was not taken to the medical facilities, but placed in a room at the base makes this assertion doubtful.

148. There was a series of memos from CPO Saud Aziz and his superiors regarding the absence of a post-mortem examination. The CPO wrote a memo to his immediate

⁶ Doctors have noted that autopsies were not normally conducted at RGH, but rather at District Headquarters Hospital also in Rawalpindi. Had the police requested one or acceded to the doctors' plea to have one, Ms Bhutto could have been moved to a different hospital for the post-mortem examination, or a pathologist from another hospital could have gone to RGH.

superior, the IGP of Punjab, dated 27 December, but actually written in the morning of 28 December, in which he reported that an autopsy could not be conducted because her husband had refused to authorize one. The IGP then sent a memo, also dated 27 December (and written on 28 December), to the Home Secretary of Sindh Province reporting Mr Zardari's refusal and suggesting that the matter be taken up by the Home Department of Sindh Province. On 28 December, a letter was written from the Punjab Additional Secretary, Internal Security, to the Sindh Home Secretary, requesting that the latter seek Mr Zardari's permission to conduct a post-mortem examination on Ms Bhutto's remains prior to burial.

149. The Commission finds the letter written by CPO Saud Aziz to be fundamentally misleading. Nothing in the letter explains why the autopsy had not been carried out earlier, during the preceding five hours while Ms Bhutto's remains were at RGH. Rather, the letter focuses solely on Mr Zardari's refusal to approve an autopsy – and portrays even that refusal in misleading terms. The letter is clearly intended to hide CPO Saud Aziz's fundamental failure to carry out his legal obligation regarding the autopsy and, instead, to redirect blame for this failure to Mr Zardari. The effort to pin responsibility for this failure on Mr Zardari is unacceptable.

No autopsy had been carried out even though five hours had passed since Ms Bhutto had been declared dead. The body had been placed in a coffin and brought to the PAF airbase.

CPO Saud Aziz placed Mr Zardari in an impossible situation – one which almost compelled Mr Zardari to refuse the request for an autopsy.

150. The subsequent letter by the IGP, Punjab reiterating the misleading summary of events set out in CPO Saud Aziz's letter reflects the willingness of his administrative superior to further this shift of responsibility and perpetrate a cover-up of the true reason behind the lack of a post-mortem examination.

151. In short, CPO Saud Aziz did not fulfil his legal obligation to order an autopsy. Having failed in that regard, he sought to cover up his failing by putting Mr Zardari in a situation designed to elicit his refusal of an autopsy. CPO Saud Aziz's further effort to cover his failings by writing a memo pinning blame on Mr Zardari was highly improper. On their face, these factors taken together strongly suggest a preconceived effort to prevent a thorough examination of Ms Bhutto's remains. 152. CPO Saud Aziz, an experienced senior police officer, refused to allow a post-

mortem examination. He certainly knew the requirements of the law and the practice of law enforcement in such cases. He need not have waited for Mr Zardari. He was, furthermore, aware of the importance and status of the person involved. All these factors together support the view held by many Pakistanis that CPO Saud Aziz did not act independently in this matter. CPO Saud Aziz's insistence on justifying his actions has made it difficult for the Commission to inquire any further and attempt to unearth who might have been behind the decision.

On whether Ms Bhutto was shot

153. Although a number of PPP members asserted publicly and in private shortly after the assassination that Ms Bhutto had been shot, none of the many PPP members, both senior and low-ranking, interviewed by the Commission could confirm that assertion. Some PPP members told the Commission that at least one of the doctors had initially stated that Ms Bhutto had suffered gunshot injuries, implying that the doctors must have deliberately altered their findings subsequently. The Commission was unable to find any

basis to support this view, however honestly held. Rather, some doctors do indeed acknowledge that they openly discussed the possibility of gunshot injuries early in their efforts to resuscitate Ms Bhutto, but excluded that possibility in their final assessment. There is one doctor who arrived during the evening at Rawalpindi General Hospital who continues to assert that there was a gunshot wound. He was not, however, an examining doctor and does not base his views on direct observation of a gunshot injury.

154. The Commission also interviewed some PPP supporters who had been injured in the blast. None had received any bullet wounds, as previously reported in some media reports. According to the police, over 25 people were also interviewed in the immediate aftermath of the incident, and none received bullet wounds. They were injured by ball bearings, but not bullets.

155. The Commission has not been provided with any credible, new information showing that Ms Bhutto had received bullet wounds. A senior PPP official, who had earlier publicly asserted that she had seen Ms Bhutto's gunshot injuries, retracted that statement when interviewed by the Commission. In fact, she had not seen Ms Bhutto's head wound and had been told to tell the media that she had seen bullet wounds. The Commission found that, although her supporters may have justifiably assumed that Ms Bhutto had been shot in the confusion surrounding the assassination, the continued assertion that she had been shot, without evidence, as well as the assertion of untrue eyewitness accounts, was and remains misleading. The Commission recognizes that the confusion and urgency at Rawalpindi General Hospital when Ms Bhutto was brought there would naturally have generated some discussion among the staff there about the possibility of a gunshot wound. Such discussions may have been misinterpreted by some as a medical finding

The Government Press Conference:

156. At about 1700 hours on the day following the assassination the government held a televised press conference, conducted by Brigadier Cheema, the spokesperson of the Ministry of Interior at which he announced that:

- a. Ms Bhutto died from a head injury sustained when from the force of the blast she hit her head on the lever of the escape hatch; and,
- b. Mr Baitullah Mehsud linked with Al -Qaida was responsible, presenting an intercepted telephone conversation between Mr Mehsud and one Mr Maulvi Sahib in which Mr Mehsud was heard congratulating Mr Maulvi on a job well-done.

157. The decision to hold the press conference was made by General Musharraf, during a meeting on the morning of 28 December at a facility in General Headquarters known as Camp House. That meeting, at which General Musharraf was briefed on the intercept and on medical evidence, was attended by the Directors General of the ISI, MI and the IB. Brigadier Cheema was summoned to a subsequent meeting at ISI Headquarters and directed by the Director General of the ISI to hold the press conference.

In attendance at this second meeting, in addition to Brigadier Cheema, were Interior Secretary Kamal Shah, Director General of the ISI, Director General of the IB, Deputy Director General of the ISI and another ISI brigadier. 158. The Musharraf government asserted that the evidence for the cause of death was clear. According to the government, video footage showed that the shooter's bullets did not hit Ms Bhutto. Based on the medical report indicating that she died of heavy bleeding from a head wound on the right side of her head, the Musharraf government set out its conclusion, through Brigadier Cheema, that she must have hit her head on the lever of the vehicle's escape hatch.

159. The press conference was met with widespread public scepticism and media outrage in Pakistan. The PPP and others accused the government of a cover up

Many questioned the sudden and timely appearance of the telephone intercept as well as the speed with which its contents were analyzed and interpreted. Many also challenged the view that Ms Bhutto had not been shot and questioned how quickly that purported analysis had been done. Furthermore, many senior PPP officials believed the government was suggesting, in an effort to demean Ms Bhutto, that she had caused her own death by emerging from her vehicle. In short, the press conference not only failed to provide credible answers to essential questions arising from the assassination, it triggered widespread suspicion that government authorities would not be conducting a genuine search for the truth. The First Joint Investigation Team (Punjab- led)

160. On 28 December, Punjab authorities set up a Joint Investigation Team (JIT) for the assassination. The JIT declared its work finished on 17 February 2008.

This section will provide an overview of the constitution, internal dynamics and focus of the first JIT established shortly after Ms Bhutto's assassination. It does not seek to set out in detail the JIT's findings. 161. Under the Anti -Terrorism Act, when a terrorist offence has been committed, the establishment of a JIT is mandatory.

The relevant provision is broad, defining a JIT as an investigation involving one law enforcement agency working together with other agencies, either law enforcement or intelligence. With other types of crimes, it is usually the provincial police that has primacy in the investigation of a crime, and for the Federal Capital Territory of Islamabad, the Federal Government takes the lead. But in terrorism cases, either the provincial police or the Federal Government can initiate a JIT. When initiated by a province, the provincial government takes the lead in selecting the team members. Due to the expertise of the Special Investigations Group (SIG) of the Federal Investigation Authority (FIA), the FIA generally assigns some of its officers from that section to the JIT. When a JIT is set up by a province, a notification is sent to the FIA inviting the assignment of SIG staff to the team.

162. The JIT was headed by Mr Abdul Majeed, Additional IG (AIG) for Punjab. In addition to police officials from Punjab, the JIT included three senior members of the FIA, including an explosives expert, a senior CID police officer at the rank of DIG, an expert on forensic photography and nine middle ranking police officers. At the time the JIT was established, AIG Majeed was out of the country and, for the first two days, the JIT was headed by the next most senior police officer on the team, the DIG/CID in Lahore, Mushtaq Ahmad Sukhera. DIG Sukhera and his team started work on 28 December 2007.

163. On the evening of 28 December, members of the JIT went to Police Lines where they met CPO Saud Aziz. Rather than proceeding directly to the crime site,⁷ CPO Saud Aziz laid out tea for the JIT investigators in a conference room. While the JIT members were still in the conference room, the television aired the press conference given by Brigadier Cheema. According to a credible source, at the end of the press conference, the CPO rhetorically asked the JIT members what they intended to investigate, since the perpetrator had been identified. When the JIT members pressed to visit the crime scene, CPO Saud Aziz, noting that it was already dark, stated instead that he would arrange for a visit to the scene in the morning.

⁷ The FIA was established under The FIA Act 1975. It has powers to investigate all offences that are set out in the Schedule to the Act, including terrorism. Expertise in the investigation of terrorism cases rests with the Special Investigation Group (SIG) within the FIA. The SIG was established after 11 September 2001 and became operational in April 2003.

The source noted above interpreted these actions as a means of hindering the JIT investigators' access to the crime site.

164. On 29 December, the following day, the JIT investigators returned to Police Lines where they were able to inspect Ms Bhutto's vehicle. They discovered early in their inspection that there was no blood or tissue on the escape hatch lever that would be consistent with the gaping injury to Ms Bhutto's head, suggesting strongly to the investigators that Ms Bhutto had not hit her head on the lever.

165. Following that inspection, rather than taking the investigators directly to the crime scene, CPO Saud Aziz hosted a lunch that went into the late afternoon, at the end of which he again, according to the same source cited above, indicated that it would be dark by the time the team arrived at the crime scene. It was only at around 1700 hours that the JIT investigators were taken to the crime scene at Liaquat Bagh. The Commission finds it inexplicable that the investigators were not in a position to conduct on-site investigations until two full days after the assassination. Such conduct further hampered the gathering of evidence and, at the very least, was contrary to best practices.

166. Once at the scene, the investigators could see that it had been hosed down. Despite the late hour, they spent seven hours there. They followed the water current, including wading through the drainage sewer and collected evidence from the debris. They were able to recover one bullet casing from the drainage sewer, later established through forensic examination to have been fired from the pistol bearing the bomber's DNA.

The JIT members left the scene around midnight. The Rawalpindi police provided security for them, and the road was cordoned off during the entire time. The next day, the team returned to continue the search. Upon their request, the scene remained cordoned off and the road closed. They eventually recovered other evidence in the course of their crime scene examination, including the partial skull of the suicide bomber from atop one of the buildings near the site.

167. On 31 December, AIG Majeed returned from his trip and took over the leadership of the JIT. This change at the JIT's helm resulted in a shift in the internal dynamics of the investigation. Mr Majeed effectively sidelined the senior and more experienced officers who had started the investigations and dealt directly with the most junior investigators of the JIT. Two senior officers invited into the JIT from the Sindh police decided to return to Sindh after only two days with the JIT. Much of the work carried out by the JIT from this point was led by information Mr Majeed received from the intelligence agencies, which retained sole control over the sharing of information with the police, providing it on a selective basis.

168. The scientific analysis of the suicide bomber's remains by the Scotland Yard team established that he was a teenage male, no more than 16 years old. According to the JIT's investigations, this young man was named Bilal also known as Saeed from South Waziristan. This was established through the links that the accused persons admitted having had with the bomber and the ISI telephone intercept of Baitullah Mehsud's conversation with Maulvi Sahib.

The accused persons

169. Five persons were arrested by the JIT: Aitezaz Shah, Sher Zehman, Husnain Gul, Mohamad Razaqat and Rasheed Ahmed. In addition, the JIT charged Nasrullah, Abdullah, Baitullah Mehsud and Maulvi Sahib as "proclaimed offenders". Baitullah Mehsud was killed in a drone attack in August 2009, and Nasrullah is reported to have been killed in an attack in FATA.

170. The Commission will not address in any detail the case against these individuals. It notes generally, however, that the accused are alleged to have served as handlers and logistics supporters of the suicide bomber, or as persons who were knowledgeable about the plans to assassinate Ms Bhutto but failed to provide such information to the police. The charges against them include aiding and abetting terrorism, murder and concealing information about the commission of a crime.

171. The JIT focused its efforts on investigating the alleged role of these low-level individuals. Little to no focus was placed on investigating those further up the hierarchy in the planning and execution of the assassination. In particular, the JIT did nothing to build a case against Mr Mehsud, treating the contents of the intercept presented to the public by Brigadier Cheema as determinative of his culpability. AIG Majeed told the Commission that he saw no need to establish the authenticity of the intercept or the basis for its analysis, including the voice identification and the interpretation of the conversation as a reference to the Ms Bhutto's assassination. The Commission finds this approach to the investigation contrary to best practices and inconsistent with a genuine search for the truth.

172. The Commission notes also with some concern the discrepancy in the detention record of some of the accused persons, particularly in light of the well-known controversy over extra-judicial detention by intelligence agencies prior to their arrest by law enforcement agencies.

Baitullah Mehsud

173. The then-government's assertion that Baitullah Mehsud was behind the assassination of Ms Bhutto was premature at best. Such a hasty announcement of the perpetrator prejudiced the police investigations which had not yet begun. Other flaw in the JIT's approach to investigating Baitullah Mehsud's alleged role in the assassination are also inconsistent with a genuine search for the truth.

174. The communication intercepted by the ISI is purported to be a telephone conversation between Emir Sahib (said to be Baitullah Mehsud) and Maulvi Sahib. In it, the two speakers congratulate each other on an event which Brigadier Cheema asserted was the assassination. The ISI asserts that they already had the voice signature of Baitullah Mehsud and were in a position to identify his voice on the intercept. In the English translation of transcript of the intercept, Emir Sahib at some point asked Maulvi Sahib: "who were they?" Maulvi Sahib replied: "There were Saeed, the second was Badarwala Bilal and Ikramullah was also there." Mehsud asked: "The three did it?" Maulvi Sahib replied: "Ikramullah and Bilal did it". The conversation did not mention Ms Bhutto by name. The Commission is not in a position to evaluate the authenticity of the purported intercept. Any further investigation into Ms Bhutto's assassination must include steps for such authentication.

175. It is not clear how or when the intercept from the ISI was recorded. A former senior ISI official told the Commission that the ISI had been tracking Baitullah Mehsud's communications closely and was, therefore in a position to identify his voice. Furthermore, he asserted that the ISI had been tracking Taliban - linked terrorist cells that were closely pursuing Ms Bhutto, targeting her at a series of successive public gatherings. According to this ISI official, it was one of these cells which finally assassinated Ms Bhutto in Rawalpindi.

176. The ISI was highly confident of the accuracy of its investigations, much of which were based on the analysis of intercepts, through which it was possible to identify each cell and also the link of each of these cells to Baitullah Mehsud. On the basis of its

investigations, the ISI detained four persons for involvement in the Karachi bombings within two weeks of that attack. According to the former ISI official cited above, interrogations confirmed their intercepts analysis. The Commission is not in a position to assess the credibility of this information from the ISI. However, this information does raise important questions, which are addressed further below.

177. There are media reports that Mr Mehsud denied responsibility for the assassination. Mr Saleh Shah Qureshi, Senator from South Waziristan, told the Commission that Mr Mehsud had categorically denied any involvement in the assassination attempt of 18-19 October and the subsequent assassination of Ms Bhutto on 27 December, questioning also the authenticity of the telephone intercept ascribed to Mr Mehsud. The JIT took no steps to investigate the veracity of any such denial. Rather, some government officials from that time told the Commission that any such denials would have no credibility, implying that such investigative steps would not be worthwhile.

178. After the arrest of the five accused persons, the JIT essentially ceased investigating the possibility of other perpetrators, particularly those who may have been involved in planning or directing the assassination by funding or otherwise enabling the assassination. The JIT even ended its efforts to identify the suicide bomber.

Persons accused by Ms Bhutto in a letter dated 16 October 2007

179. On 16 October 2007, Ms Bhutto writing from Dubai to General Musharraf, identified three people she considered a threat to her security: (i) Brigadier (ret) Ejaz Shah, Director General of the IB at the time of the assassination, (ii) General (ret) Hamid Gul, a former Director General of the ISI, and (iii) Mr Chaudhry Pervaiz Elahi, Chief Minister of Punjab until 22 November 2007.

180. The Ministry of Interior responded to Ms Bhutto in a letter dated 6 November 2007, stating that the threats she related had “neither tangible basis nor is there any evidence to support the perception” contained therein. The Commission spoke with two of those named in the letter and others close to them, all of whom hold the view that the letter was baseless and politically motivated. With respect to Ms Bhutto’s close aides, none of those who met with the Commission affirmed having seen the letter before it was written, and they had varying interpretations of its contents and intentions. One believed that the letter was intended to put political pressure on General Musharraf by naming two people closely associated with him and putting him on notice of her concerns. Other sources, including a former high-ranking foreign official, thought the men posed genuine threats to her security, linking them to the Establishment and its long-standing enmity towards the PPP and the Bhutto family. The Commission received no information of specific threats that they may have directed against Ms Bhutto.

181. In the course of their investigations, neither the Karachi nor the JIT investigators interrogated or interviewed any of these people. Karachi and JIT investigators explained that they could not summon and interrogate them on the basis of Ms Bhutto’s accusations, without more information. Ms Bhutto made indirect reference to these individuals in the FIR she filed in Karachi after the attack on 18-19 October. However, while the FIR referred to the 16 October letter, it did not provide the names, nor was a copy attached. Nor did any PPP member provide the names to the investigators. These factors were raised by Karachi and JIT investigators in explaining to the Commission why they declined to approach these three men.

182. While recognizing that Ms Bhutto and other PPP members were not forthcoming with the police on this issue, the Commission believes that police investigators should nonetheless have invited the three individuals to meet with them, on a voluntary basis.

The names of the three individuals had been widely circulated in the press, as Karachi and JIT investigators acknowledged.

PPP interaction with the investigations

183. The relationship between the PPP and the Pakistani police was characterised by mistrust on the part of the PPP. This was evident in their lack of co-operation with the Karachi police following the attack of 18-19 October 2007, and their lukewarm attitude towards the Rawalpindi investigations.

184. Apart from Major Imtiaz, the JIT never interviewed the people in the car with Ms Bhutto at the time of the incident. When asked about this, AIG Majeed explained that those persons had been summoned to be interviewed, but they refused to appear. However, some members of the JIT acknowledged that, while they could confirm that the letters summoning PPP members for interviews had been sent, they did not have any confirmation that they had been received. In general, the limited efforts of the JIT to reach out to the PPP are highlighted by a comparison to the efforts of the Karachi police after the October attack. There, although relations between the Karachi police and the PPP were tense, bordering on antagonistic, the Karachi police made efforts to accommodate PPP concerns by, among others things, replacing the initial lead investigator at the PPP's request.

185. PPP members deny that the police contacted them, asserting that they would have appeared if contacted. To underscore that willingness, they point out that when contacted by Scotland Yard they did, in fact, respond. In addition, they point out that they had spoken to several media outlets about the assassination and related events. They maintained that having been so close to Ms Bhutto, it was only natural that they would want the truth regarding her death to come out. 186. At the same time, several PPP members explained to the Commission that the PPP did not have faith in the integrity of the investigations and that, as a result, they did not cooperate with the police. Some senior PPP members acknowledged to the Commission that the PPP had, accordingly, adopted a policy against cooperating with the Karachi police investigation because the police had refused to register their FIR. This distrust of the police by the PPP was reflected also in Ms Bhutto's efforts to lodge a second FIR following the Karachi attack.

187. The Commission recognizes that the PPP distrust of the police investigations in both Karachi and Rawalpindi contributed to the party's unwillingness to cooperate with the criminal investigations. However, the PPP's refusal to cooperate with the Karachi and Rawalpindi investigations was not constructive. The Commission notes that PPP members clearly did not have to wait to be formally notified to talk to the police. As in any law enforcement matter, PPP members were free to take the initiative to speak to investigators.

Scotland Yard

188. Following discussions between the United Kingdom Prime Minister Gordon Brown and General Musharraf, it was agreed that a team of forensics experts and investigators from the Metropolitan Police's Counter Terrorism Command (SO15) would carry out a limited investigation to assist the Pakistani police investigation into Ms Bhutto's assassination. The team's work resulted in a confidential report.

189. The terms of reference for Scotland Yard's assistance, agreed between the UK's Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Interior Ministry of Pakistan, were made public through a statement issued on 11 January 2008 by the British High Commission in Pakistan. The main objective of the Scotland Yard team was "to assist the local authorities

in providing clarity regarding the precise cause of Ms Bhutto's death". According to the Scotland Yard report, a team of experts and investigators arrived in Pakistan on 4 January 2008 and spent two and a half weeks carrying out their investigation.

The British High Commission in Pakistan released an executive summary of the Scotland Yard report on 8 February 2008. The main body of the report has not yet been made public. 190. According to the summary, the team's key findings included the following:

- a. although not possible to "categorically...exclude" the possibility of a gunshot wound, the available evidence suggested there was no gunshot wound;
- b. Ms Bhutto died of a severe head injury caused by impact in the area of the escape hatch lip as a result of the blast; and
- c. the same individual both fired the shots and detonated the explosives.

The summary notes that the "task of establishing exactly what happened was complicated by the lack of an extended and detailed search of the crime scene, the absence of an autopsy...." However, it goes on to assert that "[n]evertheless, the evidence that is available is sufficient for reliable conclusions to be drawn." This latter comment has been seized upon by some Pakistani officials as support for the performance of the Rawalpindi District Police in the crime scene management and as support for their failure to allow the autopsy. It is unfortunate that the poor performance of the Rawalpindi police was excused in the executive summary.

191. Since only the executive summary is public, critical elements of the Scotland Yard report are not widely known. In the Commission's view, it is important to note that, in the Scotland Yard team's view, there was no forensic examination of the crime scene by the police on 27 December 2007.

8 The team found chaos and confusion understandable in the "immediate aftermath" of the blast and during the evacuation of casualties, but noted that there was never any organized or structured scene control or forensic examination that evening. For what evidence was collected, the Rawalpindi police often did not note their original location accurately. The Scotland Yard team was told by one police officer that the scene was searched for 45 minutes. Scotland Yard found that the scene was hosed down "within an hour" after the blast and, as a result, the "opportunity for a thorough forensic examination was lost".⁸ 192. Dr Nathaniel Cary, the pathologist appointed by Scotland Yard, confirmed that the force of the blast caused Ms Bhutto's fatal injury. However, Ms Bhutto did not suffer her injuries from hitting the latch of the escape hatch, as announced in the Ministry of Interior's press conference on 28 December 2007. Rather, Dr Cary asserted that her head struck somewhere on the lip of the escape hatch opening. While Scotland Yard's finding was arrived at after investigation, the Ministry of Interior's was conclusory.

193. As noted above, officials at the time sought also to invoke the Scotland Yard report to excuse the failure to conduct an autopsy. The report does not offer any support for that failure. Rather, the report cites Pakistan's Criminal Code of 1898 (as amended by Act II 1997, section 174(3) which mandates that a police officer shall submit a body for an autopsy and notes that Dr Aurangzeb had written that the cause of death was "[t]o be ascertained by autopsy." The team's executive summary noted that "[t]he task of establishing exactly what happened was complicated by [among other things] the absence of an autopsy." Furthermore, the summary expressly explains that Dr Cary was unable to

⁸ The Scotland Yard team makes no reference to the collection of evidence by intelligence agencies.

categorically exclude the possibility of a gunshot wound because of the “limited X-ray material, the absence of a full post mortem examination and CT scan.”

194. A number of officials from the Pakistani government at the time of the assassination and a number of police officials from the Punjab police have sought to cite the Scotland Yard report as support for, or ratification of, the Rawalpindi police’s security arrangements for Ms Bhutto or its management of the crime scene on 27 December 2007 and other actions or inactions of the Rawalpindi police and government officials at that time.

There is no factual or logical basis for such assertions. The Scotland Yard team stated clearly that they were not reviewing the security arrangements for Ms Bhutto and that identification of those responsible was not within the team’s terms of reference. 195. Given its extremely narrow mandate, much of the context in the Scotland Yard report was – as Scotland Yard emphasized – taken on good faith from the Pakistani police. That good faith was, in many respects, abused by officers of the Rawalpindi District Police, particularly with respect to security arrangements.

The Commission’s inquiry shows the accounts of the Rawalpindi police provided to Scotland Yard to be largely untrue.

196. At the request of the Commission, the Netherlands Forensic Institute (NFI) conducted a review of Scotland Yard’s investigation of the cause and manner of death of Ms Bhutto. Based on its analysis of the Scotland Yard report, the NFI prepared its own report for the Commission in which it concluded that there were no important inconsistencies in Scotland Yard’s investigation.

The further investigation: second JIT (FIA-led)

197. In October 2009, 18 months after the PPP government had come into power in Pakistan, the Ministry of Interior initiated further investigations, for which a JIT was formed, in order to investigate aspects of the case not covered by the first JIT. This JIT is federally led, with officers of the FIA/SIG leading the investigation, which is currently ongoing. The Commission will not comment in any detail on the work of this second JIT.

198. The Commission does note, generally, that this second JIT has been more rigorous in carrying out its investigations. The investigators have been vigorously pushing certain areas of the investigation and appear to have made some further progress. Nevertheless, it is unclear to what extent even this investigation will be free to conduct an unfettered pursuit of the truth, including in freely investigating those who may have borne the greatest responsibility for the planning and execution of Ms Bhutto’s assassination.

III. THREATS, RESPONSIBILITIES AND POSSIBLE CULPABILITIES

199. A determination of criminal responsibility for planning, organizing, funding, supporting and carrying out the assassination can only be made by the competent authorities of Pakistan.

This Commission has neither the authority nor the means to reach such conclusions.

Indeed, if it were to do so, it could jeopardize future prosecutions or make it difficult for future accused persons to receive fair trials. This section, instead, assesses hypotheses regarding possible culpabilities of individuals and entities that appeared to pose threats to Ms Bhutto. In addition, this section reviews the performance of those who were responsible for Ms Bhutto’s security and the investigation of her assassination. This section also reviews the role of Pakistan’s intelligence agencies in this case.

A. THREATS AND POSSIBLE CULPABILITIES REGARDING THE ASSASSINATION

200. The Commission's inquiry has resulted in a picture of the significant threats that Ms Bhutto faced on her return to Pakistan. In her writings and speeches, and in discussions with her colleagues as described to the Commission, Ms Bhutto was outspoken about her perception of the threats posed to her.

201. The conditions in Pakistan that resulted in threats to Ms Bhutto must be understood against the backdrop of Pakistan's recent history. Under the military dictatorship of General Zia ul Haq from 1977 to 1988, a once secular military was aligned with political Islam, and jihad was used as a tool to recruit and support insurgents fighting against the Soviet-backed government in Afghanistan. The Pakistani military organized and supported the Taliban to take control of Afghanistan in 1996. Similar tactics were used in Kashmir against India after 1989. These policies resulted in active linkages between elements of the military and the Establishment with radical Islamists, at the expense of national secular forces, and the 48 entrenchment of religious extremist and other militant groups in the tribal areas and Punjab. Ms Bhutto's return from exile in 2007 occurred against this backdrop. Therefore, a discussion of the threats to Ms Bhutto and of the forces that felt threatened by her potential return to power in Pakistan must include the following: Al -Qaida, Taliban and local jihadi groups and elements of the Establishment.

Al -Qaida

202. The Musharraf Government and Ms Bhutto disagreed on much, but they both identified threats to her arising from Islamist extremist groups. Ms Bhutto had concerns that Al -Qaida might have reason to do her harm. Her public positions against Al -Qaida-inspired Islamist violence, on the need to check extremism in the tribal areas, and on the perception among many that she was acting on behalf of the United States, are factors that could have made her a target for Al -Qaida and allied groups. She asserted in her 2007 book, *Reconciliation*, that Usama bin Laden funded the ISI's attempt to oust her first government in 1989 through a no-confidence motion in parliament.

A close associate remembered that during the election campaigning, Ms Bhutto told her, "Usama bin Laden would take out a lot of money to have me killed."

203. Al -Qaida posed a general threat to all Pakistani politicians, including Ms Bhutto, who were not in line with their thinking. But as her return to Pakistan neared, and as she vigorously campaigned for the election, the threat to her increased and became specific. The Al -Qaida threats to Ms Bhutto were relayed to her by the Pakistan Government and United Arab Emirates authorities.

204. After the Karachi attack, on 23 October, senior PPP leader and Ms Bhutto's lawyer, Mr Farooq Naek, received a hand-written letter at his office from a person claiming to be the "head of suicide bombers and a friend of Al -Qaida" and threatening that Ms Bhutto would be assassinated in a gruesome manner. Mr Naek notified the Supreme Court, urging that the threat be passed on to the government with a request to strengthen Ms Bhutto's security.

205. Further indications of the Al -Qaida threat to Ms Bhutto emerged two days after her death when Al -Qaida spokesman Mustafa Abu al Yazid claimed responsibility for her assassination in a telephone interview with Asia Times Online. He stated: "We have terminated the most precious American asset who vowed to defeat mujaheddin." Al Yazid said that Al -Qaida had ordered the assassination, which was carried out by operatives of Lashkar e Jangvi, a Punjab jihadi group with a strong anti -Shia bias. Al -Qaida stood to gain from the political destabilization of Pakistan that followed her

assassination. Given the above, the Commission believes that the competent authorities of Pakistan should vigorously pursue the possible role of Al -Qaida in Ms Bhutto's assassination.

The Pakistani Taliban and other local jihadi groups 9

206. The Pakistani Taliban is an agglomeration of Pashtun militant Islamist groups operating in the tribal areas. They are closely aligned with the Afghan Taliban, and with Al -Qaida. Several of these groups banded together in late 2007 to form the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud, a Taliban commander from South Waziristan. Beginning initially as a support network for the Afghan Taliban and Al -Qaida in Pakistan's tribal areas, the Pakistan Taliban became an actor in its own right after General Musharraf was perceived to have sided with the United States' anti -terror efforts. As a result, the Pakistani Taliban now constitutes a significant threat to Pakistan's internal stability.

207. The jihadi organizations are Sunni groups based largely in Punjab. Members of these groups aided the Taliban effort in Afghanistan at the behest of the ISI and later cultivated ties with Al -Qaida and Pakistani Taliban groups. The Pakistani military and ISI also used and supported some of these groups in the Kashmir insurgency after 1989. The bulk of the anti -Indian activity was and still remains the work of groups such as Lashkar e Taiba, which has close ties with the ISI.

A common characteristic of these jihadi groups was their adherence to the Deobandi Sunni sect of Islam, their strong anti -Shia bias, and their use by the Pakistani military and intelligence agencies in Afghanistan and Kashmir.

208. Given this background, it is not surprising that they posed a threat to Ms Bhutto and what she stood for. Ms Bhutto was not only a modernist politician and the leader of a major secular party, she also spoke out strongly and publicly against the extremist Islam espoused by these groups. She was supportive of the United States approach to terrorism, and it was open knowledge that the United Kingdom and United States were aiding in her return to Pakistan. And despite her differences with General Musharraf, she had supported his crackdown on militants, including in the Red Mosque episode in July 2007. Indeed, she had repeatedly castigated General Musharraf for doing a half-hearted job on the terror front. Many believe that Ms Bhutto's gender was also an issue with the religious extremists who believed that a woman should not lead an Islamic country. She was perceived as a Shia, at least by some militants, because her mother and husband are Shia. 209. Just before Ms Bhutto's return to Pakistan in October 2007, a newspaper report quoting Senator Saleh Shah Qureshi of South Waziristan, noted that Baitullah Mehsud had threatened to welcome Ms Bhutto with a wave of suicide bombers. The report was emphatically denied by Senator Saleh Shah. However, several sources in Pakistan have told the Commission that Baitullah Mehsud presented a credible threat to Ms Bhutto. Along these lines, two of Baitullah Mehsud's aides, when escorting a British Broadcasting Corporation journalist in South Waziristan in early October 2007, said that they were convinced that Ms Bhutto's impending return to Pakistan was part of a power-sharing deal with General Musharraf that was meant to strengthen the already strong pro-Americanism of the Pakistani Government. "She is actually a Shia, so what else can we expect", one of the aides told the journalist, according to the BBC report.

⁹ The term jihadi is understood in Pakistan to denote those groups that fought against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, and later carried out actions in Kashmir. Several of these groups and their splinters have established links with Al-Qaida and the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban.

210. Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud was also blamed for the assassination by the government of General Musharraf in its 28 December 2007 press conference. Former senior intelligence officials told the Commission that in November and December, they had been tracking multiple suicide bomb cells that targeted Ms Bhutto in Larkana, Mardan, Peshawar and Rawalpindi. Senior officials of the current Pakistani government have expressed their belief in Mr Mehsud's involvement, although they continue to believe that he was part of a larger conspiracy.

211. Taliban and Al -Qaida culpability was also supported by Mr Michael Hayden, the Director of the United States Central Intelligence Agency. He alleged in a Washington Post interview on 18 January 2008 that Ms Bhutto was killed by fighters allied with Baitullah Mehsud with support from Al -Qaida's terrorist network. The United States Government did not permit the Commission to meet with United States intelligence officials to ascertain the basis for Mr Hayden's assertion.

212. These factors alone are insufficient to gauge possible Taliban and jihadi culpability for Ms Bhutto's assassination. Nevertheless, almost no one the Commission has interviewed, including Ms Bhutto's PPP colleagues, deny that the militants (Taliban and jihadi groups) posed a threat to Ms Bhutto. One retired general, quite critical of the Musharraf regime, admits: "Baitullah Meshud would be one of those who would have wanted [Ms Bhutto] killed." The Commission believes that the competent authorities of Pakistan should aggressively pursue the possible role of the TTP and Pakistani jihadi groups in Ms Bhutto's assassination.

Threats from the Establishment

213. The Establishment is generally used in Pakistan to refer to those who exercise de facto power; it includes the military high command and the intelligence agencies, together with the top leadership of certain political parties, high-level members of the bureaucracy and business persons that work in alliance with them. The military high command and intelligence agencies form the core of the Establishment and are its most permanent and influential components.

214. Ms Bhutto, through her writings and public statements, was outspoken as to the sources of the threats she faced; key among these were elements of the Establishment, whose tactics and reach she knew well. She and many others held the military and the intelligence agencies responsible for a number of "dirty" campaigns against her when she ran for office in the 1980s and 1990s, as well as for orchestrating the sacking of her governments. She believed that the policies she advocated a return to civilian rule and democracy, human rights, negotiations with India, reconciliation with the non-Muslim world, and confrontation with radical Islamists - threatened the Establishment's continued control of Pakistan.

215. Ms Bhutto's relevant policy proposals, including those laid out in the PPP's Manifesto for 2007, called for restrictions on the power of the military and intelligence agencies. She proposed bringing them under civilian, democratic controls, with provisions for transparency and control of the military budget and spending. She vowed publicly to use reforms to rid the intelligence agencies of elements driven by political or religious motives. Some of the positions taken by Ms Bhutto that touched Establishment concerns included:

- a. Her publicly stated position on the need to eliminate all remnants of the military-militant nexus. Her proposal was to eliminate the military and intelligence ties to the Taliban and jihadis, although many in those institutions still publicly regarded these groups as important foreign policy tools to advance national interests against India in

the sub-region. In this vein, Ms Bhutto denounced the military's various truces with Taliban militants in Swat and the tribal areas, arguing that they amounted to appeasement.

b. Her independent position on the urgent need to improve relations with India, and its implications for the Kashmir dispute, which the military had regarded as its policy domain.

c. Her frequent denunciation of the role of the military and the intelligence agencies in domestic politics.

d. The perception of her willingness to accommodate Western concerns. While the military and others in the Establishment were willing to cooperate with the United States, United Kingdom and other Western states, Ms Bhutto was portrayed as overly pliant.

e. Her alleged willingness to compromise Pakistan's nuclear programme and allow greater Western access to it. The military has kept a tight grip on its nuclear secrets and its persistent refusal to allow international access to Dr A Q Khan, the Pakistani nuclear scientist who sold nuclear weapons knowledge to other countries. Ms Bhutto had said that she would give the International Atomic Energy Agency access to Dr Khan, although her statement was twisted in some media stories.

216. Many sources interviewed by the Commission believe that the Establishment was threatened by the possibility of Ms Bhutto's return to high public office and that it was involved in or bears some responsibility for her assassination. Their analysis is based on years of observation and knowledge of how the Establishment works, although they do not offer any specific evidence with regard to the Bhutto assassination.

217. Several of these sources spoke of the existence of elements within the Establishment who saw her return to an active political life in Pakistan as a threat to their power.

These elements included, in particular, those who retain links with radical Islamists, especially the militant jihadi and Taliban groups and are sympathetic to their cause or view them as strategic assets for asserting Pakistan's role in the region.

The development of these organizations and the spread of Islamist extremism, which marginalized secular democratizing forces, was promoted during the General Zia ul Haq military regime (which overthrew the civilian government headed by Ms Bhutto's father and later executed him); the ISI cultivated these relationships, initially in the context of the Cold War and the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan in the 1980's and later in support of Kashmiri insurgents.

While several Pakistani current and former intelligence officials told the Commission that their agencies no longer had such ties in 2007, virtually all independent analysts provided information to the contrary and affirmed the ongoing nature of many such links.

218. Ms Bhutto's own concerns about threats to her by Al-Qaida and other militants resulted in part from her knowledge of their links with people who had worked with or been assets of the ISI. She feared that the authorities could activate these connections, using radical Islamists to harm her, while hiding their own role in any attack. This was the basis for her allegations against Lt. General (ret) Hamid Gul and Brigadier (ret) Ejaz Shah, in her 16 October letter to General Musharraf. Gul was Director General of MI under Zia ul Haq and then Director General of the ISI when Ms Bhutto was Prime Minister in 1988-90.

Although he was retired, Ms Bhutto believed he still maintained his former close ties with the militant jihadis. Brigadier Ejaz Shah, Director General of the Intelligence Bureau in 2007 and a former ISI officer, was a member of General Musharraf's inner circle.

When Omar Saeed Sheikh, the main accused in the Daniel Pearl murder case, was cornered in 2002, he requested to surrender to Brigadier Shah. Some believe this was because of Brigadier Shah's reported intelligence connections with Mr Sheikh; Brigadier Shah vigorously denied this and told the Commission that the surrender was facilitated through family ties in their home community.

219. Militants of particular concern to Ms Bhutto and others included Qari Saifullah Akhtar, one of the founders of the extremist Harkat ul Jihad Islami (HuJI), whom she accused of involvement in a failed coup attempt against her in 1995, during her second government. Mr Akhtar, who was living in Pakistan when Ms Bhutto returned from exile, was reportedly one of the ISI's main links to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and is believed to have cultivated ties to Mr bin Laden, who lived in Afghanistan during that period. Ms Bhutto believed that Mr Akhtar was connected to the Karachi attack against her in October 2007. Mr Akhtar's one-time deputy Ilyas Kashmiri, who had ties with the Pakistani military during the Afghan and Kashmir campaigns, had been a senior aide to Mr bin Laden's deputy Ayman al Zawahiri. 220. It was such links and connections between elements in the intelligence agencies and militants, which most concerned Ms Bhutto and many others who believed that the authorities could activate these connections to harm her. Given their clandestine nature, any such connection in an attack on her is very difficult to detect or prove.

221. Ms Bhutto also emerged as a potential threat for General Musharraf, as she increasingly challenged his plans to maintain his hold on power, first by returning to Pakistan to campaign, then by focusing on the potential for election rigging, and finally by campaigning directly against the military dictatorship during the weeks of martial law. Some believe that he became increasingly angry at Ms Bhutto for criticizing him and his regime so strongly, after having engaged in negotiations with him. Along the same lines, General Musharraf's allies, the PML-Q were also threatened by Ms Bhutto, as they had the most to lose if the PPP were to win the elections and displace them from their majority position in Parliament.

222. Over the course of her campaign in Pakistan before her assassination, Ms Bhutto developed the view that General Musharraf was the main threat to her safety. As she saw it, his government was not providing the security she was warranted and deserved due to the threats against her and her status as a former prime minister. An email she sent to her United States-based adviser, Mr Mark Siegel, stressed her security concerns and stated: "I have been made to feel insecure by Musharraf and his minions."

223. The Commission believes that the criminal investigation of both attacks against Ms Bhutto, first in Karachi and in Rawalpindi when she was killed, must include a focus on those who may have been involved, not only on the direct operational level, but also in their conception, planning and financing. In this regard, the pertinent authorities should follow all leads and explore all reasonable hypotheses in this regard, including the possible involvement of those who form part of the Establishment.

Other hypotheses of culpability

224. The assassination of Ms Bhutto has led to a proliferation of hypotheses regarding possible perpetrators. These include other governments and Bhutto family members, close associates and security aides. The majority of these hypotheses do not assert any basis in evidence, with some seeking to do no more than name persons believed to have

benefited in some way from Ms Bhutto's death, including those closest to her. The stubborn persistence of these hypotheses is attributable almost entirely to the abject failure of the government authorities at the time to carry out an investigation with vigour and integrity. The Commission need not address each of these many theories in turn. It is sufficient to note that the proper response is an unfettered criminal investigation – a meaningful search for truth – which has thus far been frustrated.

B. RESPONSIBILITIES

Security provided by the Pakistani authorities

225. The Pakistani Government failed in its responsibility to protect Ms Bhutto. Her status as a former prime minister and a leading political candidate and the existence of credible threats on her life should have prompted an effective security response.

226. There was no overall federal security plan to safeguard Ms Bhutto. The federal nature of the organization of the Pakistani police made the establishment of a uniformly high level security programme difficult, but this does not absolve the federal Government of responsibility.

227. Provincial police did not receive from the Ministry of Interior security instructions for Ms Bhutto like those provided for the protection of other former prime ministers. As a result, security provisions for her varied from election rally to election rally depending on the capacity and motivation of the provincial and local police.

In addition, the effectiveness of the police security plans relied to a great extent on the supplemental security provided by the PPP. There was no overall security plan to provide protection to Ms Bhutto between campaign events.

228. The provision of security equipment from the authorities for Ms Bhutto was inadequate, and the equipment provided often did not work.

229. The Pakistani authorities identified threats to Ms Bhutto and urged her not to return to Pakistan.

There is little evidence of efforts by the authorities to act against those threats. Given the seriousness of the threats identified by the Government and the dangerous individuals and institutions presenting those threats, the federal response to the danger to Ms Bhutto was extremely inadequate. The federal authorities took on no effective responsibility for her security, merely passing on threat warnings to Ms Bhutto and provincial authorities, and agreeing to the appointment of Major Imtiaz as a liaison between the authorities and the PPP. 230. The appointment of Major Imtiaz as a liaison between the authorities and Ms Bhutto proved to be insufficient. There was little support for Major Imtiaz by the federal or local authorities. Since he travelled with her most of the time, he was not able to work effectively with federal or local authorities to plan security arrangements in advance or receive adequate information from them.

Major Imtiaz's appointment gives the impression of federal support, but it was ineffectual.

231. At Liaquat Bagh, on 27 December 2007, security for Ms Bhutto by the Punjab police was ineffective, insufficient and passive. Her assassination could have been prevented with proper security. The security plan was not adequate, and there is little evidence that it was even implemented. The plan called for the deployment of 1,371 police, but the Commission does not believe that the number of police actually deployed came close to that figure. The performance of the police demonstrated a lack of seriousness of purpose, a lack of leadership at the top and insufficient commitment among the ranks.

232. On Ms Bhutto's departure from the rally, the police did not control the crowds outside Liaquat Bagh and coming from within the park. As a result the crowd was able to surround her vehicle thereby slowing it down. Video footage and photographs show very little police presence at this time. The delay in the departure of Ms Bhutto from the scene is due to the crowds blocking her car. The Elite police unit that was supposed to provide a "box" security for Ms Bhutto's vehicle were not immediately present to do so. The police had a responsibility to ensure that the departure proceeded quickly and smoothly, and that if the primary route was blocked, an alternative route could be used. That the only alternative route was blocked by parked police cars is inexcusable. Their failure to clear Liaquat Road to allow for a rapid departure from the rally was a critical failure.

233. There was no emergency plan in place in case of an attack. Once the attack occurred, chaos ensued. Her vehicle was not accompanied by a police escort to get her to a hospital quickly. It is extraordinary that her vehicle was stuck alone on Murree Road until the arrival of Ms Sherry Rehman's car which took her to the hospital. Save for the people in her vehicle, Ms Bhutto was alone, without police escort or support from the back up armoured vehicle that was supposed to be part of her convoy.

234. The inadequacy of the Rawalpindi District Police's security arrangements for Ms Bhutto is further underscored when compared to those of the Karachi police for Ms Bhutto's arrival there on 18 October 2007. The event of Ms Bhutto's return to Pakistan clearly had a higher profile than the Rawalpindi public gathering. However, that difference cannot account for the fundamental differences in the security arrangements. Unlike the Rawalpindi District Police, the Karachi police engaged in an extensive series of meetings with the PPP to develop security arrangements cooperatively. The Karachi police also had a more coherent written security plan, which emphasized coordination with PPP security elements, and integrated them into the plan. The seriousness of purpose with which the Karachi police made their security arrangements was also reflected in the concrete efforts they undertook to test the efficacy of their security plan. These efforts included a full rehearsal of the security plan on 17 October 2007, involving thousands of police officers.

Security provided by the PPP

235. The PPP was forced, by the nature of the threats to Ms Bhutto and a perception that the authorities would not adequately protect her, to devise supplemental security arrangements.

236. While the PPP did not bear responsibility for Ms Bhutto's security, its own provision of security was characterized by disorganization and a lack of professionalism. Each senior PPP official the Commission spoke with on this issue described the PPP security arrangements differently. Even though Mr Rehman Malik claimed that he was not an adviser on physical security, the letters he wrote to authorities, and his liaison role with security and intelligence agencies shows that he was deeply involved in the overall management of Ms Bhutto's security. His departure from the scene at Rawalpindi after the attack allowed her damaged vehicle to become isolated. The rapid departure of the only back up vehicle, in which Mr Malik and other senior PPP leaders rode, was a serious security lapse. After moving a safe distance away from the scene of the attack, the occupants of the vehicle should have waited to see for themselves if Ms Bhutto's vehicle was able to depart safely and if there was a need for a back up vehicle. As the back-up, their vehicle would have been a necessary part of the convoy whether Ms Bhutto's vehicle was damaged or not.

237. Major Imtiaz did not provide leadership after the attack, although he was assigned to the team precisely for this reason. It is understandable that others in the vehicle would be overwhelmed by the shock of the attack, but as the lead security professional in the vehicle, he would have been expected to provide leadership at that critical moment.

The criminal investigations

238. There was not an effective or active criminal investigation of either the Karachi or the Rawalpindi attacks. This is inexplicable in terms of the basic principles of effective police work and contrary to the legal responsibilities of the relevant authorities.

239. There is no evidence that the Rawalpindi police made any attempt to seal the crime scene in the aftermath of Ms Bhutto's assassination despite the purported 1,371 strong police deployment. The decision to use a fire hose on the crime scene within one hour and forty minutes of the attack – allegedly because of civil unrest and in order to prevent rioting – is not acceptable, and effectively destroyed evidence. This destruction made it extremely difficult if not impossible to gather more DNA evidence than the minimal amount already gathered. This massive loss of evidence did irreparable damage to the crime scene. Contrary to the 23 pieces of evidence gathered by the police, attacks of this type would typically result in the collection of thousands of pieces of evidence.

240. The Commission is not convinced that the decision to wash the scene was made by CPO Saud Aziz alone. The attack was too significant and the target of the attack too important to Pakistani society to make such a decision solely on his level. Sources told the Commission that CPO Saud Aziz was constantly talking on his mobile phone while at the hospital. In the Commission's view, he has not adequately explained who called him during that time. Other sources have provided credible information about the intervention of intelligence agencies in the case. Whoever was responsible for this decision, and for whatever reason, acted in a manner that is contrary to the most basic police standards and hampered the proper investigation of the assassination.

241. The handling of other important items of evidence, most significantly the failure to preserve the vehicle in which Ms Bhutto rode and other vehicles for technical examination prevented the gathering of important evidence.

242. The absence of an autopsy caused serious damage to the investigation. The lack of a clear cause of death established by an autopsy severely affected the credibility of the Government among the general public and has given rise to wide speculation as to the cause of Ms Bhutto's death. CPO Saud Aziz again appears in a setting in which he seems to have been able to impede the effective investigation of the crime. Again, it is unlikely that a police officer of his level could make such significant and ultimately destructive decisions on his own and wield such power. CPO Saud Aziz maintains that he did not deny any requests for an autopsy.

243. The Government press conference of 28 December 2007 – the day after the assassination and the day that the Joint Investigation Team was formed – prejudiced the investigation and eroded public confidence. This problem is especially acute because Pakistan was led by a military government in a society in which the military has significant and broad authority. The Commission concludes that the decision for the press conference was made by General Musharraf.

244. The investigation of the JIT, apart from the first few days after the attack, was characterized by inaction.

245. After the early actions of the members of the JIT, particularly by the Federal Investigation Agency members, the JIT relied almost exclusively on information received

from intelligence agencies without follow up police work. They did not engage in the most basic police procedures, such as interviewing the occupants of Ms Bhutto's vehicle. Even if those persons and others within the PPP did not wish to cooperate with the authorities, the Pakistani police had the means to summon participation, and it is surprising that they did not, given the seriousness of the crime.

246. There has been essentially no communication between the Karachi police officials investigating the Karachi attack and the Rawalpindi police officials in the JIT investigating the assassination. The two police investigations remain unconnected, despite the need for full communication and cooperation in these linked complex cases. 247. The Commission is concerned that its existence enabled the authorities responsible for the investigation to slow their activities. For example, the Government, which has been in office since April 2008, only commenced the further investigation in October 2009. The Commission's effort to determine the facts and circumstances of Ms Bhutto's assassination is not a substitute for an effective, official criminal investigation. These activities should have been carried out simultaneously. Ms Bhutto was killed more than two years ago. A Government headed by her party, the PPP, has been in office for most of that time, and it only began the further investigation, a renewal of the stalled official investigation, in October 2009. This is surprising to the Commission. Role of intelligence agencies 10

248. A number of knowledgeable and credible persons with whom the Commission spoke cited the pervasive reach, control and clandestine role of intelligence agencies in Pakistani society. In the course of this inquiry, the Commission encountered abundant confirmation of this not only in law enforcement matters, but also in various aspects of the country's political life during 2007.

249. Particularly noteworthy was the intense involvement of intelligence agencies in criminal investigations. While it is often necessary, especially in terrorism cases, for intelligence agencies to provide significant assistance to police investigative authorities, in the investigation of Ms Bhutto's assassination, the role of intelligence agencies far exceeded an assisting role, with the effect of subordinating law enforcement institutions.

250. The agencies, and in particular the ISI, carried out parallel investigations into both the Karachi attack and the assassination in Rawalpindi. A former intelligence official with direct knowledge of the matter told the Commission that the ISI had conducted its own investigation of the Karachi attack and had successfully detained four men who provided logistical support for the attack. None of the police or other civilian officials interviewed by the Commission regarding Karachi reported any knowledge of such detentions. The same source told the Commission that ISI agents covering Ms Bhutto's meeting in Liaquat Bagh on 27 December were the first to secure her vehicle and take photos of it after the attack there, among other actions. One very prominent and directly knowledgeable former government official informed the Commission that the ISI was, in fact, responsible for the investigation of Ms Bhutto's assassination. Others have asserted that the Intelligence Bureau had and still has a significant role in the investigation.

251. Members of the JIT that investigated Ms Bhutto's assassination all but admitted that virtually all of their most important information, including that which led to the identification and arrest of those suspects now in prison, came from intelligence agencies. The Commission is satisfied that this was the case given that there is little¹⁰

¹⁰ Pakistan has three major intelligence agencies. The Intelligence Bureau (IB) is the main civilian intelligence agency and focuses on domestic intelligence; however it reports to the Prime Minister rather than the Minister of the Interior and has generally been led by a high-ranking military official. Military Intelligence (MI), is the section of the Army specialized in intelligence and reports to the Chief of Army Staff. The Inter-Services

indication that the JIT considered any other hypotheses, followed leads or developed its own evidence beyond the framework set by those agencies.

252. Several high-ranking law enforcement officials expressed concerns to the Commission that resources to build investigative capacity, especially in terrorism cases, have gone to the intelligence agencies, while police resources and capacity lag. Indeed, in the aftermath of the attempts on General Musharraf's life, the capacity of the ISI was strengthened to allow it to engage more effectively in such investigations. This tendency has led to a distortion and imbalance in the functions of these institutions and presents a challenge for the future in ensuring the democratic rule of law.

253. Given the historical and possibly continuing relationships between intelligence agencies and some radical Islamist groups that engage in extremist violence, the agencies could be compromised in their investigations of crimes possibly carried out by such groups.

254. Wiretapping can, of course, be a legitimate intelligence and law enforcement tool. Yet in its efforts to determine the provenance and authenticity of the phone intercept used to implicate Baitullah Mehsud in the assassination of Ms Bhutto, the Commission received credible information regarding the systematic wire-tapping by the ISI and the IB not only of suspected terrorists and other criminals, but also of politicians, government officials, journalists and social activists. These activities are not authorized or overseen by judicial authorities and are not in keeping with the operations of such agencies in a democratic society.

255. Beyond their involvement in criminal investigations, the Commission encountered a far-reaching presence of intelligence agencies in several key aspects of the tumultuous events of 2007, which formed an important part in shaping the circumstances and context of Ms Bhutto's return to Pakistan. This pervasive presence at times called into question the ability of other institutions to exercise their full, independent mandate and functions.

256. The electoral process was one such area. The involvement of intelligence agencies, and specifically the ISI, in influencing electoral outcomes in past elections is well-documented and was confirmed to the Commission by a former senior intelligence official. Ms Bhutto had her own concerns and reportedly asked General Musharraf that ISI interference in the elections be curbed as part of guaranteeing free and fair elections. The day after her July meeting in Abu Dhabi with General Musharraf, an aide to Ms Bhutto was sent secretly to Islamabad on her behalf to review the work of the firm hired to create the new electoral lists; his site visits for this purpose were facilitated directly by General Kayani and other ISI staff. The former senior intelligence official also explained that in 2007 the ISI had guaranteed that there would be no rigging. While by all accounts, the 2008 elections were "the most fair" in recent Pakistani history, constitutionally, the task of safeguarding the electoral process is the role of the Pakistan Electoral Commission.

257. The deep and direct involvement of the ISI, through its most senior leadership, in the political negotiations between General Musharraf and Ms Bhutto in all of its stages and the role of all of the intelligence agencies in efforts to sack the Chief Justice and influence the composition of the Courts are additional examples of their central function.

258. This pervasive involvement of intelligence agencies in diverse spheres, which is an open secret, has undermined the rule of law, distorted civilian-military relations and

Intelligence (ISI) draws on the intelligence capacity of the three military service branches, in addition to its own more autonomous capacity; considered to be the pre-eminent agency among the three, nominally it reports to the Prime Minister, but generally its effective practice has been to report to the Chief of Army Staff.

weakened some political and law enforcement institutions. At the same time, it has contributed to wide-spread public distrust in those institutions and fed a generalized political culture that thrives on competing conspiracy theories.

IV. MAIN FINDINGS

259. The Commission has come to the following findings:

- i. After nine years in exile, former Prime Minister Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto returned to Pakistan on 18 October 2007, during an exceptionally violent year, marked by sharp increases in violence carried out both by Islamist extremists and by the state. She returned in the context of a tenuous and inconclusive political agreement with General Pervez Musharraf, as part of a process encouraged and facilitated by the governments of the United Kingdom and the United States. While their discussions included the issue of an eventual power sharing arrangement, the final terms were never agreed. Indeed, the Commission received no compelling evidence that, by the time of her assassination, either Ms Bhutto or General Musharraf believed that she or he still needed the support of the other to achieve their ultimate political goals.
- ii. Ms Bhutto was murdered on 27 December 2007 when a 15 and a half year-old suicide bomber detonated his explosives near her vehicle as she was leaving the PPP event at Liaquat Bagh. No one believes that this boy acted alone. A range of government officials failed profoundly in their efforts first to protect Ms Bhutto and second to investigate with vigour all those responsible for her murder, not only in the execution of the attack, but also in its conception, planning and financing.
- iii. Responsibility for Ms Bhutto's security on the day of her assassination rested with the federal Government, the government of Punjab and the Rawalpindi District Police. None of these entities took necessary measures to respond to the extraordinary, fresh and urgent security risks that they knew she faced.
- iv. The federal Government under General Musharraf, although fully aware of, and tracking, the serious threats to Ms Bhutto's security, did little more than pass on those threats to her and provincial authorities and were not 61 proactive in neutralizing them or ensuring that the security provided was commensurate to the threats. The federal Government failed in its primary responsibility to provide effective protection to Ms Bhutto on her return to Pakistan.
- v. The federal Government lacked a comprehensive security plan for Ms Bhutto, relying instead on provincial authorities, but then failed to issue to them the necessary instructions. Particularly inexcusable was the Government's failure to direct provincial authorities to provide Ms Bhutto the same stringent and specific security measures it ordered on 22 October 2007 for two other former prime ministers who belonged to the main political party supporting General Musharraf. This discriminatory treatment is profoundly troubling given the devastating attempt on her life only three days earlier and the specific threats against her which were being tracked by the ISI.
- vi. Ms Bhutto's assassination on 27 December 2007 could have been prevented if the Rawalpindi District Police had taken adequate security measures. The security arrangements for Ms Bhutto by the Rawalpindi District Police were ineffective and insufficient. The police's security plan, as written, was flawed, containing insufficient focus on Ms Bhutto's protection and focusing instead on the deployment of police for crowd control purposes. In many respects, the security plan was not implemented. Although the plan called for deploying 1,371 police officers, the actual deployment

did not approach that number. Among other failings: the police co-ordinated poorly with the PPP's own security; police escort units did not protect Ms Bhutto's vehicle as tasked; parked police vehicles blocked the emergency route; and, the police took grossly inadequate steps to clear the crowd so that Ms Bhutto's vehicle would have safe passage on leaving Liaquat Bagh. The performance of individual police officers and police leadership was poor in areas of forward planning, accountability and command and control.

vii. The additional security arrangements of the PPP lacked leadership and were inadequate and poorly executed. The Commission recognizes the heroism of individual PPP supporters, many of whom sacrificed themselves to protect Ms Bhutto. However, Ms Bhutto was left vulnerable in a severely damaged vehicle that was unable to transport her to the hospital by the irresponsible and hasty departure of the bullet-proof Mercedes-Benz which, as the back-up vehicle, was an essential part of her convoy.

viii. The Rawalpindi District Police's actions and omissions in the immediate aftermath of the assassination of Ms Bhutto, including the hosing down of the crime scene and failure to collect and preserve evidence, inflicted irreparable damage to the investigation. The collection of 23 pieces of evidence was manifestly inadequate in a case that should have resulted in thousands. The one instance in which the authorities reviewed these actions, the Punjab committee of inquiry into the hosing down of the crime scene was a whitewash. Hosing down the crime scene so soon after the blast goes beyond mere incompetence; it is up to the relevant authorities to determine whether this amounts to criminal responsibility. Furthermore, CPO Saud Aziz impeded some Joint Investigation Team investigators from conducting on-site investigations until two full days after the assassination. The failure of provincial authorities to otherwise review effectively the gross failures of the senior Rawalpindi police officials and deal with them appropriately constitutes a broader whitewash by Punjab officials.

ix. The deliberate prevention by CPO Saud Aziz of a post mortem examination of Ms Bhutto hindered a definitive determination of the cause of her death. It was patently unrealistic for the CPO to expect that Mr Zardari would allow an autopsy on his arrival in Pakistan at Chaklala Airbase nearly seven hours after his wife's death and after her remains had been placed in a coffin and brought to the airport. The autopsy should have been carried out at Rawalpindi General Hospital long before Mr Zardari arrived.

x. The Commission is persuaded that the Rawalpindi police chief, CPO Saud Aziz, did not act independently of higher authorities, either in the decision to hose down the crime scene or to impede the post-mortem examination.

xi. The Government press conference conducted by Brigadier Cheema on 28 December 2007, the day after the assassination, was ordered by General Musharraf. The Government's assertion that Ms Bhutto's death was caused when she hit her head on the lever of her vehicle's escape hatch and that Baitullah Mehsud and Al - Qaida were responsible for the suicide bomber were made well before any proper investigation had been initiated. This action preempted, prejudiced and hindered the subsequent investigation.

xii. An unequivocal determination as to the cause and means of Ms Bhutto's death would have required an autopsy. The Commission has uncovered no new evidence to suggest a gunshot injury to Ms Bhutto. Instead, a senior PPP official who publicly

purported soon after the assassination to have seen indications of a bullet injury admitted to the Commission that she did not have direct knowledge of such an injury.

xiii. Ms Bhutto faced serious threats in Pakistan from a number of sources; these included Al -Qaida, the Taliban and local jihadi groups, and potentially from elements in the Pakistani Establishment. Notwithstanding these threats, the investigation into her assassination focused on pursuing lower level operatives allegedly linked to Baitullah Mehsud. The Commission finds it disturbing that little was done to investigate Baitullah Mehsud himself, AlQaida and any individuals or organizations that might have worked on, supported or otherwise been involved directly or indirectly in the planning or execution of the assassination. Investigators also dismissed the possibility of involvement by elements of the Establishment, including the three persons 63 identified by Ms Bhutto as threats to her in her 16 October 2007 letter to General Musharraf.

xiv. The Commission has identified other significant flaws in the Joint Investigation Team investigation led by the Punjab Additional Inspector General Abdul Majeed. It lacked direction, was ineffective and suffered from a lack of commitment to identify and bring all of the perpetrators to justice. This delay further hampered the gathering of evidence. Despite indications that there are links between the Karachi and Rawalpindi attacks, there has essentially been no communication between the investigators on those two cases.

xv. The investigation was severely hampered by intelligence agencies and other government officials, which impeded an unfettered search for the truth. Despite their explanation to the Commission that they do not have a mandate to conduct criminal investigations, intelligence agencies including the InterServices Intelligence agency (ISI) were present during key points in the police investigation, including the gathering of evidence at the crime scene and the forensic examination of Ms Bhutto's vehicle, playing a role that the police were reluctant to reveal to the Commission.

xvi. More significantly, the ISI conducted parallel investigations, gathering evidence and detaining suspects. Evidence gathered from such parallel investigations was selectively shared with the police. What little direction police investigators had was provided to them by the intelligence agencies. However, the bulk of the information was not shared with police investigators. In fact, investigators on both the Karachi and Rawalpindi cases were unaware of information the ISI possessed about terrorist cells targeting Ms Bhutto and were unaware that the ISI had detained four persons in late October 2007 for the Karachi attack.

xvii. More broadly, no aspect of the Commission's inquiry was untouched by credible assertions of politicized and clandestine action by the intelligence services - the ISI, Military Intelligence, and the Intelligence Bureau. On virtually every issue the Commission addressed, intelligence agencies played a pervasive role, including a central involvement in the political negotiations regarding Ms Bhutto's return to Pakistan and the conduct of the elections.

xviii. The Commission believes that the failures of the police and other officials to react effectively to Ms Bhutto's assassination were, in most cases, deliberate. In other cases, the failures were driven by uncertainty in the minds of many officials as to the extent of the involvement of intelligence agencies. These officials, in part fearing involvement by the intelligence agencies, were unsure of how vigorously they ought to pursue actions that they knew, as professionals, they should have taken.

V. CONCLUDING REMARKS

260. It is essential that the perpetrators of the assassination of Benazir Bhutto be brought to justice. The Pakistani authorities should ensure that the further investigation into the assassination of Ms Bhutto is fully empowered and resourced and is conducted expeditiously and comprehensively, at all levels, without hindrance. 261. The Commission found that the performance of the Pakistani police was severely inadequate to the task of investigating the assassination of Ms Bhutto and lacking in independence and the political will to find the truth, wherever it may lead. The Pakistani authorities should consider conducting an independent review that would fix responsibilities and make those individuals found seriously wanting accountable for their actions or inactions.

262. The Commission found that security arrangements for Ms Bhutto were fatally insufficient and ineffective. In this regard, as well, the Pakistani authorities should consider conducting an independent review to determine responsibilities and hold accountable those individuals who seriously failed in their duties. In addition, the Government of Pakistan may wish to consider a review of its security arrangements for all persons who require the highest level of security and consider measures to assign responsibility, with accountability, to an office at the federal level that would work with local police to implement the standing order and standard operating procedures.

263. In light of the deeply flawed performance and conduct of many of the police officials involved in the events addressed in this report, the Commission believes it would be appropriate for the Government of Pakistan to consider undertaking police reform measures consistent with the principles of democratic policing and operating in a structure of accountability for protecting the rights of the individual, as set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

264. Pakistan, like any other state, needs strong and effective intelligence agencies. However, the autonomy, pervasive reach and clandestine role of intelligence agencies in Pakistani life underlie many of the problems, omissions and commissions set out in this report. The actions of politicized intelligence agencies undermine democratic governance. Beyond the recent steps that have reportedly been taken to curb the involvement of intelligence agencies in political matters, the democratic rule of law in Pakistan could be greatly strengthened with a thorough review of intelligence agencies based on international best practices in this area.

265. The assassination of Benazir Bhutto occurred against the backdrop of a history of political violence that was carried out with impunity. To address this issue, Pakistan should consider establishing a transitory, fully independent Truth and Reconciliation Commission to investigate political killings, disappearances and terrorism in recent years and to provide victims of political assassinations and terrorism material and moral reparations. The United Nations principles for the protection and promotion of human rights combat impunity provide guidelines for such a commission.

266. It is difficult to overstate the effect on the Pakistani people of the shock of the assassination of Benazir Bhutto and the loss to her country, These events have been variously described to the Commission by Pakistanis as earth shattering and traumatic, and the loss as incalculable. This is made worse by the pattern of impunity for political crimes in Pakistan. The Commission hopes that this report will help shed light on the truth behind this heinous crime and support steps toward ending impunity. It is solely up to the competent authorities to make this happen.

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Heraldo Muñoz Valenzuela



Marzuki Darusman



Peter FitzGerald

New York, 15 April 2010

United Nations

S/2009/67

**Security Council**Distr.: General
3 February 2009

Original: English

Letter dated 2 February 2009 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to inform you that I have received from the Government of Pakistan a request that I establish an international commission in connection with the assassination on, 27 December 2007, of the former Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto. I am mindful of the determination and efforts made by Pakistan to search for the truth and bring to justice all financiers, perpetrators, organizers, sponsors and conspirators of this terrorist act so that they will be held accountable.

Following receipt of the request from the Government of Pakistan, and after extensive discussions with the Pakistani authorities as well as with members of the Security Council, it has been agreed that the international commission should be fact-finding in nature and that its mandate would be to determine the facts and circumstances of the assassination of former Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto.

On this basis, I wish to accede to the Pakistani request and intend to establish a three-member Commission of Inquiry.

I enclose with the present letter the draft terms of reference for the proposed commission (see annex). You will note that the commission's mandate would be of a limited duration (a maximum of six months), and would not extend to carrying out a criminal investigation. The duty of determining criminal responsibility of the perpetrators of the assassination would remain with the Pakistani authorities. The international commission would enjoy the full cooperation of the Pakistani authorities and be accorded the privileges, immunities and facilities necessary for the independent conduct of the inquiry, including, in particular, unhindered access to all relevant sources of information. The international commission may request cooperation of a third State in the collection of materials or information relevant to the case. I count on the full cooperation of Member States with such a request.

The international commission would be composed of a panel of three eminent personalities having the appropriate experience and a reputation for probity and impartiality. It would be staffed in a manner to enable it to carry out its duties effectively. The specific details of the logistical, financial, security and human resources requirements of the commission would be determined based on the results of a small security and technical mission that would be dispatched to Pakistan and other places, as necessary, in light of the Security Council's support for the establishment of the commission.

09-22666 (E) 040209



The international commission would be funded by voluntary contributions from Member States. Pakistan has offered to provide "seed money" to an appropriate United Nations trust fund to help an early deployment of security and technical assessment missions. The Secretariat is engaged in discussions with the Pakistani authorities as to the size and nature of a Pakistani contribution, mindful of the importance of maintaining the independence and impartiality of the commission.

I shall decide upon a date for the international commission to commence its operations once I have received sufficient voluntary contributions to cover the work of the commission in its entirety.

(Signed) Ban Ki-moon

Annex

Terms of reference of the Commission of Inquiry

1. At the request of the Government of Pakistan that the Secretary-General establish an international commission for the purpose of investigating the assassination, on 27 December 2007, of the former Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto, and after extensive consultations with Pakistani officials as well as with members of the Security Council, I have decided to appoint a three-member Commission of Inquiry to determine the facts and circumstances of the assassination of the former Prime Minister.
2. In the conduct of its inquiry, the Commission shall enjoy the full cooperation of the Government of Pakistan. The Government shall comply with the requests of the Commission for assistance in collecting the required information and testimony, and shall provide it with the necessary facilities to enable it to discharge its mandate. It shall, in particular, guarantee to the Commission:
 - (a) Freedom of movement throughout the territory of Pakistan, including facilities of transport;
 - (b) Free access to all places and establishments relevant to the work of the Commission;
 - (c) Freedom of access to all sources of information, including documentary material and physical evidence, freedom to interview representatives of governmental, as well as other institutions and, in principle, any individual whose testimony is considered necessary for the fulfilment of its mandate;
 - (d) Appropriate security arrangements for the personnel, documents, premises and other property of the Commission;
 - (e) Protection for all those who appear before or provide information to the Commission in connection with the inquiry; no such person shall, as a result of such appearance or information, suffer harassment, threats of intimidation, ill-treatment, reprisals, or any other prejudicial treatment;
 - (f) Privileges, immunities and facilities necessary for the independent conduct of the inquiry. In particular, members of the Commission shall enjoy the privileges and immunities accorded to experts on missions under article VI of the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, and to officials under articles V and VII of the Convention.
3. The Commission may approach third States with a request for cooperation in the collection of material or information relevant to the case and provision of expert personnel. In so doing, it may seek the assistance of the Government of Pakistan.
4. The Commission shall be composed of a panel of three eminent personalities having the appropriate experience and a reputation for probity and impartiality. The panel shall be assisted by the necessary staff as well as by administrative, security and technical staff.
5. The location of the Commission of Inquiry shall be determined by the Secretary-General.

6. The Commission shall submit its report to the Secretary-General within six months from the start of its activities. The Secretary-General will share the report with the Government of Pakistan and submit it to the Security Council for information.
 7. The Commission shall be funded by voluntary contributions from Member States. A United Nations trust fund will be utilized to receive such contributions.
 8. The Commission shall commence its activities on a date to be determined by the Secretary-General, which will be officially communicated to the Government of Pakistan.
-

United Nations

S/2009/68

**Security Council**Distr.: General
3 February 2009

Original: English

Letter dated 3 February 2009 from the President of the Security Council to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 2 February 2009 (S/2009/67), concerning your intention to accede to the request from the Government of Pakistan and establish an international commission in connection with the assassination, on 27 December 2007, of former Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto, has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They took note, with appreciation, of the intention expressed in your letter. On behalf of the members of the Security Council, I would like to confirm your intention to submit the report of the commission to the Security Council for information, as stated in the draft terms of reference for the proposed commission.

(Signed) Yukio Takasu
President of the Security Council

09-22672 (E) 040209



CODE OF CONDUCT

the security of the event further. A code of conduct was apparently agreed which included the following points:

- The function was to end before nightfall (approximately 1730 hours);
 - No vehicles, other than Police and official PPP vehicles, would be permitted in the vicinity of Liaquat Bagh;
 - All the main junctions around the venue would be blocked by a Police cordon to allow rapid, unhindered vehicular access;
 - The buses containing PPP supporters would be parked some distance away from the venue, with passengers having to make the remainder of the journey on foot; and
 - General expectations of both the Police and PPP.
24. SSP Yaseen has provided details of the security arrangements carried out on 26th December 2007. He stated that Police Officers searched all the hotel rooms overlooking Liaquat Bagh and recorded the names and addresses of all those with room reservations for the relevant period. The Officer also stated that a fingertip search was carried out within the park and that it was guarded by armed Police Officers overnight.
25. On the day of the rally, sniffer dogs were deployed inside the park and a further fingertip search was conducted around the stage area. Entry to the park was via three walk through security gates, each equipped with metal

detectors. Two gates were designated for males and the third for females. One Assistant Superintendent of Police (ASP) was responsible for managing the security procedure at the gates. Each gate was staffed by one Inspector, ten Constables and four Special Branch Officers – a total of forty six Police Officers. The gates opened at 0900 hours and SSP Yaseen stated that everyone, including PPP officials, were physically searched before they entered the park.

26. SSP Yaseen stated that there was a Police Constable positioned every fifteen feet within an inner cordon around the perimeter fence. This was to deter people jumping over the fence or throwing objects into the park with a view to retrieving them later. SSP Yaseen also stated that for practical policing purposes, the park was spilt into two sectors with each sector policed by one Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP), two Inspectors and sixty Constables – a total of one hundred and twenty six Officers.
27. In addition to the inner cordon, SSP Yaseen stated that ninety Constables, under the supervision of one Inspector and a DSP, were deployed along Liaquat Road from Liaquat Chowk to the outer gates near the water tower.
28. SSP Yaseen further stated that eighteen Police snipers were deployed on various rooftops surrounding the venue.

As well as being armed with rifles, some were equipped with binoculars.

29. A total of one thousand three hundred Punjab Police Officers were drafted in to Rawalpindi that day specifically to Police the PPP rally. DIG Saud stated that the number of Police Officers on duty was unprecedented for such an event.
30. The podium on the stage from which Ms Bhutto was to address the rally was bullet proof and, in addition, an eight foot high chain link fence was erected one hundred and eighty feet from the stage. That created a sterile area in which no one was permitted to enter. As well as a number of PPP security personnel, the stage area was guarded by twelve Punjab Police 'Elite' Commandos under the supervision of an Inspector. The only access to the stage was from the grounds of the art college via a set of custom built wooden steps.


27th December 2007

31. The PPP rally was attended by people from all over Pakistan. The majority had travelled in buses that were parked some distance away, with the party faithful having to make the final kilometre or two on foot. It is estimated that between fifteen and twenty thousand people had gathered inside Laquatt Bagh to hear Ms Bhutto's address.

MEDICAL REPORT OF BB

Details of the Wound

According to a medical report, Benazir Bhutto sustained a skull fracture above her right ear, injuring the temporoparietal region of her brain, which led to cardiac arrest.



The wound was reported to be about 5 by 3 centimeters and was roughly oval in shape.

Source: Rawalpindi General Hospital

MEDICAL REPORT OF MOHTARMA BENAZIR BHUTTO

On 27-12-2007 at approximately 5.35 p.m. a female patient was brought in Accident & Emergency Department of Rawalpindi General Hospital, Rawalpindi. She was brought to the Resuscitation Room and was received by Dr. Aurangzeb Khan and Dr. Saeeda of Surgical Unit-II. This patient was identified as Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto.

Dr. Habib Ahmad Khan, Medical Superintendent RGH also arrived immediately

The condition appreciated at the time of receiving the patient was as follows:-

The patient was pulseless and was not breathing. She was markedly pale. Her pupils were fixed, dilated and non reacting to light. A wound was present on the right temporoparietal region through which blood was trickling down and whitish material which looked like brain matter was visible in the wound. Her clothes were soaked with blood.

Immediate cardiopulmonary resuscitation was started. She was ventilated by Ambu bag and within a minute was intubated with endotracheal tube, blood mixed with secretions was noticed in the throat, that was suctioned out before intubation. External cardiac compressions were started. A cannula was passed in her right hand and intravenous fluids were pushed in. Inj. adrenaline was given.

No response was seen. Patient was shifted to emergency operation theatre while resuscitation was continued.

In operation theatre Dr Arshad, Anaesthetist joined the team. Prof Mussadiq Khan also joined the team at 5 50 PM. As external cardiac massage was not leading to any success therefore open cardiac massage was started via left antero-lateral thoracotomy. No blood was seen in the left thoracic cavity or the pericardium. There was no cardiac muscular activity seen.

Artificial assisted ventilation, internal cardiac massage and intravenous fluid resuscitation was continued. She was given intra cardiac adrenaline, calcium gluconate. These drugs along with sodium bicarbonate were also repeated intravenously.

Though no cardiac activity was seen but in order to treat fine ventricular fibrillation, electrical defibrillation was carried out. No cardiac response was seen.

Prof. Azam Yusuf and Dr. Qudsia had also joined the resuscitation team.

Pupils were fixed and dilated, no evidence of any cardiac or respiratory activity was observed. ECG showed no electrical activity.

At 6.16 p.m it was decided to stop resuscitation and patient was declared dead. The thoracotomy wound was closed. Fractured rib due to resuscitative thoracotomy was noticed.

Prof Arif Malik and Prof Saleem also reached by then.

Handwritten signature and date: *Saeeda* 28/12/2007
August 11

DETAILS OF THE WOUND AND ITS SURROUNDINGS

There was wound in right Temporoparietal region. Shape was irregularly oval, measuring about 5 x 3 cms, just above the pinna of right ear. Edges were irregular. No surrounding wounds or blackening was seen. There was a big boggy swelling around the wound. Blood was continuously trickling down and whitish material that looked like brain matter was seen in the wound and on the surrounding hair. Sharp bone edges were felt in wound. No foreign body was felt in the wound.

Wound was not further explored. Gentle aseptic dressing was used to cover the wound

Bleeding from both the ears was seen, more so from the right ear. Slight trickle of Blood was seen from right nostril also. Blood mixed with secretions was seen in the oral cavity also.

Detailed external examination of the body did not reveal any other external injury.

X-rays of the skull AP and Lateral views were done after she had been declared dead. Findings are as below:-


Comminuted depressed skull fracture involving right temporoparietal bone is observed with inwards depressed fracture fragment measuring approx. 35 mm (on-X-ray measurement). Depressed fracture fragment distant from intact bony skull measures 12 mm from outer to outer skull table & 12 mm from inner to inner skull table. Two to three tiny radio-densities underneath fracture segment are observed on both projections. Associated scalp soft tissue swelling & moderate degree of pneumocephalus is observed. Rest of the bony skull is intact. Radio-opaque dental fillings are evident.

CAUSE OF DEATH

Open head injury with depressed skull fracture, leading to Cardiopulmonary arrest.

Handwritten notes:
28/12/2007
Agn...
L. — Agni


Prof. Mohammad Mussadiq Khan
FACS, DABS, FCPS
Principal/Professor of Surgery
RMC/Allied Hospital, Rawalpindi



Dr. Habib Ahmad Khan
Medical Superintendent
Rawalpindi General Hospital
Rawalpindi



Prof. Azam Yusuf, FRCS, FCPS
Professor of Surgery
Head of Surgical Unit-II
Rawalpindi General Hospital
Rawalpindi



Dr. Aurangzeb Khan FCPS
Registrar S U II
Rawalpindi General Hospital
Rawalpindi



Dr. Saeeda Yasmin
Post graduate Resident
Surgical Unit-II
Rawalpindi General Hospital
Rawalpindi



Dr. Qudsiya Anjum Qureshi FCPS
Anaesthetist
Rawalpindi General Hospital
Rawalpindi



Dr. Nasir Khan FCPS
Assistant Professor Radiology
Rawalpindi General Hospital,
Rawalpindi,



CHALLAN 2011

CHALLAN Dated 27-12-2007
INVESTIGATION OFFICE, F.T.S.A. 7ATA,
F.T.C. City, Rawalpindi
(Mogharna Benazir Bhutto Assassination Case)

Incomplete Supplementary Challan U/S 173 Cr.P.C. (Charge Sheet)
Federal Investigation Agency
Dated: February 07, 2011



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Police Station:

City, Rawalpindi




**Incomplete Supplementary Challan u/s 173 Cr.P.C
(Charge Sheet)
(Assassination Case of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto)**




1

Complainant





**Mr. Kashif Riaz Khan
Inspector / SHO, PS City, Rawalpindi**




Accused Declared as Proclaimed Offenders (POs).

1.	<p>Baitullah Mehsud r/o South Waziristan Agency (killed)</p> <p>(Chief Commander of Tahrik-e-Taliban Pakistan who provided suicide bombers Saeed @ Bilal and Ikramullah)</p>	
2.	<p>Ibad ur Rahman @ Noman @ Usman s/o Rehmatullah r/o Bazdara Payan PO Palai, Tehsil Batkhela Malakand Agency, ex-student of Madrassa Akora Khattak, Nowshehra. (killed)</p> <p>(Provided suicide bombers and suicide vests to Rifaqat and Hasnain)</p>	
3.	<p>Abdullah @ Saddam s/o Ali Rehman r/o Garbuz, PO Lakre, Lakre, Aden Khel, Upper Mohmond, Mahmand Agency, ex-student of Madrassa Akora Khattak, Nowshehra. (killed)</p> <p>(Involved in planning of the incident, taking suicide bombers from Baitullah Mehsud and transportation of suicide vests in Rawalpindi before 27-12-2007)</p>	
4.	<p>Faiz Muhammad @ Kiskat s/o Shah Nazar r/o Swabi, ex- student Madrassa Haqqania, Akora Khattak</p> <p>(Involved in conspiracy and provision of suicide vests to Rifaqat and Hasnain in Rawalpindi)</p>	
5.	<p>Ikramullah r/o South Waziristan Agency</p> <p>(2nd suicide bomber deployed at the other gate of Liaquat Bagh Rawalpindi)</p>	

6.	<p>Nasrullah @ Ahmed r/o Madrassa Haqqania, Akora Khattak (killed)</p> <p>(Focal person in Rawalpindi. He took two suicide bombers Saeed @ Bilal and Ikramullah from Baitullah Mehsud, carried out reconnaissance of the place of occurrence)</p>	
7.	<p>Nadir @ Qari Ismail r/o Madrassa Haqqania, Akora Khattak (killed)</p> <p>(Main character of the conspiracy who took two suicide bombers from Baitullah Mehsud)</p>	
8.	<p>Pervez Musharraf S/o Syed Musharraf Uddin, Ex-Chief Executive & President of Pakistan, R/o Agro Farm No. 1, Chak Shahzad, Park Road, Islamabad, Presently in London, UK. (Absconder)</p>	

Accused in Judicial Custody

<p>1.</p>	<p>Aitzaz Shah @ Saifullah S/o Zaheer Shah Caste Syed R/o Sangal Kot, Mansehra, presently Karachi</p> <p>(Knowledge of conspiracy . Also identified the voice of Baitullah Mehsud from intercepted CD)</p>	
<p>2.</p>	<p>Sher Zaman s/o Akbar Jan caste Mehsud r/o Ladha South Waziristan Agency, presently Tariqabad, D.L.Khan</p> <p>(Knowledge of conspiracy.)</p>	
<p>3.</p>	<p>Hasnain Gul alias Ali S/o Muhammad Riaz R/o House situated in Street No. 07, Shah Jewan Colony, Dhoke Sayyadan, Rawalpindi.</p> <p>(In contact with conspirators in Madrassah Haqqania i.e Qari Ismail, Abad-ur-Rehman and Nasarullah. Involved Rafaqat in the execution of the plan. Handler and facilitator of suicide bombers in RWP. He also conducted recce in Nov 2007. He kept suicide jackets)</p>	
<p>4.</p>	<p>Muhammad Rafaqat s/o Sabir Hussain R/o H# AD-90, St # 8/1, Ahmedabad Quaid-e-Azam Colony, Rawalpindi</p> <p>(Handler and facilitator of S.Bs in RWP. S.Bs stayed at his residence. Operators and S.Bs used his taxi in RWP. He also conducted recce along with Nasarullah on 27.12.07)</p>	

5.	<p>Rasbeed Ahmed @ Abdul Rahim Turabi s/o Qudrat Shah caste Mahmand r/o Shabqadar Sareekh Morozai, PS Batagram, Distt. Charsadda</p> <p>(Knowledge of conspiracy. Also identified Abdullah @ Saddam, Qari Ismail, Nasarullah and S.B Bilal)</p>	
6.	<p>Syed Saud Aziz s/o Syed Aziz Ahmed, former City Police Officer, Rawalpindi. R/o 116-C, Model Town, Lahore.</p>	
7.	<p>Khurram Shahzad Haider s/o Muhammad Iqbal Warriach, former SP, Rawal Town, Rawalpindi. R/o Rana Ashraf Colony, City Block, Bhalwal, District Sargodha.</p>	

4
Accused on Bail
"NIL"

Detail of attached documents / case properties

1.	One Pistol 30 bore with damaged magazine and three rounds
2.	One Pistol 9mm with magazine and five rounds
3.	One empty shell 30 bore
4.	One damaged wrist watch Seiko5
5.	One damaged mobile phone Sony Erickson with sim bearing number 35464001-512115-00304-5199000
6.	Number of shoes of different sizes and colors with blood stains
7.	Different ID cards and visiting cards along with few photographs
8.	One damaged vehicle number plate bearing number 17
9.	Blood samples
10.	One circuit plate
11.	One damaged suicide vest
12.	One vehicle Double Cabin Reg. No. CS099 / Sindh Toyota Intercooler Hilux, silver color
13.	One Police Pickup Reg. No. RIG/07 / 1201
14.	One Elite Police Pickup Reg. No. RLB / 4582
15.	One vehicle Land cruiser BF/7772, white color with photocopy of Registration Book having detail Engine No. LHZ 0227414, Chassis No. TTEC BO 9170 / 3033929 Model 2007. Further recoveries from inner and outer side of the vehicle are; <ol style="list-style-type: none"> i. Blood samples ii. White fibres iii. Explosive residues iv. Black residues from roof v. Explosive residues from left side of the vehicle.
16.	One empty shell 30 bore
17.	Two steel pellets
18.	One bone piece
19.	One pair of coat shoes black color from Land cruiser BF7772
20.	Two amputated legs with one pair of shoes (Sandal) and two socks.
21.	CD containing conversation between Baitullah Mehsud and Molvi sahib produce by Mr. Javed Iqbal Lodhi Director NCMC M/o Interior, Islamabad.
22.	CD containing briefing and Scott Land Yard Police Report
23.	One pair of Jogger shoes, Shaal (winter cloth), Cap bearing number

	11 and two keys recovered through Hasnain Gul
24.	One CPU computer (Tower casing) recovered from the house of Hasnain Gul.
25.	Rs.701/-, One Telephone Diary, Photocopy of ID Card in the name of Qudratullah bearing no. 139-47-263108, Photocopy of ID card in the name of Rasheed Ahmed (17101-0423682-5), four visiting cards, five different paper chits, one 12 volt bulb with wire recovered from Rasheed Ahmed.
26.	Rs. 100,000/-, visiting cards, one letter addressed to Wali Muhammad from Shamim of Tehrik-e-Taliban Latha, two lists of militants and contact numbers, one chit containing number 0300-9345813, one visiting card in the name of Muhammad Ata ur Rahman, one paper for the direction of mujahideen in the name of Wali ur Rahman, one knife, one piece of paper with written a word Fidyaa on it, three small perfume bottles (Attar Shishi), two wrist watches, two sun glasses, one tasbeeh, one cap, one nail cutter, four ball pens, one comb recovered from Aitzaz Shah at the time of arrest. One ID card (142038224152-7), driving license LTV (29980/BU), Rs. 1000/- two keys of motor car recovered from Asmat Ali Driver.
27.	Two mobile sets, one Sony Errickson with sim bearing number 0308-5580755 and Nokia set 1110 with sim Telenor recovered from Sher Zaman.
28.	Four hand grenades, detonators, striker sleeve, explosive material recovered from Sher Zaman.
29.	Challan form
30.	Copy of Isteghasa (03 pages)
31.	Copy of FIR (01 page)
32.	Judicial remand documents (15 pages)
33.	Office order F. No. 1/1/08-DS(FIA) dated 06.08.2009 issued by M/o Interior Government of Pakistan for transfer of case from Punjab Police to FIA while constituting JIT (01 page).
34.	Office order issued by DG/FIA in pursuance of office order dated 06.08.09 issued by M/o Interior Government of Pakistan Islamabad nominating members of JIT (01 page).
35.	Office Order No. HQ/SIG/Ops/471/09/773-76 dated 15.08.09 through which Inspector Falek Sher was directed to receive the Police File from I.O of the Rawalpindi Police and conduct the investigation of the case (01 page).
36.	Office Order No. HQ/SIG/PF/09/1782-B dated 17.08.09 through which investigation of the case was entrusted to Inspector Shoaib Ahmed, SIG/FIA Lahore (01 page).
37.	Copy of application dated 01.09.09 for interrogation of the accused

	by the IO already confined in judicial lock-up (central Jail Adiala, Rawalpindi) and application dated 21.04.10. (02 pages)
38.	Copy of letter No. HQ/SIG/Ops/471/09/1985-87 dated 12.09.09 regarding sending of Jogger Shoes Service Cheetah Long white color with yellow mark size No. 9, Warm Shaal Dark Brown and Woolen Cap color black No. 11 recovered from the residence of accused IHasnain Gul to US Legate Office, US Embassy, Islamabad for comparison and DNA test with the DNA samples of suicide bomber (01 page).
39.	Letter No. HQ/SIG/Ops/471/09/2843 dated 15.12.09 issued by Shoaib Ahmed Inspector/member JIT to AD/Analyst, SIG/FIA Islamabad with record for preparation of link chart of accused persons of telephone mentioned in the letter (01 page).
40.	Report/letter No. HQ/SG/Ops/471/09/223 dated 20.01.10 issued by Qamar Zaman, AD, Analyst SIG/FIA Islamabad (06 pages)
41.	Letter No. HQ/SIG/Ops/471/09/431 dated 17.02.10 issued to DD/Forensic, FIA/SIG HQ Islamabad by Director SIG/FIA HQ Islamabad for forensic of three telephone sets alongwith two sims recovered from the possession of accuse Hasnain Gul @ Ali and Muhammad Rafaqat. List of 82 phone numbers were also sent to DD/Forensic to find out linkage between the data recovered from three cell mentioned above (01 page).
42.	Letter No. HQ/SIG/Ops/471/09/2843 dated 15.12.09 issued by Shoaib Ahmed Inspector/member JIT to AD/Analyst, SIG/FIA Islamabad with record for preparation of link chart of accused persons of telephone mentioned in the letter (01 page).
43.	Telephone bill of phone No. 5575823-0 installed at the residence of Ghulam Abbas at Mohallah Ahmadabad St. No. 8 Near Dhamial Camp Rawalpindi for the month of February/ March 2008 (02 page).
44.	Letter No. TR/SRO-Cantt dated 23 rd Feb, 2010 regarding detail of phone No. 051-5575823 installed at the residence of Ghulam Abbas (01 page).
45.	Copy of application dated 23.02.10 by Shoaib Ahmed, AD/IO SIG/FIA to Senior Revenue Officer, PTCL Rawalpindi cantt regarding provision of particulars of subscriber of phone no. 051-5575823 (01 page).
46.	A recovery memo dated 23.02.10 regarding letter No. TR/SRO-Cantt dated 23 rd Feb, 2010 (01 page).
47.	Letter No. HQ/SIG/Ops/471/09/505 dated 24.02.10 regarding provision of record of mobile phone No. 0322-5402148, 0322-5049781, 0321-5540177 to Manager Warid Phone Company Islamabad (01 page).
48.	Record regarding mobile phone No. 0322-5402148, 0322-5049781,

	0321-5540177by Warid Phone Company Islamabad alongwith recovery memo dated 01.03.10. (03 pages)
49.	Forensic report of DD/Forensic, SIG/FIA dated 06.03.10 regarding cell phones of accused Hasain Gul and Muhammad Razaqat, Nokia-1112, Nokia 1200 and Motorola sets (02 pages) with Annex-A1 and A-2, Annex-B1 and B-2 and Annex- C alongwith list of accused Hasain Gul telephone diary numbers .
50.	DNA report dated 26.03.10 received from Carol M. Sniagowski, Acting Legal Attaché, US Department of Justice, FBI Islamabad (06 pages)
51.	Letter No. HQ/SIG/Ops/471/09/876-77 dated 08.04.10 addressed to Commandant Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, Rwp by Director/SIG Head of JIT for provision of specimens for DNA profiling.
52.	Letter No. F-No. Pt/1/1/08-DS-FIA, M/o Interior dated 17 th August 2009 and letter No TR-1340/24.SVA. (26) C-T dated 13 th August 2009 (Two pages).
53.	A.F Institute of Pathology Rawalpindi letter No. C/1/DNA/AFIP dated 08.04.10 alongwith DNA report of A.F. I P (05 pages)
54.	MLR No. 5350.07 of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto alongwith an application of I.O and a copy of Death slip of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto and Receipt of Javaid Sadiq Mir (Photocopy) (04 pages).
55.	Letter No. HQ/Ops/471/09/1452 dated 17.05.10 (01 page)
56.	Letter No. HQ/Ops/471/09/1451 dated 17.05.10 (01 page)
57.	Recovery memo of spit, swab and shoe (01 page)
58.	Recovery memo of daily diary of PS, City Rawalpindi (01 page)
59.	Statements of u/s 161 Cr. P.C (26 pages)
60.	Conviction slip (01 page)
61.	Seizure Memo of record of Madrassah Haqqania, Akora Khattak with 04 certificates (04 pages).
62.	Certified copy of statement of Mr. Ashfaq Anwar, SP recorded by Magistrate u/s 164 Cr PC.
63.	Certified copy of statement of Prof. Dr. Muhammad Mussadaq recorded by Magistrate u/s 164 Cr PC.
64.	Certified copy of statement of Dr. Abdur Rehman recorded by Magistrate u/s 164 Cr PC.
65.	Certified copy of statement of Mr. Ghulam Muhammad Naz recorded by Magistrate u/s 164 Cr PC.
66.	Copies of Statements of PWs recorded u/s 161 Cr. PC. (5 sets)
Note: The documents mentioned at Serial No. 1 to 66 have already been annexed with the previous Challans submitted in the learned Trial Court.	
67.	Certified copy of statement of Mr. Yaseen Farooq, then SSP (operation), Rawalpindi recorded by Magistrate u/s 164 Cr PC.

68.	Copies of Statements of (09) PWs recorded u/s 161 Cr. PC.
69.	Four forensic reports dated 24.12.2010, 28.12.2010, 05.01.2011 and 18.01.2011 submitted by PW Nauman Ashraf Bodla, Deputy Director (Forensic), CTW, FIA Headquarters, Islamabad.
70.	Report dated 04.01.2011 of PW Sher Khan, Manager, Admin & Legal Affairs, M/s United Mobile, Karachi
71.	Seizure Memo dated 02.02.2011 regarding production of two Cell Phones (i) "Black Berry" Coloured Dark Blue, IMEI No. 357890009509368, alongwith SIM of Etisalat and (ii) "Black Berry" Coloured Black, IMEI No. 354672018501237, alongwith SIM of Etisalat, reportedly belonging to and was in use of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto in the year 2007, produced by PW Mr. Abdul Razzaq Mirani S/o Ali Muhammad Mirani, Incharge Bilawal House, Clifton, Karachi.
72.	Forensic Report dated 04.02.2011 submitted by PW Nauman Ashraf Bodla, Deputy Director (Forensic), CTW, FIA Headquarters, Islamabad.
73.	E-mail dated October 26, 2007 sent by Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto to Mr. Mark Siegel, regarding threat to her life by accused Pervez Musharraf.
74.	Electronic copy of Source Ocnus.net 2008 regarding warning from Pervez Musharraf to Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto
75.	Application for Judicial remand of accused Saud Aziz and Khurram Shahzad containing order of the Hon'able Trial Court dated 01.02.2011.
76.	Conviction Slip

List of Prosecution Witnesses (PWs)

1.	Javed-ur-Rehman S/o Gul Rehman Caste Pashtoon R/o F-8/2 Zardari House, Islamabad Personal Driver of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto of Vehicle No. BF-7772 (Land Cruiser, Bullet Proof) and Eye Witness of Liaquat Bagh incident
2.	Muhammad Amin S/o Abdul Aziz R/o DAV 541 College Road, Rawalpindi Eye Witness, Injured during Liaquat Bagh incident on 27.12.07
3.	Siraj Khan S/o Behram Khan R/o ZA/496, St #31, Mazharabad, Rawalpindi Eye Witness, Injured during Liaquat Bagh incident on 27.12.07
4.	Muhammad Ijaz S/o Muhammad Khan Caste Sheikh R/o Kolian, P.S Bhera, Sargodha Eye Witness, Injured during Liaquat Bagh incident on 27.12.07
5.	Riaz Ali S/o Bashir Ahmed Caste Awan R/o Y/358, St # 07, Dhoke Ratta Rawalpindi Eye Witness, Injured during Liaquat Bagh incident on 27.12.07
6.	Kamran Nazir S/o Nazir Ahmed R/o SW/784 Awan Colony, Dhoke Kala Khan, Rawalpindi Eye Witness, Injured during Liaquat Bagh incident on 27.12.07
7.	Wali Muhammad S/o Safri Khan Caste Sheikh R/o H # 32, St. # 05, Gulrez Colony, Rawalpindi Eye Witness, Injured during Liaquat Bagh incident on 27.12.07
8.	Aziz Mehmood S/o Mehmood Ahmed Caste Awan R/o Z/359 near Haji House, Dhoke Ratta, Rawalpindi. Eye Witness, Injured during Liaquat Bagh incident on 27.12.07
9.	Abid Bhatti S/o Azam Bhatti R/o H # 222, Westridge Bazaar, Rawalpindi Eye Witness, Injured during Liaquat Bagh incident on 27.12.07

10.	Muhammad Hanif S/o Muhammad Jalil Caste Sheikh R/o St #11, Nanek Pura, Kashmiri Bazar, Rawalpindi Eye Witness, Injured during Liaquat Bagh incident on 27.12.07
11.	Muhammad Sharif S/o Muhammad Shafi Caste Awan R/o 756/G Ferozpora, Mohallah Kohati Bazar, Rawalpindi Eye Witness, Injured during Liaquat Bagh incident on 27.12.07
12.	Muhammad Akram S/o Muhammad Hayat R/o Gualmandi, Rawalpindi Eye Witness, Injured during Liaquat Bagh incident on 27.12.07
13.	Fida Abass S/o Zafar Abass R/o H # N-1868 Amar pura, Rawalpindi Eye Witness, Injured during Liaquat Bagh incident on 27.12.07
14.	Tariq Mehmood S/o Muhammad Sabir R/o Diwan Qasoori, Tehsil Sohawa, Jhelum Eye Witness, Injured during Liaquat Bagh incident on 27.12.07
15.	Waheed Ahmed S/o Muhammad Siddique R/o St # 02. Dhoke Ratta, Rawalpindi Eye Witness, Injured during Liaquat Bagh incident on 27.12.07
16.	Haji Khalid Mehmood S/o Muhammad Hanif R/o H # ZA-487, St # 10, Mazharabad, Hazara Colony, Rawalpindi Eye Witness, Injured during Liaquat Bagh incident on 27.12.07
17.	Nawazish Ali S/o Khaki Jan R/o Lawrencepur, Faqirabad, Attock Eye Witness, Injured during Liaquat Bagh incident on 27.12.07
18.	Altaf Ahmed S/o Aftab Ahmed R/o St # 33, Dhoke Ratta, Rawalpindi Eye Witness, Injured during Liaquat Bagh incident on 27.12.07
19.	Hasnain Ashraf S/o Muhammad Ashraf R/o H # 20, Block # 248, Loco Shed Colony, Rawalpindi Eye Witness, Injured during Liaquat Bagh incident on 27.12.07
20.	Muhammad Ahsan S/o Muhammad Hafiz R/o H # A-15 Chakri Road Dhamial, Rawalpindi Eye Witness, Injured during Liaquat Bagh incident on 27.12.07

21.	Iftikhar Ahmed S/o Muhammad Tanvir Caste Bhatti R/o Bhara Kahu, Islamabad Eye Witness, Injured during Liaquat Bagh incident on 27.12.07
22.	Muhammad Zamir S/o Muhammad Khalil R/o H # 1447, Tariqabad Lalkurti, Rawalpindi Eye Witness, Injured during Liaquat Bagh incident on 27.12.07
23.	Tariq Saeed S/o Gulzar Ahmed Caste Khawaja R/o H # 82D Sector # 01, Khayaban-e-Sir Syed, Rawalpindi Eye Witness, Injured during Liaquat Bagh incident on 27.12.07
24.	Mushtaq Ahmed S/o Fazal Dad R/o Dhoke Faqirbaba, Tehsil Gujar Khan, Rawalpindi Eye Witness, Injured during Liaquat Bagh incident on 27.12.07
25.	Ghulam Murtaza S/o Mian Muhammad R/o Dharnaal, Tehsil Fateh Jang, Attock Eye Witness, Injured during Liaquat Bagh incident on 27.12.07
26.	Muhammad Abhtar S/o Haji Saeed Muhammad R/o Boring Road, Dhoke Matkal, Rawalpindi Eye Witness, Injured during Liaquat Bagh incident on 27.12.07
27.	Chaudhry Muhammad Ghous S/o Chaudhry Ghulam Khan R/o H # ZA-386, St # 29, Mazharabad, Rawalpindi Eye Witness, Injured during Liaquat Bagh incident on 27.12.07
28.	Rukhsar S/o Faraz Chaudhry R/o Sebnisa Tehsil Murree, Rawalpindi Eye Witness, Injured during Liaquat Bagh incident on 27.12.07
29.	Iftikhar Ahmed S/o Bashir Ahmed R/o H # 03, St # 7, Sir Syed Chowk, Tipu Road, Rawalpindi Eye Witness, Injured during Liaquat Bagh incident on 27.12.07
30.	Mati-ur-Rehman 6047/C, P.S City, Rawalpindi Eye Witness, Injured during Liaquat Bagh incident on 27.12.07
31.	Wasim Abass 5267/C Gunman DSP City, Rawalpindi Eye Witness, Injured during Liaquat Bagh incident on 27.12.07
32.	Fida Hussain 4001/C Elite Force, Rawalpindi Eye Witness

33.	Muhammad Ramzan 3374/C Elite Force, Rawalpindi Eye Witness
34.	Rifat Ali 3011/HC Elite Force, Rawalpindi Eye Witness
35.	Muhammad Shoaib 634/C Elite Force, Rawalpindi Eye Witness
36.	Tahir Hussain 24/C, Elite Force, Rawalpindi Eye Witness
37.	Gul Shahzad 805/C, Elite Force, Rawalpindi Eye Witness
38.	Imtiazullah 546/HC, Elite Force, Rawalpindi Eye Witness
39.	Muhammad Ayaz 2841/C, Elite Force, Rawalpindi Eye Witness
40.	Arshad Hussain 3428/C, Elite Force, Rawalpindi Eye Witness
41.	Sijad Hussain 617/C, Elite Force, Rawalpindi Eye Witness
42.	Amir Iqbal 4477/C, Elite Force, Rawalpindi Eye Witness
43.	Azmat Ali Dogar, Inspector Elite Force, Rawalpindi Eye Witness
44.	Asghar Ali, SI P.S City, Rawalpindi He requested Medico Legal Officer for medical reports regarding injured persons and Autopsy reports regarding killed persons.
45.	Kashif Bashir 6315/C, P.S City, Rawalpindi Witness of Personal Search Memo.
46.	Ishtiaq Hussain Shah DSP/SPO, P.S City, Rawalpindi Eye Witness, Injured during Liaquat Bagh incident on 27.12.07
47.	Muhammad Ilyas, S.I, P.S Westridge, Rawalpindi Witness Taxi No. BK-1427 and Personal Search Memo regarding accused persons Hasnain Gul and Rifaqat Hussain.

48.	Ashfaq Ahmed S.I, CID Lahore Witness of Seizure Memo regarding Jogger Shoes, Shaal, Cap used by suicide bomber, CPU computer of Hasnain Gul.
49.	Tariq Ilyas Kiyani Inspector CID, Lahore Member Joint Investigation Team.
50.	Zameer Ahmed S.I, P.S City, Rawalpindi Witness of Seizure Memo regarding Pistol 30-Bore without number, Damaged magazine, 03 rounds, Pistol 9mm bearing number 042220 with magazine, one empty shell (30-Bore), mobile phone Erickson with SIM, ID card, Damaged number plate, Circuit plate, Victim vehicle, empty shell 30-bore with pellets, coat shoes of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto (Shaheed)
51.	Arshad Kalim, A.S.I, P.S City, Rawalpindi Witness of Seizure Memo regarding a pair of shoe and socks, two amputated legs.
52.	Fazal Rehman, Commander Bomb Disposal Civil Defense, Rawalpindi Bomb Disposal Expert
53.	Abdul Qayyum, 320/C, P.S City, Rawalpindi Eye Witness
54.	Nazar Hussain, S.I, P.S City, Rawalpindi Eye Witness
55.	Tariq Ilyas, ASI, P.S City, Rawalpindi Eye Witness
56.	Muhammad Nawaz, ASI, P.S City, Rawalpindi Eye Witness, injured during Liaquat Bagh incident, Fingerprint and DNA witness.
57.	Aftab Khan, SP Technical, Police College Sihala, Rawalpindi Took photographs of the damaged vehicle No. BF-7772 (Land Cruiser) parked at MT park, Police Lines, RWP on 31.12.07.
58.	Asad Hussain S/o Adalat Hussain R/o Pari Mori, P.O Kori, Tehsil & Distt Islamabad Eye Witness, injured during Liaquat Bagh incident on 27.12.07

59.	Major (Retd) Imtiaz Hussain, SSP Security Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto, Establishment Division, Govt. of Pakistan. Eye Witness
60.	Malik Muhammad Akram, Draughtsman, R/o 433/A, Dispensary Ground, Tench Bhata, Rawalpindi He prepared Crime Scerie Sketch on 28.12.07.
61.	Javed Iqbal Lodhi, Director Crisis Management Cell, Ministry of Interior, Govt. of Pakistan, Islamabad Witness of Seizure Memo regarding one recorded CD (phone number 0928-230493 and phone number 0965-238387).
62.	Prof. Dr. Muhammad Mussaddaq, Principal Professor of Surgery, Rawalpindi Medical College, Allied Hospital, Rawalpindi Witness regarding Medical report of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto
63.	Dr. Habeeb Ahmed Khan, Medical Superintendent, General Hospital, Rawalpindi Witness regarding Medical report of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto.
64.	Prof. Dr. Muhammad Azam Yousaf, Professor of Surgery, Head Surgical Unit 2, General Hospital, Rawalpindi Witness regarding Medical report of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto.
65.	Dr. Aurangzeb Khan, Registrar SU-11, General Hospital, Rawalpindi Witness regarding Medical report of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto.
66.	Dr. Saeeda Yasmin, Post Graduate President II, General Hospital, Rawalpindi Witness regarding Medical report of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto.
67.	Dr. Qudsia Anjum Qureshi, Anesthetist, General Hospital, Rawalpindi Witness regarding Medical report of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto.
68.	Dr. Nasir Khan, Assistant Professor Radiology, General Hospital, Rawalpindi Witness regarding Medical report of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto.
69.	Dr. Amjad Hussain Shah, CMO, District Hospital, Rawalpindi Witness regarding Medical report of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto.
70.	Dr. Qasim Khan, CMO, District Hospital, Rawalpindi

	Witness regarding Medical report of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto.
71.	Dr. Muhammad Ashraf, CMO, District Hospital, Rawalpindi Witness regarding Medical report of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto.
72.	Dr. Rinda, Holy Family Hospital, Rawalpindi Witness regarding Medical report of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto.
73.	Dr. Hina, Holy Family Hospital, Rawalpindi Witness regarding Medical report of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto.
74.	Dr. Zia-ur-Rehman, CMO, RGH, Rawalpindi Witness regarding Medical report of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto.
75.	Ch. Muhammad Toufiq, Special Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Rawalpindi Witness regarding confessional statements of accused Muhammad Rafaqat, Hasnain Gul and Aitizaz Shah u/s 164 Cr.PC.
76.	Ahmed Masood Janjua, Special Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Rawalpindi Witness regarding confessional statements of accused Rasheed Ahmed u/s 164 Cr.PC.
77.	Rehan Yaseen, 6417/C, P.S City, Rawalpindi Witness Fingerprint.
78.	Haider Ali 2445/C, P.S City, Rawalpindi DNA and Fingerprint Witness.
79.	Mohsin Khan, 6523/C, P.S City, Rawalpindi Witness Explosives, Empty shell (30-Bore) and pellets.
80.	Feroz Alam, Director Computer Internet, GM PTCL, Islamabad Witness of PTCL record regarding conversation between Baitullah Mehsud and Molvi Sahib.
81.	Asif Muzamil, Manager Co-ordination UFONE, Ali Plaza Jinnah Avenue, Blue Area, Islamabad Witness of call record regarding accused persons.
82.	Ahmed Faisal, Representative Pak Telefone, Jinnah Avenue, Islamabad Witness of call record regarding accused persons.
83.	Miss Kalsoom, Representative Telenor, Markaz F-7, Islamabad

	Witness of call record regarding accused persons.
84.	Ijaz Hussain Shah, SHO, P.S Westridge, Rawalpindi Investigation Officer of Case FIR No.76/08 PS Westridge, Rawalpindi regarding arrest of Muhammad Razaqat and Hasnain Gul.
85.	Kashif Riaz, SHO, P.S City, Rawalpindi Investigating Officer, Witness of Seizure Memo regarding CD and Scotland Yard Police report.
86.	Waqar Ahmed Chohan, SP Regional Traffic Police, Rawalpindi Member of Punjab Joint Investigation Team
87.	Tahir Ayub, SP Investigation, Rawalpindi. (Member JIT) Member of Punjab Joint Investigation Team, prepared Challan of the Case
88.	Niaz Muhammad Khan, Inspector & SHO Police Station Cantt. D I Khan.
89.	Sona Khan, Sub Inspector, Police Station Cantt. D I Khan
90.	Mr. Jamal Turo, Assistant Manager, Public and Government Office Department, Telenor Jinnah Super Market, Islamabad.
91.	Mr. Ahmed Faisal, Senior Manager Regulatory Zong near FIA Office, Islamabad.
92.	Mr. Feroz Alam, Director Computer Internet PTCL, Islamabad
93.	Mr. Ghulam Abbas S/o Momin Khan, R/o Mohallah Amida Abad, H. No. AD/ 89, Gali No.8, Dhamial Rd, RWP.
94.	Muhammad Saced Qureshi Revenue Officer PTCL, RWP Cantt.
95.	Mirza Sarfraz Ahmed, Assistant Manager Senior Revenue Office, PTCL, RWP Cantt.
96.	Mr. Rasheed Rahim, Manager Govt. relation and Regulatory Officer Warid Telecom, ISB.
97.	Mr. Usman Maftoor, Manager Govt. Relation & Regulatory Officer Warid Telecom Blue Area, ISB.
98.	Mr. Nauman Ashraf Bodla, Deputy Director/ Forensic SIG now CTW, FIA HQ, Islamabad.
99.	Mr. Qamar Zaman, Analyst/AD, SIG now CTW, FIA HQ

	Islamabad.
100.	Mr. Muhammad Ismail Operator, ISI, ISB C/o Mr. Iftekhar Ahmed, DDG/ Legal ISI, ISB.
101.	DNA Expert FBI, Laboratory Quantico, USA
102.	AFIP Rawalpindi Technician
103.	Mr. Muhammad Jameel Akhtar, Moharrar, ASI PS City, RWP.
104.	Mr. Kamran Ali Cheema, Magistrate 1 st Class, ICT, Islamabad.
105.	Mr. Wasaal Ahmed, Nazim Talemaat, Madrassa Haqqania, Akora Khattak.
106.	Raja Shakeel S/o Raja Akbar R/o H. No. Z/ 68, Gali No. 27, Dhok Ratta, RWP.
107.	Mr. Mahammad Khalid Qureshi, Director, SIG now CTW, FIA Headquarters, Islamabad (Head of JIT).
108.	Mr. Wajid Zia, Director, ECW, FIA HQ, Islamabad (Member JIT)
109.	Mr. Azad Khan, Additional Director, SIG now CTW, FIA, Karachi (Member JIT).
110.	Mr. Sohail Habib Tajik, Additional Director, SIG now CTW, FIA HQ, Islamabad (Member JIT).
111.	Mr. G. A. Jatoi, Assistant Director, SIG now CTW, FIA, Karachi (Member JIT)
112.	Mr. Naseer Ali Khan, Inspector, SIG now CTW, FIA Peshawar
113.	Mr. Muhammad Adnan, S.I, SIG now CTW, FIA Peshawar.
114.	Mr. Sohaib Ahmed, Assistant Director, SIG now CTW, FIA (Member JIT/ Investigation Officer)
115.	Dr. Samra Iqbal, Medical Officer, Benazir Bhutto Hospital (Ex-RGH) Rawalpindi.
116.	Mr. Ashfaq Anwar, SP Rawalpindi Police.
117.	Dr. Abdur Rehman, former Emergency Officer 1122 Rawalpindi.
118.	Mr. Ghulam Muhammad Naz, Assistant Fire Officer Rawalpindi.
119.	Malik Farrukh Mehmood, Magistrate 1 st Class, ICT, Islamabad.
120.	Mr. Javed Iqbal, SP, Railways Rawalpindi.
121.	Dr. Moeen Masood, SSP Traffic, Islamabad.
122.	Mr. Azhar Hussain Shah, Inspector Rawalpindi Police.

123.	Mr. Bahiul Khan S/o Ali Rehman, R/o Garbaz, PO Lakray, Tehsil Upper Mahmand, Mahmand Agency.
124.	Mr. Zamir Ahmed, Sub Inspector, City P.S Rawalpindi.
125.	Brig. ® Javed Iqbal Cheema, then Director General, NCMC, Ministry of Interior, Govt. of Pakistan, Islamabad.
126.	Brig. ® Syed Ejaz Shah, Ex-Director General, IB, Islamabad.
127.	Raja Walayat Khan Satti, Volunteer in Civil Defence Organization, Rawalpindi
128.	Mr. Yasin Farooq, then SSP (Operation), Rawalpindi
129.	Mr. Sher Khan (R) DSP, Manager Admin & Legal Affairs, United Mobile, Suite No. 301, 3 rd . Floor, Business Avenue, Main Shahrah- e-Faisal, Karachi.
130.	Mr. Abdul Razzaq Mirani S/o Ali Muhammad Mirani, R/o Bilawal House, Clifton, Karachi.
131.	Mr. Khalid Jamil, Assistant Director, CTW, FIA, Karachi.
132.	Mr. Nisar Ahmed Khan Jadoon, Inspector, CTW, FIA, Karachi.
133.	Mr. Khalid Rasool, Deputy Director, FIA, Member JIT / I.O.

Note: The Copies of statements of PWs mentioned at serial no. 1 to 123 have already been attached with the previous Challans submitted by JIT of Punjab Police, and JIT of FIA before this Honorable Court and supplied the same to the accused persons.

**Incomplete Supplementary Challan u/s 173 Cr.P.C
(Charge Sheet No. 10)
(Assassination Case of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto)**

**Case FIR No.471/07 Dated 27-12-2007
U/s 302/324/435/436/120-B/109/118/119/201 PPC,
R/w Section 4/5 ESA, and Section 6/7/21-C/21-I/11-L, ATA, 1997
PS City Rawalpindi**

Gist of FIR

1. On 27.12.2007 at about 5.11 p.m, Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto after addressing the public gathering boarded on vehicle No.BF/7772 Land Cruiser alongwith her party leaders and left the Liaquat Bagh, Rawalpindi. When her vehicle reached at Liaquat road outside the Liaquat Hall gate, she appeared from the sun roof (Escape Hatch) of her vehicle to respond to the slogans of the party workers. An unknown accused present near her vehicle fired at her with pistol and blown himself. Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto got serious injuries. She was immediately shifted to the Rawalpindi General Hospital (RGH) where she succumbed to her injuries. Legal heirs did not allow post mortem of her dead body. However, according to the Medical Report, her death occurred due to "open head injury with depressed skull fracture, leading to cardiopulmonary arrest". The wound was measuring 5 x 3 cms just above the pinna of right ear with no surrounding wounds or blackening. The blast caused death of 18 persons at the spot while 70 received serious injuries. Suicide bomber also died at the spot and pieces of his bodies scattered there. Case FIR No. 471 dated 27.12.2007 was registered at Police Station City, Rawalpindi.

Summary of Investigation Conducted by Punjab Police

2. On inspection of place of occurrence, one pistol 30 bore alongwith a loaded magazine and one damaged magazine, one pistol 9-MM alongwith Magazine and 5 live cartridges, two empty cartridges of 30 bore, two ball-bearings, pieces of

leather jacket were taken into possession through recovery memos and sealed parcels of recovered items were prepared. Blood was taken through cotton from the place of occurrence and prepared sealed parcel of it. One electric circuit, one mobile phone SIM, one wrist watch, Identity Cards, visiting cards and blood stained pieces of cloth were also taken into possession through recovery memos from the place of occurrence. Human parts of the body i.e., 4 legs, 3 hands, piece of skull bone, one thumb and skin of fact of the suicide bomber were taken into possession from the place of occurrence, which were later on sent for DNA test. Face surgery of suicide bomber was got conducted for publication and identification. Site plan of place of occurrence without scale was prepared and later on site plan with scale was got prepared through draftsman.

3. On inspection of vehicle of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto, her shoes and other material were taken into possession and sealed parcels were prepared. Blood and other material which were taken into possession from the place of occurrence and from the vehicle of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto were sent to concerned department for analysis. All other vehicles which were damaged due blast, were taken into possession. Statements of P.Ws were recorded who verified the occurrence. Four injured succumbed to their injuries in the Hospital. Post mortem reports, MLRs, Chemical reports, Forensic Science Laboratory report and explosive expert report were taken from the concerned departments. A Joint Investigation Team (JIT) consisting upon Mushtaq Ahmed Sukhera DIG/CID, Waqar Ahmed Chauhan SP/Traffic Region-III, Tahir Ayub SP/Investigation, Rawalpindi, Inspector Tariq Ilyas and S.I. Ashfaq Ahmed of CID Lahore, under the supervision of Abdul Majeed, Addl. Inspector General of Police, CID Punjab investigated the case.

4. On the request of Govt. of Pakistan, a team from Scotland Yard police came in Pakistan. The team, after examining all the available and relevant evidence stated that Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto died as a result of a severe head injury sustained as consequence of the bomb blast. J.I.T, took into possession the reports and CDs provided by the Scotland Yard Team.

5. The Interior Ministry provided J.I.T, a C.D, containing telephonic conversation (in Pashto language) from 'Amir Sahib' by telephone No.0928-234093 to 'Moulvi Sahib' on phone No.0965-238387, dated 28-12-2007. Two terrorists Aitzaz Shah alias Saifullah and Sher Zaman arrested from Dera Ismail Khan disclosed about the conspiracy hatched by Baitullah Mehsud and his companions for the assassination of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto. After listening the intercepted telephonic conversation, accused Aitzaz Shah identified the 'Amir Sahib' as Baitullah Mehsud. He got recorded his confessional statement u/s 164 Cr. P.C, before the court.

6. During investigation accused Hasnain Gul alias Ali and Muhammad Rafaqat were also arrested from Rawalpindi. From their possession, hand grenade, detonators and bullets were recovered. Resultantly, Case FIR No. 76, dated 07-2-2008 u/s 13/20/65 A.O, ¼ FSA P.S. Westridge was registered. Both the accused got recorded their confessional statements u/s 164 Cr. PC in which they confessed their guilt and made inculpatory statements. They also disclosed the names of co-accused as Nadir Khan alias Qari Ismail r/o Swabi, Nasarullah alias Ahmed r/o Waziristan, Ibad-ur-Rehman alias Nauman alias Usman Ex-student of Madrassa Haqqania, Akora Khattak, Abdullah alias Sadam r/o Mahmand Agency, Faiz Muhammad alias Kaskat r/o Swabi, Ikram Ullah r/o South Waziristan and the suicide bomber Saeed alias Bilal r/o South Waziristan, who fired at Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto and then blown him up. They also disclosed their links with Baitullah Mehsud. On the pointation of Hasnain Gull alias Ali certain articles (Jogger, Cap and Shawl) of the suicide bomber were recovered from his house.

7. Another arrested accused Rasheed Ahmed alias Abdul Rahim Turabi (arrested on 14-02-2008) also disclosed in his confessional statement u/s 164 Cr. PC before the Magistrate that suicide bomber Saeed alias Bilal was handed over to Nadir alias Qari Ismail, Nasrullah alias Ahmed and Abdullah alias Saddam by Baitullah Mehsud alongwith Rs.4 Lac for the assassination of Mohtarma Benazir

Trial in Court

11. After completion of investigation the local police have submitted incomplete Challan in Anti- Terrorism Court No. I, Rawalpindi on the basis of incriminating evidence based on confessional statements of four accused persons. On receipt of Challan by the local police the learned trial Court has taken the cognizance into the matter and framed charge against the accused persons and commenced the trial. During the trial, the Court recorded statements of three P.Ws. Since Sardar Muhammad Ishaq Khan, Advocate was appointed, Special Public Prosecutor by the Punjab Govt. who during trial got framed charge against accused persons in ATC-I Rawalpindi on 22.11.08.

12. The subject case was transferred to FIA by M/o Interior Government of Pakistan vide Office Order No. 1/1/2008-DS (FIA), dated 06.8.2009 while constituting JIT in terms of Section- 19(1) of ATA 1997 for further investigation of the case. On 22.8.2009 as per direction of the Federal Government Mr. Shah Khawar, Deputy Attorney General moved application in the Anti- Terrorism Court No. I, Rawalpindi for adjournment of the trial proceedings till completion of investigation by the FIA. The learned trial Court after hearing the argument from both the sides adjourned the trial proceedings from time to time.

13. Ministry of Interior Government of Pakistan notified the transfer of the case to FIA for further investigations vide letter no. 1/1/2008/DS(FIA) dated 06-08-2009 and constituted JIT to be headed by Director SIG. AD Shoab Ahmad was notified as investigating officer of the case. Subsequently Mr. Wajid Zia Director ECW FIA, Mr. Sohail Habib Tajik Additional Director SIG FIA, Mr. Azad Khan Additional Director SIG Karachi, Mr. Ghulam Asghar Jatoti Assistant Director FIA Karachi were notified as members of JIT. Mr. Shah Khawar Deputy Attorney General on 17.08.2009 moved the Anti Terrorism Court Rawalpindi for adjournment of the trial.

Further Investigation:

14. Tasks Undertaken By FIA JIT:

- a. Police investigation mainly relied upon confessional statements of 02 accused, which have been corroborated.
- b. Statement of author of intercepted CD recorded.
- c. Statements of concerned officials of mobile phone companies w/s 161 Cr. PC recorded.
- d. Call record of all linked phone numbers of suspects obtained for identification of active terrorists.
- e. Proper analysis of suspect's phone numbers conducted.
- f. 02 diaries containing telephone numbers recovered from accused Hasnain Gul analyzed.
- g. Arrest of POs.

Record of Accused Verified From Madrassah Darul uloom Haqqania in Akora Khattak, District Nowshera, KP.

15. During the earlier investigation it was reported that some of the accused had studied and resided in Madrassah Darul Uloom Haqqania, Akora Khattak before and during the day of occurrence of Liaquat Bagh, Rawalpindi. Hence, Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa was requested to provide necessary assistance to the JIT to verify Madrassah record on the spot. On 12.05.2010 SIG Team headed by Inspector Naseer Ali Khan visited Madrassah Darul Uloom Haqqania, Akora Khattak and met Mr. Wasal Ahmed, Nazim-e-Talimaat.

16. Nazim-e-Talimaat produced all the relevant registers of admission and discharge from Madrassah for inspection of investigation team. The investigation Team checked all the registers in order to identify accused involved in the assassination of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto in Rawalpindi. During the inspection complete particulars of the following accused were detected by the investigation team: -

- a. Abdullah @ Saddam S/o Ali Rahman R/o Village Lakaro, Mahmand Agency (original admission form)
- b. Nadir @ Qari Ismail S/o Musafar R/o Khazana Kalabat, District Swabi. (Original admission form).
- c. Rasheed Ahmed @ Abdur Rahim Turabi S/o Qudrat Shah R/O Village Srikh Morzai, P.O. Batagram, Tehsil Shabqadar, District Charsadda (original admission form).
- d. Faiz Muhammad S/o Shah Nazar R/o Village Zaida, District Swabi. (original admission form).

17. The investigation team seized original forms pertaining to the above mentioned accused persons vide Registration No. 21716, 17816, 18642 and 23629, Mr. Wasal Ahmed, Nazim-e-Talimaat in his statement u/s 161 Cr. P.C promised to produce the original admission registers in court as and when required. The investigation team during inspection of record found that the above mentioned four accused involved in the assassination of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto remained students of Madrassah Haqqania, as a result their complete particulars have been confirmed.

18. Mr. Wasal Ahmed, Nazim-e-Talimaat in his statement u/s 161 Cr. P.C also disclosed that accused Said Arab, S/o Azim Khan R/o Chota Lahore, Swabi, Gul Roz S/o Ali Akbar R/o Chota Lahore, Swabi, Muhammad Shafique S/o Badshah Gul R/o Gar Tajik Peshawar and Rasheed Ahmed @ Abdul Raheem Taribi S/o Qudrat Shah R/o Village Srikh Morzai, P.O Batagram, Tehsil Shabqadar, Distt. Charsadda were also students of Darul Uloom Haqqania and were arrested by Police in Kamra Missile Attack case 2008 for their alleged connection with Tehrik Taliban Pakistan.

Verification of Death of Accused Nasrullah @ Ahmed and Nadir @ Qari Ismail in Mahmand Agency:

19. SIG team visited Khapakh check post, Ghalanai Mahmand Agency to verify the reported death of two accused Nasarullah and Nadir on 15-01-2008. SIG

team met Addl Political Agent Saeed Ahmed Jan and Asst Political Agent Roshan Khan Mehsud who verified that according to record, on 15-01-2008 a Jeep was stopped by MR at Khapakh check post. Two of the three persons sitting in the jeep tried to escape; whereas, the third one who was a young boy of 10/11 years remained seated in the jeep who later of exploded himself. One of the two fleeing persons was shot dead who was later identified as Nadir @ Qari Ismail, r/o Khazana Kalabat and the second fleeing person was over powered by MR personnel and was identified as Nasarullah r/o Dandi Sedgi. Nasarullah was taken to hospital where he died after 6/7 days and his dead body was shifted to Ghalanai Hospital. A CNIC was recovered from the dead body belonging to one Nadir s/o Musafar r/o Khazana Kalabat, District Swabi. Nasarullah's dead body was handed over to a person named Noroz Khan s/o Haji Jan Khan r/o Dandi Sedgi, P.O Meran Shah, Tehsil Ghulam Khan, North Waziristan, bearing CNIC No. 21504-6212434-1 where he was buried. SIG team obtained copies of the following documents from the office of Political Agent Mahmand Agency:-

- a. Letter of Political Agent (DSR-ii).
- b. Special Report of Naib Tehsildar (15-01-2008).
- c. Letter No. 316 of Political Naib Tehsildar.
- d. Letter of Naroz Khan who received dead body of Nasrullah.
- e. Attached copies of telephone numbers and addresses.
- f. Photocopies of CNIC of Noroz Khan.

DNA Comparison Report by FBI Laboratory.

20. Accused Hasnain Gul was arrested by police on Jan 05, 2008. He subsequently made confessional statement u/s 164 Cr.PC before the learned Magistrate. His confession included that 02 suicide bombers namely Bilal and Ikramullah stayed at residence of his arrested co-accused Muhammad Rafaqat on Dec 26, 2007. Furthermore, on Dec 27, 2007 Hasnain Gul got the 02 suicide bombers prepared at his residence for launching the suicide attack on Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto. While leaving in accused Rafaqat's taxi the suicide bombers left one shawl, a pair of joggers and a cap at the residence of accused Hasnain Gul.

20. The Shawl, pair of joggers and the cap was seized by Rawalpindi police on Feb 11, 2008 from the residence of arrested accused Hasnain Gul r/o Rawalpindi on his pointation. JIT sent these items to FBI DNA Laboratory, Quantico USA through US Legal Attache office, US Embassy Islamabad vide SIG HQ letter No. HQ/SIG/Ops/471/09/1985-87, dated: Sep 12, 2009 to obtain DNA profiles from above mentioned articles for comparison with DNA profiles already prepared by Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (AFIP), Rawalpindi vide their report No: DNA-01/2008 (addendum), dated Jan 04, 2008, from following body parts of three different individuals:-

- a. Piece of soft tissue adjacent to teeth.
- b. Reconstructed face.
- c. Intact right hand without index finger.
- d. Thumb.
- e. Soft tissue from tongue.
- f. Piece of soft tissue.
- g. Left leg with woolen socks and red shoes.
- h. Right leg with woolen socks and red shoes.
- i. Right leg with black socks and brown leather chappal.
- j. Left leg with black socks and brown leather chappal.
- k. Left hand without thumb with stains of Mehndi on its palmer aspect.
- l. Right hand complete.

21. US Legal Attache office, US Embassy, Islamabad vide its letter No. IS-C163-A, dated: Mar 26, 2010 has provided final DNA result of FBI Laboratory's forensic DNA examination. The report has verified that the DNA profiles of two individuals prepared by AFIP, Rawalpindi from Piece of soft tissue adjacent to teeth, Reconstructed face, Intact right hand without index finger, Thumb, Soft tissue from tongue, Piece of soft tissue, Right leg with black socks and brown

ather chappal, Left leg with black socks and brown leather chappal (**Unknown 1**) and Left leg with woolen socks and red shoes, Right leg with woolen socks and red shoes (**Unknown 2**) has been found present on Shawl and pair of joggers recovered from house of accused Hasnain Gul mentioned above.

22. Comparison report of FBI Lab has corroborated Hasnain Gul's confessional statement by confirming that 02 terrorists who left Shawl and pair of joggers and cap in Hasnain Gul's residence were killed in the blast on crime scene in Liaquat Bagh on 27-12-2007.

Forensic Report of Cell phones recovered from Accused Hasnain Gul and Muhammad Rafaqat.

23. At the time of arrest of accused Hasnain Gul and Muhammad Rafaqat on Jan 05, 2010, police recovered following 03 cell phone numbers from their possession:-

S. No	Make	Phone IMEI	SIM IMSI (Warid)
1	Nokia 1112	356405012608494	410071390008236
2	Nokia 1200	359554016785688	410071930049920
3	Motorola	35195501382647449	Without SIM Card


24. Forensic examination of above mentioned cell phone numbers was conducted in SIG Computer Forensic Laboratory. The IMEI analysis of above mentioned cell phones has revealed that the cell phone recovered from Muhammad Rafaqat (with IMEI 356405012608494) at the time of arrest was in use of Hasnain Gul on the day of occurrence i.e 27-12-2007.

RBS Locations of Accused Hasnain Gul, Muhammad Rafaqat and Nasarullah.

25. Accused Hasnain Gul and Muhammad Rafaqat were arrested by police on Jan 05, 2008. They subsequently made confessional statement u/s 164 CrPC before the learned Magistrate. In their confessional statements both have revealed that

they received 02 suicide bombers namely Bilal and Ikramullah along with accused Nasarullah (killed in Momand Agency on 15-01-2008) near Daewoo terminal Rawalpindi on Dec 26, 2007. Both of them disclosed their activities including reconnaissance of Liaquat Bagh on Dec 27, 2007 by Rafaqat and Nasarullah and bringing the 02 suicide bombers to the crime scene for suicide attack on Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto.

26. During call record analysis RBS locations were analyzed which corroborated the confessional statements of both arrested accused Hasnain Gul and Rafaqat Hussain by corroborating the location and timings revealed by them in their confessional statements which is shown in following map (26-A).



Call Record Analysis of Arrested Accused.


27. The call data record of cell phone numbers of the following accused has been analyzed by SIG i2 Analyst:-

- a. Nasarullah - 0304-9684538 (12-02-2007 to 28-12-2007)
- b. Hasnain Gul - 0332-5609682 (26-12-2007 to 27-01-2008)
- c. Muhammad Razaqat - 0331-5013836 (26-12-2007 to 28-12-2007)
- d. Qari Ismail - 0344-6654236 (03-12-2007 to 31 Dec 2007 - Jan 2008)
- e. Abad ur Rahman - 0344-9666465 (07-12-2007 to 29-12-2007)
- f. Abad ur Rahman - 0346-9442498 (05-12-2007 to 18-12-2007)
- g. Mazhar Uddin - 0928-230493 (09-12-2007 to 28-12-2007)
- h. Haji Shah Wali Khan - 0965-238387

28. The analysis has revealed that Nasrullah, Hasnain Gul, Muhammad Razaqat, Qari Ismail, Abad ur Rahman and the two PTCL numbers mentioned above are interconnected as shown in the chart below between 02.12.2007 to 27.01.2008 while accused were involved in planning, facilitating and execution of suicide bombing attack against Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto in Rawalpindi and subsequent escape from Rawalpindi to Dir etc.

**Telephonic Link Chart of Identified Accused Persons
Showing Frequency of Calls**

28.A



29. The above mentioned PTCL number 0965238387 in Tank is the number on which one Moulvi Sb received a call from one Amir Sb (Bait Ullah Mehsud) from the above mentioned PTCL number 0928230493 in Bannu / Miranshah on 28-12-2007, which was intercepted by ISI. The same PTCL number in Tank had already called Nasarullah before he was called by Ameer Sb.

Gist of Statement of Special operator of ISI

30. Muhammad Ismail operator ISI Islamabad stated that he has been appointed in ISI for almost 05 years and he is well versant with Pushto Language. His duties include hearing and recording telephonic conversation of commanders of different organizations. On 28-12-2007 during interception of routinely under observation telephone numbers, ISI intercepted a telephone call from a phone number 0928-230493 (registered in the name of Mazhar uddin) to a phone number 0965-238387 (registered in the name of Haji Shah Wali Khan). Through experience he identified the caller from the phone number 0928-230493 as Bait ullah Mehsud. He recorded the conversation on the CD whose duration was 01 minute and 13 seconds.

Corroboration of Association of Cell Phone Numbers with Accused

31. Call record analysis of cell phone numbers of arrested accused Hasain Gul and Muhammad Razaqat (0332-5609682 and 0331-50138336 respectively) has further corroborated that the above mentioned numbers were in use of arrested accused Hasnain Gul and Muhammad Razaqat as Hasnain Gul called the landline number installed at the residence of Muhammad Razaqat and the cell phone in his use on 27-12-2007 (the day of occurrence) was recovered from Muhammad Razaqat at the time of arrest. Further more the cell phone numbers disclosed by Muhammad Razaqat to be in his use on 27-12-2007 (the day of occurrence) was in contact with a cell phone number 0300-2594556, which was in use of Shahzad (brother of Muhammad Razaqat), moreover the cell phone number of Muhammad Razaqat was in contact with two other cell phone numbers which are registered in the name of Sabir Hussain (father of Muhammad Razaqat).

Efforts to Arrest POs Through Sources, Surveillance and Interception.

32. JIT had deployed and utilized all the sources to affect the arrest of absconding accused (mentioned in column No. 2, of Challan in Red Ink) through informers and surveillance by intelligence agency. Ibad-ur-Rehman @ Farooq Chattan was last located near Bara and Landi Kotal in Khyber Agency. According to sources he was involved in conducting terrorist attacks in Peshawar, Swat, Rawalpindi and other areas of Pakistan on behest of TTP and Al-Qaeda. JIT has held a number of meetings with the officials in Frontier Corps HQ Bala Hisar, Corps Headquarters Peshawar and ACS FATA Peshawar to locate the remaining POs.

Fixing Responsibility For Breach of Security, Destruction of Evidence & Failure to Conduct Postmortem.

33. During investigation the JIT also examined a number of persons through recording of their statements and issuance of questionnaires in order to identify other accused, if any, involved in the criminal conspiracy for assassination of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto in Rawalpindi. The JIT also investigated role of relevant Police Officers for failure to provide proper security arrangements for Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto, negligent washing of crime scene, failure to get conduct postmortem etc which either contributed directly to the assassination of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto or subsequently impeded investigation due to insufficient crime scene evidence. JIT has also made every effort to determine whether the accused persons mentioned in col. No. 3 in Challan, including those who are Pos, received any support or facilitation or instigation from any government & public functionary, etc and whether any Police officer deployed on duty in Liaquat Bagh Rawalpindi on the day of occurrence had any role by intentional omission or commission in facilitation of the execution of assassination plan of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto. The JIT also examined concerned responsible officials regarding motive of press conference of Brig. @ Javed Iqbal Cheema, Ex-Director General, National Crisis Management Cell, M/o Interior, Islamabad.

34. During the course of investigation, JIT recorded the statements of following persons & officials: -

- i. Makhdoom Amin Faheem, Federal Minister for Commerce & Trade, Govt. of Pakistan, Islamabad
- ii. Lt. Gen. © Hameed Gul, ex-DG ISI.
- iii. Syed Kamal Shah, former Secretary, Ministry of Interior, Islamabad.
- iv. Mr. Khusro Perwaiz Khan, Ex-Secretary Home, Govt of Punjab.
- v. Syed Asghar Raza Zaidi, then Joint Director General, IB, Islamabad.
- vi. Brig. © Javed Iqbal Cheema, then Director General, NCMC, Ministry of Interior, Govt. of Pakistan, Islamabad.
- vii. Mr. Muhammad Irfan Ellahi, then D.C.O, Rawalpindi
- viii. Syed Saud Aziz, then C.P.O, Rawalpindi
- ix. Professor Muhammad Mussadiq, RGH (BBH), Rawalpindi
- x. Professor Azam Yousaf, RGH (BBH), Rawalpindi
- xi. Brig. © Syed Ejaz Shah, Ex-Director General, IB, Islamabad.
- xii. Col. © Muhammad Mohsin Mahmood, Ex-Director (Tech.), IB, Islamabad
- xiii. Ms. Naheed Khan, Ex-Political Secretary, PPPP.
- xiv. Senator Dr. Safdar Ali Abbasi, Leader PPPP.
- xv. Mr. Abdul Razzak Mirani, Personal attendant of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto on 27.12.2007.
- xvi. Mr. Ayyaz Khan @ Pappu S/o Mukhtar Ahmed, President Peoples Student Federation (PSF), Rawalpindi.
- xvii. Syed Sagheer Hussain Shah S/o Syed Maqsood Hussain Shah, Deputy General Secretary, (PSF), Punjab, Rawalpindi
- xviii. Maj. © Imtiaz Hussain, then S.S.P Security for Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto
- xix. Dr. Abdur Rehman, then Emergency Officer, Rescue-1122, Rawalpindi
- xx. Mr. Ghulam Muhammad Naz, then Assistant Fire Officer, Distt. Govt. Rawalpindi.
- xxi. Raja Walayat Khan Satti, Volunteer in Civil Defence Organization, Rawalpindi
- xxii. Mr. Yasin Farooq, then SSP (Operation), Rawalpindi
- xxiii. Mr. Khurram Shahzad, then S.P Rawal Town, Rawalpindi
- xxiv. Mr. Ashfaq Anwar, then A.S.P, HQ, Rawalpindi.
- xxv. Mr. Ishtiaq Hussain Shah, then D.S.P, City Rawalpindi
- xxvi. Mr. Sultan Mehmood Chadhar, then D.S.P, Rawalpindi
- xxvii. Inspector Kashif Riaz, then S.H.O City P.S, Rawalpindi
- xxviii. Dr. Aurangzeb, RGH (BBH), Rawalpindi
- xxix. Dr. Habib Ahmed Khan, then Medical Superintendent, RGH (BBH), Rawalpindi
- xxx. Dr. Nasir Khan, Assistant Professor, RGH (BBH), Rawalpindi
- xxxi. Dr. Qudsiya Anjum Qureshi, then Deputy Director, Anesthesia, RGH (BBH), Rawalpindi

- xxxii. Dr. Saeeda Yasmin, then Post Graduate Trainee, RGH (BBH), Rawalpindi
- xxxiii. Dr. Samra Ayub, then Casualty Medical Officer, RGH (BBH), Rawalpindi
- xxxiv. S.I Nazar Hussain, City P.S, Rawalpindi
- xxxv. S.I Zamir Ahmed, City P.S Rawalpindi
- xxxvi. Ch. Zamrud Khan, Director General, Bait-u-Imal and leader of PPP, Rawalpindi.
- xxxvii Mr. Sher Khan (R) DSP, Manager Admin & Legal Affairs, United Mobile, Suite No. 301, 3rd. Floor, Business Avenue, Main Shahrah-e-Faisal, Karachi.

35. JIT has already submitted supplementary incomplete Challans in the Trial Court on 25th May 2010 and 11th June 2010. During this period JIT coordinated its efforts with the Frontier Corp Peshawar, Frontier Constabulary, Frontier Police and FATA Secretariat to apprehend POs namely Ibad ur Rahman @ Noman @ Farooq Chatan, Abdullah @ Saddam & others in FATA and adjoining areas in Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa. Since security operations are being carried out in FATA a great difficulty was faced to access these areas for apprehension of the absconding accused. Furthermore during last two years most of the previous top leadership of TTP and Al-Qaida has been eliminated in South Waziristan, Mahmand and Bajur agencies. Likewise telephone record of suspects is not available beyond 3 months. All these impediments made the arrest of Pos difficult for JIT.

However, a source in Khyber Agency has provided a video to JIT indicating death of P.O Ibad-ur-Rehman @ Farooq Chatan along with 14 other Taliban militants including foreigners in a drone attack on 13th May, 2010 in Tirah, Khyber Agency.

Likewise, the death of PO Abdullalt @ Saddam was confirmed by his brother Bahlol Khan S/o Ali Rehman, R/o Garbaz, PO Lakray, Tehsil Upper Mahmand, Mahmand Agency. He stated that his brother Saddam died in a bomb blast on 31st May 2008 at Mamad Gatt, Mahmand Agency and he

was buried in his native village Lakaro, Mahmand Agency.

36. Furthermore, during investigation it has been established that conspirators and accused studied and stayed at Madrassah Haqqania, Akora Khattak during 2006 & 2007. Apparently JIT Punjab Police did not contact management of Madrassah Haqqania, Akora Khattak to procure the relevant record. In this regard SIG, Peshawar has seized all the relevant record pertaining to accused from Madrassah Haqqania, Akora Khattak. As mentioned earlier there is no doubt that accused Nasrullah, Saddam & their associates etc were students and resident of Madrassah Haqqania while they were hatching conspiracies and planning to assassinate Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto. However, so far the JIT has not come across evidence of any role of abetment, incitement or facilitation by any member of management of Madrassah Darul Uloom Haqqania Akora Khattak in the actual suicide attack on Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto on December 27, 2007.

37. As mentioned earlier, JIT has conducted extensive investigation to determine liability of Police Officers of Rawalpindi Police who were responsible for providing comprehensive security cover, protection of crime scene and carrying out initial investigation as per law. In this regard JIT has recorded statements of number of witnesses. PW Ashfaq Anwar, SP in his statement recorded u/s 164 Cr. P.C has disclosed that approximately two hours before the departure of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto from Liaquat Bagh, CPO Syed Saud Aziz removed him from the escort duty of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto and sent him to Karal Chowk, Islamabad for inquiring into an alleged firing incident. This sudden removal of SP Ashfaq Anwar by the then CPO Syed Saud Aziz from Escort duty of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto caused a security breach which facilitated the terrorists to carry out a successful suicide attack in close proximity of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto's vehicle resulting in her assassination.

Statement of SP Ashfaq Anwar is duly supported by PWs SP Tahir Ayub, SP Javed Iqbal, SSP Dr. Moeen Masood and Inspector Azhar Hussain Shah. Furthermore, this vital fact of deliberate removal of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto's security officer at a crucial juncture was determined by this investigation.

38. Based on reliable and irrefutable ocular evidence JIT has found that Rawalpindi Police Officers CPO Syed Saud Aziz, and SP Khurram Shahzad are directly responsible for intentional destruction of evidence from crime scene through a deliberate and totally unwarranted order for washing of crime scene. In this regard statements of PWs Dr. Abdur Rehman, Emergency officer Rescue-1122, and Mr. Ghulam Muhammad Naz, Assistant Fire Officer have been recorded under Sec- 164 Cr. PC. They have stated that the crime scene was washed on the orders of SP Khurram Shahzad. While SP Khurram Shahzad stated that prior to washing the crime scene he had obtained orders from CPO Saud Aziz on phone. When CPO Syed Saud Aziz and SP Khurram Shahzad were confronted with this evidence they admitted that they ordered the washing of crime scene because in their opinion all relevant evidence had been collected from the crime scene. However, when further confronted with the seized articles they couldn't point out a single seized article which provided any lead for investigation. These officers couldn't justify the washing of crime scene in a hasty and arbitrary manner. It is emphasized that as a result of washing the crime scene the opportunity to find additional incriminating evidence in such an important case was lost.

39. JIT has also found that CPO Syed Saud Aziz deliberately avoided to get conduct the post mortem in an attempt to obstruct and impede investigation. In this regard statement of PW Prof. Dr. Mussadaq has been recorded u/s 164 Cr. PC. CPO Syed Saud Aziz in his statement before JIT

tried to shift this legal responsibility but JIT finds his explanation as implausible and untenable.

40. JIT has also scrutinized the role of Punjab Government functionaries and other public functionaries. In this regard the then Home Secretary Mr. Khuro Pervaiz was also examined. After examining all the statements and relevant record it can be stated with confidence that while Govt. of Punjab placed Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto under house arrest during this period on the pretext of 'security reasons' and also banned Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto rally at Rawalpindi, but the same Government of Punjab failed to adopt sufficient security measures for Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto on 27.12.2007. In this regard JIT would like to mention here for comparison the security measures taken by Government of Sindh on 18.10.2007 for Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto when she survived the twin suicide attacks at Karsaz, Karachi due to laycred and alert police security arrangement and provision of armoured truck/ escape vehicle.

41. Similarly, the JIT also interviewed and issued questionnaires to a number of Federal Government functionaries including the then Secretary Interior, the previous DG IB, the then DG, NCMC, the then Director Technical IB, the then JD IB, ICT Islamabad etc. It is abundantly clear that while Federal Govt. was in possession of sufficient material to indicate imminent threat to the life of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto from Al-Qaida and Taliban, yet the Federal Govt. did not provide appropriate level of security to Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto in Punjab or Rawalpindi. Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto was continuously requesting the government to provide her high level security comparable to the threat to her life. This security lapse in Rawalpindi is significant because Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto had already suffered and barely survived the twin suicide attacks on 18.10.2007 at Karsaz incident Karachi. While the then Federal Govt. has contended that

security in Punjab is a provincial matter, the same Federal Government had notified VVIP security arrangements for Mr. Shaukat Aziz, Ex Prime Minister and Ch. Shujaat Hussain, Ex-Prime Minister but did not notify such security arrangements for Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto who remained Prime Minister of Pakistan twice and was Chairperson of Pakistan Peoples Party. The concerned officials have not provided a satisfactory explanation for this deliberate lapse of security on their part.

42. In the same manner JIT found that the then Federal Government without valid justification again took over responsibility of Provincial Government, when DG, NCMC, Ministry of Interior held a premature press conference on 28.12.2007 amazingly giving details of investigation. While the Punjab Government notified the JIT on 31.12.2007. In this press conference the then DG, NCMC not only announced cause of death of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto but also declared that the terrorists belonged to Baitullah Mehsud, Chief Commander, TTP. The credibility of investigation of this case was affected by the premature press conference mentioned above.

43. It is evident from the above paragraphs that the conduct of then Provincial and Federal Govt. functionaries on 27.12.2007 and in the subsequent days was not up to the mark. Resultantly, a number of controversies cropped up because of inadequate security arrangements, destruction of evidence and the premature and hasty press conference. There is an apparent effort to screen the mastermind. Similarly, the Punjab Government did not order an independent Judicial Inquiry but instead notified a committee just to cover up and justify crime scene destruction. There is considerable circumstantial evidence against the former President indicating his involvement in all issues pertaining to attack on Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto on 27.12.2007. However, despite efforts by the JIT former

President Pervez Musharraf could not be examined during the investigation of the case as he is abroad.

44. Furthermore, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs vide letter No. Afg(II)-1/15/2010, dated 3rd March 2010, replied to JIT that they don't possess any warning or report issued on their record by President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan regarding any threat to Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto's life. Similarly, vide CC No. 1-1200 Dated 5th May 2010, PAREP Abu Dhabi has informed that according to UAE authorities they had received information on a serious threat of life to Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto, which was conveyed to Mohtarma as well as ISI. But they did not have specific information either on the identity of the planners or those who carried out the assassination.
45. As already pointed JIT also examined a number of important political leaders and officials. While these persons pointed out various weaknesses in security of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto but none of them provided any vital or additional evidence in this regard.
46. JIT made an attempt to seek additional evidence from UN because UN Commission on assassination of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto had pointed out at a number of other aspects of the case. However, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Government of Pakistan vide u.o note No. UN(I)-8/42/2007 dated 22 July 2010 has conveyed to the JIT that no such evidence is forthcoming.
47. In order to seek assistance from Sindh Police, JIT met Mr. Saud Ahmed, Addl. IGP CID, Sindh to discuss the progress made in FIRs 183/07 and 213/08 PS Bahadurabad, Karachi, pertaining to suicide attacks on Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto on 18 October 2007 in Karsaz, Karachi. Apart from this DSP Mr. Nawaz Ranjha the I.O of the said case was also called to

Islamabad. The case file was examined and thoroughly discussed with him. However, so far Karachi Police has not provided any substantial clue which could be useful in the investigation of the instant case.

Conclusion:

48. JIT has minutely examined the statements of witnesses, confessional statements of accused, accused call record / RBS analysis, DNA comparison report, cell phone forensic reports, Darul Uloom Haaqania, Akora Khattak record, Medico Legal Certificates of deceased, statement of ISI official, statements U/s 164 Cr.PC of 5 PWs, Forensic analysis of 3 cell phones of accused Saud Aziz and Khurram Shahzad, Forensic analysis of 2 Black Berry of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto etc.
49. It is evident from the evidence available on record that accused Hasnain Gul & Muhammad Razaqat carried out suicide attack against Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto in Rawalpindi with active support, facilitation, financing, guidance, abetment and provision of suicide bombers & explosive jackets by Nasruallah, Abad-ur-Reham, Nadir @ Qari Ismail, Abdullah @ Saddam and Faiz Muhammad @ Kisket. Similarly Aitzaz Shah accused in confessional statement admitted knowledge of conspiracy and identified the voice of Baitullah Mehsud, Amir of Tehrik Taliban Pakistan (TTP) on intercept by ISI. Similarly accused Aitzaz Shah in his inculpatory confessional statement recorded by the Magistrate has implicated his co-accused Sher Zaman with the commission of offence with which he has been charged. Likewise, accused Rasheed Ahmed @ Abdul Rahim Turabi in his inculpatory confessional statement recorded by the Magistrate also implicated his co-accused for having knowledge of the criminal conspiracy to assassinate Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto. JIT has brought corroborative and concrete evidence against the accused mentioned at serial No. 1 to 5 in Col.

No. 03 of the Challan including FBI DNA Comparison Report, SIG Forensic Expert Report, SIG i-2 Analyst Report, Record seized from Daruloom Haqqania Akora Khattak, RBS location of accused Hasnain Gul & Muhammad Rafaqat and Nasrullah in Rawalpindi on 27.12.07 i.e. day of occurrence.

50. During the investigation, FIA JIT with the permission of court has re-examined & interrogated the accused namely, Aitzaz Shah @ Saifullah S/o Zaheer Shah, Hasnain Gul alias Ali S/o Muhammad Riaz, Muhammad Rafaqat s/o Sabir Hussain and Rasheed Ahmed @ Abdul Rahim Turabi s/o Qudrat Shah mentioned in Col. No. 03 of the Challan & confined in Judicial Lockup. The accused namely: Muhammad Rafaqat, Hasnain Gul, Aitezaz Shah and Rasheed Ahmed @ Abdul Rahim Turabi admitted their guilt and have not expressed any remorse or repentance for their brutal criminal act. These accused had already made their voluntary confessional statements u/s 164 Cr.PC.

51. The JIT has examined the entire evidence available on record and also brought on record the plea of the accused Police Officers who were found responsible for causing deliberate security breach, destruction of evidence and failure to get conduct postmortem of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto. As mentioned above, substantial evidence has been brought on record against accused Saud Aziz, former CPO Rawalpindi regarding his role in causing breach of security by deliberately withdrawing ASP Ashfaq Anwar, who was deputed for Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto's escort duty, destruction of evidence by ordering washing of crime scene and avoiding to get conduct postmortem of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto. All of these acts have resulted in firstly facilitating assassination of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto and have subsequently caused damage to the investigation of the case. Similarly, sufficient evidence has come on record against accused Khurram Shahzad,

the then SP, Rawal Town, Rawalpindi, who in active connivance and collusion with accused Saud Aziz, ordered washing of crime scene which resulted in destruction of evidence. Based on the evidence available on record, accused Syed Saud Aziz, former CPO Rawalpindi and Khurram Shahzad, the then SP Rawal Town, Rawalpindi, it has been established that both of them are involved in facilitating the terrorist accused by destroying evidence and failure to get conduct postmortem in order to impede the investigation.

During this period accused Saud Aziz filed a Writ Petition before the Hon'able Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench for removal of his name from ECL but his petition was dismissed by the Hon'able Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench.

52. On 04.12.2010 the Hon'able Trial Court examined evidence available in the Incomplete Report U/s 173 Cr.PC and issued non-bailable warrants of arrest of accused Syed Saud Aziz, then CPO, Rawalpindi and Khurram Shahzad, then SP, Rawal Town. Both the accused appeared before the court on 07.12.2010 and got their pre-arrest bail from the Hon'able Trial Court. The Hon'able Court further directed them to join the investigation before the JIT; however, they failed to comply with the Court orders and again appeared before the Hon'able trial Court on next date of hearing i.e. 11.12.2010.

53. In compliance with the directions of the Court both the accused joined investigation with JIT on 11.12.2010. During investigation of the case their plea was recorded by one of the members of JIT (G. A. Jatoi, Assistant Director, FIA). The accused were asked certain material questions to unearth the conspiracy concerning deliberate breach of security, non-conducting of postmortem and destruction of evidence by washing of crime scene in haste but both accused did not co-operate with the JIT and purposely withheld the

material information/ facts. Accused Saud Aziz did not produce his cell phone which remained in his use as CPO Rawalpindi on the day of incident i.e. 27.12.2007. Both the accused were confronted with the statements of PWs namely: SP Ashfaq Anwar, Professor Dr. Musaddaq Khan, Dr. Abdur-Rahman, Ghulam Muhammad Naz, SSP Javed Khan, SP Tahir Ayub, SSP, Dr. Moeen Masud & Inspector Azhar Hussain Shah but they miserably failed to give any justification of the role attributed to them by all these PWs. They also failed to show any animosity with the PWs i.e. professional doctors, their colleague police officers and senior officers of other departments including Rescue-1122. Prima facie the allegations against both accused officers have been established during the course of investigation by the JIT.

54. On 22.12.2010 the Hon'able Court after hearing the arguments of both the sides, rejected pre-arrest bail of both the accused, therefore, their custody was taken by FIA and they were arrested vide "Arrest & Personal Search Memo dated 22.12.2010". On 23.12.2010 both the accused were produced before this Court with the request to grant 12 days physical remand for further interrogation. The Hon'able Court granted 6 days physical custody of both the accused to FIA till 28.12.2010.

55. During arrest of above named accused on 22.12.2010, Cell Phone "SAINO" E-55 IMEI Nos. 359151010060497 & 359151010260493 with 2 SIM Cards bearing IMSI Nos. 410038102729426 & 410070560063045 was recovered from accused Khurram Shahzad which was in his use on 27.12.2007 i.e. the day of incident; however, accused Saud Aziz did not produce his cell phone which was in his use on that day. On 23.12.2010, accused Saud Aziz arranged the production of his cell phone "Nokia E52", IMEI No.359327033207618, Mobilink SIM Card, IMSI No. 0014100459361, which he claimed was his only cell phone and number since 2007 and the same was secured vide Seizure Memo of the day.

56. On 24.12.2010, two cell phone sets (i) "SAINO" E-55 (IMEI No. 359151010060497 & 359151010260493), alongwith 2 SIM cards recovered from accused Khurram Shahzad Haider on 22.12.2010 and (ii) "Nokia" E52 (IMEI No. 359327033207618) alongwith one SIM card was produced by accused Syed Saud Aziz. Deputy Director (Forensic) has conducted forensic analysis of above mentioned cell phones. The Deputy Director (Forensic) of CTW, FIA has submitted his detailed reports dated 24.12.2010, 28.12.2010 and 04.01.2011, regarding Cell Phone "SAINO E55" in the use of accused Khurram Shahzad and "Nokia E52" of accused Saud Aziz. It is evident from his report that "Nokia E52" cell phone produced by accused Saud Aziz to JIT on 23.12.2010 was launched and introduced in Pakistan in the month of August, 2009. It is now crystal clear that accused Saud Aziz has deliberately and willfully concealed and withheld Cell Phone, which was in his use on 27.12.2007 in order to prevent forensic analysis of contents of cell phone i.e. contacts, SMS, Call Logs etc. On receipt of forensic analysis report on 28.12.2010 from the Deputy Director (Forensic), JIT confronted accused Saud Aziz with this fact but he failed to give any plausible explanation regarding his missing cell phone of December, 2007.

Another Cell Phone (Nokia-6303C) No. 0333-3333320 was seized on 14.01.2011, which he claimed had also remained under his use. All the data of the cell phone was retrieved. It was found in Forensic analysis that even the second cell phone provided by accused Saud Aziz is of year 2009. He was confronted with this fact but he has no plausible explanation regarding the whereabouts of cell phone in his use on 27.12.2007.

57. During interrogation by the JIT, accused Saud Aziz and Khurram Shahzad contended that although they were in fact casual and negligent in performance of their official duties but other police officers including SSP Yaseen Farooq and then SSP (Security) Maj. (R) Imtiaz Hussain have also equally failed to perform their duties entrusted to them. Both the arrested

accused further contended that whether JIT has recovered "Dupatta" and Black Berry of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto for analysis in order to locate other accused.

Accused Saud Aziz during interrogation inadvertently made a disclosure that in September, 2007 while posted as Regional Police Officer (RPO), Gujranwala of five (05) districts, he was suddenly transferred to a junior assignment of CPO, District Rawalpindi. He could not give any plausible explanation for this transfer.

JIT also re-examined SSP Yaseen Farooq and then SSP (Security) Maj. (R) Intiaz Hussain and confronted them with the accusations of accused Saud Aziz and Khurram Shahzad. SSP Yaseen Farooq volunteered to record his statement U/s 164 Cr.PC; therefore, he was produced before learned Magistrate 1st Class, Islamabad (Mr. Kamran Ali Cheema), who was deputed by the Deputy Commissioner, ICT, Islamabad. PW Yaseen Farooq in his statement recorded before the Learned Magistrate has reiterated that his exclusive assigned duty was to look after the security arrangements in Liaquat Bagh within its boundaries. He had no authority, concern or any supervisory role to interfere with the special squad under the charge of Mr. Ashfaq Anwar, particularly deputed for security and escort along with Elite Force and Motorcade with Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto, who was directly under the supervision of Syed Saud Aziz, then CPO, Rawalpindi and none else. He further categorically clarified that it was not in his knowledge that Mr. Ashfaq Anwar had been removed from his duties by the then CPO (Syed Saud Aziz). Neither this issue was discussed by then CPO with him, nor Mr. Ashfaq Anwar brought to his knowledge that he had been ordered by then CPO to report at Koral on 27.12.2007 i.e. the day of occurrence. He stated that the CPO as a head of the District Police is Incharge of all SHOs, investigations, posting & transfers, financial and administrative matters etc. As such, on the spot Syed Saud Aziz, then CPO made all the decisions pertaining to security, crime scene, postmortem and registration of FIR,

hence, PW Yaseen Farooq was neither consulted nor he had issued any orders with regard to security, crime scene, postmortem and registration of FIR. He confirmed that on the day of incident most of the CPO's communication with him was through his cell phone No. 0300-8640700.

JIT had detailed Mr. Azad Khan Additional Director, Member JIT for the recovery / seizure of "Dupatta" and "Black Berry" of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto. Mr. Azad Khan has secured vide seizure memo dated 02.02.2011, two cell phone sets (i) "Black Berry" of Dark Blue colour, IMEI No. 357890009509368, alongwith SIM of Etisalat and (ii) "Black Berry" of Black colour, IMEI No. 354672018501237, alongwith SIM of Etisalat, belonging to and remained in use of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto in the year 2007. These cell phones were produced by Mr. Abdul Razzaq Mirani S/o Ali Muhammad Mirani, Incharge Bilawal House, Clifton, Karachi before Mr. Azad Khan, Additional Director, CTW, FIA, Karachi in his office in Karachi. PW Abdul Razzaq Mirani S/o Ali Muhammad Mirani has stated in his statement recorded U/s 161 Cr.PC that on 27.12.2007, he was in the vehicle of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto and he returned from Rawalpindi to Larkana with dead body and belongings of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto. Her belongings included 02 cell phones, which throughout remained under lock & key in Bilawal House, Clifton, Karachi. After seizure by FIA, both the cell phones with SIM Cards were sent to the Deputy Director (Forensic), CTW for forensic analysis vide letter dated 03.02.2011. According to Forensic Report dated 04.02.2011, Black Berry 8700g contains 18 Handset E-mails Messages, 01 Handset Note and 52 SIM Contacts. All the retrieved Handset Email Messages are from 14.12.2007 to 23.12.2007. Similarly, Black Berry 8800 contains 317 Handset Contacts, 06 Handset SMS Messages, 01 Handset Note, 207 SIM Contacts and 14 Deleted SIM SMS Messages. All SMS Messages retrieved from SIM Card are from 06.09.2007 to 19.09.2007. According to Forensic Report no call log was retrieved from two cell phones

mentioned above.

Out of the retrieved material during Forensic analysis is the last E-mail message sent to Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto by one Palwasha Khan on 23.12.2007, which is reproduced below:

“Respected Prime Minister. The US embassy confirms that a message has also been separately sent to the heads of all Intelligence agencies asking them specifically not to interfere and to stay away from the Electoral process. Regards Palwasha”

The message is an indication of the anxiety of the period in question and extent of foreign interference in our national affairs.

59. It is evident from record that PWs have consistently stated / deposed against accused Saud Aziz and Khurram Shahzad regarding their wilful, unlawful and criminal role which amounts to abetment and facilitation in deliberately causing breach of security and destroying evidence through their illegal and deliberate acts. In this way they have firstly facilitated the terrorist accused to carryout a successful terror attack against Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto, which resulted in her assassination & death of 23 persons also and secondly by committing act of destruction of evidence to screen out the offenders / co-conspirators. Furthermore, accused Saud Aziz and Khurram Shahzad have enhanced their liability by concealing from JIT their cell phones, which were in their use on 27.12.2007.

60. On 07.01.2011, the Special Public Prosecutors of this case filed Criminal Revision Petition before the Hon'able Lahore High Court Bench at Rawalpindi against the impugned orders dated 29.12.2010 passed by the learned Trial Court through which he refused further physical remand of both the arrested accused Saud Aziz and Khurram Shahzad, which was fixed for 13.01.2011 and the Hon'able Division Bench of Lahore High Court, Bench at Rawalpindi after hearing the arguments of both the sides at length admitted and accepted the Criminal Revision Petition filed by the FIA

through SPPs and set aside the order dated 29.12.2010 of the learned trial court of refusing further physical remand of both the arrested accused Syed Saud Aziz and Khurram Shahzad Haider, with the directions to the learned trial court to give appropriate physical remand of both these accused to JIT of FIA enabling them to complete the investigation in accordance with law to identify their Co-conspirators.

Accordingly, both the accused Saud Aziz and Khurram Shahzad, who were in Judicial Custody confined in Central Prison, Adiala, Rawalpindi were produced before the learned trial court on 14.01.2011 and their 08 days physical remand in FIA custody was granted by the trial court. On completion of 08 days physical remand on 21.01.2011 both the accused were produced before the Court on 22.01.2011 and their further 10 days physical remand till 31.01.2011 was obtained from the Hon'able trial Court, however, both the arrested accused were remanded to Judicial custody on 01.02.2011.

During this physical remand the JIT has interrogated both the arrested accused and found that both the accused police officers namely Syed Saud Aziz and Khurram Shahzad badly failed to give any justification of their criminal acts attributed to them. Similarly, accused have utterly failed to shift their official & legal responsibility to other officials, and they are unable to refute charges leveled against them. The pleas taken by the accused were found totally frivolous & after thought and devoid of any substance or merit. Resultantly, both the accused police officers mentioned above were found guilty on the basis of evidence available on record against them.

61. During this physical remand, the JIT headed by Director, CTW, FIA Headquarters, Islamabad intensively interrogated both the accused police officers and asked certain material questions from them regarding their involvement in "Breach of Security", "Destruction of evidence by hosing down the Crime Scene to screen out the Offenders" & "Non conducting of
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Postmortem of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto including 23 others" and concealing their cell phones of 2007, and their abetment, resulting in assassination of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto and 23 others on 27.12.2007. But both the accused police officers have miserably failed to give any justification about the acts attributed to them. On the contrary they resort to contradictory and shifting statements and frequently blame their subordinates for all the lapses.

62. **Role of former President Pervez Musharraf:**

- i. JIT has carefully weighed all the available evidence in order to fix the responsibility of former President Pervez Musharraf. It cannot be ignored that for 08 years he exercised total and absolute powers under a unique and extra constitutional office i.e. Chief Executive, to whom all important institutions of the country were reporting, whereas, he was accountable to no one. An example of his unprecedented, unquestioned power and authority was witnessed when he unilaterally declared state of emergency on 03.11.2007 by suspending the Constitution and sacked & detained the Hon'able Judges of Supreme Court including Chief Justice of Pakistan on flimsy grounds. Ex-President Pervez Musharraf powerful position is without any parallel in modern times.
- ii. During this period Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto returned to her homeland to take part in national elections. She strongly denounced and condemned the illegal and unconstitutional acts of then President Pervez Musharraf and in November, 2007 held a rally in Islamabad and totally supported the restoration of Constitution & Judiciary. She also declared in the public rally in Islamabad that she will herself fly the Pakistan Flag at the residence of the Hon'able Chief Justice of Pakistan. Under these circumstances, one can not be misled by the polite interpretations that who was head of the government and who

- was the head of state. The real challenge is to identify the person who wielded actual and de-facto powers.
- iii. It is also evident from Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto's election campaign that as Chairperson of Pakistan's largest political party, she was the biggest challenge to the regime and personal authority of then President Pervez Musharraf. There is, overwhelming circumstantial evidence that then President Pervez Musharraf would be main beneficiary from removal of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto from the scene and her party's failure in election without her leadership. Hence, while Pervez Musharraf's government ordered VVIP security for 2 former Prime Ministers i.e. Mr. Shaukat Aziz and Ch. Shujaat Hussain but deliberately denied the same security umbrella to Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto despite her repeated requests on record to the then President Pervez Musharraf to provide her proper security. Thus an insecure environment was intentionally created to ensure elimination of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto by terrorists. This security lapse by then President Pervez Musharraf is totally inexcusable particularly after the twin suicide attack on Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto in Karachi on 18.10.2007.
- iv. In this background, JIT has examined and evaluated all the relevant evidence. On the basis of available evidence, JIT is of the firm opinion that already established security breach and destruction of evidence on the day of assassination by then CPO accused Saud Aziz and SP accused Khurram Shahzad is not accidental criminal negligence but apparently is part of wider conspiracy to eliminate Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto from the political scene before the elections. It was found that accused Saud Aziz in September, 2007 posted as Regional Police Officer (RPO), Gujranwala of five (05) districts manipulated under clandestine circumstances his posting to a junior assignment of CPO, Rawalpindi, which itself is indicative of his mense-rea and about his

involvement in the conspiracy of assassination of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto. Even after the assassination in spite of his criminal security failure, accused Saud Aziz was kept posted in Rawalpindi till April, 2008 in order to cover-up his own misdeeds and to mislead & impede investigations. The conduct of then CPO, Rawalpindi and then President after the assassination is also suspicious and suggests a deliberate cover up on their part. For instance, neither any departmental nor any judicial enquiry was ordered by any Government nor any police officer was awarded even a minor punishment by the then CPO or the Governments This is uniquely strange because police officers in routine are severely punished for ordinary failures and lapses under Police Order, 2002, Police Act, and E & D Rules, 1973. It is clearly evident that conspirators had assurances and support of the then President.

- v. The JIT has also examined Brig. (R) Javed Iqbal Cheema former Director General, National Crises Management Cell, who in his statement before JIT has categorically held former President Pervez Musharraf responsible for his premature press conference on the investigation of the subject case and stated that under his (former President) orders and clear cut instructions, he (Mr. Cheema) held the Press Conference on 28.12.2007 on investigation of the case in Rawalpindi without consulting the Punjab Government, while the Punjab Government had yet to notify a JIT on 31.12.2007. It shows that as President, he was the single source of authority in the country. This meeting held in President's Camp Office, Rawalpindi has also been corroborated by Brig. (R) Ejaz Shah, former DG, IB in his statement to the JIT. Needless to emphasize here that the former President ordered this hasty press conference with the motive to influence subsequent police investigation. In the process then Prime Minister, Chief Minister Punjab and Punjab Police were not even

consulted. It is also evident from this pre-investigation press conference that former president Pervez Musharraf had prior knowledge of the assassination of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto by accused Baitullah Mehsud. And he withheld this vital information of a conspiracy.

- vi. JIT has been unable to examine then President Pervez Musharraf in investigation in the light of evidence. On different occasions, efforts were made to contact him at his Chak Shahzad residence, Islamabad but without any success.
- vii. In the light of above mentioned facts, circumstances and verbal statements, there is a strong motive for Pervez Musharraf then President for elimination of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto as his main political adversary and threat to his authoritarian rule. She was evidently the prime obstacle and the strongest challenge to his prolonged stay in the presidency.
- viii. Based on the motive, circumstantial evidence and statements mentioned above, it is prima facie established that former President Pervez Musharraf is equally responsible with criminal mense-rea for facilitation and abetment of assassination of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto through his government's unjustified failure in providing her the requisite security protection her status deserved as twice Prime Minister; suppressing her election campaign by arresting Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto in Lahore on 14.11.2007; failure of his government to take any legal action against accused police officers of Rawalpindi; deliberately ordering a motivated press conference within 24 hours just to impede proper investigation in order to screen the mastermind.
- ix. According to available record, on 26.10.2007 Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto e-mailed to Mark Siegel, her U.S. spokesman, lobbyist and friend about threat to her life by President Pervez Musharraf, which is reproduced as under:-

"Nothing will, God willing happen. Just wanted u to know if it does in addition to the names in my letter to Musharaf of Oct 16nth, I wld hold Musharaf responsible. I have been made to feel insecure by his minions and there is no way what is happening in terms of stopping me from taking private cars or using tinted windows or giving jammers or four police mobiles to cover all sides cld happen without him."

- x. Similarly, Pulitzer Prize winning US journalist Ron Suskind, was a confident of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto. He helped her in writing her last book, which was published after her death. He also spent some time with Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto during her election campaign in Pakistan. According to Mr. Ron Suskind, Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto told him that Pervez Musharraf had warned her in the following words:


"You should understand something, your security is based on the state of our relationship"

- xi. This compelling, forceful and irrefutable evidence is itself sufficient to establish the involvement of Pervez Musharraf in the assassination of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto. JIT cannot ignore or overlook such incriminating evidence available on record. Hence, in order to meet the ends of justice the JIT places the name of former President Pervez Musharraf in Col. No. 2 of the Challan as absconder. The Hon'able Court is therefore, requested to issue his "Non Bailable Warrant of Arrest" in order to compel him to appear before this Hon'able Court to face the trial.
63. During the course of investigation, it has been gathered that there was a broad based conspiracy to assassinate Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto during her election campaign. The actual terrorist attack was carried out by Terrorist based in Waziristan, whereas, former President Pervez Musharraf and two accused police officers have aided and abetted the terrorists through

her series of criminal acts attributed to them and narrated above.


Sufficient oral as well as documentary evidence is available on record alongwith scientific evidence which directly connects all the accused persons mentioned in Column No. 3 of the Challan including the POs and absconder accused mentioned in Col. No. 2 of the Challan with red ink / black ink with the commission of offence. The accused mentioned in Col. No. 3 of the Challan and accused mentioned in Col. No. 2 of the Challan with red ink and black ink, have been found guilty on the basis of sufficient incriminating evidence available on record against them mentioned in Col. No. 5 & 6 of the Challan. Hence, prima facie case U/s 6, 7, 11- L, 21-C & 21-I Anti Terrorism Act, 1997, R/w Section 4 & 5 ESA, 1908 and Section 302, 324, 435, 436, 109, 118, 119, 120-B & 201 PPC is made out against accused in Judicial Custody mentioned in column No. 3 and absconding accused mentioned in column No. 2 of the Challan with red ink and black ink. All the earlier Challans already submitted in the Court by the Rawalpindi Police and FIA are integral part of this Challan and all evidence annexed with these Challans may please be read with the instant Challan. Thus, (incomplete) Supplementary Challan is being submitted in the court alongwith list of witnesses and other evidence with the prayer to summon the witnesses mentioned in Col. No. 6 of the Challan and trial be initiated against all the accused persons accordingly.

Note: The case property of this case is lying in the Malkhana of Rawalpindi Police and would be produced in the Court as and when required.


(G. A. Jatoi)
Assistant Director/ SIG, FIA
(Member JIT)


(Muhammad Khalid Qureshi) PSP
Director/SIG
(Head of JIT)

Dated: February 07, 2011


Islamabad
S.P.A. 07/2/2011
57

The Bhutto Blood

Another prime witness could be American journalist Ron Suskind who recently wrote a book "The Way of the World". It is learnt that Ron Suskind was a confidant of Benazir. He helped her in writing her last book, which was published after her death. He spent some time with Benazir during her election campaign. It was none other than Benazir herself who told him that Musharraf had warned her: "Your security depends upon your relationship with me". Just a few days before her assassination, Benazir Bhutto told this scribe in Zardari House, Islamabad, that the attack on her procession in Karachi on October 18 was not a suicide attack, it was actually a car bomb but she survived. Benazir Bhutto said that some people within the regime were behind the attack and they will try again to kill her. Benazir said that it was tragic that the people responsible for the murder of her two brothers were still at large but her would-be killers will definitely be punished because her party will be in power. Unfortunately, her killers are still at large despite the fact that her party is in power.

Source: Ocnus.net 2008

"The Way of the World" authored by a Pulitzer Prize winning US journalist Ron Suskind, is full of disclosures, with its fair portion about Musharraf-Benazir conversation including Musharraf's quote "You should understand something, your security is based on the state of our relationship".

Benazir's original email to Mark Seigel holding musharraf responsible for her killing

by Suhail 1. January 2008 03:17

As CNN reported yesterday, on October 26, eight days after she returned to Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto emailed Mark Seigel, her DC lobbyist, expressing her belief that if something happened to her, President Musharraf would be at least partly responsible. Here, courtesy of Seigel via our Pentagon correspondent, Mark Thompson, is the email itself.

-----Original Message-----

From: sazdubai@emirates.net.ae [mailto:sazdubai@emirates.net.ae]
Sent: Friday, October 26, 2007 6:52 AM
To: Siegel, Mark
Subject: MOST URGENT ATTENTION.

Mark,

Nothing will, God willing happen. Just wanted u to know if it does in addition to the names in my letter to Musharraf of Oct 16th, I wd hold Musharraf responsible. I have been made to feel insecure by his minion and there is no way what is happening in terms of stopping me from taking private cars or using tinted windows or giving jammers or four police mobiles to cover all sides cld happen without him.

B

Sent from my BlackBerry(t) wireless device


**STATEMENT U/S 161 CrPC OF ASSISTANT DIRECTOR KHALID JAMIL
CTW/FIA KARACHI.**

Stated that I am working as Assistant Director in Counter Terrorism Wing FIA Karachi. Today i.e. 02.02.2011 Additional Director Azad Khan seized two mobile phones: (1) Black Berry, Coloured Dark Blue, I.M.E.I. No. 357890009509368, along with SIM of Etisalat, (2) Black Berry, Coloured Black, I.M.E.I. No. 354672018501237, along with SIM of Etisalat, produced by Mr. Abdul Razzak Mirani in connection with Case FIR No. 471/2007 Dated 27.12.2007 U/S: 302/324/435/436/120-B PPC, R/w Sec. 7-ATA,1997 and Sec. 4/5 ESA, P.S City, Rawalpindi.

The proceedings of the memo were recorded in my presence. I and Inspector Nisar Jadoon signed the memo as witnesses. Besides, Mr. Abdul Razzak Mirani also signed the memo.

2nd February 2011.

Before me


(AZAD KHAN) ISI, PSP
ADDITIONAL DIRECTOR
FIA, CTW, KARACHI
(Member JIT)

STATEMENT U/S 161 CR.PC OF MR. ABDUL RAZZAK MIRANI S/O ALI MUHAMMAD MIRANI R/O BILAWAL HOUSE, CLIFTON, KARACHI, CNIC NO. 43203-1349603-5, CELL NO. 03015111286.

It is stated that I have been working in Balawal-house with Bhutto family for the past twenty years. Presently I am working as in-charge Bilawal House Karachi. On 27th December 2007 I was working as personal attendant to Late BB. In addition to my previous statement I state that at the time of death of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto Shaheed, her hand bag containing two mobile phones and her other personal belongings was in my possession. I took the hand bag to Larkana and then on the directions of the family members kept it in the closet in the bed room of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto in Bilawal House, Clifton, Karachi.

During this time I was never asked by any police or law enforcement officials investigating the assassination case of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto regarding availability or production of Cell Phones of Shaheed BB at any stage. Furthermore, I never removed the same from that place and they were in my safe custody. Today, i.e. 02.02.2011 at 1000 hrs Mr. Azad Khan, Additional Director FIA asked me on phone whether the personal belongings of Late Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto contained her mobile phone. I replied him that two mobile phones are present in the hand bag of Shaheed BB. Mr. Azad Khan asked me to produce the said two mobile phones to him at FIA office located in Block No. 48-A, Pak Secretariat, Saddar, Karachi. I contacted the family members and after their approval, I came in FIA office and handed over two mobile phones (maker Black Berry) to Mr. Azad Khan, Additional Director FIA, which were secured by him vide Seizure Memo of the day, prepared in his office in presence of two witnesses. The said memo was signed by me and the witnesses as well. I see the memo which is the same and bear my signatures.

2nd February 2011.

Before me



(AZAD KHAN) TS&PSP
ADDITIONAL DIRECTOR
FIA, CTW, KARACHI
(Member JIT)

Annextures

PLACE: Office of the Additional Director,
FIA, CTW, Block 48-A, Pak
Secretariat, Saddar, Karachi.


DATE & TIME: 02.02.2011 at 1200 hrs.

SEIZURE MEMO

In connection with Case FIR No. 471/2007 Dated 27.12.2007 U/s 6, 7, 11-L, 21-I & 21-C Anti Terrorism Act, 1997, R/w Section 4 & 5 ESA, 1908 and Section 302, 324, 435, 436, 109, 120-B, 118, 119 & 201 PPC, P.S City, Rawalpindi, I Azad Khan Additional Director, FIA, CTW, Karachi in presence of the witnesses seized the following two mobile phones, which were in use of Late Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto on 27th December 2007, produced by Mr. Abdul Razzak Miriani, S/o. Ali Muhammad Mirani, Incharge Bilawal House, Clifton, Karachi:

1. Black Berry, Coloured Dark Blue, I.M.E.I. No. 357890009509368, along with SIM of Etisalat.
2. Black Berry, Coloured Black, I.M.E.I. No. 354672018501237, along with SIM of Etisalat.


The memo prepared in the office and read over upon the witnesses, who admitted it to be correct and signed the same.


PRODUCED BY: Mr. Abdul Razzak Mirani
S/o Ali Muhammad Mirani.

WITNESSES:

1. Khalid Jamil, Assistant Director FIA/CTW, Karachi. 
2. Nisar Jadoon, Inspector, FIA/CTW, Karachi. 

Prepared by


(AZAD KHAN) Tst, PSP
ADDITIONAL DIRECTOR
FIA, CTW, KARACHI
(Member JIT)

STATEMENT U/S 161 CR.PC OF MR. MUHAMMAD RAMZAN S/O BARKAT ALI ARAIN, EX-ACCOUNTANT, IN POLICE DEPARTMENT, DISTRICT GUJRANWALA, R/O NEAR AZIZ RICE MILL, MOHALLA PEHLWANPURA, GAKHAR MANDI, TEHSIL WAZIRABAD, DISTRICT GUJRANWALA.

CNIC NO. 34104-3819737-9 CELL NO. 0300-6498902

State that I was born on 01.04.1949 in District Patiala, India. After partition my parents migrated from India to Pakistan and settled at above address. My educational qualification is FA did from Gujranwala. I joined Punjab Police as trainee clerk on 03.04.1968 and joined as LDC in the year 1981. In the year 1992-93 I was promoted as Accountant and posted in District Mandi Bahaudin.


In the year 2002, while I was posted as accountant in District Gujranwala, Syed Saud Aziz had taken over the charge as Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP) by replacing Mr. Aslam Tareen. During his (Syed Saud Aziz) posting as SSP, he called me in his office and asked for one SIM of Jazz phone. On my request for his NIC, he said that at the moment he did not have in hand, therefore, he asked me to buy in my own name. Accordingly, I went in the market and purchased the phone SIM for him (Syed Saud Aziz, then SSP, Gujranwala) in my own name against my CNIC bearing No. 34104-3819737-9. According to my memory the SIM phone No. was 0300-8640700.

I remained posted as accountant in District Gujranwala for about five years. Then I was posted in Gujranwala Police Range as Auditor. In the year 2007, I was posted in District Sialkot. During my posting in District Sialkot, Syed Saud Aziz was posted as Regional Police Officer (RPO) in Gujranwala Range. In the month of September, 2007 I was promoted as Office Superintendent (BPS-16) and retired on 31st March, 2009 from Gujranwala Range Office.

Statement read over and admitted to be correct to the best of my knowledge.

Dated: 02.02.2011.

Before me,


(G. A. DATOI)
Assistant Director, FIA
(Member JIT)

COUNTERTERRORISM WING
Federal Forensic Agency
Islamabad, Pakistan
Ph: 051- 9261590

HQ/CTW/Ops/41/2010/268-69

Dated: 27.01.2011

The Assistant Director/FIA
Member of JIT

**Subject:- INVESTIGATION OF CASE FIR NO.471/2007 OF PS CITY,
RAWALPINDI (ASSASSINATION OF MOHTARMA
BENAZIR BHUTTO).**

Please refer to your office letter No. FIA/CTW/FIR-471/2007/JIT/196-
07 dated: 18.01.2011 on the subject cited above.

2. The record of Two (02) numbers provided in your reference letter Since November, 2007 was requisited from the concerned quarter. According to the reply (Annex-I & II) under their SOPs the concerned companies store data maximum upto one year only. Hence data for the relevant period i.e 2007 does not exist with the concerned cell phone companies.

3. However, as per the company record the subscriber details of the cell phone number 0300-8640700 is as under and its current CDR is attached in a CD (Annex-III).

Subscriber Name:	Muhammad Ramzan C/O Saud Aziz
Subscriber Address:	H.No.116-C Model Town Lahore
NIC Number:	3410438197379

4. According to the reply received from the concerned quarter, the subscriber detail and call record of the cell phone No.0345-5444644 is not available with the cell phone company.

Encl:- (I, II, III)


(Nauman Ashraf Bodla)
Dy. Director Forensic Investigations.

Copy to:-
Director/CTW/FIA, Islamabad.



Ashraf Bodla

Hawkeye <optiplex4it@gmail.com>
Thursday, January 27, 2011 3:26 PM
Nauman Bodla
Re: No.2011

ject:

T OF SOP:

per SOP data of maximum last one year can be preserved.

Thu, Jan 27, 2011 at 2:57 PM, Hawkeye <optiplex4it@gmail.com> wrote:

of SOP , kindly send your request according to the SOP.

Ashraf Bodla

Hawkeye <optiplex4it@gmail.com>
Thursday, January 20, 2011 10:25 AM
Nauman Bodla
Fwd: No.2011

bject:

lenor have maximum one year old data with us.

Place: Office of the Director,
FIA, Islamabad Zone,
Iqbal Town, Islamabad
Dated: 14.01.2011.
Time: 2230 Hours

SEIZURE MEMO

Today in connection with the investigation into the Assassination of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto, in Case FIR No. 471/2007 of City Police Station, Rawalpindi, U/s 302/324/435/436/120-B PPC, R/w Sec. 4/5 ESA & Sec. 7 ATA, 1997, arrested accused Syed Saud Aziz S/o Syed Aziz Ahmed, the then City Police Officer (CPO), Rawalpindi, during interrogation with regard the contacts of his Cell Phone which was in his use on the day of incident i.e 27.12.2007, he disclosed that his concerned cell phone set is not with him, however, he stated that major portion of those contacts are available on his present Cell Phone No. 0333-3333320, which according to him in his use since more than one year. He arranged its production to the undersigned. Its SIM is in the name of M/s Master Tiles, who had given this number / SIM to him. The identification and make of Cell Phone set's is "Nokia 6303C". IMEI No. is 358281030557171, IMSI No. 033001948527. The above cell phone was taken into possession through Seizure Memo in presence of the following witnesses, who after admitting it to be correct signed the same.

WITNESSES:

1. Mr. Qammar Zaman Assistant Director, FIA, CTW, Islamabad.
2. Mr. Muhammad Ashraf, Inspector, FIA, CTW, Islamabad.

Saud Aziz
14/01/11

Prepared by
14/01/11
(G. A. LATOI)
Assistant Director, FIA
(Member JIT)

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